Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Sikandra Rao Through Its Secretary Vs. U.P. Industry Falicitation Council, - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/485780
SubjectArbitration
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided OnMay-23-2008
JudgeSunil Ambwani, J.
Reported inAIR2009All14; 2008(4)ARBLR432(All); 2008(4)AWC3807
AppellantKrishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Sikandra Rao Through Its Secretary
RespondentU.P. Industry Falicitation Council, ;an Ads Through Its Partner, Sri Rajesh Singhal and U.P. State
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases ReferredAshalata S. Lahoti v. Hiralal Lilladhar
Excerpt:
- - 2425 (m/b) of 1998. the matter has been referred for arbitration to industry facilitation council under section 6(2) of the amended act 28 of 1998 and that in order to preserve and to keep the property in safe custody and for its inspection and for preserving the amount, the orders are required to be made. cooperative societies act, if the plaintiffs seeks to challenge that, reference itself was bad his only remedy was to proceed under section 33 of the arbitration act. if the plaintiff seeks of challenge that the reference itself was bad, his only remedy was to proceed under section 33 of the arbitration act, which in our opinion, is not inconsistent with the provisions of the u.sunil ambwani, j.1. heard shri b.d. mandhyan, sr. advocate assisted by shri satish mandhyan for the petitioner. shri p.n. saxena, sr. advocate assisted by shri uma nath pandey, advocate appear for m/s an ads chowk bazar. bulandshahr-respondent no. 2 learned standing counsel appears for respondent no. 1. with the consent of the parties, all the writ petitions were heard and arc being finally decided.2. in all these writ petitions krishi utpadan mandi samitis have prayed for writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the proceedings in claim petitions filed by m/s an ads chowk bazar, bulandshahr, and the award given by the commissioner and director of education u.p. (facilitation council) kanpur on references made by m/s an ads chowk bazar, buland shahr under section 6(2) of the interest on delayed payments to small scale ancillary undertaking act, 1993 as amended by act no. 23 of 1998 (in short the act) awarding the sums claimed with interest at the rate of 5% above floor idle charged by the scheduled banks on credit limit on the grounds: (a) there was no agreement between the claimant and the mandi samitis and that there was no arbitration clause agreed between the parties to refer the dispute to the facilitation council under the act; (b) section 4 of the llp. knshi utpadan mandi adhinham. 1964 (act no. 25 of 1964), which received the assent of the president on 28.10.1964 and was published in u.p. extraordinary gazette on 10.11.1964, the provisions of the act shall have effect notwithstanding anything in consistent therewith contained in any law, custom, use or agreement. the alleged agreement was not entered into in accordance with mandi adhiniyam, 1964 and thus the act does not give the jurisdiction to the facilitation council to enter into the dispute for arbitration and for making award; (c) though the jurisdiction of the facilitation council under the act is not admitted, the facilitation council did not decide the objections raised by the knshi utpadan mandi samiti, before it, regarding exclusive application of the mandi adhiniyam under section 4 and on the question of jurisdiction of the facilitation council, alleging that there was no agreement between parties to allow facilitation council to enter into arbitration; and (d) a writ petition against the award made without jurisdiction for quashing award is maintainable under article 226 of the constitution of india.3. briefly stated the facts giving rise to this writ petition aie that m/s an ads chowk bazar, bulandshahi made an application lo the director. state agriculture produce market board, u.p. lucknow on august 12th, 1996 for installations and supply orders of the hoarding and display boards in the market yards, and market areas of the market committee of the state on the rates given in the letter. the then director, rajkiya knshi utpadan mandi parishad by his letter dated 10.10.1996 informed all the regional deputy directors (admn.) forwarding a copy of the proposal given by m/s an ads chowk bazar, bulandshahr and for utilizing then seivices in accordance with law as and when they die required. the director clarified on 16.1.1997 in pursuance to letter written by m/s classical and marketing lucknow that he has come to know about an order on the talk of proposal given by m/s an ads chowk bazar, bulandshahr, that the headquarters has not approved any firm or rates and that any anangement made by the concerned departments will be according to their own needs at the specified rates. if any orders have been made contrary to this arrangement, the same shall be modified and that the financial control may be maintained. by earlier orders issued on 13.12.1981 of the director, mandi parishad, it was clarified that the mandi samiti will select the place for placing the hoardings. the turn will be given the required material if it is to be printed on the hoarding after receiving 50% conservation money by bank draft with regard to expenses on the allotted hoardings the mandi samiti will make the expenses from its own income according to the administrative instructions.4. it is contended that at no point of time any directions were issued by the rajya knshi utpadan mandi parishad of the mandi samiti for the purposes of supply of hoardings and display boards to m/s an ads chowk bazar, bulandshahr (the firm).5. shri b.d. mandhyan submits that there was no agreement or any concluded contract with the firm. taking into account the conduct of the firm it was blacklisted. the firm filed a suit for injunction against blacklisting. the firm thereafter filed writ petition no. 43848 of 2001 in which an order was passed on 4.8.2001 for giving opportunity before the firm is blacklisted. it is contended that before the injunction was issued the orders were passed blacklisting the firm. the writ petition is still pending.6. it is stated that the firm was blacklisted as on the enquiry it was found that the hoardings worth less than rs 15.000/- were supplied, whereas the firm made a claim of rs. 45000/- per hoarding. a finding was also recorded that the firm has already charged rs. 22 lacs in excess from the mandi samiti. shri b.d. mandhyan has neither pleaded nor explained as to how the firm would supply the hoardings, when no orders were placed and if the firm was not making any supplies, why it was blacklisted7. the firm, thereafter, filed several applications impleading the market committees to which the hoardings and display boards were supplied, under section 9 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 in the civil court for inspections of the goods in question, to confirm the identity, quality and deterioration in condition and for deposit in lumpsum in the form of fix deposit in security of the amount in dispute or to preserve by making payments under protest. these applications were filed with the allegation that the firm had received the orders for supply and that only a part amount was paid. the firm was blacklisted, however, the order was stayed in writ petition no. 2425 (m/b) of 1998. the matter has been referred for arbitration to industry facilitation council under section 6(2) of the amended act 28 of 1998 and that in order to preserve and to keep the property in safe custody and for its inspection and for preserving the amount, the orders are required to be made.8. in the proceedings under section 9 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 the krishi utpadan mandi samiti made an application for directing the firm to file a copy of the original agreement and to stay the proceedings on the ground that the director. rajya krishi utpadan mandi parishad, lucknow is considering the matter. the district judge relying upon sub-section (2) of section 6 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 rejected these applications on 19.5.2000 giving rise to writ petition nos. 31426 of 2000; 42249 of 2000; 42802 of 2000; 48546 of 2000; 54556 of 2000; 2012 of 2001 and 4104 of 2001. in all these writ petitions this court has passed orders staying the proceedings in misc. cases under section 9 of the arbitration and conciliation act. the matters are tied up with the bench presided by hon'ble the chief justice.9. the commissioner and director of industries, u.p. acting as facilitation council at kanpur made an award dated januan 7th, 2004 for both the principal amount and interest and has forwarded the same to the parties. aggrieved the krishi uptadan mandi samities have filed these writ petitions.10. shri b.d. mandhyan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no concluded contract between parties. there was no arbitration agreement. the u.p. industry facilitation council, kanpur had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference. the act was made for payment on interest on delayed payments and not to adjudicate the entire claim. the mandi samitis made applications raising preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction of the facilitation council alleging that section 4 of the mandi adhiniyam ignores the application of other laws including the act, and that in the absence of any concluded contract or arbitration agreement, the facilitation council has no jurisdiction to decide the matter. without deciding this application on merits the facilitation council proceeded with the arbitration and has decided the matter exparte without giving any reasons at all, and imposing a liability upon the mandi samitis. in the preliminary objections dated 23.12.2005, the mandi samiti submitted that krishi utpadan mandi adhiniyam, 1964 is a self contained code. section 4 of the act excludes application of any other law. these objections were rejected by the chairman of the council on the same day on 23.12.2005.11. shri p.n. saxena, sr. advocate appearing for the firm submits that the parliament enacted act no. 32 of 1993 for ensuring payments of interest to the small scale industries undertaking, protecting their interest and for their benefit providing for 5% above floor rate for comparable lending by the schedule banks with further benefit of compound interest at the same rate the act was amended in the year 1998 providing tot settlement of disputes by making a reference to industry facilitation council to act as an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of matters referred to in sub-section (1) and that the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 was to apply to such disputes as if the arbitration or conciliation were in pursuance to an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of that act. the respondent firm made a reference to the facilitation council under section 6(2) of the act. dining the pendency of the reference before the council, micro, small and medium enterprise development act, 2006 (act no. 27 of 2006) was passed, which repealed act no. 32 of 1993, and provided that notwithstanding such repeal anything done of any action under the repealed act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the act of 2006. the facilitation council exercises powers under section 6(2) of the act no. 32 of 1993, and corresponding section 18(4) of act no. 27 of 2006. once an award is made, it can be challenged only under section 34 of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996. section 19 of act no. 27 of 2006 also makes a specific provision, that the application for setting aside any award made by the council, shall not be entertained by am court unless appellant has deposited with it 75% of the amount in terms of the award and that no application for setting aside the award shall be entertained by any court unless 75% of the amount is not deposited by the buyer.12. shri p.n. saxena further submits that section 16 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 provides and allows the arbitral tribunal to decide objections with regard to its jurisdiction, and if it rejects the plea and makes an arbitral award, section 6 provides that party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for setting aside the award under section 34 of the act. there is thus a specific statutory remedy and forum, where the petitioner could have challenged the jurisdiction of the award he submits that writ petition is not maintainable and has relied upon the judgment in secur industries ltd. v. godrej & boyee mfg. co. ltd. and anr. : air2004sc1766 in which the supreme court held, relying upon konkan railways corporation ltd. v. rani construction pvt. ltd. : [2002]1scr728 and rohtas industries ltd. v. rohtas industries staff union : (1976)illj274sc held that section 16 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 applies to the arbitration proceedings under the act and thus direction issued by the bombay high court staying the arbitration proceedings before the u.p. industry facilitation council was not legally sustainable.13. section 6 of the small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings act, 1993 as amended in 1998 provides:recovery of amount due-(1) the amount clue from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 4 and 5 shall he recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceedings under any law for the time being in force.(2) notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), any party to a dispute may make a reference to the industry facilitation council for acting as an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of the matters referred to in that sub-section and the provisions of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such disputes as if the arbitration or conciliation were pursuant to an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of that act.14. section 2 sub-section (4) and section 16 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 provides:2(4). this part except sub-section (1) of section 40, sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as the provisions of this part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder.15. competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction- (1) the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose-(a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be heated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and (b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.(2) a plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission ot the statement of defence; however, a party shall not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because that he has appointed, or participate in the appointment of, an arbitrator.(3) a plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.(4) the arbitral tribunal may, in either of the cases referred to in sub-section (2) of sub-section (3), admit a later plea it if considers the delay justified.(5) the arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in sub-section (2) of sub-section (3) and, where the arbitral tribunal takes a decision rejecting the plea, continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award.(6) a party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance u ith section 34.16. shri p.n. saxena has made preliminary objections that a writ petition is not maintainable against the statutory award made by the u.p. industrial facilitation council under the act of 1993 as amended in 1998 and that the question of existence of arbitration agreement and the jurisdiction, could be raised before the facilitation council acting as an arbitrator under section 16 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996. in case the petitioner was aggrieved by the decision of the facilitation council acting as arbitrator with regard to existence of the agreement and the jurisdiction of the facilitation council to arbitrate the matter, it could raise such a dispute only under section 34 of the act by filing an application to set aside the award and not by writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india.17. in district cooperative federation ltd. meerut and anr. v. registrar, cooperative societies, u.p. lucknow and ors. : air1966all489 a division bench of this court held. with reference to an arbitration award under section 70 of the u.p. cooperative societies act and section 46 of the arbitration act, 1940 that section 46 of the arbitration act provides that in the absence of any provision relating to any matter connected with an arbitration in the special act, the provisions of the indian arbitration act would be followed to the extent of the omission; and for that limited purpose a statutory aw aid made under any other enactment shall be deemed to have been made under the arbitration act. it is not and it could be the intention of section 46 of the arbitration act to make a statutory award given under the provisions of a special act, and award under the arbitration act for all purposes. in any case there is nothing in section 46 of the arbitration act or any other provisions of that act, which obliterate the distinction between an award based on the agreement of the parties and a statutory award. a statutory aw aid does not have its roots in consent of the parties, as an award based on the agreement of the parties. by this judgment the division bench deferred with the opinion expressed in : air1963all113 and found that it was incorrectly decided.18. in bahadur singh v. district judge, rampur : air1975all12 another division bench by a short judgment found that arbitration award by the registrar under section 71 of the u.p. cooperative societies act, has been protected from interference by the civil court. section 102 and 111(d) of the u.p. cooperative societies act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court from entertaining any suit or application consisting the validity of the award even where no appeal has been preferred. the division bench held that provisions of section 14, 17 and of the arbitration act are in consistent with the provisions of section 98 and 111 of the u.p. cooperative societies act as they bar the jurisdiction of the civil court for the relief of setting aside the award, hence these provisions will not be available to the petitioner for instituting the suit or application in a civil suit and thus a writ petition was maintainable.19. in fida ali v. amroha sahkari kraya vikaraya samiti ltd. and ors. : air1977all158 another division bench considered the entire case law including the two previous decisions and opined that where there was a valid reference, the arbitrator will get a jurisdiction to make the award. in respect of an award given under section 21 of the u.p. cooperative societies act, if the plaintiffs seeks to challenge that, reference itself was bad his only remedy was to proceed under section 33 of the arbitration act. if, however, the award is challenged on merits it is appellable and thereafter writ petition would lie against the appellate order. para 24 to 26 of the judgment are quoted as below:the plaintiff, therefore, should have been a member of the society on the date of the transaction and not on the date of reference. on the finding of the court below itself, the plaintiff was not a member on the date of the transaction of loan. if he was not a member of the society on the date when the transaction of loan was entered into, the referent e could not be within the meaning of rule 115 and if the reference itself could not be made under rule 115, the award of the arbitrator will not be an award under the rules of the society within the meaning of rule 134.unless there was a valid reference, there could in no award under the arbitration agreement. valid reference gives the jurisdiction to the arbitrator and if the agreement of reference itself falls through, the award cannot stand. if the plaintiff seeks of challenge that the reference itself was bad, his only remedy was to proceed under section 33 of the arbitration act, which in our opinion, is not inconsistent with the provisions of the u.p. cooperative societies act or the rules framed thereunder. as observed earlier. there is no provisions under the u.p. cooperative societies act whereunder the appellant could have challenged the validity of the agreement of reference itself.under rule 134, only the award can he challenged on merits. in the instant case, the appellant had, however, raised an objection before the arbitrator that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration proceedings, but as this question could not be decided by the arbitrator himself, the only course open to the appellant was to proceed under section 33 of the arbitration act, which applies to all arbitrations under any act unless the provisions of the arbitration act are inconsistent with the provisions under the special act. in view of the principles laid down by the supreme court in deccan merchants cooperative bank ltd. v. dalichand jugraj jain : [1969]1scr887 (supra) the case of bhadur singh v. district judge, rampur : air1975all12 (supra) cannot stand in the way of the appellant.for the reasons given above, the appeal must succeed. it is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the court below is set aside and the suit stands decreed. in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.20. the law of arbitration and conciliation has undergone a change by enactment of arbitration & conciliation act, 1996. section 16 of the act of 1996 correspondence to article 16 of uncitral model law and also article 21 or the uncitrai arbitration rules. this rule gives authority to the arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction. section 16 has recognized the general trend of modem national legal systems and the international conventions, which allows an arbitral tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction by this provision the court has been allowed to remove the impasse.21. the development of law by section 16 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 has been recognized by the courts. in gas authority of india ltd. v. keti construction (i) ltd. : (2007)5scc38 the supreme court held that the arbitral tribunal may rule on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. the award of the arbitral tribunal is not confined to the width of its jurisdiction and there is no impediment in contending before the arbitral tribunal that it has been wrongly constituted. such plea must be raised at the threshold so that the arbitral measures may be immediately taken and time and expense involved in the hearing of the matter may be avoided where the arbitral tribunal decides the question, the writ petition would not be maintainable at that stage or even after the award is made as sub-section (6) of section 16 provides to make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award, which has been made after rejecting the plea under section 16, in accordance with section 34.22. the judgment in fida ali's case was given while interpreting the provisions of arbitration act, 1940, which did not provide the challenge to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator before the arbitrator but by a separate proceedings creating an impasse. the shift in law by the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 would not allow the parties now to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitrator/arbitral tribunal by taking separate proceedings of by writ petition.23. it may further be noticed that in case of statutory arbitrations provided under the special act, the provisions of section 34 are not excluded. sub-section (4) of section 2 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 only excludes sub-section (1) of sections 40, 41 and 43. the other provisions of the arbitration 6c conciliation act. 1996 are applicable even to the statutory arbitrations except in so far as the provisions of part i of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 are inconsistent, with any other enactment or with any rules made there under. the counsel for the petitioner has not pointed out any such inconsistent between the act of 1993 as amended in 1998 and the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996. russel on arbitration, twenty first edition (1997); statutory arbitration, paragraph a4-004 on page 627-628 says:application of the arbitration act- the provisions of part i of the arbitration act 1996 apply to even statutory arbitration 'whether the enactment' was passed or made before or after the commencement of this act, subject to the adaptations and exclusions specified in sections 95 to 98 'and subject to exclusion by or inconsistency with the enactment concerned.' usually ant exclusion will be expressed in the act of parliament giving rise to the statutory arbitration, but even in the event of an inconsistency that act will prevail over the provisions of part i of the arbitration act, 1996.where the provisions of part i of the arbitration act, 1996 are not excluded they will apply to a statutory arbitration:- as if the arbitration were pursuance to an arbitration agreement and as if the enactment were that agreement, and- as if the persons by and against whom a claim subject to arbitration in pursuance of the enactment may be or has been made were parties to that agreement.thus, for the purposes of the arbitration act, 1996 an arbitration pursuant to another statute is treated as if it were a contractual arbitration, subject to the adaptions and exclusions mentioned in the following paragraphs.24. in davies v. price and ors. (1958) 1 all.e.r. 671 and in r. v. agricultural land tribunal for the south eastern area, es parte bracey 1962 all.e.r. 518 the court of appeal and the queen's bench division held that where the tribunal was acting within its jurisdiction and the error alleged was one of law and did not appear on the record, the court could not look at the affidavit evidence and must refuse certiorari.25. in the stock exchange, mumbai v. vinay bubna and ors. 1999 (suppl.) arb.lr 32 (bombay) the bombay high court while considering the bombay stock exchange byelaws no. 248 and 249(a) made under section 2(4) and 10 of the securities contracts (regulation) act, 1956 held that challenge to the composition of arbitration tribunal of two members (even numbers) would prevail over section 10 of the arbitration & conciliation act. the bombay high court held that since the byelaws are framed in exercise of powers under section 9 of the regulation act and are statutory, they would squarely fall under the phrase 'under any other enactment' appearing in sub-section (4) of section 2 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 and the same in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the act would prevail. on the interpretation of the same provisions namely the byelaws of the stock eexchange with reference to securitisation contract (regulation) act, 1956 and provisions of sections 30, 33, 37 and 46 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 the bombay high court held in ashalata s. lahoti v. hiralal lilladhar 1999 (3) arb.lr 462 (bombay) that section 37 of the arbitration & conciliation act. 1996 excludes the provisions of the indian limitation act in the act of 1940 and by virtue of section 2(4) the application of indian limitation act as contained in section 43 is excluded and thus the provisions of the indian limitation act would not apply to arbitration between a member and non-member in respect of transactions made under the bombay stock exchange act.26. coming to the last submissions of shri b.d. mandhyan that the u.p. krishi utpadan mandi adhiniyam, 1964, which has received the assent of the president on 28.10.1964 excludes under section 4 the provisions of the act to prevail over anything inconsistent therewith contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement and that section 10 of the act will have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being enforced, and that the act under article 254(2) of the constitution of india will prevail over the other acts, i find that the argument misses the point that u.p. krishi utpadan mandi adhiniyam, 1964 does not provide of any machinery of adjudication or arbitration, which is an entirely separate legislative field. the act may provide for the manner in which the market committee will enter into contract and which may be a ground to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal regarding validity of the arbitration agreement. this, however, would not exclude the applicability of the provisions of statutory arbitration under section 6 of the interest on delayed payment to the small scale and ancillary undertaking act, 1993 as amended by act no. 23 of 1998. the non-obstante non-obstante clauses in section 4 and section 10 of the u.p. krishi utpadan mandi adhiniyam, 1964 will not affect or exclude the applicability of arbitration by the facilitation council under the special act, which deems the consent of the parties to the arbitration clause.27. the court thus holds that sub-section (1) of section 2 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 makes the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 except sub-section (1) of section 40, 41 and 43 of the act applicable to the statutory arbitration provided under the interest on delayed payments to the small scale and ancillary undertaking act, 1993 as amended by act no. 23 of 1998. the court further holds that the provisions of sections 4 and 10 of u.p. krishi utpadan mandi adhiniyam, 1964 do not override the provisions of arbitration in the act of 1993 as amended in 1998 and that decision of the facilitation council on its own jurisdiction is subject to challenge only under section 34 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996. a writ petition for setting aside the statutory award is ordinarily not maintainable.28. all the writ petitions are consequently dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to challenge the award of the facilitation council in accordance with law and subject to the limitation prescribed in law to challenge the award. there shall be no order as to costs.
Judgment:

Sunil Ambwani, J.

1. Heard Shri B.D. Mandhyan, Sr. Advocate assisted by Shri Satish Mandhyan for the petitioner. Shri P.N. Saxena, Sr. Advocate assisted by Shri Uma Nath Pandey, Advocate appear for M/s An Ads Chowk Bazar. Bulandshahr-respondent No. 2 Learned Standing Counsel appears for respondent No. 1. With the consent of the parties, all the writ petitions were heard and arc being finally decided.

2. In all these writ petitions Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samitis have prayed for writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the proceedings in claim petitions filed by M/s An Ads Chowk Bazar, Bulandshahr, and the award given by the Commissioner and Director of Education U.P. (Facilitation Council) Kanpur on references made by M/s An Ads Chowk Bazar, Buland Shahr under Section 6(2) of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale Ancillary Undertaking Act, 1993 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1998 (in short the Act) awarding the sums claimed with interest at the rate of 5% above floor idle charged by the scheduled banks on credit limit on the grounds: (a) there was no agreement between the claimant and the Mandi Samitis and that there was no arbitration Clause agreed between the parties to refer the dispute to the Facilitation Council under the Act; (b) Section 4 of the LLP. Knshi Utpadan Mandi Adhinham. 1964 (Act No. 25 of 1964), which received the assent of the President on 28.10.1964 and was published in U.P. Extraordinary Gazette on 10.11.1964, the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything in consistent therewith contained in any law, custom, use or agreement. The alleged agreement was not entered into in accordance with Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 and thus the Act does not give the jurisdiction to the Facilitation Council to enter into the dispute for arbitration and for making award; (c) though the jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council under the Act is not admitted, the Facilitation Council did not decide the objections raised by the Knshi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, before it, regarding exclusive application of the Mandi Adhiniyam under Section 4 and on the question of jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council, alleging that there was no agreement between parties to allow Facilitation Council to enter into arbitration; and (d) a writ petition against the award made without jurisdiction for quashing award is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

3. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this writ petition aie that M/s An Ads Chowk Bazar, Bulandshahi made an application lo the Director. State Agriculture Produce Market Board, U.P. Lucknow on August 12th, 1996 for installations and supply orders of the hoarding and display boards in the market yards, and market areas of the Market Committee of the State on the rates given in the letter. The then Director, Rajkiya Knshi Utpadan Mandi Parishad by his letter dated 10.10.1996 informed all the Regional Deputy Directors (Admn.) forwarding a copy of the proposal given by M/s An Ads Chowk Bazar, Bulandshahr and for utilizing then seivices in accordance with law as and when they die required. The Director clarified on 16.1.1997 in pursuance to letter written by M/s Classical and Marketing Lucknow that he has come to know about an order on the talk of proposal given by M/s An Ads Chowk Bazar, Bulandshahr, that the headquarters has not approved any firm or rates and that any anangement made by the concerned departments will be according to their own needs at the specified rates. If any orders have been made contrary to this arrangement, the same shall be modified and that the financial control may be maintained. By earlier orders issued on 13.12.1981 of the Director, Mandi Parishad, it was clarified that the Mandi Samiti will select the place for placing the hoardings. The turn will be given the required material if it is to be printed on the hoarding after receiving 50% conservation money by bank draft With regard to expenses on the allotted hoardings the Mandi Samiti will make the expenses from its own income according to the administrative instructions.

4. It is contended that at no point of time any directions were issued by the Rajya Knshi Utpadan Mandi Parishad of the Mandi Samiti for the purposes of supply of hoardings and display boards to M/s An Ads Chowk Bazar, Bulandshahr (the firm).

5. Shri B.D. Mandhyan submits that there was no agreement or any concluded contract with the firm. Taking into account the conduct of the firm it was blacklisted. The firm filed a suit for injunction against blacklisting. The firm thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 43848 of 2001 in which an order was passed on 4.8.2001 for giving opportunity before the firm is blacklisted. It is contended that before the injunction was issued the orders were passed blacklisting the firm. The writ petition is still pending.

6. It is stated that the firm was blacklisted as on the enquiry it was found that the hoardings worth less than Rs 15.000/- were supplied, whereas the firm made a claim of Rs. 45000/- per hoarding. A finding was also recorded that the firm has already charged Rs. 22 lacs in excess from the Mandi Samiti. Shri B.D. Mandhyan has neither pleaded nor explained as to how the firm would supply the hoardings, when no orders were placed and if the firm was not making any supplies, why it was blacklisted

7. The firm, thereafter, filed several applications impleading the market committees to which the hoardings and display boards were supplied, under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 in the civil court for inspections of the goods in question, to confirm the identity, quality and deterioration in condition and for deposit in lumpsum in the form of fix deposit in security of the amount in dispute or to preserve by making payments under protest. These applications were filed with the allegation that the firm had received the orders for supply and that only a part amount was paid. The firm was blacklisted, however, the order was stayed in Writ Petition No. 2425 (M/B) of 1998. The matter has been referred for arbitration to Industry Facilitation Council under Section 6(2) of the amended Act 28 of 1998 and that in order to preserve and to keep the property in safe custody and for its inspection and for preserving the amount, the orders are required to be made.

8. In the proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti made an application for directing the firm to file a copy of the original agreement and to stay the proceedings on the ground that the Director. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, Lucknow is considering the matter. The District Judge relying upon Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 rejected these applications on 19.5.2000 giving rise to Writ Petition Nos. 31426 of 2000; 42249 of 2000; 42802 of 2000; 48546 of 2000; 54556 of 2000; 2012 of 2001 and 4104 of 2001. In all these writ petitions this Court has passed orders staying the proceedings in Misc. Cases under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The matters are tied up with the Bench presided by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

9. The Commissioner and Director of Industries, U.P. acting as Facilitation Council at Kanpur made an award dated Januan 7th, 2004 for both the principal amount and interest and has forwarded the same to the parties. Aggrieved the Krishi Uptadan Mandi Samities have filed these writ petitions.

10. Shri B.D. Mandhyan, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no concluded contract between parties. There was no arbitration agreement. The U.P. Industry Facilitation Council, Kanpur had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference. The act was made for payment on interest on delayed payments and not to adjudicate the entire claim. The Mandi Samitis made applications raising preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council alleging that Section 4 of the Mandi Adhiniyam ignores the application of other laws including the Act, and that in the absence of any concluded contract or arbitration agreement, the Facilitation Council has no jurisdiction to decide the matter. Without deciding this application on merits the Facilitation Council proceeded with the arbitration and has decided the matter exparte without giving any reasons at all, and imposing a liability upon the Mandi Samitis. In the preliminary objections dated 23.12.2005, the Mandi Samiti submitted that Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 is a self contained code. Section 4 of the Act excludes application of any other law. These objections were rejected by the Chairman of the Council on the same day on 23.12.2005.

11. Shri P.N. Saxena, Sr. Advocate appearing for the firm submits that the parliament enacted Act No. 32 of 1993 for ensuring payments of interest to the small scale industries undertaking, protecting their interest and for their benefit providing for 5% above floor rate for comparable lending by the schedule banks with further benefit of compound interest at the same rate The Act was amended in the year 1998 providing tot settlement of disputes by making a reference to Industry Facilitation Council to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator in respect of matters referred to in Sub-section (1) and that the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 was to apply to such disputes as if the arbitration or conciliation were in pursuance to an arbitration agreement referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of that Act. The respondent firm made a reference to the Facilitation Council under Section 6(2) of the Act. Dining the pendency of the reference before the Council, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Act, 2006 (Act No. 27 of 2006) was passed, which repealed Act No. 32 of 1993, and provided that notwithstanding such repeal anything done of any action under the repealed act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act of 2006. The Facilitation Council exercises powers under Section 6(2) of the Act No. 32 of 1993, and corresponding Section 18(4) of Act No. 27 of 2006. Once an award is made, it can be challenged only under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 19 of Act No. 27 of 2006 also makes a specific provision, that the application for setting aside any award made by the Council, shall not be entertained by am Court unless appellant has deposited with it 75% of the amount in terms of the award and that no application for setting aside the award shall be entertained by any Court unless 75% of the amount is not deposited by the buyer.

12. Shri P.N. Saxena further submits that Section 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 provides and allows the Arbitral Tribunal to decide objections with regard to its jurisdiction, and if it rejects the plea and makes an Arbitral award, Section 6 provides that party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act. There is thus a specific statutory remedy and forum, where the petitioner could have challenged the jurisdiction of the award He submits that writ petition is not maintainable and has relied upon the judgment in Secur Industries Ltd. v. Godrej & Boyee Mfg. Co. Ltd. and Anr. : AIR2004SC1766 in which the Supreme Court held, relying upon Konkan Railways Corporation Ltd. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd. : [2002]1SCR728 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union : (1976)ILLJ274SC held that Section 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 applies to the arbitration proceedings under the Act and thus direction issued by the Bombay High Court staying the arbitration proceedings before the U.P. Industry Facilitation Council was not legally sustainable.

13. Section 6 of the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 as amended in 1998 provides:

Recovery of amount due-

(1) The amount clue from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 and 5 shall he recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceedings under any law for the time being in force.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), any party to a dispute may make a reference to the Industry Facilitation Council for acting as an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of the matters referred to in that sub-section and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such disputes as if the arbitration or conciliation were pursuant to an arbitration agreement referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of that Act.

14. Section 2 Sub-section (4) and Section 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 provides:

2(4). This Part except Sub-section (1) of Section 40, Sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as the provisions of this Part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder.

15. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction- (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose-

(a) an arbitration Clause which forms part of a contract shall be heated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and (b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.

(2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission ot the statement of defence; however, a party shall not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because that he has appointed, or participate in the appointment of, an arbitrator.

(3) A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.

(4) The arbitral tribunal may, in either of the cases referred to in Sub-section (2) of Sub-section (3), admit a later plea it if considers the delay justified.

(5) The arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in Sub-section (2) of Sub-section (3) and, where the arbitral tribunal takes a decision rejecting the plea, continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award.

(6) A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance u ith Section 34.

16. Shri P.N. Saxena has made preliminary objections that a writ petition is not maintainable against the statutory award made by the U.P. Industrial Facilitation Council under the Act of 1993 as amended in 1998 and that the question of existence of arbitration agreement and the jurisdiction, could be raised before the Facilitation Council acting as an Arbitrator under Section 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. In case the petitioner was aggrieved by the decision of the Facilitation Council acting as Arbitrator with regard to existence of the agreement and the jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council to arbitrate the matter, it could raise such a dispute only under Section 34 of the Act by filing an application to set aside the award and not by writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

17. In District Cooperative Federation Ltd. Meerut and Anr. v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, U.P. Lucknow and Ors. : AIR1966All489 a Division Bench of this Court held. with reference to an arbitration award under Section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and Section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that Section 46 of the Arbitration Act provides that in the absence of any provision relating to any matter connected with an arbitration in the special act, the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act would be followed to the extent of the omission; and for that limited purpose a statutory aw aid made under any other enactment shall be deemed to have been made under the Arbitration Act. It is not and it could be the intention of Section 46 of the Arbitration Act to make a statutory award given under the provisions of a special act, and award under the Arbitration Act for all purposes. In any case there is nothing in Section 46 of the Arbitration Act or any other provisions of that Act, which obliterate the distinction between an award based on the agreement of the parties and a statutory award. A statutory aw aid does not have its roots in consent of the parties, as an award based on the agreement of the parties. By this judgment the Division Bench deferred with the opinion expressed in : AIR1963All113 and found that it was incorrectly decided.

18. In Bahadur Singh v. District Judge, Rampur : AIR1975All12 another Division Bench by a short judgment found that arbitration award by the Registrar under Section 71 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, has been protected from interference by the civil court. Section 102 and 111(d) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court from entertaining any suit or application consisting the validity of the award even where no appeal has been preferred. The Division Bench held that provisions of Section 14, 17 and of the Arbitration Act are in consistent with the provisions of Section 98 and 111 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act as they bar the jurisdiction of the civil court for the relief of setting aside the award, hence these provisions will not be available to the petitioner for instituting the suit or application in a civil suit and thus a writ petition was maintainable.

19. In Fida Ali v. Amroha Sahkari Kraya Vikaraya Samiti Ltd. and Ors. : AIR1977All158 another Division Bench considered the entire case law including the two previous decisions and opined that where there was a valid reference, the Arbitrator will get a jurisdiction to make the award. In respect of an award given under Section 21 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, if the plaintiffs seeks to challenge that, reference itself was bad his only remedy was to proceed under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act. If, however, the award is challenged on merits it is appellable and thereafter writ petition would lie against the appellate order. Para 24 to 26 of the judgment are quoted as below:

The plaintiff, therefore, should have been a member of the Society on the date of the transaction and not on the date of reference. On the finding of the Court below itself, the plaintiff was not a member on the date of the transaction of loan. If he was not a member of the society on the date when the transaction of loan was entered into, the referent e could not be within the meaning of Rule 115 and if the reference itself could not be made under Rule 115, the award of the arbitrator will not be an award under the Rules of the Society within the meaning of Rule 134.

Unless there was a valid reference, there could In no award under the arbitration agreement. Valid reference gives the jurisdiction to the arbitrator and if the agreement of reference itself falls through, the award cannot stand. If the plaintiff seeks of challenge that the reference itself was bad, his only remedy was to proceed under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, which in our opinion, is not inconsistent with the provisions of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act or the Rules framed thereunder. As observed earlier. There is no provisions under the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act whereunder the appellant could have challenged the validity of the agreement of reference itself.

Under Rule 134, only the award can he challenged on merits. In the instant case, the appellant had, however, raised an objection before the arbitrator that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration proceedings, but as this question could not be decided by the arbitrator himself, the only course open to the appellant was to proceed under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, which applies to all arbitrations under any Act unless the provisions of the Arbitration Act are inconsistent with the provisions under the special Act. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain : [1969]1SCR887 (Supra) the case of Bhadur Singh v. District Judge, Rampur : AIR1975All12 (Supra) cannot stand in the way of the appellant.

For the reasons given above, the appeal must succeed. It is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the Court below is set aside and the suit stands decreed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

20. The law of arbitration and conciliation has undergone a change by enactment of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 16 of the Act of 1996 correspondence to Article 16 of UNCITRAL Model Law and also Article 21 or the UNCITRAI Arbitration Rules. This rule gives authority to the Arbitral Tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction. Section 16 has recognized the general trend of modem national legal systems and the international conventions, which allows an Arbitral Tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction By this provision the Court has been allowed to remove the impasse.

21. The development of law by Section 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 has been recognized by the Courts. In Gas Authority of India Ltd. v. Keti Construction (I) Ltd. : (2007)5SCC38 the Supreme Court held that the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. The award of the Arbitral Tribunal is not confined to the width of its jurisdiction and there is no impediment in contending before the Arbitral tribunal that it has been wrongly constituted. Such plea must be raised at the threshold so that the arbitral measures may be immediately taken and time and expense involved in the hearing of the matter may be avoided Where the Arbitral Tribunal decides the question, the writ petition would not be maintainable at that stage or even after the award is made as Sub-section (6) of Section 16 provides to make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award, which has been made after rejecting the plea under Section 16, in accordance with Section 34.

22. The judgment in Fida Ali's case was given while interpreting the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940, which did not provide the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator before the Arbitrator but by a separate proceedings creating an impasse. The shift in law by the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 would not allow the parties now to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal by taking separate proceedings of by writ petition.

23. It may further be noticed that in case of statutory arbitrations provided under the special act, the provisions of Section 34 are not excluded. Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 only excludes sub-section (1) of Sections 40, 41 and 43. The other provisions of the Arbitration 6c Conciliation Act. 1996 are applicable even to the statutory arbitrations except in so far as the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 are inconsistent, with any other enactment or with any rules made there under. The counsel for the petitioner has not pointed out any such inconsistent between the Act of 1993 as amended in 1998 and the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Russel on Arbitration, Twenty First Edition (1997); Statutory Arbitration, paragraph A4-004 on page 627-628 says:

Application of the Arbitration Act- The provisions of Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996 apply to even statutory arbitration 'whether the enactment' was passed or made before or after the commencement of this Act, subject to the adaptations and exclusions specified in Sections 95 to 98 'and subject to exclusion by or inconsistency with the enactment concerned.' Usually ant exclusion will be expressed in the Act of Parliament giving rise to the statutory arbitration, but even in the event of an inconsistency that Act will prevail over the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

Where the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 are not excluded they will apply to a statutory arbitration:

- as if the arbitration were pursuance to an arbitration agreement and as if the enactment were that agreement, and

- As if the persons by and against whom a claim subject to arbitration in pursuance of the enactment may be or has been made were parties to that agreement.

Thus, for the purposes of the Arbitration Act, 1996 an arbitration pursuant to another statute is treated as if it were a contractual arbitration, subject to the adaptions and exclusions mentioned in the following paragraphs.

24. In Davies v. Price and Ors. (1958) 1 All.E.R. 671 and in R. v. Agricultural Land Tribunal For The South Eastern Area, Es parte Bracey 1962 All.E.R. 518 the Court of appeal and the Queen's Bench Division held that where the Tribunal was acting within its jurisdiction and the error alleged was one of law and did not appear on the record, the Court could not look at the affidavit evidence and must refuse certiorari.

25. In The Stock Exchange, Mumbai v. Vinay Bubna and Ors. 1999 (Suppl.) Arb.LR 32 (Bombay) the Bombay High Court while considering the Bombay Stock Exchange byelaws No. 248 and 249(a) made under Section 2(4) and 10 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 held that challenge to the composition of Arbitration Tribunal of two members (even numbers) would prevail over Section 10 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. The Bombay High Court held that since the byelaws are framed in exercise of powers under Section 9 of the Regulation Act and are statutory, they would squarely fall under the phrase 'under any other enactment' appearing in Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and the same in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act would prevail. On the interpretation of the same provisions namely the byelaws of the Stock Eexchange with reference to Securitisation Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956 and provisions of Sections 30, 33, 37 and 46 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 the Bombay High Court held in Ashalata S. Lahoti v. Hiralal Lilladhar 1999 (3) Arb.LR 462 (Bombay) that Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. 1996 excludes the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act in the Act of 1940 and by virtue of Section 2(4) the application of Indian Limitation Act as contained in Section 43 is excluded and thus the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act would not apply to arbitration between a member and non-member in respect of transactions made under the Bombay Stock Exchange Act.

26. Coming to the last submissions of Shri B.D. Mandhyan that the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, which has received the assent of the President on 28.10.1964 excludes under Section 4 the provisions of the Act to prevail over anything inconsistent therewith contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement and that Section 10 of the Act will have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being enforced, and that the Act under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India will prevail over the other acts, I find that the argument misses the point that U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 does not provide of any machinery of adjudication or arbitration, which is an entirely separate legislative field. The Act may provide for the manner in which the market committee will enter into contract and which may be a ground to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding validity of the arbitration agreement. This, however, would not exclude the applicability of the provisions of statutory arbitration under Section 6 of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Undertaking Act, 1993 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1998. The non-obstante non-obstante Clauses in Section 4 and Section 10 of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 will not affect or exclude the applicability of arbitration by the Facilitation Council under the Special Act, which deems the consent of the parties to the arbitration clause.

27. The Court thus holds that Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 makes the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 except Sub-section (1) of Section 40, 41 and 43 of the Act applicable to the statutory arbitration provided under the interest on Delayed Payments to the Small Scale and Ancillary Undertaking Act, 1993 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1998. The Court further holds that the provisions of Sections 4 and 10 of U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 do not override the provisions of arbitration in the Act of 1993 as amended in 1998 and that decision of the Facilitation Council on its own jurisdiction is subject to challenge only under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. A writ petition for setting aside the statutory award is ordinarily not maintainable.

28. All the writ petitions are consequently dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to challenge the award of the Facilitation Council in accordance with law and subject to the limitation prescribed in law to challenge the award. There shall be no order as to costs.