Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Gulam Mohammad - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]section 168; [s.b. sinha & h.s. bedi, jj ] determination of compensation meaning of income of victim held, the term income has different connotations for different purposes. a court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory provident fund, gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family if some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. the amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. from the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted.1. the assessment order under section 143(1) of the income-tax act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the act, in respect of the assessment year 1990-91, was originally framed on january 4, 1991. on the basis of the report of the departmental valuation officer in respect of investment made in the construction of building by the respondent-assessee at building material market in maida bazar, kanpur, proceeding under section 147/148 of the act, was initiated and vide his order dated december 16, 1997, the assessing officer added the difference in the valuation made by the departmental valuation officer and the investment shown by the assessee as income from other sources which order was upheld in appeal by the commissioner of income-tax (appeals). however, the tribunal, vide order dated november 28, 2003, had quashed the reassessment order.2. heard sri shambhu chopra, learned standing counsel for the revenue and learned counsel appearing for respondent assessee.3. relying on the provisions of section 142a of the act which was inserted by the finance (no. 2) act, 2004, with effect from november 14, 1972, the learned standing counsel submits that the tribunal committed an error of law in setting aside the reassessment proceedings. according to him, the assessing officer was fully justified in taking recourse to the provisions of under section 147/148 of the act on the basis of the report on the departmental valuation officer.4. we have perused the three orders passed by the authorities filed along-with the memo of appeal as also the proviso to section 142a of the act which is as under:provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply in respect of an assessment made on or before that 30th day of september, 2004, and where such assessment has become final and conclusive on or before that date, except in cases where a reassessment is required to be made in accordance with the provisions of section 153a.5. we find that in the present case, the reassessment proceedings would be hit by the proviso as it also forms part of section 142a of the act, inserted by the finance (no. 2) act, 2004, with effect from november 14, 1972. the proviso has been reproduced above. from the reassessment order, we find that the original assessment order was passed on january 14, 1991, that is much before november 28, 2003. it had become final between the parties on the date when section 142a was inserted by the finance (no. 2) act, 2004, as there is nothing on record to show to the contrary.6. we are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the tribunal had not committed any error of law in setting aside the reassessment proceedings.7. the appeals fails and is dismissed on the merits.