Dayalbagh Educational Institute Vs. State of U.P. and Others - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/475248
SubjectProperty
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided OnMay-18-2001
Case NumberC.M.W.P. No. 37963 of 2000
JudgeS.K. Sen, C.J. and; S. Rafat Alam, J.
Reported inAIR2001All290; (2001)2UPLBEC1615
Acts Uttar Pradesh Town Areas Act, 1914 - Sections 3; Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Building Operation Act, 1958 - Sections 3(1), 5, 5A, 6, 7, and 17; Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 - Sections 8, 10(2), 11, 12, 59 (1), (2) and (6); University Grants Commission Act, 1956 - Sections 3; General Clauses Act - Sections 8(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 21; Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958; Constitution of India - Article 300-A
AppellantDayalbagh Educational Institute
RespondentState of U.P. and Others
Appellant Advocate G.D. Srivastava and ;K.S. Chaudhary, Advs.
Respondent Advocate S.C., ;S.P. Gupta, ;Swapnil Kumar, ;V.K. Birla, ;Ravi Kant and ;Anil Krishan, Advs.
DispositionWrit Petition dismissed
Cases ReferredState of Madhya Pradesh v. Narasimhan
Excerpt:
- - the town areas act was enacted for providing better sanitation, lighting and improvement of town areas within the state, whereas r. act was enacted to check and control the tendency of haphazard building construction round about growing towns without there being any proper civic amenities such as proper drainage, water supply, communication, sanitation and to prevent bad laying out of land, haphazard erection of buildings or growth of sub-standard colonyoutside the urban areas. therefore, the object and purpose of all the three acts is very much akin and close to each other, to ensure proper and planned growth of the area maintaining ecological balance and to provide better civic amenities to the people. the non-obstante clause is appended to a provision to give overriding effect.....s. rafat alam, j.1. by means of this writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india the petitioner, a deemed university under section 3 of the university grants commission act, 1956 (3 of 1956) as prayed for the following reliefs :(a) issue a writ direction or order in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 2 to preserve the use of all the plots meant for the development of the petitioner institution and not to permit construction over the said plots ; and (b) to issue a writ of mandamus to stop and ultimately to remove the construction raised in the plot nos. 340, 341 and 348 and further restrain it from doing any act which constitutes breach of the master plan under the notification dated 11.2.1992 in derogation of the rights created in favour of the.....
Judgment:

S. Rafat Alam, J.

1. By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner, a deemed University under Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (3 of 1956) as prayed for the following reliefs :

(A) issue a writ direction or order in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 2 to preserve the use of all the plots meant for the development of the petitioner institution and not to permit construction over the said plots ; and

(B) to issue a writ of mandamus to stop and ultimately to remove the construction raised in the plot Nos. 340, 341 and 348 and further restrain it from doing any act which constitutes breach of the Master Plan under the Notification dated 11.2.1992 in derogation of the rights created in favour of the petitioner under the Master Plan for the Dayalbagh Regulated Area reserved for the petitioner and further the Hon'ble Court may quash the plans wrongfully sanctioned by the A.D.A. by issuing a writ in the nature of certtorari.

(C) to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the controlling authority of Dayalbagh Regulated Area to act in accordance with law with the provision of U. P. R.B.O. Act and to take steps to preserve the integrity of the Master Plan of the Dayalbagh Regulated Area.

2. The short question involved in this writ petition is as to whether the Plot Nos. 340, 341 and 348 which are in dispute after its exclusion from the Dayalbagh Town Area continued to be part of Dayalbagh Regulated Area, hence governed by the Master Plan of Dayalbagh Development Area or after its exclusion from the Dayalbagh Town Area, it reverted back to Agra Regulated Area and, therefore, will be governed by its Master Plan, and further as to whether the petitioner has any legal right over the plots in question only on the basis of land use shown in the Master Plan as University.

3. It appears that the Dayalbagh Town Area was created videNotification under Section 3 of the U. P. Town Area Act dated 29.10.1957 and a part of village Jaganpur was included in it. These three plots referred were also located within Jaganpur and was, therefore, included in the Dayalbagh Town Area. The State Government vide Notification dated 1 1.9.1974 (Annexure-9 of counter-affidavit of respondent No. 61, constituted the Agra Development Area under the provisions of the U. P. Urban Development and Planning Act (for short the Act) comprising the area of Agra Nagar Mahapalika and its periphery of eight Kms. beyond the Nagar Mahapalika, but excluding Cantonment areas and land owned, requisitioned or taken on lease by the Central Government for the purpose of naval, military or air force authority. Since Dayalbagh Town Area and village Jaganpur was within the radius of eight Kms. of the Nagar Mahapalika, it also fell within the area of Agra Development Area. The draft Master Plan of Agra Development Area was notified in October, 1974 and was finalized in July, 1975. However, on representation that the norms adopted for preparation of Agra Development Plan did not take into account the special features of Dayalbagh which is predominatly made to promote the religion of Radha Swami Satsang and, therefore, it was represented that the Dayalbagh Town Area may be excised out from Agra Development Area. In that view of the matter, the State Government vide notification dated 29.4.1978 (Annexure-2), under Section 3 of the Urban Planning Act, modified its earlier notification dated 11.9.1974 and re-defined the area falling under the Agra Development Area. By the aforesaid Notification, Cantonment Areas, Dayalbagh Town Area and land requisitioned or taken on lease by the Central Government for the purpose of any naval, military or air force authority were excluded from the limits of Agra Regulated Area. The effect of the aforesaid notification was that the Dayalbagh Town Area was taken out from the purview of Agra Development Area. The StateGovernment further vide Notification dated 12.9.1978 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition), under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, declared Dayalbagh Town Area as Regulated Area which comprises the area falling within the Dayalbagh Town Area.

4. It is significant to be noticed that the boundary of Dayalbagh Regulated Area was not described by plot numbers but the notification describes the area of Dayalbagh Regulated Area of that area falling within the limits of Dayalbagh Town Area. In other words, the boundaries and areas of Dayalbagh Town Area would be the area to be regulated area under the R.B.O. Act. Thereafter, the Dayalbagh Regulated Area prepared a Master Plan under Section 5 (a) of the R.B.O. Act in the year 1982, a copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure-26 to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 5. Clause 2 of the aforesaid Master Plan provides that it has been prepared keeping in view the pace of development of ten years and thus. It would be in operation till the year 1992. The plan does not envisage the development activity beyond the period of ten years. However, it appears that though the plan was prepared in the year 1982, but it was approved by the State Government on 13.2.1992. The aforesaid Master Plan (Annexure-26) also mentions as 'Dayalbagh Master Plan, 1982-92'. Similarly, the Agra Development Authority also prepared its Master Plan on 11.7.1974 which was approved vide Notification dated 11.7.1975 specifying therein that it will remain in force from 1975 to 2001. The plot Nos. 340, 341 and 348 have also been shown in the Agra Master Plan. Plot No. 340 has been shown as partly central functions, which includes school use and plot No. 341 as partly residential, which includes for the use of school, However, after declaration under subsection (1) of Section 3 of the R.B.O. Act, these plots which were in the Agra Development Authority fall within the jurisdiction of Dayalbagh Development Area with effect from1978. In the Master Plan of the Dayalbagh Development Area, land use of these plots have been shown as University (Annexure-26).

5. The contention of the petitioner is that since the land use of these three plots in the Master Plan of Dayalbagh Regulated Area are shown as University, therefore, no other person can be allowed to use it or make any construction over it except the petitioner-University as it is meant for its use only. Shri Srivastava, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner strenuously argued that any deviation of the land use shown in the Master Plan is illegal and cannot be permitted. It is contended that these plots are meant for the University and thus, the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have illegally been allowed to construct school on these plots. He further argued that despite notification dated 12.8.1993 (Annexure-8) under the provisions of the Town Area Act amending the notification dated 9.2.1957 under the Town Area Act will have no effect over the jurisdiction of Dayalbagh Regulated Area. It is submitted that the non-obstante clause in Section 17 of the R.B.O. Act protects all acts and actions which have been taken under the provisions of this Act and, therefore, the regulated area notified under Section 3 of the R.B.O. Act would have no effect of the notification dated 12.8.1993 and the limits of the Dayalbagh Regulated Area would remain the same, which also covers the plots in question. It is further submitted that since these plots are within the limits of Dayalbagh Regulated Area, the Agra Development Authority has no jurisdiction over it and as such it could not have permitted respondent Nos. 5 and 6 to raise construction over these plots. He further contended that merely by exclusion of these plots from the Dayalbagh Town Area these plots cannot be automatically restored to the Agra Development Authority unless the notification under Section 3 of the R.B.O. Act is issued by the State Government. The thrust of the submission is that the inclusion ofthese plots within the limits of Agra Development Area requires fresh notification under Section 3 and since no such notification has been issued, these plots were never restored back to the Agra Development Authority and remained within the limits of Oayalbagh Regulated Area. He also argued that the Master Plan prepared by the Dayalbagh Regulated Area in 1982 was a draft Master Plan which attained finality only after the approval of the State Government dated 3.2.1992 and as such it will remain operative for a period of ten years with effect from 3.2.1992. He also referred sub-section (6) of Section 59 of the U. P. Urban Planing and Development Act, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1973), and submitted that it saves the things done or action taken, and schemes made under the R.B.O. Act will continue to be in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and as such the use of plots in question shown in the Master Plan of the Dayalbagh Development Area as University cannot be changed.

6. On the other hand, Sri S.P. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 5, submitted that the petitioner has no locus standi or right to file the present writ petition challenging the action of the Agra Development Authority approving the plan of respondent No. 5 for construction of school. His contention is that the petitioner is a deemed University and runs educational institution and, therefore, does not want that any other educational institution should come up near it and, therefore. It has mala fide filed this petition. He further submitted that respondent No. 5 has purchased plot No. 341 on 10.5.1999 for a price of Rs. 23,39,617 and plot No. 340 for Rs. 10 lakhs. Thereafter he submitted the plan before the Agra Development Authority for its sanction as required under the Act in the notified development area where these plots are located. The said plan has also been sanctioned by the Agra Development Authority and soon thereafter construction was startedwhich is now almost at the stage of completion. Similarly, Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 6, submitted that respondent No. 5 is the lawful owner and in possession of plot No. 348 and has invested huge sum for establishing an educational institution whereas the petitioner nowhere claims or alleges that they are owner of the said plot. It is also submitted that plot No. 348 falls within the Agra Development Area and as such this plot will be governed by the Master Plan of Agra Development Area.

7. Learned standing counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4, contended that vide notification dated 12.8.1993 (Annexure-8 to the petition), these plots along with others were excised out from the limits of Dayalbagh Town Area on the demand raised by the land owners and as a result of which. It was automatically restored to Its original position and fell within the domain of Agra Development Area. Sri Birla, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 Agra Development Authority, submitted that the lands are being maintained in the same manner as shown in the Master Plan of Agra Development Area which mentions the land use of these plots for letting up educational institution.

8. A close reading of the provisions of the Town Areas Act. 1914, U. P. Regulation of Buildings Operation Act. 1958 and U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act. 1973 shows that its provisions are not inconsistent rather complementary and supplemental to each other. The Town Areas Act was enacted for providing better sanitation, lighting and improvement of Town Areas within the State, whereas R.B.O. Act was enacted to check and control the tendency of haphazard building construction round about growing towns without there being any proper civic amenities such as proper drainage, water supply, communication, sanitation and to prevent bad laying out of land, haphazard erection of buildings or growth of sub-standard colonyoutside the urban areas. Similarly, the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act. 1973 was enacted to provide for development of certain areas of the State of U. P. according to plan and for the matters ancillary thereto. Therefore, the object and purpose of all the three Acts is very much akin and close to each other, to ensure proper and planned growth of the area maintaining ecological balance and to provide better civic amenities to the people. Thus, there is no inconsistency and provisions of these Acts may apply at different situations.

9. Section 17 of the R.B.O. Act provides as under :

'17. Effect of provisions of the Act inconsistent with other laws.--The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding, anything inconsistent therewith contained in (any other law in force at the commencement of this Act).'

10. Similar provision was engrafted in Urban Planning Act. 1973 by incorporating sub-section (6) of Section 59. It reads as under :

'59. (6) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) :

(a) anything done or any action taken (including any notification issued or order or scheme made or permission granted) under any of the enactments referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act continue in force and be deemed to have, been done or taken under the provisions of this Act unless and until it is superseded by anything done or any action taken under the provisions of this Act ;

(b) .....

(c) .....

(d) .....

(e) .....

(f) .....

11. Relying on these two provisions, it was strenuously argued that the non-obstante clause protects all acts done under the R.B.O. Act and the notification dated 12.8.1993 under the Town Areas Act will have no impact on the boundaries of Dayalbagh Regulated Area. In our view, the submission is misconceived and cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of this case. The non-obstante clause is appended to a provision to give overriding effect over any existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment, where both cannot be read harmoniously ; for, even apart such clause, a later law abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it. It can be invoked only in case of irreconcilable conflict where both cannot be read harmoniously. But, where the provisions of two or more Acts can co-exist and can be enforced or applied without abrogating or eroding the provisions of other Act, the non-obstante clause will have no effect. Therefore, where the provision of this Act cannot be read harmoniously with the provisions of any other law in force at the commencement of this Act, in that situation the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect, otherwise not.

12. In our view, there is no inconsistency in both the Acts and by issuing notification dated 12.8.1993 under the Town Areas Act read with General Clauses Act does not abrogate or erode any provision of R.B.O. Act and thus, the non-obstante clause is not attracted in the facts and circumstance of this case.

13. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that these plots continue to be amenable to the Jurisdiction of Dayalbagh Regulated Area despite re-fixation of the boundaries under the Town Areas Act in the absence of notification under Section 3 of the Urban Planning Act declaring these plots as development area, can also not be accepted for the reason that these plots wereoriginally part of Agra Development Authority and was included in the Development Area under the notification dated 11.9.1974 issued under Section 3 of the Urban Planning Act. Admittedly, the Master Plan of Agra Development Authority was finalized and published in July, 1975 and, therefore, after its exclusion from Dayalbagh Regulated Area, no further notification for its inclusion in the Agra Development Authority is required to be issued, because after exclusion. It automatically reverted back to its original position and formed part of Agra Development Authority. Admittedly, in the Master Plan of Agra Development Authority, which was finalized in the year 1975 and will remain in force till 2001, these plots have been shown therein and their user has been shown as school. Therefore, the contention that after deletion from Dayalbagh Regulated Area, a notification ought to have been issued under Section 3 declaring these three plots within the regulated area, is unsustainable and cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

14. The two notifications, i.e., dated 12.8.1993, issued under the Town Areas Act and the notification dated 12.9.1978 issued under Section 3 of the R.B.O. Act, cannot be separated. While declaring regulated area under the R.B.O. Act, the notification mentions that the area falling within the limits of Dayalbagh Town Area is declared as regulated area. Thus, the notification under the Town Areas Act is supplemental to the notification issued under the R.B.O. Act.

15. It is settled legal position that where certain provisions incorporated from the existing Act have been borrowed by incorporation in the second Statute, the repeal of first Statute by the third Act would not affect modifying the second Statute. Section 8(i) of the General Clauses Act provides as under :

'8. Construction of references to repealed enactments.--(1) Where this Act, or any (Central Act) or Regulation made after thecommencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provisions so re-enacted.'

16. Where there is mere reference to or citation of one enactment in another without incorporation. Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, applies and the repeal and re-enactment of the provision referred to or cited has the effect set out in that section and the reference to the provision repealed is required to be construed as reference to the provision as re-enacted. But where a provision of one Statute is incorporated in another, the repeal or amendment of the former does not affect the latter. The effect of incorporation is as if the provision incorporated were written out in the incorporating Statute and were a part of it.

17. Therefore, when a Statute borrows provision of another Act by reference only, in that case whenever there is amendment in the borrowed Act, the same will be deemed to have been incorporated in the borrowing Act but where the provision has been borrowed by incorporation and not by reference, only then the repeal of the first Statute by the third does not affect the second. In other words, where a reference to or a citation of one Statute in another is made by incorporation which in effect means bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another, in that event the repeal of the former leaves the latter Statute wholly untouched. But where it has not been bodily lifted and has been borrowed by reference only, in that case the subsequent amendment in the Statute will also have to be deemed to have been incorporated in the borrowing Act. Reference may be made to para 27 of the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bajya v. Gopikabai : [1978]3SCR561 , which is as under :

'27. Broadly speaking, legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories.--First, where a Statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another Statute as of the time of adoption. Second, where a Statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject, as a genus. In the case of the former, the subsequent amendments made in the referred Statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting Statute. In the case of latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also, made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. This principle of construction of a reference Statute has been neatly summed up by Sutherland, thus :

A Statute which refers to the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law is invoked. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference Statute was enacted.' (Vide Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Art 5208 & 5209). '

Corpus Juris Secondum also enunciates the same principle in these terms : '......Where the reference inan adopting Statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific Statute or part thereof.....the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied, with all the changes made from time to time, at least as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting Statute.'

18. Similar view was again expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Ujagar Prints v. Union of India : [1989]179ITR317a(SC) of the said judgment are quoted below :

'49. Referential legislation is of two types. One is where an earlier Act or some of its provisions ar ncorporated by reference into a later Act. In this event, the provisions of the earlier Act or those so incorporated, as they stand in the earlier Act at the time of incorporation, will be read into the later Act. Subsequent changes in the earlier Act or the incorporated provisions will have to be ignored because, for all practical purposes, the existing provisions of the earlier Act have been re-enacted by such reference into the later one, rendering irrelevant what happens to the earlier Statute thereafter. Examples of this can be seen in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society ; Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State : [1975]2SCR138 ; Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 798. On the other hand, the later Statute may not incorporate the earlier provisions. It may only make a reference of a broad nature as to the law on a subject generally, as in Bhaiya v. Gopikabai : [1978]3SCR561 , or contain a general reference to the terms of an earlier Statute which are to be made applicable. In this case any modification, repeal or enactment of the earlier Statute will also be carried into in the later, for here, the idea is that certain provisions of an earlier Statute which become applicable in certain circumstances are to be made use of for the purpose of the later Act also. Examples of this type of legislation are to be seen in Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty : 1983ECR2198D(SC) ; New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector : 1978(2)ELT393(SC) and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. City Improvement Trust (1977) 1 SCR 569. Whether a particular Statute falls into the first or second category is always a question of construction. In the present case,in my view, the legislation falls into the second category. Section 3 (3) of the 1957 Act does not Incorporate into the 1957 Act any specific provisions of the 1944 Act. It only declares generally that the provisions of the 1944 Act shall apply 'so far as may be', that is, to the extent necessary and practical, for the purposes of the 1957 Act as well.

50. That apart, it has been held, even when a specific provision is incorporated and the case apparently falls in the first of the above categories, that the rule that repeals, modifications or amendments of the earlier Act will have to be ignored is not adhered to in certain situations. These have been set out in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narasimhan : 1975CriLJ1639 . In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the amendment of Section 21 of the Penal Code by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, was also applicable for purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the definition of 'public servant' in Section 21 of the Penal Code. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Court outlined the following propositions :

'Where a subsequent Act Incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases :

(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplement to each other ;

(b) where the two Acts are in part materia ;

(c) where the amendment in the previous Act. If not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.'

19. The notification creating Dayalbagh Area does not mention the boundary of regulated area by giving plot numbers and only refers that limits and boundaries of town area is declared as regulated area. Thus, the notification of town area has been borrowed by reference only and not by incorporation, hence, any amendment or modification under the Town Areas Act would be deemed to have modified the boundaries of regulated area. The two notifications, i.e., dated 29.10.1957 under the Town Areas Act and dated 12.9.1978 under the R.B.O. Act cannot be separated as the former is supplemental to the latter as if it were a part thereof.

20. Now coming to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties with regard to the Master Plan, it was strenuously argued that these three plots have been shown for the use of University in the Master Plan of Dayalbagh Area and thus the petitioner being University, can only use this land.

21. Section 5A of the R.B.O. Act, provides about the preparation of Master Plan for the regulated area. It reads as under :

'(1) if in the opinion of the State Government any regulated area requires to be developed according to a Master Plan it may cause such a plan to be prepared either through the Controlling Authority or through such other agency as it may think fit.

(2) A Master Plan shall be revised at the end of every ten years, and may be revised earlier if the State Government so think fit.'

22. The Master Plan prepared under Section 5A is to be revised at the end of every 10 years or may be earlier if the State Government thinks proper and fit. Section 6 of the R.B.O. Act provides that no person shall undertake or carry out the development of any site within the regulated area or erect, re-erect or make any material change in any building or extend any excavation or lay out any means of access to road except in accordance with the regulations issued under the R.B.O. Act and with previous permission of the Prescribed Authority in writing. Section 7 of the R.B.O. Act provides about the procedure of making such application seeking permission in respect of the development, building excavation or by means of access to which the application relates. One of the grounds for refusing the permission as mentioned in clause (g) is that the use of the proposed building or the plan is not in conformity with the Master Plan. Therefore, where the area is declared as a regulated area under Section 3 of the Act, in that event the 'constructions and the development activities' of that area shall strictly adhere to the land use mentioned in the Master Plan.

23. The Urban Planning and Development Act empowers the State Government to declare any area within the State as development area by issuing a notification under Section 3 of the Act in the gazette. After declaration under Section 3, the State Government may constitute Development Authority for the purposes of the Act for such development area to promote and secure the development of the development area according to the plan. Section 8 of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act provides for the preparation of Master Plan and zonal development plan. Sub-section (2) of Section 10 requires that every plan after its preparationshall be submitted to the State Government for Its approval and the State Government may either approve the plan without modification or with such modification as it may consider necessary, or reject the plan with the direction to the authority to prepare a fresh plan according to such direction. The procedure for preparation and approval of the plan has been mentioned in Section 11 of the Act. Section 12 of the Act provides that the Master Plan having been approved by the State Government shall be published and it shall come into operation from the date of its first publication. Section 13 of the Act provides about the amendment of the plan.

24. Sri Srivastava, during the course of argument, sought to argue that a draft Master Plan of Dayalbagh was prepared in 1982 and was approved by the State Government in 1992 and, therefore. It would be effective and remain operative till 2002 as has been provided in Section 5 of the R.B.O. Act. This submission can also not be accepted for the reason that the draft Master Plan of Dayalbagh Regulated Area was prepared in 1982 (Annexure-26 to counter-affidavit of respondent No. 5). The heading of the Plan is 'Dayalbagh Mahayojna. 1982-1992' and was sent to the State Government for its approval. But it appears that it remained pending before the State Government till 1992. From the perusal of the Master Plan, it appears that it has been prepared keeping in view the development activities upto 1992 only. It has not taken into account the developmental activities beyond 1992 and it is this draft plan which has been approved by the State Government. This also finds support from the letter of the State Government directing the development authority to prepare another Master Plan. Thus, it would be difficult to hold that the Master Plan for 1982-1992 is operative till 2002 inspite of the fact that the plan itself provides that it has been prepared for the period upto 1992 only.

25. The Master Plan describes the omnibus plan of a city or town keeping in view the impact of environmental factors. It mentions the land use falling within the Master Plan. It does not refer the ownership of the land. It only lays down that the land which has been brought within the Master Plan is to be used in the same manner and purpose as has been shown in the Master Plan so that the regulated area may be developed in accordance with the Master Plan otherwise the very object and purpose of the Act and of the Master Plan will be defeated. Therefore, any deviation from the Master Plan in respect of erection of a building or change of user cannot be permitted and the land can be used by the land owner in the manner and for the purpose indicated in the Master Plan. But merely on the basis that a particular piece of land has been shown in the Master Plan as University or as Hospital, the University or Hospital cannot claim title over it as a matter of right unless the same is acquired in accordance with law and land is given to such University or the Hospital for that purpose. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner has no title over it nor it has been acquired and given to the petitioner for establishing University. Therefore, simply on the ground that three plots which are in dispute in this writ petition, its user has been shown as University in the Master Plan, does not confer any right to the petitioner to claim possession of the same without there being any acquisition in its favour. The right to hold property has been ceased to be a fundamental right of a citizen, nevertheless it continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.

26. As noticed earlier, the Dayalbagh Town Area was declared in the year 1957 and the lands belonging to various persons including the Radha Swami Satsang Sabha and several other persons formed part of Dayalbagh Town Area. However, in view of restrictions A.W.C. 122imposed over the land use in the Master Plan of Dayalbagh Regulated Area which was predominantly made to promote religion of Radha Swami Satsangh, the development of land belonging to non Satsangis was greatly affected and hampered because a non-Satsangi was not allowed to raise any immoveable property within that area. Therefore, several persons whose lad was within the Dayalbagh Town Area, made objections and the Government realizing the difficulty and obstruction in the growth and development of land decided to excise out certain land from the Dayalbagh Town Area. The Town Area Committee of Dayalbagh Town Area also vide letter dated 9.5.1992 (Annexure-C.A. 2 to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 5) requested the Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra to exclude all those lands, which do not belong to Radha Swami Satsang from the Town Area of Dayalbagh and re-determine the boundary of the Dayalbagh Town Area. Consequently, the State Government issued notification dated 12.8.1993 (Annexure-8 to the petition) and re-determined the limit and boundary of the Dayalbagh Town Area. A perusal of the said notification shows that plot Nos. 340, 341 and 348 alongwith other plots were excised out from the area of Dayalbagh Town Area. It also appears that the controlling authority of Dayalbagh Regulated Area, pursuant to the aforesaid notification of the State Government, resolved in its meeting dated 20.9.1993 that the land taken out from Dayalbagh Town Area may be developed by the Agra Development Authority. The office of the Associate Town and Country Planner of the Urban and Rural Planning Department of U. P. vide letter dated 19.3.1998 (Annexure-C.A. 28 to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 5) asked the Agra Development Authority to develop the land in accordance with the Master Plan prepared for the Agra Development Authority, which has been excised out pursuant to the notification dated 12.8,1993.

27. It was faintly urged that on the request of the petitioner, 600acres of land including these three plots were allocated for establishing the University whereupon the petitioner has spent more than Rs. two crores on the construction of the building, details of which have been furnished in Annexure-7 to the writ petition : and further constructions are yet to be undertaken for which necessary grants are expected from the University Grants Commission and, therefore, on the assurance of the State, the petitioner has altered his position by spending huge amount in the construction of the building, etc. It is also submitted that some constructions have also been made by the petitioner on these three plots and, therefore. In view of the rule of promissory estoppel, the State-respondents cannot escape from its liability to carry out its obligations arising out of assurance made by it relying upon which the petitioner has altered his position. We are afraid, it is not possible to accept the contention in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand for invoking the rule of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is evolved on principles of equity to promote justice founded on fairness. For invoking this doctrine, the petitioner is not only required to plead but also to establish that there was a clear and unequivocal promise knowing or intending that if such promise is acted upon by the State in that event it would be binding on it and cannot resile from such promise. It is also to be established that upon such promise, the petitioner has altered his position by acting upon It. Nothing has been brought on record to show that any promise or assurance was made which induced the petitioner to establish the University and thus he altered his position by spending huge amount.

28. During the course of argument, we repeatedly asked Mr. G.D. Srivastava, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner to show any document or paper whereupon it could be gathered that there was any assurance which induced the petitioner to alter his position, but he failed to point out or to produce any such document orevidence which could establish the basic element which are sine qua non for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The only document which he relied is the Master Plan wherein the use of these plots have been shown as University. It has also been noticed earlier that after these plots being excised out from the Dayalbagh Regulated Area, it reverted back to the Agra Development Authority and, therefore, it will govern by the Master Plan of the Agra Development Authority wherein the user of these plots have not been shown as University. Besides that in our view, merely by showing the land use in Master Plan, it cannot be held by any stretch of Imagination that it made to induce the petitioner to alter his position. The argument that he has made some construction on these plots can also not be accepted for the reason that the second prayer in the writ petition is to remove the constructions raised in these three plots, namely, 340, 341 and 348 and further to restrain the respondents from doing any act which constitutes the breach of the Master Plan. This supports the submission made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 that they have already made substantial construction after approval of their plan over these plots. Therefore, in the absence of any clear and unequivocal promise made by the respondents-State. It is difficult to hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel can at all be invoked against the respondents.

29. The petitioner also could not produce any document to show that how these lands were conveyed to him and thus, in the absence of any document conveying the title in his favour and any promise or assurance in this regard made by the State-respondents, the petitioner in any view of the matter, has no right to put claim on these plots.

30. From the discussions made above, we are of the view that the plots in question after being excised out from Dayalbagh Town Area were made part of Agra Development Authority and Dayalbagh RegulatedArea has ceased to have any jurisdiction over the same and, therefore, the Master Plan of Agra Development Authority shall be applicable in respect of these plots.

31. We are further of the view that the petitioner has no locus standi or right to challenge the sorder of the Agra Development Authority sanctioning the plan of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 only on the basis of land user shown in the Master Plan of Dayalbagh Regulated Area.

32. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the writ petition. It accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed but without cost.