Mukesh (Minor) Son of Mahajan Under the Guardianship of Smt. Rukmani Devi Vs. the Chief Revenue Controlling Authority/Board of Revenue, - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/466400
SubjectCivil;Property
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided OnMar-24-2005
Case NumberCivil Misc. Writ Petition No. 39705 of 1996
JudgeA.P. Sahi, J.
Reported in2005(3)AWC2529
ActsStamp Act - Sections 33, 47A, 56 and 341; Stamp Rules; Land Acquisition Act; Constituttion of India - Article 226
AppellantMukesh (Minor) Son of Mahajan Under the Guardianship of Smt. Rukmani Devi
RespondentThe Chief Revenue Controlling Authority/Board of Revenue, ;additional Collector (Finance and Revenue
Appellant AdvocateJ.P. Pandey, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateC.S.C.
DispositionPetition dismissed
Excerpt:
- - 2 and 1 respectively, whereby reference under section 47a/33 of the indian stamp act has been answered against the petitioner and the petitioner has been called upon to make good the deficiency reported in the payment of the stamp duty. 2 has further indicated that even though the land has been reported to be an agricultural land and is being utilized as such with a tube well and one room constructed thereon, yet since the land is near to the human habitation and is approximately one hundred meters from the main p. one buyer may intend to establish an industrial undertaking thereon, another may intend to use it for agricultural purpose and a third person may intend to dedicate it for charitable purposes like leaving it open as pasture ground or a cremation ground or a playground. 2. a finding has been recorded by the revisional authority as well to the said fact, which is not under challenge in the present writ petition. as regards the first contention the judgment of the division bench clearly holds that in its earlier judgment the high court did not conclude the question of genuineness of the said two copies and that it remanded the case to the commissioner only because the commissioner, while considering the appellant's case, had not called for the record of the deputy secretary (re-habilitation) containing the copies which, according to the appellant, were copies endorsed to him by the deputy commissioner, lyallpur.a.p. sahi, j.1. the present writ petition questions the legality of the orders dated 30.12.1995 and 11.9.1996 passed by the additional collector (finance & revenue), maharajganj and chief revenue controlling authority/board of revenue, u.p. at allahabad, respondent nos. 2 and 1 respectively, whereby reference under section 47a/33 of the indian stamp act has been answered against the petitioner and the petitioner has been called upon to make good the deficiency reported in the payment of the stamp duty.2. i have heard sri j.p, pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, perused the records, as also the submission advanced by the learned standing counsel and the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.3. the dispute relates to plot no. 443 m area 0.18 acres of village dinguri, post office kamasin khurd via campiarganj, district maharajganj, which was purchased by the petitioner vide sale deed dated 12.6.1994 and the amount of consideration is rs. 16,200/-. it appears that since the valuation shown in the instrument was less than the circle rate the sub registrar reported the reference before the respondent no. 2 indicating certain deficiency in payment of stamp duty the respondent no. 2 proceeded with the matter and finally passed an order dated 30.12.1995, which is annexure-2 to the writ petition.4. the order passed by the respondent no. 2 indicates that reliance has been placed on an exemplar in respect of a sale deed executed by one sri ram lai in respect of an adjacent plot no. 445, area 2 decimals at the rate of rs. 55/- per square feet. the respondent no. 2 has further indicated that even though the land has been reported to be an agricultural land and is being utilized as such with a tube well and one room constructed thereon, yet since the land is near to the human habitation and is approximately one hundred meters from the main p.w.d. road, therefore, the instrument was under valued and the respondent no. 2 has proceeded to record a deficiency as indicated in the order dated 30.12.19955. the petitioner aggrieved by the said order moved a stamp revision no. 25 of 1996-97 under section 56 of the stamp act before the respondent no. 1. the ground of revision has been appended as annexure-3 to the writ petition. the revisional authority found that the petitioner did not file any objection to the contents of the reference and that the rate of rs. 9000/- per acre as suggested in the report of the tahsildar dated 25.1.1995 has no basis. the revisional authority further upheld the order of the respondent no. 2 and has placed reliance on the judgment of the apex court in the case of administrator general of west bengal v. collector, varanasi, reported in (1988) 2 scc 150 paragraph 8 to hold that the land has potentialities of urban use and hence the order of the additional collector, cannot be faulted with.6. having heard the learned counsel for the parties, 1 proceed to deal with the principal argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the authorities have committed error by proceeding to assess the value of the instrument on the basis of future potentialities of the land. learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the finding recorded by the revisional authority by placing reliance in the case of administrator general of west bengal (supra) is erroneous inasmuch as the said decision related to the assessment of compensation under the land acquisition act where the criteria is different. to the aforesaid extent the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted inasmuch as the principle of assessing the future potential value of a property for the purpose of levying stamp duty cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of calculating the stamp duty under the indian stamp act. the reliance placed by the revisional authority on the aforesaid decision, therefore, was totally misplaced. this aspect of the matter requires to be looked into in the light of the decisions on the stamp act itself. the apex court in the case of ramesh chandra bansal and ors. v. district magistrate/collector, ghaziabad and ors. reported in (1999) 5 scc 62, paragraph 5, had held that the imposition of stamp duty on sale deeds is on the actual market value of such property and not the value described in the instruments. the market value of a property may vary from village to village, from location to location and even may differ from the sizes of area and other relevant factors. this apart there has to be some material before such authority as to what is the likely value of such property in that area.7. a division bench of our high court in the case of smt. har payri and ors. v. district registrar, aligarh and ors. reported in (1999) 2 acj 1211, paragraph 6, has held that the question of imposition of stamp duty has to be seen at the time when document is executed. it cannot be the time prior to the date of execution. the relevant date for sale deed or for any instrument is the time of its execution.8. learned single judge of our high court dealing with, directly the proposition presently in question, in the case of maya foods and vanaspati ltd. company v. the chief controlling revenue authority (board of revenue) allahabad and ors. reported in 1999 rd 57, paragraph 19 has ruled as under: -'19. i have reproduced paragraph 5 of the impugned order 14.11.94 for a certain purpose. learned chief controlling revenue authority has observed that the land was purchased for an industrial purposes and the collector is not arbitrary in deciding the price of the land on the basis of the proposed usage. this proposition is legally incorrect. the market value of the land cannot be determined with reference to the use of the land to which buyer intends to put it. one buyer may intend to establish an industrial undertaking thereon, another may intend to use it for agricultural purpose and a third person may intend to dedicate it for charitable purposes like leaving it open as pasture ground or a cremation ground or a playground. these different intentions may affect the price that each of them may be willing to pay for the property and such prices have wide variations but the market value is not what each such individual may offer for the property. the market value is what a general buyer may offer and what the owner may reasonably expect. in determining the market value. the potential of the land as on the date of sale alone can be taken into account and not what potential it may have in the distant future.'the aforesaid proposition of law in the case of m/s maya foods and vanaspati ltd. company (supra), therefore, squarely applies in the present case and with which 1 am in full agreement. accordingly, the reasoning given by the authority below on the question of imposition of stamp duty of future potential value, of the land is unsustainable.9. coming to the second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the approach of the additional collector on the ground of proximity of the land to the road, it appears that the land is situate nearby the p.w.d. road. the authority has relied upon a sale deed executed in respect of 0.02 acre of land of an adjacent plot no. 445. relying upon the said exemplar, the authority proceeded to calculate the deficiency. learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of smt. prakashwati v. chief controlling revenue authority, board of revenue, up. at allahabad and ors. reported in (1996) 4 scc 657 and urged that the approach of the authority is erroneous. learned counsel for the petitioner has laid much stress on paragraph 4 of the aforesaid decision, which is quoted herein below: -'we have carefully examined the orders of the first respondents. noticeably the house is built on a very small area i.e. 68.84 sq yards only in town which is not a metropolis. presumably the smallness of the area would not suggest the same by itself to be a costly property or be situated in a prestigious of posh locality, where the upper classes would rub shoulders to acquire it. secondly, it being situated in an area which is close to samrat vikram colony, said to be a decent locality where people of high income group reside, does not by itself make it a part thereof. we are doubtful whether the said factum of closeness by itself would cast any reflection on the price of property in question. seemingly, influenced by the factor of the close proximity of samrat vikram colony, the assistant commissioner, stamps, for one does not know how, determined the monthly rental value of the property at rs. 1500/- per mensem and worked out the price of the house on that basis. despite that the tahsildar at a subsequent stage reported that the annual rental value of the house was rs. 1200/- per annum whereas for house tax purpose it was recorded as rs. 840/- per annum. the first respondent ignoring the same worked out a monthly rental of the property at rs. 830 per mensem and its value at rs. 2.5 lakhs, ostensibly on the basis that the average cost of construction of building in the year 1992 was about rs. 400 per sq. yard, inclusive of the land cost this figure too was arrived at one knows not from where, without determining the age of the building, the quality of construction and citing appropriate instances. the approach of the authorities, to say the least, was highly vain, casual and unsatisfactory and dehors any constructive material on the basis of which one could have said that the decision arrived at by the first respondent was fair and reasonable. we cannot approve of such an assumptive posture of the respondent in treating the appellant as an evader. we must, therefore, upset the impugned order of the first respondent and the proceedings for the supposed deficient payment of stamp duty, but confining the end result to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, when the valuation fixed is at least not below the minimum prescribed under section 341 of the stamp rules.'10. the order passed by the authorities has been supported by the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.11. a perusal of the facts as brought out on the record, indicate that the petitioner did not choose to raise any objection to the aforesaid exemplar before the respondent no. 2. a finding has been recorded by the revisional authority as well to the said fact, which is not under challenge in the present writ petition. the plea taken in paragraph 9 of the writ petition is that the land is in the interior area and is not part of any abadi. however, there is no evidence in support of the aforesaid allegation nor is there any successful challenge to the specific finding recorded by the authorities below. in view of the aforesaid fact and in view of the finding recorded by the authorities below it cannot be said that the approach of the respondent no. 2 was either causal or simply assumptive in nature. the authority has relied upon an exemplar against which there is no objection of the petitioner. accordingly, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in smt. prakashwati (supra) cannot be applied to the facts and circumstance of the instant case. thus, there is no error in the orders of the authorities below on this score. the imposition of stamp duty is founded on relevant material and cannot be faulted with12. finally there is yet another reason for not interfering with the orders of the authorities below. as indicated herein above, even though the finding on the question of future potential value of the land is untenable, yet the calculation which has been made objectively on the basis of relevant material cannot be faulted with. thus, one of the reasons which is an objective consideration recorded by the authorities below is sufficient to sustain the order. in such a situation, the principle laid down by the apex court in the decision of zora singh v. j.m. tandon and ors., reported in air 1971 sc 1537, paragraph 10, is worth quoting : -'10. counsel for the appellant raised the very same contentions before us which were raised before the high court. as regards the first contention the judgment of the division bench clearly holds that in its earlier judgment the high court did not conclude the question of genuineness of the said two copies and that it remanded the case to the commissioner only because the commissioner, while considering the appellant's case, had not called for the record of the deputy secretary (re-habilitation) containing the copies which, according to the appellant, were copies endorsed to him by the deputy commissioner, lyallpur. this is quite clear from the extract from its earlier judgment quoted earlier. there is, therefore, no substance in the first contention. the second contention also was rejected, and in our view rightly. the high court was right in holding that even if there were amongst the reasons given by the commissioner, some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant and could be considered sufficient, the commissioner's conclusions would not be vitiated. the principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applied to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. the reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. but in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would notaries.13. having, therefore, found the order to be otherwise valid, i see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders in exercise of power conferred under article 226 of the constitution of india.14. the writ petition is accordingly dismissed with the observations made herein above.
Judgment:

A.P. Sahi, J.

1. The present writ petition questions the legality of the orders dated 30.12.1995 and 11.9.1996 passed by the Additional Collector (Finance & Revenue), Maharajganj and Chief Revenue Controlling Authority/Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, respondent Nos. 2 and 1 respectively, whereby reference under section 47A/33 of the Indian Stamp Act has been answered against the petitioner and the petitioner has been called upon to make good the deficiency reported in the payment of the stamp duty.

2. I have heard Sri J.P, Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, perused the records, as also the submission advanced by the learned Standing Counsel and the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.

3. The dispute relates to plot No. 443 M area 0.18 acres of Village Dinguri, Post Office Kamasin Khurd Via Campiarganj, district Maharajganj, which was purchased by the petitioner vide sale deed dated 12.6.1994 and the amount of consideration is Rs. 16,200/-. It appears that since the valuation shown in the instrument was less than the circle rate the Sub Registrar reported the reference before the respondent No. 2 indicating certain deficiency in payment of stamp duty The respondent No. 2 proceeded with the matter and finally passed an order dated 30.12.1995, which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition.

4. The order passed by the respondent No. 2 indicates that reliance has been placed on an exemplar in respect of a sale deed executed by one Sri Ram Lai in respect of an adjacent plot No. 445, area 2 decimals at the rate of Rs. 55/- per square feet. The respondent No. 2 has further indicated that even though the land has been reported to be an agricultural land and is being utilized as such with a tube well and one room constructed thereon, yet since the land is near to the human habitation and is approximately one hundred meters from the main P.W.D. road, therefore, the instrument was under valued and the respondent No. 2 has proceeded to record a deficiency as indicated in the order dated 30.12.1995

5. The petitioner aggrieved by the said order moved a Stamp Revision No. 25 of 1996-97 under Section 56 of the Stamp Act before the respondent No. 1. The ground of revision has been appended as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The revisional authority found that the petitioner did not file any objection to the contents of the reference and that the rate of Rs. 9000/- per acre as suggested in the report of the Tahsildar dated 25.1.1995 has no basis. The revisional authority further upheld the order of the respondent No. 2 and has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 150 paragraph 8 to hold that the land has potentialities of urban use and hence the order of the Additional Collector, cannot be faulted with.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, 1 proceed to deal with the principal argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the authorities have committed error by proceeding to assess the value of the instrument on the basis of future potentialities of the land. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the finding recorded by the revisional authority by placing reliance in the case of Administrator General of West Bengal (supra) is erroneous inasmuch as the said decision related to the assessment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act where the criteria is different. To the aforesaid extent the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted inasmuch as the principle of assessing the future potential value of a property for the purpose of levying stamp duty cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of calculating the stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act. The reliance placed by the revisional authority on the aforesaid decision, therefore, was totally misplaced. This aspect of the matter requires to be looked into in the light of the decisions on the Stamp Act itself. The Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Bansal and Ors. v. District Magistrate/Collector, Ghaziabad and Ors. reported in (1999) 5 SCC 62, paragraph 5, had held that the imposition of stamp duty on sale deeds is on the actual market value of Such property and not the value described in the instruments. The market value of a property may vary from village to village, from location to location and even may differ from the sizes of area and other relevant factors. This apart there has to be some material before such authority as to what is the likely value of such property in that area.

7. A Division Bench of our High Court in the case of Smt. Har Payri and Ors. v. District Registrar, Aligarh and Ors. reported in (1999) 2 ACJ 1211, paragraph 6, has held that the question of imposition of stamp duty has to be seen at the time when document is executed. It cannot be the time prior to the date of execution. The relevant date for sale deed or for any instrument is the time of its execution.

8. Learned Single Judge of our High Court dealing with, directly the proposition presently in question, in the case of Maya Foods and Vanaspati Ltd. Company v. the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (Board of Revenue) Allahabad and Ors. reported in 1999 RD 57, paragraph 19 has ruled as under: -

'19. I have reproduced paragraph 5 of the impugned order 14.11.94 for a certain purpose. Learned Chief Controlling Revenue Authority has observed that the land was purchased for an industrial purposes and the Collector is not arbitrary in deciding the price of the land on the basis of the proposed usage. This proposition is legally incorrect. The market value of the land cannot be determined with reference to the use of the land to which buyer intends to put it. One buyer may intend to establish an industrial undertaking thereon, another may intend to use it for agricultural purpose and a third person may intend to dedicate it for charitable purposes like leaving it open as pasture ground or a cremation ground or a playground. These different intentions may affect the price that each of them may be willing to pay for the property and such prices have wide variations but the market value is not what each such individual may offer for the property. The market value is what a general buyer may offer and what the owner may reasonably expect. In determining the market value. The potential of the land as on the date of sale alone can be taken into account and not what potential it may have in the distant future.'

The aforesaid proposition of law in the case of M/s Maya Foods and Vanaspati Ltd. Company (supra), therefore, squarely applies in the present case and with which 1 am in full agreement. Accordingly, the reasoning given by the authority below on the question of imposition of stamp duty of future potential value, of the land is unsustainable.

9. Coming to the second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the approach of the Additional Collector on the ground of proximity of the land to the road, it appears that the land is situate nearby the P.W.D. road. The authority has relied upon a sale deed executed in respect of 0.02 acre of land of an adjacent plot No. 445. Relying upon the said exemplar, the authority proceeded to calculate the deficiency. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Smt. Prakashwati v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Board of Revenue, UP. at Allahabad and Ors. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 657 and urged that the approach of the authority is erroneous. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid much stress on paragraph 4 of the aforesaid decision, which is quoted herein below: -

'We have carefully examined the orders of the first respondents. Noticeably the house is built on a very small area i.e. 68.84 sq yards only in town which is not a metropolis. Presumably the smallness of the area would not suggest the same by itself to be a costly property or be situated in a prestigious of posh locality, where the upper classes would rub shoulders to acquire it. Secondly, it being situated in an area which is close to Samrat Vikram Colony, said to be a decent locality where people of high income group reside, does not by itself make it a part thereof. We are doubtful whether the said factum of closeness by itself would cast any reflection on the price of property in question. Seemingly, influenced by the factor of the close proximity of Samrat Vikram Colony, the Assistant Commissioner, Stamps, for one does not know how, determined the monthly rental value of the property at Rs. 1500/- per mensem and worked out the price of the house on that basis. Despite that the Tahsildar at a subsequent stage reported that the annual rental value of the house was Rs. 1200/- per annum whereas for house tax purpose it was recorded as Rs. 840/- per annum. The first respondent ignoring the same worked out a monthly rental of the property at Rs. 830 per mensem and its value at Rs. 2.5 lakhs, ostensibly on the basis that the average cost of construction of building in the year 1992 was about Rs. 400 per sq. yard, inclusive of the land cost This figure too was arrived at one knows not from where, without determining the age of the building, the quality of construction and citing appropriate instances. The approach of the authorities, to say the least, was highly vain, casual and unsatisfactory and dehors any constructive material on the basis of which one could have said that the decision arrived at by the first respondent was fair and reasonable. We cannot approve of such an assumptive posture of the respondent in treating the appellant as an evader. We must, therefore, upset the impugned order of the first respondent and the proceedings for the supposed deficient payment of stamp duty, but confining the end result to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, when the valuation fixed is at least not below the minimum prescribed under Section 341 of the Stamp Rules.'

10. The order passed by the authorities has been supported by the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.

11. A perusal of the facts as brought out on the record, indicate that the petitioner did not choose to raise any objection to the aforesaid exemplar before the respondent No. 2. A finding has been recorded by the revisional authority as well to the said fact, which is not under challenge in the present writ petition. The plea taken in paragraph 9 of the writ petition is that the land is in the interior area and is not part of any abadi. However, there is no evidence in support of the aforesaid allegation nor is there any successful challenge to the specific finding recorded by the authorities below. In view of the aforesaid fact and in view of the finding recorded by the authorities below it cannot be said that the approach of the respondent No. 2 was either causal or simply assumptive in nature. The authority has relied upon an exemplar against which there is no objection of the petitioner. Accordingly, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Smt. Prakashwati (supra) cannot be applied to the facts and circumstance of the instant case. Thus, there is no error in the orders of the authorities below on this score. The imposition of stamp duty is founded on relevant material and cannot be faulted with

12. Finally there is yet another reason for not interfering with the orders of the authorities below. As indicated herein above, even though the finding on the question of future potential value of the land is untenable, yet the calculation which has been made objectively on the basis of relevant material cannot be faulted with. Thus, one of the reasons which is an objective consideration recorded by the authorities below is sufficient to sustain the order. In such a situation, the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the decision of Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon and Ors., reported in AIR 1971 SC 1537, paragraph 10, is worth quoting : -

'10. Counsel for the appellant raised the very same contentions before us which were raised before the High Court. As regards the first contention the judgment of the Division Bench clearly holds that in its earlier judgment the High Court did not conclude the question of genuineness of the said two copies and that it remanded the case to the Commissioner only because the Commissioner, while considering the appellant's case, had not called for the record of the Deputy Secretary (Re-habilitation) containing the copies which, according to the appellant, were copies endorsed to him by the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur. This is quite clear from the extract from its earlier judgment quoted earlier. There is, therefore, no substance in the first contention. The second contention also was rejected, and in our view rightly. The High Court was right in holding that even if there were amongst the reasons given by the Commissioner, some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant and could be considered sufficient, the Commissioner's conclusions would not be vitiated. The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applied to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior Court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would notaries.

13. Having, therefore, found the order to be otherwise valid, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

14. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with the observations made herein above.