Sita Ram Vs. State of U.P. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - it is sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough :how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. it is interesting to note that in the united states, speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. the sixth amendment to the constitution provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. and the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by catena of decisions of this court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. maqsoodan singh, it was held by their lordships that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused would enjoy the right to speedy and public trial. 7. it is a sad and distressing commeq,tiifry! 6000/- with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur.orders.i. jafri, j.1. heard sri manzarul islam, advocate, learned counsel for the applicant sita ram and also sri jagdish tiwari. learned counsel for the state at a great length, sri jagdish tiwari has also filed counter-affidavit.2. applicant sita ram is in jail in connection with offences under section 302/323, i.p.c. in crime no. 221 of 1985, police station, badshahpur, district jaunpur.3. the learned counsel for the applicant has filed a certified copy of the order-sheet of the court of chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur in connection with the present case showing thereby that the case was put up before the chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur commencing from 18-1-1986 to 17-10-86 on several dates. the order-sheet dt. 17-10-1986 shows that the chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur has fixed 31-10-1986 for committing the accused to the court of session. a perusal of the certified copy of the order-sheet further goes to show that the charge sheet in the instant case was filed in the court of chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur on 18-1-1986 and ever-since, the case has come up before the chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur on as many as 20 occasions, but yet the accused persons were not committed to the court of session without any valid reason. it is, therefore, abundantly clear that the accused sita ram has been in jail since november, 1985 awaiting his commital to the court of session till today. this sorry state of affairs of the court speaks volumes as to how the proceedings were allowed to drag on since 18-1-1986 to 17-10-1986 and the accused were not committed to the court of session for their trial.4. this is the second bail application on behalf of the applicant. his earlier prayer for bail was rejected by this court on 18-7-1986. the chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur has proceeded in a very perfunctory and leisurely manner so far. he should have taken note of the fact that the accused has been languishing in jail since quite a long time. the liberty of the accused cannot be restrained in such a dilatory manner. speedy and expeditious trial and enquiry have been envisaged under section 309(1) of the criminal p.c., 1973 which is reproduced below:309(1)- in every enquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.5. the learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on : 1979crilj1036 , hussainara v. state of bihar wherein it was observed by hon'ble supreme court as under:there is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the under-trial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. it is sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough : how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and. there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. it is interesting to note that in the united states, speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. the sixth amendment to the constitution provides that,in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.so also article 3 of the european convention of human rights provides that,every one arrested or detained- shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.we think that even under our constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of article 21 as interpreted by this court in maneka gandhi v. union of india : [1978]2scr621 . we have held in that case that 'art. 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just.' if a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair or just. such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of article 21. there can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in article 21. the question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under article 21. would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under article 21 that is a question we shall have to consider when we hear the writ petition on merits on the adjourned date. but one thing is certain and we cannot impress it too strongly on the state government that it is high time that the state government realised its responsibility to the people in the matter of administration of justice and set up more courts for the trial of cases. we may point out that it would not be enough merely to establish more courts but the state government would also have to man them by competent judges and whatever is necessary for the purpose of recruiting competent judges such as improving their conditions of service, would have to be done by the state government, if they want to improve the system of administration of justice and make it an effective instrument for reaching justice to the large masses of people for whom justice is today a meaningless and empty word.'reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the applicant on the observations made in : 1984crilj160 where the .learned hon'ble judges of the supreme court have observed as under:.and the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by catena of decisions of this court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. the only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence.6. in a recent case of full bench of patna high court reported in : air1986pat38 , state v. maqsoodan singh, it was held by their lordships that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused would enjoy the right to speedy and public trial. it was also observed that the accused has a constitutional right to a speedy and public trial in all criminal prosecutions flowing from article 21 of the constitution of india by virtue of precedential mandate. it was also held that the violation of right of speedy and public trial pertains to the realm of sentence alone both on principle and precedent. it was further held that once the constitutional guarantee of the speedy trial and the right to fair, just and reasonable procedure under article 21, has been violated, then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release.7. it is a sad and distressing commeq,tiifry! on our judicial system that committal proceedings in the present case were not concluded by the chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur within a period of nine months without any valid reason, particularly when the case had been taken up by the magistrate on as many as 20 dates which has'occasioned a denial of justice to the applicant. under the circumstances as shown above, if the applicant is further detained in jail, it will amount to awarding him punishment before the commencement of his trial.8. on over-all consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, i am of the view that the applicant deserves to be released on bail.9. let the applicant sita ram son of adya prasad charged under section 302/323, i.p.c. in crime no. 221 of 1985, police station badshahpur, district jaunpur be released on bail subject to his executing a personal bond of rs. 6000/- with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur.10. a copy of this order be sent to the chief judicial magistrate, jaunpur for perusal so that he may proceed with the committal proceedings expeditiously in future.11. office is further directed to send a copy of this order to all the chief judicial magistrates and chief metropolitan magistrates of the state with the direction to act promptly and expeditiously in the matter of commitment proceedings of accused persons to the court of session, particularly when they are in jail.

Judgment:
ORDER

S.I. Jafri, J.

1. Heard Sri Manzarul Islam, Advocate, learned Counsel for the applicant Sita Ram and also Sri Jagdish Tiwari. learned Counsel for the State at a great length, Sri Jagdish Tiwari has also filed counter-affidavit.

2. Applicant Sita Ram is in Jail in connection with offences Under Section 302/323, I.P.C. in Crime No. 221 of 1985, Police Station, Badshahpur, District Jaunpur.

3. The learned Counsel for the applicant has filed a certified copy of the order-sheet of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur in connection with the present case showing thereby that the case was put up before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur commencing from 18-1-1986 to 17-10-86 on several dates. The order-sheet dt. 17-10-1986 shows that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur has fixed 31-10-1986 for committing the accused to the Court of Session. A perusal of the certified copy of the order-sheet further goes to show that the charge sheet in the instant case was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur on 18-1-1986 and ever-since, the case has come up before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur on as many as 20 occasions, but yet the accused persons were not committed to the Court of Session without any valid reason. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the accused Sita Ram has been in Jail since November, 1985 awaiting his commital to the Court of Session till today. This sorry state of affairs of the Court speaks volumes as to how the proceedings were allowed to drag on since 18-1-1986 to 17-10-1986 and the accused were not committed to the Court of Session for their trial.

4. This is the second bail application on behalf of the applicant. His earlier prayer for bail was rejected by this Court on 18-7-1986. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur has proceeded in a very perfunctory and leisurely manner so far. He should have taken note of the fact that the accused has been languishing in Jail since quite a long time. The liberty of the accused cannot be restrained in such a dilatory manner. Speedy and expeditious trial and enquiry have been envisaged Under Section 309(1) of the Criminal P.C., 1973 which is reproduced below:

309(1)- In every enquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.

5. The learned Counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on : 1979CriLJ1036 , Hussainara v. State of Bihar wherein it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:

There is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the under-trial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is sad reflection on the legal and Judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough : how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is of the essence of Criminal justice and. there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. It is interesting to note that in the United States, speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that,

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.

So also Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights provides that,

Every one arrested or detained- shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.

We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India : [1978]2SCR621 . We have held in that case that 'Art. 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just.' If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair or just. Such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 That is a question we shall have to consider when we hear the writ petition on merits on the adjourned date. But one thing is certain and we cannot impress it too strongly on the State Government that it is high time that the State Government realised its responsibility to the people in the matter of administration of justice and set up more Courts for the trial of cases. We may point out that it would not be enough merely to establish more Courts but the State Government would also have to man them by competent Judges and whatever is necessary for the purpose of recruiting competent Judges such as improving their conditions of service, would have to be done by the State Government, if they want to improve the system of administration of justice and make it an effective instrument for reaching justice to the large masses of people for whom justice is today a meaningless and empty word.'

Reliance was also placed by the learned Counsel for the applicant on the observations made in : 1984CriLJ160 where the .learned Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court have observed as under:.and the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence.

6. In a recent case of Full Bench of Patna High Court reported in : AIR1986Pat38 , State v. Maqsoodan Singh, it was held by their Lordships that in all Criminal prosecutions, the accused would enjoy the right to speedy and public trial. It was also observed that the accused has a constitutional right to a speedy and public trial in all Criminal prosecutions flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India by virtue of precedential mandate. It was also held that the violation of right of speedy and public trial pertains to the realm of sentence alone both on principle and precedent. It was further held that once the constitutional guarantee of the speedy trial and the right to fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21, has been violated, then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release.

7. It is a sad and distressing commeq,tiifry! on our Judicial system that committal proceedings in the present case were not concluded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur within a period of nine months without any valid reason, particularly when the case had been taken up by the Magistrate on as many as 20 dates which has'occasioned a denial of justice to the applicant. Under the circumstances as shown above, if the applicant is further detained in jail, it will amount to awarding him punishment before the commencement of his trial.

8. On over-all consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the applicant deserves to be released on bail.

9. Let the applicant Sita Ram son of Adya Prasad charged Under Section 302/323, I.P.C. in Crime No. 221 of 1985, Police Station Badshahpur, District Jaunpur be released on bail subject to his executing a personal bond of Rs. 6000/- with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur.

10. A copy of this order be sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur for perusal so that he may proceed with the committal proceedings expeditiously in future.

11. Office is further directed to send a copy of this order to all the Chief Judicial Magistrates and Chief Metropolitan Magistrates of the State with the direction to act promptly and expeditiously in the matter of commitment proceedings of accused persons to the Court of Session, particularly when they are in jail.