Director, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur Vs. Hiyat Khan - Court Judgment

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service - removal of trainee - article 226 of constitution of india - respondent enrolled as trainee for two years - terminated - petition filed against termination - petition allowed by the court - left open to the appellant to take appropriate action and pass fresh order - after affording opportunity of hearing to the trainee - appellant served show cause notice - it was proved that trainee committed acts of gross indiscipline and misbehavior - order of termination not liable to be quashed - held, while assessing performance of student principle of natural justice do not come into play. - - the sole objective of the scheme was to provide exposure to the upgraded training facilities available in the institute in a richer academic environment so that the persons so trained had a 'value addition' to have a better chance in coping with the job market demand. letter dated 3.2.1997). 2. that you stopped working from 20th january, 1997 and despite being asked to explain your absence, failed to do so (ref. letter dated 8.7.1997). 4. in spite of repeated reminders, you failed to devote yourself to the training, programme. the communication sent by the iit to the respondent on 18/19.9.1996 informing him that he had been selected for enrolment as a trainee (machinist) clearly mentions that he was enrolled only as a trainee and it was not a job position. this clearly shows that the status of the respondent was that of a trainee and not of an employee. the position of the respondent was, therefore, more or less like a student who was undergoing training in the trade of a machinist. the conditions mentioned at the time of his enrolment as a trainee clearly indicate that he is not appointed on any job. while declaring such a provision to be ultra vires, the court also took notice of the fact that the difference in the bargaining power of a big employer like a central government corporation and a humble individualfor a job in order to manage his both ends meet, is incomparable and quite often an aspirant for a job has hardly any choice but to accept the employment on whatever terms it is offered to him. he was not even a student of a regular engineering course like b. it is necessary to recapitulate the factsleading to passing of the order dated 12.10.1998. the incharge of central workshop wrote to him in writing on 3.2.1997 that for 'on job training',it was necessary that the trainee should seriously follow the instructions of the supervisor and devote full time in the workshop and further it was necessary that the trainee should show a keen desire to learn and should maintain good relations with fellow trainees. apart from denying the charges, he stated that the training programme was not in conformity with the apprentices act and the syllabus was completely illegal, and also complained that his emoluments were very small. he complained about the type of training being given and also said that there had been no improvement in his knowledge and proper machines were not available in the workshop. his poor academic performance is a ground for termination of his training. ' 17. the order for terminating the training of the respondent on the ground of bad academic performance, therefore, could not be faulted on any principle of natural justice. they are the best judge of the situation and knowhow to maintain the discipline so that the atmosphere in the institute does not get polluted putting in jeopardy the career of a large number of bright students who are pursuing course in the advanced fields of technology or are devoting to research. after all, the authorities in charge of education whose duty it is to conduct examination fairly and properly, know best how to deal with situations of this character. after referring to leading cases relating to compliance of natural justice in quasi-judicial proceedings like ridge v. to put it more simply, they are not satisfied that that hearing was unfair. the order terminating training of the respondent clearly shows that the director of the institute had considered the show cause notice, the reply given by the respondent and also the statement made by him during the course of oral hearing wherein he did not deny any charge and, thereafter, he had arrived at a finding that the training of the respondent should be terminated. the director was not trying the respondent like a judge of a criminal court where evidence in support of each charge had to be considered and weighed and, thereafter, a finding had to be recorded. non-consideration of the facts mentioned in the show cause notice in great detail cannot per se make the order bad. state of karnataka, 1995 16) scc 289, it was observed in paragraph 32 that it is a settled law that the order need not contain detailed reasons like a court order.g.p. mathur, j. 1. this special appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 23.8.1999 of a learned single judge by which writ petition no. 39548 of 1998 filed by respondent. hiyat khan, was allowed and the order dated 12.10.1998 passed by director. indian institute of technology. kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the iit) terminating his training was quashed. 2. the respondent, hiyat khan, was enrolled by the iit, kanpur, as a trainee (machinist) on 7.10.1996 for a period of two years. his training was initially terminated by order dated 19.9.1997. this was challenged by him by filing c.m. writ petition no. 39148 of 1997 which was allowed on 21.5.1998 and the order terminating his training was quashed. it was, however, left open to the appellants (respondents in the writ petition) to take appropriate action and pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner. thereafter, the appellant served a notice dated 12.6.1998 upon the respondent to show cause why his training programme be not terminated. he was also afforded an opportunity of personal hearing. thereafter, an order was passed on 12.10.1998 terminating his training. this was again challenged by him by filing c.m. writ petition no. 39548 of 1998 which has been allowed by a learned single judge on 23.6.1999. the director of iit, kanpur has filed the present special appeal, against the said order. 3. we have heard sri s.n. verma, learned senior counsel for the appellant. at the commencement of hearing, the respondent, hiyat khan,moved an application for permission to withdraw the vakalatnama of his counsel. sri dinesh pathak, advocate. sri dinesh pathak was requested to be present in the court who made a statement that he was willing to argue the appeal. however, the respondent. hiyat khan, made a statement that he wanted to argue the appeal himself and, consequently. sri dinesh pathak, advocate was permitted to withdraw his vakalatnama, we have heard sri hiyat khan in person and have perused the record. 4. the iit, kanpur, which has sophisticated laboratories, workshops and other facilities. introduced a scheme, as an extension activity, to offer training opportunity to those who were qualified to receive such training. selected areas/fields of training were identified, based on strength, capability and expertise available in house to offer such training. the scheme was conceived as a training scheme beyond the normal training given in industrial training institutes. the sole objective of the scheme was to provide exposure to the upgraded training facilities available in the institute in a richer academic environment so that the persons so trained had a 'value addition' to have a better chance in coping with the job market demand. the institute also provided stipend to each trainee from its own budget/fund. this scheme was in addition to the normal teaching for the b.tech./m.tech/m.sc. students or those who were registered for ph.d. degree under the approved academic/research programme. an advertisement for enrolment as trainee (machinist) was issued sometime in the year 1996. the respondent. hiyat khan, was selected for enrolment as a trainee (machinist) and an order in this regard was issued on 18/19.9.1996. the order contained the following conditions : 'duration : the training period will be for a period of two years with effect from the date of your joining. the training can be terminated at any time without any notice and without assigning any reason. you will be required to work day and/or night as per directions of the authorities of the institute. please note that the above is not a job position. you are being enrolled only as a trainee.' 5. the respondent joined the institute as a trainee (machinist) on 7.10.1996 and at the time of joining, an agreement was executed by him. in the said agreement, he was described as 'party of the first part'. since the agreement has a bearing on the controversy in dispute, the relevant terms thereof are being reproduced below. '1. the party of the first part shall submit himself to the orders of the institute and of the officers and authorities under whom he from time to time be placed by the institute. 2. the party of the first part shall remain in the training upto a period of two years commencing from 7.10.1996 and the period of the party of the first part will come to an end on the expiry of two years provided that subject to exigencies of institute training, the terms of training of the party of the first part may be extended beyond two years for a further period as may be agreed between the parties. 3. the party of the first part shall devote his whole time of his training and at all times obey the rules including the conduct rules as may be prescribed by the institute from time to time. 4. the party of the second part shall pay stipend of rs. 800 per month during the period of first year of training. enhancement in the stipendiary amount to rs. 950 per month in the second year of training may be considered by the party of the second part provided party of the first part completes his training satisfactorily during the first year. 5. .... 6. the training of the party of the first part may be terminated at any time without assigning any reason and without any previous notice. 7. ...... 8. ...... 9. the party of the first part will neither claim any regular employment under the institute after completion of his training at the institute nor he would become eligible for any regular employment under the institute on the basis of his training under these presents. 10. if at any time after execution of these presents, the party of the first part serves the institute in any post in pay scale prescribed therefor, the period of training under these presents will not count towards any retirement/ terminal benefits. 11. in respect of any matter regarding which no provision has been made in this agreement the decision of the director of the institute shall be final and binding on the party of the first part.' 6. according to the appellant, the respondent refused to follow the instructions of workshop supervisor and refused to work with effect from 20.1.1997. the incharge of the workshop wrote to him in writing on 3.2.1997 asking him to follow the instructions of this superiors and take interest in the training. the respondent persisted in his uncooperative attitude and the incharge, workshop, sent another letter to him on 6.2.1997 to appear before him and explain the position. some equipment in the workshop was damaged by him as he did not follow the instructions of the superior. when enquiry was made, he misbehaved with the incharge of the workshop. accordingly, a warning was issued to him on 8.7.1997 regarding his attitude of defiance and indiscipline. the respondent started claiming absorption in the institute on permanent basis and moved applications in that regard within 8 months of joining the training. on 19.9.1997, a decision was taken to terminate his training in terms of the letter dated 18/19.9.1996. 7. the aforesaid order of termination of training was challenged by the respondent by filing c.m. writ petition no. 39148 of 1997 which was allowed by a learned single judge and the order dated 19,9.1997 was quashed with liberty to the appellant to take appropriate action and pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity of hearing to him. thereafter, a notice was given to the respondent mentioning certain charges and he was required to show cause why his training programme be not terminated. the relevant part of the notice reads as under :'......during your training programme, you were found to be irregular and disobedient and in this behalf, communications dated 3.2.1997. 6.2.1997 and 8.7.1997 were issued to you by the incharge. central workshop (copies enclosed). the undersigned has, in view of your persistent neglect and laxity in the discharge of your duty, decided to call for your explanation to the following articles of charges : 1. that despite being called on 28.1.1997 by the incharge, central workshop and being told to follow his instructions, you disobeyed his orders and continued to abstain from work (ref. letter dated 3.2.1997). 2. that you stopped working from 20th january, 1997 and despite being asked to explain your absence, failed to do so (ref. letter dated 6.2.1997). 3. that despite being told not to misbehave with the senior staff shri v.k. srivastava. incharge, central workshop, you continued to do so (ref. letter dated 8.7.1997). 4. in spite of repeated reminders, you failed to devote yourself to the training, programme. 5. you continuously misbehaved with your seniors and at no point of time were you serious in pursuing the training programme.' 8. the respondent gave a reply to the notice on 24.6.1998 wherein he accepted the receipt of the letters mentioned in the notice but denied the charges. it was stated in the reply that the training programme was not in conformity of the apprentices act and was illegal. he further stated that the syllabus for the training programme was completely illegal because the authority initiating the programme had no authority to do so. the respondent was afforded a personal hearing by the director of the institute on 22.9.1998. thereafter, the director passed an order on 12.10.1998, terminating his training with immediate effect. the order recites that after examining all the relevant papers on record, viz., the complaints received against him, his reply to the show cause notice and the replies given by him during the course of oral hearing on 22.9.1998, he had come to the conclusion that hiyat khan was not a fit person to be trained or retained as a trainee in the institute. the stipend with effect from the date of earlier termination i.e.. 19.9.1997 to the date of issuance of the order, i.e.. 12.10.1998 amounting to rs. 16,394 and a further sum of rs. 1,200 in lieu of notice period was paid through crossed cheque. 9. sri. s.n. verma, learned senior counsel for the appellant, has submitted that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the institute and the respondent, hiyat khan. he was a trainee simpliciter, and, therefore, the ground on which the writ petition filed by him had been allowed by the learned single judge could have no application on the facts and circumstances of the case. according to the learned counsel, the learned single judge committed a manifest error of law in applying the principles which are applicable to termination of service of an employee by an employer and, therefore, the impugned order was liable to be setaside. the respondent submitted that his training had been illegally terminated. 10. the first question which requires consideration is what was the status of the respondent, namely, whether he was a trainee or an employee? the communication sent by the iit to the respondent on 18/19.9.1996 informing him that he had been selected for enrolment as a trainee (machinist) clearly mentions that he was enrolled only as a trainee and it was not a job position. it further mentions that the period of training will be two years. the agreement executed between the parties on 7.10.1996 mentions at several places that the respondent will remain in training upto the period of two years and he shall devote his whole time for this purpose. it further provides that he shall be paid stipend during the period of training. there is also a clause in the agreement that he shall not claim any employment after completion of his training nor he would become eligible for any regular employment under the institute on the basis of the said training. this clearly shows that the status of the respondent was that of a trainee and not of an employee. the dictionary meaning of the word 'train' is to teach or exercise in an art, profession, trade or occupation and a 'trainee' means a person undergoing training. the position of the respondent was, therefore, more or less like a student who was undergoing training in the trade of a machinist. 11. the respondent had moved an application before the director of the iit on 20.6.1997 claiming that he should be absorbed in service to which a reply was given that the question of absorption of a trainee did not arise, as appointment in the institute was made on the basis of an open selection. he then filed c.m. writ petition no. 33245 of 1997 praying that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the director, iit, kanpur, to absorb him on the post of senior technical assistant and to pay him the salary of the said post. thispetition was heard along with the other writ petition filed by the respondent, namely. writ petition no. 39148 of 1997. the learned single judge recorded a finding to the following effect : 'admittedly the petitioner is merely a trainee mechanic. he was permitted to join the institute for two years' training course in september. 1996. he cannot claim absorption in any service in the institute. the conditions mentioned at the time of his enrolment as a trainee clearly indicate that he is not appointed on any job.' after recording the aforesaid finding and referring to the terms of the agreement it was held that the respondent was not entitled for absorption in service and, consequently, the writ petition was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 21.5.1998. 12. thus, there cannot be even a slightest doubt that the position of respondent was that of a trainee which is akin to a student, and not that of an employee. in c. m. writ petition no. 39148 of 1997, wherein termination order dated 19.9.1997 was challenged, the learned single judge has held that the term of the agreement executed between the parties on 7.10.1996 which provided that the training of the respondent may be terminated at any time without assigning any reason and without any previous notice was arbitrary. for this, he placed reliance on two cases of the apex court, viz.. central inland water transport corporation ltd. v. brojo nath ganguly, air 1986 sc 1571 and delhi transport corporation v. dtc mazdoor congress, air 1991 sc 101. in our considered opinion, the principle laid down in the aforesaid cases can have no application to facts of the present case. in central inland water transport corporation (supra), the respondents of the said case were initially working with rivers steam navigation company ltd. and an arrangement was entered into between the said company and the central inland water transportcorporation ltd., which was approved by the calcutta high court, whereunder the corporation was required to take under its employment as many existing staff or labour of the company as was possible. in pursuance of the said agreement, brojo nath and others, the respondents of the said appeal, were offered employment in the corporation which they had accepted as they had not much of a choice. similarly, in the case of the delhi transport corporation (supra) regulation 9 (b) of the regulations framed under section 53 of the delhi road transport act, which provided for termination of service of the permanent employees on simply giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason therefor, came up for consideration. these cases, therefore, relate to the validity of the regulations which gave power to the employer to terminate the service of a permanent employee without giving any reason by simply giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. the principle laid down in these cases can have no application here as the respondent. hiyat khan, was not an employee, but was merely a trainee undergoing a particular type of training, the duration of which was of two years'. 13. the provision in the service rule which gives power to an employer to terminate the services of a permanent employee at any time after giving a month's notice or pay in lieu thereof is certainly a very arbitrary provision and is capable of great misuse resulting in serious injury to the employee. normally, a person taking up an employment presumes that there will be certainty of his tenure and he will continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation. if the services of an employee are terminated after he has put in 10 or 20 years, it may lead to a serious human problem as his entire family may be put to starvation. while declaring such a provision to be ultra vires, the court also took notice of the fact that the difference in the bargaining power of a big employer like a central government corporation and a humble individualfor a job in order to manage his both ends meet, is incomparable and quite often an aspirant for a job has hardly any choice but to accept the employment on whatever terms it is offered to him. the respondent was not taking up an employment in the institute when he entered into the agreement. he was not even a student of a regular engineering course like b.tech. he was not to be awarded any degree or diploma which a student normally gets in any academic institution. he was merely enrolled for the purpose of getting training in the trade of machinist so that he may get practical knowledge of sophisticated type of machines available in the laboratory of the institute which might later on help him in getting a job in some other establishment. the respondent in order to gain some experience applied for enrolment as a trainee and there was hardly any compulsion upon him to get enrolled for such type of training. it not being an employment, he was merely offered a small amount as stipend. he opted for the training in order to improve his knowledge of the trade which might help him in securing a job. therefore, it cannot be held that the agreement had been executed by him under any compulsion or the clause in the agreement which empowered the institute to terminate his training at any time without assigning any reason was arbitrary or unconstitutional. 14. what weighed with the learned, single judge in setting aside the order dated 12.10.1998 by which the training of the respondent was terminated is that the finding on every charge that it had been proved, had not been recorded and also no reason had been given for passing the said order. it has been further held that the principle of natural justice had not been complied with and the termination order had been passed in violation of the earlier order passed by the high court. in order to examine whether a proper enquiry was conducted by the institute and whether the principles of natural justice had been violated. it is necessary to recapitulate the factsleading to passing of the order dated 12.10.1998. the incharge of central workshop wrote to him in writing on 3.2.1997 that for 'on job training', it was necessary that the trainee should seriously follow the instructions of the supervisor and devote full time in the workshop and further it was necessary that the trainee should show a keen desire to learn and should maintain good relations with fellow trainees. the respondent was persistently abstaining from doing any work and he had paid no attention to the advice given to him on 28.1.1997. the incharge of the workshop again sent him a letter on 6.2.1997 bringing to his notice that he had not been doing any work since 20.1.1997 nor was following the instructions of the supervisor of the workshop. he was required to explain his position as to whether he wanted to continue with the work or not. the incharge, central workshop, sent him another letter on 8.7.1997 mentioning that he had been orally asked on many occasions to devote himself to the training but not only he had shown an attitude of defiance but had also been grossly misbehaving with his senior staff. he had damaged some equipment on 1.7.1997 on account of his stubborn attitude of refusing to follow the instructions. when an enquiry was made, he resorted to gross misbehaviour. it was further mentioned that he was committing acts of gross indiscipline and misbehaviour which was simply intolerable and had shown complete reluctance to learn the trade. the respondent was fully aware that he had been enrolled for undergoing a training the period of which was two years and it was not a job position. however, within 8 months of his joining the training, he started claiming absorption in the service of the institute on permanent basis and also started complaining that the stipend being paid to him was very small. in the show cause notice dated 12.6.1998, all these facts regarding his refusal to follow the instructions of the supervisory staff, refusal in pursuing the training programme, acts of gross misbehaviour were mentioned. in the reply given by him.apart from denying the charges, he stated that the training programme was not in conformity with the apprentices act and the syllabus was completely illegal, and also complained that his emoluments were very small. by the letter dated 10.9.1998, the respondent was asked to appear before the director on 22.9.1998. he was given oral hearing by the director on the said date and he was asked to say whatever he wanted to say. at the time of oral hearing, he did not deny the allegations levelled against him to the effect that he had refused to devote himself to the training, that he had not been attending the workshop and that he had misbehaved with the supervisory staff. he also did not deny the fact that an equipment in the workshop had been damaged by him. in fact, the aforesaid allegations made against him were not at all refuted or controverted by him during the course of oral hearing. on the contrary, he said that he had been enrolled for training in the trade of machinist but proper training had not been given to him. he complained about the type of training being given and also said that there had been no improvement in his knowledge and proper machines were not available in the workshop. the director of the institute, after taking into consideration the facts mentioned in the show cause notice, the reply of the respondent and also statements and replies given by him during the course of oral hearing, recorded a finding that he had come to the conclusion that hiyat khan was not a fit person to be trained or retained as a trainee in the institute, and accordingly terminated his training with immediate effect. 15. it is needless to repeat that the position of the respondent was akin to that of a student and not that of an employee. he was undergoing training as a machinist for which there were no theory classes. his performance as a trainee could only be judged by his work in the workshop and not by any written examination. in fact, no written examination was contemplated nor any practical examination was to beheld. his persistent defiance to do the work assigned to him in the workshop showed that he was taking no interest in the training programme. apart from the said fact which related to his academic performance, he had also grossly misbehaved with the supervisor and incharge of the workshop which was an act of indiscipline. 16. rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. their aim is to secure the ends of justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. these rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. they do not supplant the law but supplement it. if fairness is shown, absence of strict adherence to form does not amount to breach of principles of natural justice. the rules are not intended to be applied as technical rules. the respondent has not made any allegation of mala fide either against the director or any other staff of the institute. he has neither any diploma nor a degree but has got merely a certificate in a particular trade which is treated as necessary for the lowest job of mechanic or electrician etc. there was, thus, hardly any occasion for any kind of conflict between him and the director of the institute. his poor academic performance is a ground for termination of his training. while assessing the performance of a student, the principles of natural justice do not come into play. this question was considered by the apex court in jawahar lal nehru university v. b. s. narwal, air 1980 sc 1666, and it was held as follows : 'when duly qualified and competent academic authorities examine and assess the work of a student over a period of time and declare his work to be unsatisfactory, no question of a right to be heard can arise. the duty of an academic body in such a case is 'to form an unbiased assessment of the student's standard of work based on the entirety of his record and potential'. that is their function.the very nature of the function of academic adjudication negatives any right to an opportunity to be heard. if the assessment by the academic body permitted the consideration of 'non-academic' circumstances also, a right to be heard may be implied. but if the assessment is confined to academic performance, a right to be heard may not be so implied. of course, if there are allegations of bias or mala fides, different considerations might prevail, but in the absence of allegations of bias or mala fides, the declaration by an academic body that a student's academic performance is unsatisfactory, is not liable to be questioned in a court on the ground that the student was not given an opportunity of being heard.' 17. the order for terminating the training of the respondent on the ground of bad academic performance, therefore, could not be faulted on any principle of natural justice. 18. there were also allegations of misbehaviour and indiscipline against the respondent. he had been given ample warning in writing to improve himself and devote himself to the training. before taking any action, show cause notice was given to respondent and he was also afforded an opportunity of hearing. in the matter of discipline of an academic institution, the court should be slow in interfering with the decision of the authorities. they are the best judge of the situation and knowhow to maintain the discipline so that the atmosphere in the institute does not get polluted putting in jeopardy the career of a large number of bright students who are pursuing course in the advanced fields of technology or are devoting to research. it will be useful to remember the following caution sounded by the apex court in controller of examination etc. v. g.s. sunder and another. jt 1992 (4) sc 204 : 'one thing must be put beyond doubt. in matters of enforcement of discipline, this court must be very slow ininterference. after all, the authorities in charge of education whose duty it is to conduct examination fairly and properly, know best how to deal with situations of this character. one cannot import fine principles of law and weigh the same in golden scales......' 19. glynn v. keeie university and another. (1971) 2 all er 89, is a case where a severe punishment was imposed upon a student for an act of indiscipline without affording him an opportunity of hearing and even after arriving at a finding that there was violation of principles of natural justice, the court refused to exercise the discretion in his favour. after getting a report of indiscipline, the vice-chancellor imposed a fine and excluded glynn from residence in any residential accommodation on the university campus for the whole of the academic session. glynn subsequently wrote to the registrar of the university denying his involvement in the incident and further pleaded that the punishment had been imposed without any representation by him or on his behalf and hence he had not even had opportunity to defend himself. after referring to leading cases relating to compliance of natural justice in quasi-judicial proceedings like ridge v. baldwin, (1963) 2 all er 66 and duryappah v. fernando. (1967) 2 all er 152, the following observation was made : 'the context of educational societies involves a special factor which is not present in other contexts namely, the relation of tutor and pupil ; i.e., the society is charged with the supervision and upbringing of the pupil under tuition, be the society a university or college or a school. where this relationship exists. it is quite plain that on the one hand in certain circumstances the body or individual acting on behalf of the society must be regarded as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity expulsion from the society is the obvious example. on the other hand, there exists a wide range ofcircumstances in which the body or individual is concerned to impose penalties by way of domestic discipline. in these circumstances, it seems to me that the body or individual is not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity at all but in a magisterial capacity, i.e., in the performance of the rights and duties vested in the society as to the upbringing and supervision of the members of the society. no doubt there is a moral obligation to act fairly, but this moral obligation does not. i think, lie within the purview of the court in its control over quasi-judicial acts, indeed, in case of a schoolboy punishment, the contrary could hardly be argued.' in the same report reference is made to a decision of queen's bench divisional court, r v. university of oxford exparte bolchover, (1970). the times, 7th october, in which the university had expelled a post graduate member and he applied for an order of certiorari to quash the decision. in a short judgment, lord parker, c.j., said : 'the court has carefully considered the papers in this case, and of course, all that you so ably urged, but at the end of the day we remain unconvinced that the conduct of the hearing before the proctors offended against such rules of natural justice as were applicable in the circumstances. to put it more simply, they are not satisfied that that hearing was unfair. but it is only right to and that even if the court felt there might be something to be enquired into nevertheless as a matter of discretion they would, having regard to the appeal, refused you leave. in the result leave is refused.' these cases lay down that in matters involving disciplinary action by academic bodies, discretion to quash their decisions should not be lightly exercised. 20. coming to the criticism levelled by the learned single judge that no reasons have been recorded, it may be stated at the very outset that the matter is not governed by any statutory provision which may make the recording of reasons mandatory. we are not concerned here with decision of any court or tribunal. the order terminating training of the respondent clearly shows that the director of the institute had considered the show cause notice, the reply given by the respondent and also the statement made by him during the course of oral hearing wherein he did not deny any charge and, thereafter, he had arrived at a finding that the training of the respondent should be terminated. the director was not trying the respondent like a judge of a criminal court where evidence in support of each charge had to be considered and weighed and, thereafter, a finding had to be recorded. the order cannot be said to a non-speaking order. it is not a cryptic order of one sentence but is a fairly long order. non-consideration of the facts mentioned in the show cause notice in great detail cannot per se make the order bad. in sachchidanand pandey v. state of west bengal, air 1987 sc 1109, it was held that where reasons are not stated, the court may seek to gather the same from the impugned adjudicative order by considering the entire course of events. in k. l. tripathi v. state bank of india and others, air 1984 sc 273, the court sustained an order of dismissal from service which did not give reasons with the following observations : '.....though reasons had not been expressly stated in the final order, these reasons were implicit, namely, the nature of the charges, the explanation offered and the reply of the officer to the show cause notice. it was manifest that absence of any denial by the officer, indeed admissions of the factual basis and nature of the explanation offered by the officer were considered by the authority to merit the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. such aconclusion could not, in the facts and circumstances of the case, be considered to be unreasonable or one which no reasonable man could make......' 21. again, in m.j. siwani v. state of karnataka, 1995 16) scc 289, it was observed in paragraph 32 that it is a settled law that the order need not contain detailed reasons like a court order. administrative order itself may contain reasons or the file may disclose the reasons to arrive at a decision showing application of mind to the facts in issue which would be discernible from the reasons stated in the order or the contemporaneous record. 22. it should be borne in mind that the respondent had filed a writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india challenging the order of the director of the institute by which his training had been terminated. the court was not sitting in appeal over the order of termination. in such a case, the power of the court is limited one, and it should be seen whether fair treatment had been offered to the respondent. it may be useful to refer to the following observation made by venkatachalliah, j. (as his lordship then was) in state of u. p. v. dharmander prasad singh, air 1989 sc 997, in paragraph 28 : 'however, judicial review under article 226 cannot be converted into appeal. judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. in chief constable of the north wales police v. evans, (1982) 1 wlr 1155, refers to the merits-legality distinction in judicial review. lord haisham said : 'the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.' lord bright man observed : '.....judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made.....' and held that it would be an error to think : '......that the court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.' ..... 23. in apparel export promotion council v. a.k. chopra. jt 1999 (1) sc 61, the services of an employee had been terminated on account of his misbehaviour with a lady employee working in the same office. the high court quashed the order on the ground that the charges were not proved. reversing the judgment, the court ruled. 'judicial review is not an appeal from the decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at. the court while exercising the power of judicial review must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which felt squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority.' 24. applying the aforesaid test, it cannot be said that there is any such error in the order dated 28.10.1998, which may warrant interference of this court in exercise of power under article 226 of the constitution. 25. for reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned single judge cannot be sustained in law. in the result, the appeal succeeds and ishereby allowed. the impugned judgment and order dated 23.8.1999 of the learned single judge is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed.