Queen-empress Vs. Durga - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/450119
SubjectCriminal
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided OnDec-31-1969
JudgeStraight, J.
Reported in(1888)ILR10All459
AppellantQueen-empress
RespondentDurga
Excerpt:
act v of 1861, sections 8, 29 - police officer--suspension--breach of order. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - when this reference came before me, i thought the matter of sufficient importance to invite the learned public prosecutor to be good enough to give me the benefit of his valuable assistance, more particularly as there was to be found in the bengal law reports, vol. indeed, with reference to what transpired yesterday in the course of the case of muhammad mian khan [unreported] and from what appears in the present case, it is difficult to see how the discipline of the police force can be properly preserved unless the district superintendents have larger and more clearly defined statutory powers to deal with insubordination.straight, j.1. this case has been reported by the learned judge of banda for consideration as to whether the conviction of the accused under section 29 of act v of 1861, which contains the statute law on the subject, can be sustained. section 29 of the act to which i have referred provides: 'every police officer who shall be guilty of any violation of duty, or wilful breach or neglect of any rule or regulation or lawful order made by competent authority; or who shall withdraw from the duties of his office without permission, or without having given previous notice for the period of two months; or who shall engage, without authority, in any employment other than his police duty; or who shall be guilty of cowardice; or who shall offer any unwarrantable personal violence to any person in his custody, shall be liable, on conviction before a magistrate, to a penalty not exceeding three months pay, or to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a period not exceeding three months, or to both.'2. in this particular case it appears that the man durga was a police constable employed in the police force of these provinces; that for some misconduct upon his part he had been ordered by his district superintendent to be suspended and to remain in the lines during such suspension; that despite the order that he was to remain in the lines, he absented himself therefrom without leave; and it was in respect of his doing so that he has been charged under section 29, act v of 1861, and convicted by the magistrate. when this reference came before me, i thought the matter of sufficient importance to invite the learned public prosecutor to be good enough to give me the benefit of his valuable assistance, more particularly as there was to be found in the bengal law reports, vol. viii, appendix, page 58 (the queen v. dinanath gangooly), a decision which, if a right decision, governs this case and settles the question as to whether such a conviction as that which had been had against durga can be sustained. i have heard the learned public prosecutor, and i have had an opportunity also of carefully considering the terms of the judgment of the two learned judges of the calcutta high court, and i am constrained to come to the conclusion that they were right. the provision contained in section 29 of act v of 1861 contemplates that the person to be charged with an offence under that section must have been, at the time of his having done the act in respect of which the charge is preferred, a police constable within the meaning of that statute; and by section 8, read in conjunction with the form to be found in the schedule attached to the act, it is clear, that when once a police officer has been suspended, it is his duty to hand over to his superior officer the certificate under which he is appointed a member of the police force; so that the effect of the statute, as pointed out by the two learned judges of the calcutta court, is that a police officer who has been suspended, from the more circumstance of that suspension, ceases to be a police officer, because it is ordered by the act that when he is suspended his certificate, hitherto in operation, shall cease to have effect, and shall be immediately surrendered to his superior officer. i cannot help concurring with that view, though, with the profoundest respect for the framers of the law, the policy or convenience of such a provision seems to me doubtful. indeed, with reference to what transpired yesterday in the course of the case of muhammad mian khan [unreported] and from what appears in the present case, it is difficult to see how the discipline of the police force can be properly preserved unless the district superintendents have larger and more clearly defined statutory powers to deal with insubordination. it is no use framing rules and formulating police manuals, if such rules and the directions in such manuals are not authorized by or are in hostility with the statute, and i think the subject is one which may fairly claim attention at the hands of the local government, specially just now, when there are so many complaints of the working of the present police system, and a thorough overhauling and re-organization seems desirable.3. i quash the conviction and sentence of durga, because on the terms of the statute it seems to me i have no option, and he will stand acquitted. i direct that a copy of this order be forwarded to the local government and to the inspector-general of police. under these circumstances the reference must be accepted, the conviction and sentence being set aside, the accused will stand acquitted.
Judgment:

Straight, J.

1. This case has been reported by the learned Judge of Banda for consideration as to whether the conviction of the accused under Section 29 of Act V of 1861, which contains the statute law on the subject, can be sustained. Section 29 of the Act to which I have referred provides: 'Every police officer who shall be guilty of any violation of duty, or wilful breach or neglect of any rule or regulation or lawful order made by competent authority; or who shall withdraw from the duties of his office without permission, or without having given previous notice for the period of two months; or who shall engage, without authority, in any employment other than his police duty; or who shall be guilty of cowardice; or who shall offer any unwarrantable personal violence to any person in his custody, shall be liable, on conviction before a Magistrate, to a penalty not exceeding three months pay, or to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a period not exceeding three months, or to both.'

2. In this particular case it appears that the man Durga was a police constable employed in the police force of these Provinces; that for some misconduct upon his part he had been ordered by his District Superintendent to be suspended and to remain in the lines during such suspension; that despite the order that he was to remain in the lines, he absented himself therefrom without leave; and it was in respect of his doing so that he has been charged under Section 29, Act V of 1861, and convicted by the Magistrate. When this reference came before me, I thought the matter of sufficient importance to invite the learned Public Prosecutor to be good enough to give me the benefit of his valuable assistance, more particularly as there was to be found in the Bengal Law Reports, Vol. VIII, Appendix, page 58 (The Queen v. Dinanath Gangooly), a decision which, if a right decision, governs this case and settles the question as to whether such a conviction as that which had been had against Durga can be sustained. I have heard the learned Public Prosecutor, and I have had an opportunity also of carefully considering the terms of the judgment of the two learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, and I am constrained to come to the conclusion that they were right. The provision contained in Section 29 of Act V of 1861 contemplates that the person to be charged with an offence under that section must have been, at the time of his having done the act in respect of which the charge is preferred, a police constable within the meaning of that statute; and by Section 8, read in conjunction with the form to be found in the schedule attached to the Act, it is clear, that when once a police officer has been suspended, it is his duty to hand over to his superior officer the certificate under which he is appointed a member of the police force; so that the effect of the statute, as pointed out by the two learned Judges of the Calcutta Court, is that a police officer who has been suspended, from the more circumstance of that suspension, ceases to be a police officer, because it is ordered by the Act that when he is suspended his certificate, hitherto in operation, shall cease to have effect, and shall be immediately surrendered to his superior officer. I cannot help concurring with that view, though, with the profoundest respect for the framers of the law, the policy or convenience of such a provision seems to me doubtful. Indeed, with reference to what transpired yesterday in the course of the case of Muhammad Mian Khan [Unreported] and from what appears in the present case, it is difficult to see how the discipline of the police force can be properly preserved unless the District Superintendents have larger and more clearly defined statutory powers to deal with insubordination. It is no use framing rules and formulating police manuals, if such rules and the directions in such manuals are not authorized by or are in hostility with the statute, and I think the subject is one which may fairly claim attention at the hands of the Local Government, specially just now, when there are so many complaints of the working of the present police system, and a thorough overhauling and re-organization seems desirable.

3. I quash the conviction and sentence of Durga, because on the terms of the statute it seems to me I have no option, and he will stand acquitted. I direct that a copy of this order be forwarded to the Local Government and to the Inspector-General of Police. Under these circumstances the reference must be accepted, the conviction and sentence being set aside, the accused will stand acquitted.