Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors. - Court Judgment

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			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
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Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
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                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
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			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
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		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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S.U. Khan, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '487614',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
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		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.

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			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '487614',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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(i) 14.5.1985.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
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		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '487614',
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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(iii) 10.7.1985.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
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			'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.

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			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '487614',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
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		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
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		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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$cnt = (int) 34
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Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.

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			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 34
$i = (int) 14
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View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
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Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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$cnt = (int) 34
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Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.

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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 34
$i = (int) 17
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Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
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9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.

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Code Context
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
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	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
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34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.

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Code Context
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			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. 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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:

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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.

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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
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			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '487614',
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
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			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
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		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
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		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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$cnt = (int) 34
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Judgment reserved.

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			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 34
$i = (int) 31
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Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
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			'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2008(4)AWC3656',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Tenancy',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
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17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '487614',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
			'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.U. Khan, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Judgment reserved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Smt Krishna Devi and ors Vs Mahavir Prasad and ors - Citation 487614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '487614',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Smt. Krishna Devi and ors. Vs. Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 168; [S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi, JJ ] Determination of compensation  Meaning of income of victim  Held, The term income has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. Section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory Provident Fund, Gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. Different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family If some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. From the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted. -  Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. AIR1996SC2410 ,has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J.;',
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		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2008-09-18',
		'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'S.U. Khan, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.</p><p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.</p><p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.</p><p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.</p><p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:</p><p>(i) 14.5.1985.</p><p>(ii) 13.6.1985.</p><p>(iii) 10.7.1985.</p><p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.</p><p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.</p><p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:</p><p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.</p><p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.</p><p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.</p><p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.</p><p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.</p><p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.</p><p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:</p><p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.</p><p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.</p><p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:</p><p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.</p><p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:</p><p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.</p><p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.</p><p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:</p><p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.</p><p>Judgment reserved.</p><p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.</p><p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Mahavir Prasad and ors.',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.U. Khan, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. This is tenants' writ petition. Landlord respondent No. 1, Mahavir Prasad filed S.C.C. Suit No. 290 of 1987 against Mahesh Prasad the original tenant for his eviction on the ground of default and recovery of rent. Rate of rent is Rs. 23 per month. Property in dispute is a residential house situate on the ground floor in Ram Bagh, Kanpur City and contains one room, verandah, kitchen and common court-yard. The trial court/II A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar decreed the suit through judgment and decree dated 22.3.1994. Original tenant Mahesh Prasad since deceased and survived by the petitioners filed S.C.C. Revision No. 64 of 1994 against judgment and decree passed by the trial court. V A.D.J., Kanpur Nagar, through judgment and order dated 8.2.2001 dismissed the revision, hence this writ petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Notice of termination of tenancy and demand of rent was sent on 4.8.1986 and was served upon the tenant on 6.8.1986. In the said notice, rent from 10.3.1985 till 9.7.1986 was demanded.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Tenants' case is that landlord stopped accepting rent from 10.3.1985, hence tenant sent the rent through money-orders thrice but all the money-orders were refused to be accepted by the landlord, hence tenant deposited the rent under Section 30 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said case was allowed on 20.11.1985. Suit was filed on 21.4.1987. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, tenant had deposited the rent till February, 1987.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. According to the tenant, he sent the rent through money-order on the following dates:',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) 14.5.1985.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) 13.6.1985.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>(iii) 10.7.1985.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The case under Section 30 of the Act instituted by the tenant was registered as Misc. Case No. 925/70 of 1985. Money-orders coupons and receipts were filed by the tenant in the said case and the file of the said case was summoned in the suit giving rise to the instant writ petition.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The courts below held that the mere fact that the file of the case under Section 30 of the Act had been summoned and money-order, coupons and receipts were available on the said file did not mean that the said money-order coupons and receipts were proved in the suit also. I do not agree with this finding in the least. Original documents in the file of a case, which has been summoned, are as good as filed in the case in which file of the earlier case has been summoned. Courts below held that postman was not examined to prove the refusal on the money-order coupons. There is always a presumption that refusal endorsement made by the postman, who is Government servant, is correct. In the case, under Section 30 of the Act, the rent was for the first time deposited on 23.9.1985, which was for the period from 10.3.1985 to 9.9,1985. The courts below held that the order permitting the tenant to deposit the 1 rent in the case under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the Munsif on 18.9.1985 and notice of the said case 'had been served upon the landlord but he did not appear. The courts below held that in case even under Section 30, rent on several occasions was deposited late. However, in my opinion, the said fact will not make any difference as at the time when notice was sent by the landlord, rent for four months was not due in the sense that it had been deposited under Section 30 of the Act.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The details of deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act as given in Para 11 of his written statement filed before the trial court, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, are as follows:',
	(int) 12 => '<p>Six months' rent from 10.3.1985 to 9.9.1985 deposited on 23.9.1985.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.12.1985 to 9.2.1985 deposited on 7.3.1986.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.2.1986 to 9.6.1986 deposited on 12.7.1986.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>Four months' rent from 10.6.1986 to 9.10.1986 deposited in August, 1986.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Three months' rent from 10.10.1986 to 9.1.1987 deposited on 20.2.1987.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. Accordingly, when notice dated 4.8.1986 was received by the tenant he was not defaulter of four or more months as on 12.7.1986 rent till 9.6.1986 had already been deposited.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Both the impugned judgments, decree of the trial court and order of revisional court are set aside. Suit of the landlord is dismissed.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J. : 2004(1)AWC851 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR2008SC3148 of which are quoted below:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)1 In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India : AIR1996SC2410 of which is quoted below:',
	(int) 24 => '<p>It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Thereafter in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. : AIR1996SC2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him In the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>15. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>16. In this writ petition, after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Judgment was reserved, on 1.7.2008, by the following order:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>Heard learned Counsel for the parties.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>Judgment reserved.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>Learned Counsel for the petitioners has agreed that in case writ petition is allowed then he will willingly continue to pay the rent of Rs. 1,000 per month as directed by interim order dated 19.9.2006 passed in this writ petition.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. Accordingly, it is directed that tenant shall continue to pay rent @ Rs. 1,000 per month to the landlord respondent. Rent is enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per month and tenant shall continue to pay the said rent to landlord.<p>',
	(int) 33 => '<p>'
)
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$i = (int) 33
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