Guru Nanak Dev Ji Maharaj Vs. Roza Power Supply Company and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/479723
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided OnMay-19-2009
JudgeAmitava Lala and ;D.K. Arora, JJ.
Reported in2009(3)AWC2871
AppellantGuru Nanak Dev Ji Maharaj
RespondentRoza Power Supply Company and ors.
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredShiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors.
Excerpt:
- interpretation of statutes definition clause: [markandey katju & h.l. dattu, jj] meaning given to an expression in one statute cannot be applied to another statute. - are clearly attracted in this case particularly in view of the ratio of the judgment in shiv kumar chadha v. here, an application was made by a party taking the plea that the disposal of the contentions of such party will be good enough for guru nanak dev ji maharaj although a non-party, and at the same time on the behest of such party while an application is already made, after hearing which 30th may, 2009 is the date fixed for passing appropriate order protecting right, title and interest in between the parties, therefore, it does not look just and proper for the appellate court to prevent the trial court from passing such order.amitava lala, j.1. this appeal is arising out of judgment and order passed by learned civil judge (senior division), shahjahanpur dated 1st may, 2009 granting an ad interim injunction to the extent as follows:during the period defendants were prohibited they should not interfere in arazi gata no. 14 area 0.519 hectare situated at village rampur barakatpur, pargana and tehsil sadar, district shahjahanpur, purchased by the plaintiff. plaintiff is directed to comply order xxxix, rule 3 of c.p.c.(emphasis supplied)2. mr. ashok mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended before this court that the order impugned has been passed ex barte without considering the case of the appellant in spite of recording the fact that the appellant is co-sharer of the property. he further contended that non-compliance of the provisions of order xxxix, rule 3 of c.p.c. is fatal, for which appellate court can interfere and set aside such interim order so passed by the trial court. he then contended that the appellant has also filed an application vacating the interim order on 8th may, 2009 which is pending for consideration by the trial court. he also contended that the provisions of order xxxix, rule 3 of c.p.c. are clearly attracted in this case particularly in view of the ratio of the judgment in shiv kumar chadha v. municipal corporation of delhi and ors. : (1993) 3 scc 161, where supreme court held as follows:33. it has come to our notice that in spite of the aforesaid statutory requirement, the courts have been passing orders of injunction before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for passing such orders. it is said that if the reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a grievance can be made by the other side that court has prejudged the issues involved in the suit. according to us, this is a misconception about the nature and the scope of interim orders. it need not be pointed out that any opinion expressed in connection with an interlocutory application has no bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage of the final adjudication. apart from that now in view of the proviso to rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. when the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant.3. mr. shashi nandan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents in support of the order impugned contended before this court that the appellant is not party to the suit, therefore, the necessary requirement of law is that he should first obtain leave of the appellate court to prefer the appeal directly and thereafter only he can proceed in accordance with law. so far as the caveat is concerned, the same has been filed in respect of different matter, i.e., reliance power supply corporation ltd. and the appellant is one guru nanak dev ji maharaj, therefore, neither he is party to the suit nor caveator.4. mr. mehta, learned counsel has opposed this contention saying that the plea which has been taken by mr. shashi nandan, learned senior counsel is hypertechnical in nature since rakshpal singh is sarvarakar of guru nanak dev ji maharaj and as individual he is defendant in the present suit. however, at the time of passing order, the appellate court will definitely look into pros and cons as regards prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and will simultaneously bear in mind whether it is going to interfere with the independence of the trial court in hearing the suit and interim application. the protection that mr. mehta wanted from this court is that the plaintiff/respondents should not demolish the wall of gurudwara but the prayer as made by the appellant in the appeal is stay of the order impugned wherein no indication at all is there with regard to demolition of the wall of gurudwara and the defendants are only prohibited from interfering with the land in question mentioned in the order impugned itself. that apart, we agree with the submission of mr. shashi nandan to the extent that rakshpal singh being defendant no. 5 has already made an application for vacating the interim order, which has been heard and for delivery of judgment 30th may, 2009 is the date fixed, therefore, at this stage today, i.e., on 19th may, 2009 appellate court should not interfere with such order, that too at the instance of a party who has not been formally arrayed as party defendant as is apparent from the formal order. on one hand it can be construed that above party is formal one and on the other hand principles of audi alteram partem are attracted. had it been the case that immediately after passing of order impugned on 1st may, 2009 the appellant could have preferred the appeal with the leave of the court, the position would have been different but that is not the scenario before us. here, an application was made by a party taking the plea that the disposal of the contentions of such party will be good enough for guru nanak dev ji maharaj although a non-party, and at the same time on the behest of such party while an application is already made, after hearing which 30th may, 2009 is the date fixed for passing appropriate order protecting right, title and interest in between the parties, therefore, it does not look just and proper for the appellate court to prevent the trial court from passing such order. upon hearing the parties, it is expected of the appellate court to pass appropriate order to avoid any such controversy among the parties concerned. in totality, we do not find any cogent reason for interference with the order impugned particularly when we do not find any whisper with regard to demolition, therefore, the appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission without imposing any cost.5. however, passing of this order will no way cause prejudice to the court below and we expect that it will deliver judgment on 30th may, 2009. in other words, court below is free enough to proceed in accordance with law and pass appropriate order.6. in any event, copy of this order will be issued only upon giving regular number of the appeal by the department.d.k. arora, j.i agree.
Judgment:

Amitava Lala, J.

1. This appeal is arising out of judgment and order passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Shahjahanpur dated 1st May, 2009 granting an ad interim injunction to the extent as follows:

During the period defendants were prohibited they should not interfere in Arazi Gata No. 14 area 0.519 hectare situated at village Rampur Barakatpur, Pargana and Tehsil Sadar, district Shahjahanpur, purchased by the plaintiff. Plaintiff is directed to comply Order XXXIX, Rule 3 of C.P.C.

(Emphasis supplied)

2. Mr. Ashok Mehta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended before this Court that the order impugned has been passed ex barte without considering the case of the appellant in spite of recording the fact that the appellant is co-sharer of the property. He further contended that non-compliance of the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 3 of C.P.C. is fatal, for which appellate Court can interfere and set aside such interim order so passed by the trial court. He then contended that the appellant has also filed an application vacating the interim order on 8th May, 2009 which is pending for consideration by the trial court. He also contended that the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 3 of C.P.C. are clearly attracted in this case particularly in view of the ratio of the judgment in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. : (1993) 3 SCC 161, where Supreme Court held as follows:

33. It has come to our notice that in spite of the aforesaid statutory requirement, the Courts have been passing orders of injunction before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for passing such orders. It is said that if the reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a grievance can be made by the other side that Court has prejudged the issues involved in the suit. According to us, this is a misconception about the nature and the scope of interim orders. It need not be pointed out that any opinion expressed in connection with an interlocutory application has no bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage of the final adjudication. Apart from that now in view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the Court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant.

3. Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents in support of the order impugned contended before this Court that the appellant is not party to the suit, therefore, the necessary requirement of law is that he should first obtain leave of the appellate court to prefer the appeal directly and thereafter only he can proceed in accordance with law. So far as the caveat is concerned, the same has been filed in respect of different matter, i.e., Reliance Power Supply Corporation Ltd. and the appellant is one Guru Nanak Dev Ji Maharaj, therefore, neither he is party to the suit nor caveator.

4. Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel has opposed this contention saying that the plea which has been taken by Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned senior counsel is hypertechnical in nature since Rakshpal Singh is Sarvarakar of Guru Nanak Dev Ji Maharaj and as individual he is defendant in the present suit. However, at the time of passing order, the appellate court will definitely look into pros and cons as regards prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and will simultaneously bear in mind whether it is going to interfere with the independence of the trial court in hearing the suit and interim application. The protection that Mr. Mehta wanted from this Court is that the plaintiff/respondents should not demolish the wall of Gurudwara but the prayer as made by the appellant in the appeal is stay of the order impugned wherein no indication at all is there with regard to demolition of the wall of Gurudwara and the defendants are only prohibited from interfering with the land in question mentioned in the order impugned itself. That apart, we agree with the submission of Mr. Shashi Nandan to the extent that Rakshpal Singh being defendant No. 5 has already made an application for vacating the interim order, which has been heard and for delivery of judgment 30th May, 2009 is the date fixed, therefore, at this stage today, i.e., on 19th May, 2009 appellate court should not interfere with such order, that too at the instance of a party who has not been formally arrayed as party defendant as is apparent from the formal order. On one hand it can be construed that above party is formal one and on the other hand principles of audi alteram partem are attracted. Had it been the case that immediately after passing of order impugned on 1st May, 2009 the appellant could have preferred the appeal with the leave of the Court, the position would have been different but that is not the scenario before us. Here, an application was made by a party taking the plea that the disposal of the contentions of such party will be good enough for Guru Nanak Dev Ji Maharaj although a non-party, and at the same time on the behest of such party while an application is already made, after hearing which 30th May, 2009 is the date fixed for passing appropriate order protecting right, title and interest in between the parties, therefore, it does not look just and proper for the appellate court to prevent the trial court from passing such order. Upon hearing the parties, it is expected of the appellate court to pass appropriate order to avoid any such controversy among the parties concerned. In totality, we do not find any cogent reason for interference with the order impugned particularly when we do not find any whisper with regard to demolition, therefore, the appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission without imposing any cost.

5. However, passing of this order will no way cause prejudice to the court below and we expect that it will deliver judgment on 30th May, 2009. In other words, court below is free enough to proceed in accordance with law and pass appropriate order.

6. In any event, copy of this order will be issued only upon giving regular number of the appeal by the department.

D.K. Arora, J.

I agree.