Smt. Vimla Devi Gaur Vs. Anil Kumar JaIn and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
contempt of court - hiding facts - section 24 of code of civil procedure 1908 - application filed for transfer of matter - earlier applications rejected by court - facts of dismissal not told in current application - held, current application can be rejected as concealment of facts amounts to contempt of court. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 113 of 1998, pending before the civil judge (junior division). haridwar, as well as smt.r. h. zaidi, j.1. heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. by means of this application under section 24, c.p.c., applicant prays for transfer of smt. vimla devi gaur v. anil kumar jain and others. misc. case no. 113 of 1998, pending before the civil judge (junior division). haridwar, as well as smt. vimla devi gaur v. anil kumar and others, civil revision no. nil of 2000, arising out of an order dated 23rd november, 1999 passed by the civil judge (junior division), haridwar pending before the 1st additional district judge, haridwar from district haridwar to any civil court either in district bulandshahr, meerut, bijnor, saharanpur or dehradun. 3. learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, shri s. k. mishra objected to the maintainability of the present application. it was urged that the applicant, smt. vimla devi gaur earlier filed transfer applications which were registered as transfer application no. 174 of 2000 and transfer application no. 175 of 2000, for transfer of the abovenoted cases from haridwar. it was urged that the said applications were dismissed by this court by judgment and order dated 17.7.2000. the said order has become final. the applicant again filed the present application and deliberately and wilfully suppressed the fact of rejection of earlier applications and succeeded in obtaining the interim order dated 25.8.2000 from this court by which further proceedings of misc. case no. 113 of 1998 and civil revision no. nil of 2000 were stayed. it was submitted that deliberate suppression of material facts, amounts to criminal contempt. it was also urged that as the applicant did not approach this court with clean hands, therefore, not only the aforesaid interim order dated 25.8.2000 is liable to be vacated but the present transfer application itself is liable to be dismissed. learned counsel for the applicant conceded that transfer application nos. 174 of 2000 and 175 of 2000 were dismissed by this court. it was, however, urged that the said applications were filed on the grounds different from the grounds, on which the present application has been filed, therefore, this application is legally maintainable. he, however, had to concede that facts relating to dismissal of earlier transfer applications, were not mentioned/ stated in the present application. in asiatic engineering co. v. achhru ram, air 1951 all 746 (fb), it was ruled by the full bench of this court as under : 'a person obtaining an ex parte order or a rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under article 226 of the constitution must come with clean hands, must not suppress any relevantfacts from the court, must refrain from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the court. courts, for their own protection, should insist that persons invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts. applying this principle to the present case, we feel that, in this case, the petitioner company has disentitled itself to ask for a writ of prohibition by material suppressions, misrepresentation and misleading statements which have been found by us above.'4. the principle laid down in the abovenoted case, will also apply to the transfer applications and other petitions filed in this court inasmuch as nobody should be permitted to obtain orders from this court by suppression or misstatement of material facts, thus, not only the interim order dated 25.8.2000 is liable to be vacated but this application itself deserves to be dismissed. the applicant did not approach this court with clean hands, legally in view of the law laid down by the apex court, deliberate suppression or misstatement of material facts amounts to criminal contempt. a reference in this regard may be made to the decisions in chandra shashi v. anil kumar verma, (1995) 1 scc 421 ; dhananjay sharma v. state of haryana and others, (1995) 3 scc 57 ; in re : sanjay datta, deputy secretary and others, (1995) 3 scc 619 and in dev nath yadav v. district inspector, schools and others, 1996 (2) esc 359. 5. further, it is evident from the copies of the earlier bail applications placed before this court by the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent that the grounds taken for transfer of misc. case no. 113 of 1998, were substantially the same as have been taken in the present applications. in any view of the matter, the fact ofdismissal of earlier transfer applications was a relevant fact for the purposes of the present application, therefore, the same ought to have been stated in the present application ; but with a view to obtain favourable orders from this court, said fact was not stated. however, under the facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the fact that the learned counsel for the applicant felt sorry and offered unconditional apology, i do not propose to take any action against the applicant or her counsel. 6. in view of the aforesaid facts and discussion, not only the interim order dated 25.8.2000 is liable to be vacated but the application itself deserves to be dismissed. 7. this application fails and is hereby dismissed. the interim order dated 25.8.2000 is also discharged. 8. this order shall also govern the transfer application no. 231 of 2000.