Jwala Prasad Vs. Irshad Muhammad Khan - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/449602
SubjectTenancy
CourtAllahabad
Decided OnFeb-15-1924
JudgeGrimwood Mears, Kt., C.J. and ;Piggott, J.
Reported inAIR1925All50; (1924)ILR46All512
AppellantJwala Prasad
Respondentirshad Muhammad Khan
Excerpt:
act (local) no. ii of 1901 (agra tenancy act), section 201(1) - suit by one co-sharer to recover from another co-sharer revenue which the former had been compelled to pay owing to a mistake in the revenue records. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - the courts below differed on the plain question of fact, namely, whether the plaintiff had or had not during the years in suit enjoyed possession over the entire share of 16 biswas and odd. we do not agree with the learned judge of this court, where he appears to hold that the lower appellate court failed to determine this point.1. this appeal has been heard ex parte. the suit was one brought under the provisions of section 160 of the agra tenancy act (no. ii of 1901). the plaintiff during the years to which the suit refers stood recorded as the usufructuary mortgagee of a share of 16 biswas and odd in a certain mahal. by reason of this record he was compelled to pay the whole of the land revenue demand in respect of the said share.2. as a matter of fact a portion of the mortgage had been redeemed and the plaintiff was really in possession as mortgagee over a share of 81 biswas only. the defendant was the co-sharer in possession of the remainder. the courts below differed on the plain question of fact, namely, whether the plaintiff had or had not during the years in suit enjoyed possession over the entire share of 16 biswas and odd. we do not agree with the learned judge of this court, where he appears to hold that the lower appellate court failed to determine this point. we have no doubt that the learned district judge has decided that the plaintiff during the years in suit was in possession only of a share of 8 biswas 5 biswansis.3. the learned judge of this court, however, in reversing the decision of the lower appellate court, was influenced by a curious argument addressed to him with respect to the wording of section 201 of the agra tenancy act (no. ii of 1901). what the plaintiff had to show was that as a matter of fact he was a co-sharer who had paid arrears of revenue on account of another co-sharer. because the revenue record during the years in suit was incorrectly framed, the plaintiff did not on the face of that record appear to have paid any revenue except that which was due from the share recorded in his name as usufructuary mortgagee.4. his position, therefore, was that of a co-sharer not recorded as having the particular proprietary right which would entitle him to maintain the suit brought by him. in reality his case fell under the first clause, and not under the third clause of section 201 of the tenancy act. the learned district judge had jurisdiction to inquire into this matter and to determine it. his finding on the question of possession is final.5. we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned judge of this court and restore the decree of the lower appellate court. the costs of both hearings in this court must be borne by the defendant.
Judgment:

1. This appeal has been heard ex parte. The suit was one brought under the provisions of Section 160 of the Agra Tenancy Act (No. II of 1901). The plaintiff during the years to which the Suit refers stood recorded as the usufructuary mortgagee of a share of 16 biswas and odd in a certain mahal. By reason of this record he was compelled to pay the whole of the land revenue demand in respect of the said share.

2. As a matter of fact a portion of the mortgage had been redeemed and the plaintiff was really in possession as mortgagee over a share of 81 biswas only. The defendant was the co-sharer in possession of the remainder. The Courts below differed on the plain question of fact, namely, whether the plaintiff had or had not during the years in suit enjoyed possession over the entire share of 16 biswas and odd. We do not agree with the learned Judge of this Court, where he appears to hold that the lower Appellate Court failed to determine this point. We have no doubt that the learned District Judge has decided that the plaintiff during the years in suit was in possession only of a share of 8 biswas 5 biswansis.

3. The learned Judge of this Court, however, in reversing the decision of the lower Appellate Court, was influenced by a curious argument addressed to him with respect to the wording of Section 201 of the Agra Tenancy Act (No. II of 1901). What the plaintiff had to show was that as a matter of fact he was a co-sharer who had paid arrears of revenue on account of another co-sharer. Because the revenue record during the years in suit was incorrectly framed, the plaintiff did not on the face of that record appear to have paid any revenue except that which was due from the share recorded in his name as usufructuary mortgagee.

4. His position, therefore, was that of a co-sharer not recorded as having the particular proprietary right which would entitle him to maintain the suit brought by him. In reality his case fell under the first clause, and not under the third clause of Section 201 of the Tenancy Act. The learned District Judge had jurisdiction to inquire into this matter and to determine it. His finding on the question of possession is final.

5. We accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Judge of this Court and restore the decree of the lower Appellate Court. The costs of both hearings in this Court must be borne by the defendant.