Ram Charitra Vs. Mohan Dei and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/449272
SubjectProperty;Other Taxes
CourtAllahabad
Decided OnJan-09-1923
JudgeRyves and ;Daniels, JJ.
Reported inAIR1923All210; (1923)ILR45All309
AppellantRam Charitra
RespondentMohan Dei and anr.
Excerpt:
act (local) no. iii of 1901 (united provinces land revenue act), section 233(k) - partition--objecting co-sharer referred to civil court--suit dismissed, hut subsequently decreed in appeal--no information given to revenue court--subsequent suit for recovery of share not maintainable. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 2. musammat mohan dei, one of the proprietors of a mahal, applied for a perfect partition, under the land revenue act, some time in 1911. ram charitra, the plaintiff appellant here, filed an objection claiming that he was a proprietor of an eight pies share in the mahal of which partition was sought. paragraph (k): partition or union of mahals except as provided in section 111 and section 112. 3. this suit is clearly not a suit such as is contemplated by section 111 of the land revenue act. no doubt the former suit was, but this suit clearly is not.ryves and daniels, jj.1. this appeal raises an unusual point of law and has, therefore, been referred to a division bench for disposal.2. musammat mohan dei, one of the proprietors of a mahal, applied for a perfect partition, under the land revenue act, some time in 1911. ram charitra, the plaintiff appellant here, filed an objection claiming that he was a proprietor of an eight pies share in the mahal of which partition was sought. the revenue authorities proceeded under section 111(1)(b) of the land revenue act and directed him-to establish his claim in the civil court. ram charitra accordingly brought a suit, but that suit was dismissed on the 29th of november, 1911. lie appealed and the appellate court reversed the trial court and leave him a decree declaring him entitled to the declaration which he sought. this was on the 9th of april, 1912. after the decision of the first court and before the decision of the appellate court, it appears that partition proceedings were completed. it must be the case that ram charitra took no steps to inform the revenue court either that he intended to appeal or had appealed against the decision of the trial court. nor did he take any steps, even after the case was decided in his favour by the appellate court, in the revenue courts, either by way of appeal or by an application for review. on the 17th of january, 1918, that is, seven years afterwards, he brings this suit for the recovery of possession of the eight pies share which he claimed. his plaint entirely ignores the partition and his claim is based on the decision of the appellate court in 1912. the only defence to the suit with which we are now concerned is that it was barred by section 233(k) of the land revenue act. this was the view taken by the lower appellate court, and, in our opinion, it was right. section 233 provides i hat no person shall institute any suit in the civil court with respect to any of the following matters:paragraph (k): partition or union of mahals except as provided in section 111 and section 112.3. this suit is clearly not a suit such as is contemplated by section 111 of the land revenue act. no doubt the former suit was, but this suit clearly is not. it has been held in a aeries of rulings by this court that section 233(k) bars a suit in the civil court which attempts to disturb the title to land as established in a partition in the revenue court. the result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Judgment:

Ryves and Daniels, JJ.

1. This appeal raises an unusual point of law and has, therefore, been referred to a Division Bench for disposal.

2. Musammat Mohan Dei, one of the proprietors of a mahal, applied for a perfect partition, under the Land Revenue Act, some time in 1911. Ram Charitra, the plaintiff appellant here, filed an objection claiming that he was a proprietor of an eight pies share in the mahal of which partition was sought. The revenue authorities proceeded under Section 111(1)(b) of the Land Revenue Act and directed him-to establish his claim in the civil court. Ram Charitra accordingly brought a suit, but that suit was dismissed on the 29th of November, 1911. lie appealed and the appellate court reversed the trial court and leave him a decree declaring him entitled to the declaration which he sought. This was on the 9th of April, 1912. After the decision of the first court and before the decision of the appellate court, it appears that partition proceedings were completed. It must be the case that Ram Charitra took no steps to inform the revenue court either that he intended to appeal or had appealed against the decision of the trial court. Nor did he take any steps, even after the case was decided in his favour by the appellate court, in the revenue courts, either by way of appeal or by an application for review. On the 17th of January, 1918, that is, seven years afterwards, he brings this suit for the recovery of possession of the eight pies share which he claimed. His plaint entirely ignores the partition and his claim is based on the decision of the appellate court in 1912. The only defence to the suit with which we are now concerned is that it was barred by Section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act. This was the view taken by the lower appellate court, and, in our opinion, it was right. Section 233 provides I hat no person shall institute any suit in the civil court with respect to any of the following matters:

Paragraph (k): Partition or union of mahals except as provided in Section 111 and Section 112.

3. This suit is clearly not a suit such as is contemplated by Section 111 of the Land Revenue Act. No doubt the former suit was, but this suit clearly is not. It has been held in a aeries of rulings by this Court that Section 233(k) bars a suit in the civil court which attempts to disturb the title to land as established in a partition in the revenue court. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.