Committee of Management Shri Kashi Raj Mahavidyalaya, Aurai and Another Vs. Dy. Director of Education, Varanasi and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
constitution - education - section 16a of u.p. intermediate education act, 1921 and rule 5 chapter 8 of allahabad high court rules, 1952 - whether persons who are in actual control of affairs of institution are said to constitute committee of management - question is of administrative nature - deputy director not authorized to act judicially but rationally - cannot bind court or tribunal with his finding - deputy director cannot be a substitute for tribunal. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - there can be no doubt that to enable the board to perform its duties properly, and effectively, as per provisions of the act, it is essential that every institution is administered satisfactorily. provided that where the management of an institution is aggrieved by an orderof the director refusing to approve an amendment or change in the scheme of administration, the state government, on the respresentation of the management, may, if it is satisfied that the proposed amendment or change in the scheme of administration is in the interest of the institution, order the director to approve of the same, and thereupon the director shall act accordingly. and so, it would not be constitutionally inappropriate or improper to say that judicial power of the state can be conferred on the hierarchy of courts established under the constitution as well as on tribunals which are not courts strictly so called. since the tribunals also discharge similar functions of deciding disputes acting judicially, as is done by the courts and they enjoy the same status as the courts do, as the tribunals have also been entrusted with inherent judicial powers of the state, there is no reason why the same reason should not apply for exclusion of special appeal in respect of an orderof a tribunal. it was observed that the finding of 'guilty' made by the committee is only a recommendation to the parliament to commence its process and to act on lhat finding which, at best, is tentative and inchoate at the stage of submission of the report under sec-lion 4 of the act.orderr. dayal, j. 1. following question has been referred by a division bench of this court for decision by the full bench: 'whether the deputy director of education can be said to be functioning as a tribunal within the meaning of rule 5 in chapter viii of the allahabad high court rules, while exercising the powers conferred on him under sub-section (7) of section 16-a of the u.p. intermediate education act, 1921.'2. this special appeal arose from an order passed by a learned single judge of this court dismissing the writ petition which was filed questioning the validity of an order passed by thedeputy director of education under section 16-. a(7) of the u.p. intermediate education act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the act). the appeal came up for hearing before a division bench comprising the then hon'ble acting chief justice mr. a.l. rao and hon'ble mr. justice v.n. khare (as he then was). a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent that the special appeal is not maintainable in view of the provisions of rule 5 of chapter viii of the allahabad high court rules, as the deputy director of education acts as a tribunal and no special appeal lies in respect of an order of a tribunal. rule 5 reads as under: 'special appeal:-- an appeal shall lie to the court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a court subject to the superintendence of the court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by article 226 or article 227 of the constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award-(a) of a tribunal, court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any uttar praclesh act or under any central act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the state list or the concurrent list in the seventh schedule to the constitution, or (b) of the government or any officer or authority, made or purporied to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellaie or revisional jurisdiction under any such act of one judge.3. there is no dispute that no special appeal lies in respect of an order made by a court or a tribunal and, as such, if the deputy director of education whose order gave rise to the writ petition from which the special appeal arose, the present special appeal would not be maintainable. the learned counsel for the third respondent in support of his contention that the deputy director of education is a tribunal referred to a decision of a division bench of this court rendered in special appeal no. 521 of 1994 (committee of management u.m. vidyalaya, khascgpur v. slate of u.p.), 1994 all cj 939, where it was held that while exercising power under section 16-a(7)the deputy director of education discharges his duties as a tribunal. it was also observed in that judgment that similar view had been taken by a division bench of this court in sita ram lal v. d.i.o.s. azamgarh, 1994 all cj 180. the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the view taken by the division bench required reconsideration. the division bench was not inclined to follow the view taken in the former case and so referred the question set out in the beginning of this judgment for decision by a full bench. 4. we have heard shri r.g. padia, teamed counsel for the appellants. no arguments were advanced on behalf of the respondents. 5. the u. p. intermediate education act, 1921 was enacted to establish the board of high school and intermediate education (hereinafter refered to as the board) which took me place of the allahabad university in regulating and supervising the system of the high school and intermediate education in uttar pradesh and prescribe courses therefor. section 7 of the act specifies powers of the board and, inter alia, provides that the board shall have the power to prescribe course of instructions, text books, other books and instructional material: to grant diploma or certificate; to conduct the examinations at the end of the high school and intermediate courses; to recognise instructions for the purposes of its examinations; to admit candidates to its examinations; to demand and receive such fee as may be prescribed in the regulations; to publish or withhold publication of the results of its examination wholly or in part; to see the schedules of new demands proposed to be included in the budget relating to the institutions recognised by it and to submit, if it thinks fit, its views thereon for the consideration of the state government, and to do all such other acts and things as may be requisite in order to further the objects of the board as a body constituted for regulating and supervising high schools and intermediate education. there can be no doubt that to enable the board to perform its duties properly, and effectively, as per provisions of the act, it is essential that every institution is administered satisfactorily. section 16-a provides for a scheme of administration for every institution. such scheme must necessarily provide for the constitution of a committee of management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. section16-a reads as under: '16-a. : scheme of administration:-- notwithstanding anything in law, document, or decree order of a court or other instrument there shall be a scheme of administration (hereinafter referred to as the scheme of administration) for every institution, whether recognised before or after the commencement of the intermediate education (amendment) act, 1958. the scheme of administration shall amongst other matters provide for the constitution of a committee of management (hereinafter called the committee of management) vested with authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. the head of the institution and two teachers thereof, who shall be selected by rotation according to seniority in the manner to be prescribed by regulations, shall be ex-officio members of the committee of management with a right to vote. (2) no member of the committee of management shall either attend a meeting of the committee or exercise his right to vote whenever a charge concerning his personal conduct is under discussions. (3) the scheme of administration shall also describe subject to any regulations, the respective powers, duties and functions of the (the head of the institution) and committee of management in relation to the institution. (4) where more than one recognised institution is maintained by a body or authority, there shall be separate committee of management for each institution unless otherwise provided in the regulations for any class of institution. (5) the scheme of administration of every institution shall be subject to the approval of the director and no amendment to or change in the scheme of administration shall be made at any lime without the prior approval of the director: provided that where the management of an institution is aggrieved by an orderof the director refusing to approve an amendment or change in the scheme of administration, the state government, on the respresentation of the management, may, if it is satisfied that the proposed amendment or change in the scheme of administration is in the interest of the institution, order the director to approve of the same, and thereupon the director shall act accordingly. (6) every recognized institution shall be managed in accordance with the scheme of administration framed under and in accordance with sub-section (5) and sections 16-b and 16-c. (7) whenever there is dispute wilh respect to the management of an institution, persons found by the regional deputy director of education, upon such enquiry as is deemed fit to be in actual control of its affairs may, for purposes of this act, be recognised to constitute the committee of management of such institution until a court of competent jurisdiction direct otherwise: provided that the regional deputy director of education shall, before making an order under this sub-section, afford reasonable opportunity to the rival claimants to make representations in writing. explanation-- in determining the question as to who is in actual control of the affairs of the institution, the regional deputy director of education shall have regard to the control over the funds of the institution and over the administration, the receipt of income from its properties, the scheme of administration approved under subsection (5) and other relevant circumstances.' 6. from a perusal ofsection 16-a it would appear that a dispute with respect to the management of an institution is contemplated to be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. however, until such decision is available, interim arrangement has to be made with respect to the persons who may be recognised to constitute the committee of management, because if there is confusion about the persons who are in charge of the management of an institution, the board would find itself handicapped in performance of its statutory duties, with respect to that institution. the persons who may under sub-section (7) be recognised as constituting the committee of man-agement of such institution must be the persons who are found to be in actual control of its affairs. the authority who is to find such persons is by virtue of sub-sec!ion (7) the regional deputy director of education, who must afford reasonable opportunity to rival claimants to make representations in writing. he need not give any opportunity to the rival claimants to produce oral evidence or make oral arguments, as he is required to make only such inquiry as he deems fit. in determining the question as to who are in actual control of the affairs of the institution, the regional deputy director of education is required to haveregard to the control over the funds of the institution and over the administration, the receipt of income from its properties, the scheme of administration approved under sub-section (5) and other relevant circumstances. the requirement to provide reasonable opportunity to make representations in writing is to ensure a fair deal, since even an administrative authority, in discharge of its administrative functions, must act wilh fairness, particularly when the discharge of the functions by the administrative authority is to affect the civil rights of any person. the right to participate in the management of an institution is certainly civil right. the act does not ctonfer such powers on the regional deputy director of education as are associated with a court or a tribunal, such as powers about summoning of witnesses and production of documents. moreover, the decision of the regional deputy director of education as to the persons who are found in actual control of affairs may or may not result in any effective order. sub-section (7) only permits such persons as are found to be in actual control of affairs to be recognised to constitute the committee of management of such institution. the word, 'may' occurring in sub-section (7) makes it clear that it is not imperative that such persons should necessarily be recognised to constitute the committee of management. further, even if such persons are recognised to constitute a commiltee of management, the recognition is not to settle the dispute between the rival claimants for all purposes, but only for the purposes of the act. this coupled with the fact that the recognition stipulated in sub-section (7) is to operate until the decision of the court of competent jurisdiction suggesls that the regional deputy director of education has not been entrusted with the inherent judicial power of the state. 7. as pointed out in a.c. companies ltd. v. p.m. sharma, air 1965 sc 1595, under our constitution, mere is no rigid separation of powers as under the australian constitution; and so, it would not be constitutionally inappropriate or improper to say that judicial power of the state can be conferred on the hierarchy of courts established under the constitution as well as on tribunals which are not courts strictly so called. the functions discharged by the courts and tribunals arc necessarily the same, though the nature of questions entrusted to their jurisdiction, the pro-cedure required to be followed by them and the extent and character of their powers may be different. 8. as observed in engineering mazdoor sabha v. hind cycles ltd, air 1963 sc 874, the expression, 'a court' in the technical sense is a tribunal constituted by the state as a part of ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the state's inherent judicial powers. the tribunal as distinguished from the court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially, but it does not constitute a court in the technical sense. special matters and questions are entrusted to the tribunals for decision and in that sense they share with the courts common characteristic, namely, both the courts and tribunal arc constituted by the state and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions (vide durga shanker mehta v. reghuraj singh, ((1955) i scr 267 at p. 272) : (air 1954 sc 520 at p. 522). they are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. as said in a.c. companies case. (air 1965 sc 1595) (supra) the procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. as in the case of courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the stale's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the state's inherent judicial function which they discharge. judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign state and on consideration of policy, the state transfer its judicial functions and powers mainly to the court established by the constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the state, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. it is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the courts and features which are distinct and separate. the basicand fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the tribunals isthat they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign state.' 9. the rationale behind exclusion of special appeals in respect of a decree or order made by a court is that once adecision has been rendered by a competent court of jurisdiction, on challenge in the high court against such decree or order should be enough, so far as the high court is concerned and finality should attach to that decision even if the decision has been rendered by a learned single judge of the high court. since the tribunals also discharge similar functions of deciding disputes acting judicially, as is done by the courts and they enjoy the same status as the courts do, as the tribunals have also been entrusted with inherent judicial powers of the state, there is no reason why the same reason should not apply for exclusion of special appeal in respect of an orderof a tribunal. therefore, a tribunal within the meaning of rule 5 must be an authority which is required to act judicially and which has been entrusted with the inherent judicial powers of the state. 10. the question as to whether a particular authority is-a tribunal came to be considered before the apex court from time to lime, in the context of article 136 of the constitution. under article 136, special leave may be granted to appeal from a judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal. under rule 5, special appeal does not lie in respect of an order from a court or tribunal. thus under article 136, as under rule 5, the word, 'tribunal' came up for consideration i n association with the word 'court', and so tribunal' should mean the same authority, under both the provisions. 11. in jaswant sugar mills ltd. meerut v. lakshmi chand, air 1963 sc 677, clause 29 of the order issued by the governor of uttarpradesh in 1954 under the u.p. industrial disputes act, 1947 provided that during pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal or an adjudicator in respect of any dispute, an employer shall not alter the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute or discharge or punish any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission of a conciliation officer. a question arose whether the conciliation officer is a tribunal and whether an appeal underarticle 136 of the constitution is competent against the grant or refusal of permission by the conciliation officer under clause 29. it was held that conciliation officer in granting or refusing permission to alter the terms and conditions of service of workmen, at the instance of employer, has to act judicially, but a tribunal, besides being' under a duly to act judicially, must be a body invested with the judicial power of the state. it was held that the conciliation officer is not invested with the judicial power of the state and, therefore, he cannot be regarded as tribunal within the meaning of article 136 of the constitution. the court observed : '(21) reverting to the order issued by the governor of uttar pradesh in 1954 it is manifest that no procedure is prescribed for the investigation to be made by the conciliation officer, under cl. 29. he is not required to sit in public; no formal pleadings are contemplated to be tendered; he is not empowered to compel attendance of witnesses, nor is he restricted in making an enquiry, to evidence which the parties may bring before him. the conciliation officer is again not capable of delivering a determinative judgment or award affecting the rights and obligations of parties. he is not invested with powers similar to those of the civil court under the code of civil procedure for enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, compelling production of documents, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and other matters. he is concerned in granting leave to determine whether there is a prima facie case for dismissal or discharge of an employee or for altering terms of employment, and whether the employer is actuated by unfair motives; he has not to decide whether the proposed step of discharge or dismissal of the employee was within the rights of the employer. his order merely removes a statutory ban in certain eventualities, laid upon the common law right of an employer to dismiss, discharge or alter the terms of employment according to contract between the parlies. the conciliation officer has undoubtedly to act judicially in dealing with an application under cl. 29, but he is not invested with the judicial power of the state; he cannot therefore be regarded as a 'tribunal' within the meaning of art. 136 of the constitution.'12. in engineering mazdoor sabha v. hind cycles ltd. air 1963 sc 874, the question fordecision was whether the arbitrator under section 10a of the industrial disputes act, 1947 is a tribunal? it was held that the arbitrator under section 10-a is not exactly in the same position as a private arbitrator but that does not mean that he isa tribunal under article 136. even if some of the trappings of a court are present in his case, he lacks the basic, the essential and the fundamenlal requisite in that behalf because he is not invested-with the state's inherent judicial power. he is appointed by the parties and the power to decide the dispute between the parties who appoint him is derived by him from the agreement of the parties and from no other source. 13. in dev singh v. registrar, punjab and haryana high court, (1987) 3 scc 169 : (air 1987 sc 1629), the district judge imposed upon some members of the ministerial staff punishment of dismissal from service. they preferred service appeal before the high court of punjab and haryana. the high court considered the verious contentions placed by the appellants in detail and dismissed the appeal as having no merit. the question before the supreme court was whether the high court disposing of the appeal under the relevant roles is a tribunal and the appeal lies under article 136 of the constitution from the decision in appeal by the high court. it was observed (at p. !635 of air): '14. rule x(3) enables the high court to summarily reject the appeal without hearing the petitioner or refer it to the district judge for report and or receipt of such report reject the petition without hearing the petitioner, secondly to hear the petitioner, and in cases where other persons are held to be concerned in the subject of the petition, such other person in open court. the procedure contained in this rule of hearing the petition is not similar to the procedure followed in regular judicial proceedings. under these rules it is not obligatory for the high court to hear the petitioner. it can go into the papers and reject it summarily without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. it can also refer it to the district judge for report. the second method of disposal of this petition is to get a report from the district judge and on receipt of such a report to dismiss it without hearing the petitioner and thirdly to give a hearing to the petitioner and also those who will be affected by the disposal of the petition. the manner of disposal of the petition underthis rule makes it abundantly clear that this petition which the appellants call an appeal is not strictly a judicial proceeding involving a lis between two adversaries and the decision thereon is not a judicial decision. it has all the trappings of an administrative proceeding and an administrative decision.'the court was of the view that aclose study of the rules left no doubi that in deciding an appeal under rule x, the high court exercises only a supervisory and administrative control and does not act as a tribunal disposing of an appeal involving a lis between two rival parties and arriving at a judicial decision. as such it was held that the high court was not a tribunal and as such no appeal lay under article 136 of the constitution. 14-15. in workmen v. meenakshi mills ltd., (1992) 3 scc 336 : (1992 air scw 1378), the question for decision was as to the status of the appropriate government or authority while passing an order under sub-section (2) of section 25n of the industrial disputes act, 1947, according to which on receipt of a notice under clause (c) of sub-seclion (1) the appropriate government or authority may, after making such enquiry as such government orauthority thinksfil, grant or refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing the permission for the retrenchment to which the notice relates. it was held that the power exercised by the appropriate government or authority under subsection (2) of section 25n is similar to the power that was exercised by the conciliation officer in jaswant sugar mills ltd. v. lakshmichand, (air 1963 sc 677) (supra) and although the appropri-ale government or authority is required to act judicially while granting or refusing permission for retrenchment of workmen under sub-section (2) of section 25n it is not invested with the judicial power of the slate and it cannot be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of article 136 of the constitution. 16. in mrs. sarojini ramaswami v. union of india, air 1992 sc 2219, a question arose whether the committee constituted under seclion 3(2) of the judges (inquiry) act, 1968 is a tribunal and, therefore, its findings are subject to an appeal to the supreme court under article 136 of the constitution, sub-section (1) of section 6 lays down that if the committee absolves the concerned judge in its report and records a findingthat the judge is not guiliy of any misbehaviour, then no further steps shall be taken in either house of parliament and the motion pending in the house shall not be proceeded with. it is clear from sub-section (1) of section 6 that a finding of 'not guilty recorded by the committe in its report terminates the process of remova1 of the concerned judge initiated in accordance with section 3(1) of the act. sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 6 provide for the situation where the report of the committee contains a finding that the judge is 'guilty' of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity. sub-section (2) prescribes that the motion admitted by the speaker chairman undersection 3(1) of the act shall then be taken up for consideration by the house together with the report of the committee. it is in this situation and in this manner that the parliamentary part of the process of removal of a judge commences requiring the house to consider the motion for removal of the jude . sub-section (3) lays down that if the motion is adopted by each house of parliament in accordance with provisions of clause (4) of article 124, then the misbehaviour or incapacity of the judge shall be deemed to have been proved and the address praying for the removal of the judge shall be presented to the president in the prescribed manner. thus, there will be no occasion for appeal under article 136 where report of the committee is of not guilty. it was held that the finding of 'guilty' made by the committee is not a final decision but is an inchoate finding prior to the stage of making the final decision, which alone is required to be subject to judicial review. it was observed that the finding of 'guilty' made by the committee is only a recommendation to the parliament to commence its process and to act on lhat finding which, at best, is tentative and inchoate at the stage of submission of the report under sec-lion 4 of the act. it was pointed out in para 57 that the decisions of the apex court indicate that one of the considerations which has weighed with the court for holding a statutory authority to be a tribunal under article 136 is finality orcpnclu-siveness and the binding nature of the determination by such authority. thus. inquiry committee was not held to be a tribunal under article 136 of the constitution. 17. it would appear that to determine the question whether an authority is a tribunal, the nature of the order passed by the authority andalso the characteristic of the body which is called upon to adjudicate upon the matter in dispute are material considerations. even a judicial authority may in a given situation, act in administrative or executive capacity. in that situation the authority would not be a tribunal. likewise an administrative authority even if required to act judicially would not be a tribunal if it is not invested with the inherent judiciat power of the state. as pointed out earlier, under section 16-a(7), the regional deputy director of education may find the persons who are in actual control of the affairs of an institution, yet those persons may not be recognised as constituting the committee of management. by way of illustration, such a situation may obtain where valid election has been held, but the previous committee of management has not allowed the nowly elected persons to have actual control of affairs of the institution. in such a case, even though members of previous committee of man-agement may be in actual control of the affairs of the authority, they may not be recognised as constituting the committee of management. whether the persons who are found to be in actual control of the affairs of an institution are to be recognised as constituting the committee of management of the institution under sub-section (7) of section 16-a is essentially administrative in character. the finding of the deputy director of education as to the persons in actual control of affairs of the institution does not decide the dispute as to the entitlement to be members of the committee of management. he is not entrusted with the duty to act judicially, though he must act fairly. he has no trappings of the court. this finding as to the persons in actual control of the affairs of an institution lacks in finality or conclu-siveness and binding nature, which is associated with the decisions of a court or a tribunal, therefore, the regional deputy director of education is not a tribunal within the meaning of rule 5 of chapter viii of the allahabad high court rules. 18. we have pointed out that in the committee of management, u.m. vidyalaya khasvegpur v. state of u.p., 1994 all cj 939, reliance was placed on sita ram lal v. d.i.o.s. azamgarh, 1994 all cj 180, observing that similar view had been taken by a division bench of this court in that case. however, that casedid not arise from an order passed under section 16-a(7) of the act.there, the question was whether the inspector deciding an appeal under sub clause (f) of regulation 3(1), chapter 2 of the regulations made under sections 16-a, 16-b and 16-c of the act from an appeal under sub-clause(e) of the aforesaid regulation is a tribunal within the meaning of rule 5 of the allahabad high court rules. the relevant provision was materially different in that case from clause (7) of section 16-a of the act. sub-clause (e) of the regulation provides that every dispute about the seniority of the teacher shall be decided by the committee of management, giving reasons for the decisions. sub-clause (f) says that any teacher aggrieved from the decision of the committee of management under sub-clause (e) may prefer an appeal to the inspector within 15 days from the date of communication of such decision to such teacher and the decision of the inspector in appeal shall be final and shall be given effect to by the committee of management. it was held that the district inspector of schools, while deciding the dispute regarding seniority of the teachers, has to give notice to the parties, look into the papers which may be filed by them, give an opportunity to produce evidence and considering respective case of the parties to determing the dispute by a reasoned order. further, it it was observed that he has trappings of a court and this power has been vested under clause (f) of regulation 3(1). as such he was held to be a tribunal. the terms of the relevant provisions which fell for consideration in that case being different from those in the instant case, that decision is of no avail for determining the controversy in the instant case. 19. in the result, we hold that the deputy director of education cannot be said to be functioning as a tribunal within the meaning of rule 5 in chapter vi11 of the allahabad high court rules while exercising the powers conferred on him under sub-section (7) of section 16-a of the u.p. intermediate education act, 1921. accordingly, we answer the reference in the negative. 20. order accordingly.

Judgment:
ORDER

R. Dayal, J.

1. Following question has been referred by a Division Bench of this Court for decision by the full Bench:

'Whether the Deputy Director of Education can be said to be functioning as a Tribunal within the meaning of Rule 5 in Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, while exercising the powers conferred on him under sub-section (7) of Section 16-A of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921.'

2. This special appeal arose from an order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing the writ petition which was filed questioning the validity of an order passed by theDeputy Director of Education under Section 16-. A(7) of The U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench comprising the then Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice Mr. A.L. Rao and Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.N. Khare (as he then was). A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent that the special appeal is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, as the Deputy Director of Education acts as a tribunal and no special appeal lies in respect of an order of a tribunal. Rule 5 reads as under:

'Special Appeal:-- An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award-(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Praclesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purporied to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellaie or revisional jurisdiction under any such act of one Judge.

3. There is no dispute that no special appeal lies in respect of an order made by a Court or a tribunal and, as such, if the Deputy Director of Education whose order gave rise to the writ petition from which the special appeal arose, the present special appeal would not be maintainable. The learned counsel for the third respondent in support of his contention that the Deputy Director of Education is a tribunal referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court rendered in Special Appeal No. 521 of 1994 (Committee of Management U.M. Vidyalaya, Khascgpur v. Slate of U.P.), 1994 All CJ 939, where it was held that while exercising power under Section 16-A(7)the Deputy Director of Education discharges his duties as a Tribunal. It was also observed in that judgment that similar view had been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Sita Ram Lal v. D.I.O.S. Azamgarh, 1994 All CJ 180. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the view taken by the Division Bench required reconsideration. The Division Bench was not inclined to follow the view taken in the former case and so referred the question set out in the beginning of this judgment for decision by a Full Bench.

4. We have heard Shri R.G. Padia, teamed counsel for the appellants. No arguments were advanced on behalf of the respondents.

5. The U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 was enacted to establish the Board of High School and Intermediate Education (hereinafter refered to as the Board) which took me place of the Allahabad University in regulating and supervising the system of the High School and Intermediate Education in Uttar Pradesh and prescribe courses therefor. Section 7 of the Act specifies powers of the Board and, inter alia, provides that the Board shall have the power to prescribe course of instructions, text books, other books and instructional material: to grant diploma or certificate; to conduct the examinations at the end of the High School and Intermediate courses; to recognise instructions for the purposes of its examinations; to admit candidates to its examinations; to demand and receive such fee as may be prescribed in the regulations; to publish or withhold publication of the results of its examination wholly or in part; to see the schedules of new demands proposed to be included in the budget relating to the institutions recognised by it and to submit, if it thinks fit, its views thereon for the consideration of the State Government, and to do all such other acts and things as may be requisite in order to further the objects of the Board as a body constituted for regulating and supervising High Schools and Intermediate Education. There can be no doubt that to enable the Board to perform its duties properly, and effectively, as per provisions of the Act, it is essential that every institution is administered satisfactorily. Section 16-A provides for a scheme of administration for every institution. Such scheme must necessarily provide for the constitution of a committee of management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. Section16-A reads as under:

'16-A. : Scheme of Administration:-- Notwithstanding anything in law, document, or decree order of a Court or other instrument there shall be a scheme of administration (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme of Administration) for every institution, whether recognised before or after the commencement of the Intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958. The Scheme of Administration shall amongst other matters provide for the constitution of a Committee of Management (hereinafter called the Committee of Management) vested with authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The Head of the institution and two teachers thereof, who shall be selected by rotation according to seniority in the manner to be prescribed by regulations, shall be ex-officio members of the Committee of Management with a right to vote.

(2) No member of the Committee of Management shall either attend a meeting of the committee or exercise his right to vote whenever a charge concerning his personal conduct is under discussions.

(3) The Scheme of Administration shall also describe subject to any regulations, the respective powers, duties and functions of the (the Head of the Institution) and Committee of Management in relation to the institution.

(4) Where more than one recognised institution is maintained by a body or authority, there shall be separate Committee of Management for each institution unless otherwise provided in the regulations for any class of institution.

(5) The Scheme of Administration of every institution shall be subject to the approval of the Director and no amendment to or change in the Scheme of Administration shall be made at any lime without the prior approval of the Director:

Provided that where the Management of an institution is aggrieved by an orderof the Director refusing to approve an amendment or change in the scheme of Administration, the State Government, on the respresentation of the Management, may, if it is satisfied that the proposed amendment or change in the scheme of Administration is in the interest of the institution, order the Director to approve of the same, and thereupon the Director shall act accordingly.

(6) Every recognized institution shall be managed in accordance with the Scheme of Administration framed under and in accordance with sub-section (5) and Sections 16-B and 16-C.

(7) Whenever there is dispute wilh respect to the Management of an institution, persons found by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, upon such enquiry as is deemed fit to be in actual control of its affairs may, for purposes of this Act, be recognised to constitute the Committee of Management of such institution until a Court of competent jurisdiction direct otherwise:

Provided that the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall, before making an order under this sub-section, afford reasonable opportunity to the rival claimants to make representations in writing.

Explanation-- In determining the question as to who is in actual control of the affairs of the institution, the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall have regard to the control over the funds of the institution and over the administration, the receipt of income from its properties, the scheme of Administration approved under subsection (5) and other relevant circumstances.'

6. From a perusal ofSection 16-A it would appear that a dispute with respect to the management of an institution is contemplated to be decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction. However, until such decision is available, interim arrangement has to be made with respect to the persons who may be recognised to constitute the committee of Management, because if there is confusion about the persons who are in charge of the management of an institution, the Board would find itself handicapped in performance of its statutory duties, with respect to that institution. The persons who may under sub-section (7) be recognised as constituting the committee of man-agement of such institution must be the persons who are found to be in actual control of its affairs. The authority who is to find such persons is by virtue of sub-sec!ion (7) the Regional Deputy Director of Education, who must afford reasonable opportunity to rival claimants to make representations in writing. He need not give any opportunity to the rival claimants to produce oral evidence or make oral arguments, as he is required to make only such inquiry as he deems fit. In determining the question as to who are in actual control of the affairs of the institution, the Regional Deputy Director of Education is required to haveregard to the control over the funds of the institution and over the administration, the receipt of income from its properties, the Scheme of Administration approved under sub-section (5) and other relevant circumstances. The requirement to provide reasonable opportunity to make representations in writing is to ensure a fair deal, since even an administrative authority, in discharge of its administrative functions, must act wilh fairness, particularly when the discharge of the functions by the administrative authority is to affect the civil rights of any person. The right to participate in the management of an institution is certainly civil right. The act does not ctonfer such powers on the Regional Deputy Director of Education as are associated with a Court or a tribunal, such as powers about summoning of witnesses and production of documents. Moreover, the decision of the Regional Deputy Director of Education as to the persons who are found in actual control of affairs may or may not result in any effective order. Sub-section (7) only permits such persons as are found to be in actual control of affairs to be recognised to constitute the committee of management of such institution. The word, 'may' occurring in sub-section (7) makes it clear that it is not imperative that such persons should necessarily be recognised to constitute the committee of management. Further, even if such persons are recognised to constitute a commiltee of management, the recognition is not to settle the dispute between the rival claimants for all purposes, but only for the purposes of the Act. This coupled with the fact that the recognition stipulated in sub-section (7) is to operate until the decision of the Court of competent jurisdiction suggesls that the Regional Deputy Director of Education has not been entrusted with the inherent judicial power of the State.

7. As pointed out in A.C. Companies Ltd. v. P.M. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595, under our Constitution, mere is no rigid separation of powers as under the Australian Constitution; and so, it would not be constitutionally inappropriate or improper to say that judicial power of the State can be conferred on the hierarchy of Courts established under the Constitution as well as on tribunals which are not Courts strictly so called. The functions discharged by the Courts and tribunals arc necessarily the same, though the nature of questions entrusted to their jurisdiction, the pro-cedure required to be followed by them and the extent and character of their powers may be different.

8. As observed in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd, AIR 1963 SC 874, the expression, 'a Court' in the technical sense is a Tribunal Constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. The Tribunal as distinguished from the Court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially, but it does not constitute a Court in the technical sense. Special matters and questions are entrusted to the tribunals for decision and in that sense they share with the Courts common characteristic, namely, both the Courts and tribunal arc constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions (vide Durga Shanker Mehta v. Reghuraj Singh, ((1955) I SCR 267 at p. 272) : (AIR 1954 SC 520 at p. 522). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. As said in A.C. Companies case. (AIR 1965 SC 1595) (supra) the procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the Stale's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State and on consideration of policy, the State transfer its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Court established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts and features which are distinct and separate. The basicand fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals isthat they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State.'

9. The rationale behind exclusion of special appeals in respect of a decree or order made by a Court is that once adecision has been rendered by a competent Court of jurisdiction, on challenge in the High Court against such decree or order should be enough, so far as the High Court is concerned and finality should attach to that decision even if the decision has been rendered by a learned single Judge of the High Court. Since the tribunals also discharge similar functions of deciding disputes acting judicially, as is done by the Courts and they enjoy the same status as the Courts do, as the tribunals have also been entrusted with inherent judicial powers of the State, there is no reason why the same reason should not apply for exclusion of special appeal in respect of an orderof a tribunal. Therefore, a tribunal within the meaning of rule 5 must be an authority which is required to act judicially and which has been entrusted with the inherent judicial powers of the State.

10. The question as to whether a particular authority is-a tribunal came to be considered before the Apex Court from time to lime, in the context of Article 136 of the Constitution. Under Article 136, special leave may be granted to appeal from a judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal. Under Rule 5, special appeal does not lie in respect of an order from a Court or tribunal. Thus under Article 136, as under Rule 5, the word, 'tribunal' came up for consideration i n association with the word 'Court', and so Tribunal' should mean the same authority, under both the provisions.

11. In Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut v. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1963 SC 677, clause 29 of the Order issued by the Governor of UttarPradesh in 1954 under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provided that during pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal or an Adjudicator in respect of any dispute, an employer shall not alter the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute or discharge or punish any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission of a Conciliation Officer. A question arose whether the Conciliation Officer is a tribunal and whether an appeal underArticle 136 of the Constitution is competent against the grant or refusal of permission by the Conciliation Officer under Clause 29. It was held that Conciliation Officer in granting or refusing permission to alter the terms and conditions of service of workmen, at the instance of employer, has to act judicially, but a tribunal, besides being' under a duly to act judicially, must be a body invested with the judicial power of the State. It was held that the Conciliation officer is not invested with the judicial power of the State and, therefore, he cannot be regarded as tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court observed :

'(21) Reverting to the Order issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh in 1954 it is manifest that no procedure is prescribed for the investigation to be made by the Conciliation Officer, under cl. 29. He is not required to sit in public; no formal pleadings are contemplated to be tendered; he is not empowered to compel attendance of witnesses, nor is he restricted in making an enquiry, to evidence which the parties may bring before him. The Conciliation Officer is again not capable of delivering a determinative judgment or award affecting the rights and obligations of parties. He is not invested with powers similar to those of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, compelling production of documents, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and other matters. He is concerned in granting leave to determine whether there is a prima facie case for dismissal or discharge of an employee or for altering terms of employment, and whether the employer is actuated by unfair motives; he has not to decide whether the proposed step of discharge or dismissal of the employee was within the rights of the employer. His order merely removes a statutory ban in certain eventualities, laid upon the common law right of an employer to dismiss, discharge or alter the terms of employment according to contract between the parlies. The Conciliation Officer has undoubtedly to act judicially in dealing with an application under Cl. 29, but he is not invested with the judicial power of the State; he cannot therefore be regarded as a 'tribunal' within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution.'

12. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 874, the question fordecision was whether the arbitrator under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a tribunal? It was held that the arbitrator under Section 10-A is not exactly in the same position as a private arbitrator but that does not mean that he isa tribunal under Article 136. Even if some of the trappings of a Court are present in his case, he lacks the basic, the essential and the fundamenlal requisite in that behalf because he is not invested-with the State's inherent judicial power. He is appointed by the parties and the power to decide the dispute between the parties who appoint him is derived by him from the agreement of the parties and from no other source.

13. In Dev Singh v. Registrar, Punjab and Haryana High Court, (1987) 3 SCC 169 : (AIR 1987 SC 1629), the District Judge imposed upon some members of the ministerial staff punishment of dismissal from service. They preferred service appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court considered the verious contentions placed by the appellants in detail and dismissed the appeal as having no merit. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court disposing of the appeal under the relevant roles is a Tribunal and the appeal lies under Article 136 of the Constitution from the decision in appeal by the High Court. It was observed (at p. !635 of AIR):

'14. Rule X(3) enables the High Court to summarily reject the appeal without hearing the petitioner or refer it to the District Judge for report and or receipt of such report reject the petition without hearing the petitioner, secondly to hear the petitioner, and in cases where other persons are held to be concerned in the subject of the petition, such other person in open Court. The procedure contained in this rule of hearing the petition is not similar to the procedure followed in regular judicial proceedings. Under these rules it is not obligatory for the High Court to hear the petitioner. It can go into the papers and reject it summarily without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. It can also refer it to the District Judge for report. The second method of disposal of this petition is to get a report from the District Judge and on receipt of such a report to dismiss it without hearing the petitioner and thirdly to give a hearing to the petitioner and also those who will be affected by the disposal of the petition. The manner of disposal of the petition underthis rule makes it abundantly clear that this petition which the appellants call an appeal is not strictly a judicial proceeding involving a lis between two adversaries and the decision thereon is not a judicial decision. It has all the trappings of an administrative proceeding and an administrative decision.'

The Court was of the view that aclose study of the rules left no doubi that in deciding an appeal under rule X, the High Court exercises only a supervisory and administrative control and does not act as a Tribunal disposing of an appeal involving a lis between two rival parties and arriving at a judicial decision. As such it was held that the High Court was not a Tribunal and as such no appeal lay under Article 136 of the Constitution.

14-15. In Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd., (1992) 3 SCC 336 : (1992 AIR SCW 1378), the question for decision was as to the status of the appropriate government or authority while passing an order under sub-section (2) of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, according to which on receipt of a notice under Clause (c) of sub-seclion (1) the appropriate government or authority may, after making such enquiry as such Government orauthority thinksfil, grant or refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing the permission for the retrenchment to which the notice relates. It was held that the power exercised by the appropriate government or authority under subsection (2) of Section 25N is similar to the power that was exercised by the Conciliation Officer in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand, (AIR 1963 SC 677) (supra) and although the appropri-ale government or authority is required to act judicially while granting or refusing permission for retrenchment of workmen under sub-section (2) of Section 25N it is not invested with the judicial power of the Slate and it cannot be regarded as a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution.

16. In Mrs. Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 2219, a question arose whether the Committee constituted under Seclion 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is a tribunal and, therefore, its findings are subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, Sub-section (1) of Section 6 lays down that if the Committee absolves the concerned Judge in its report and records a findingthat the Judge is not guiliy of any misbehaviour, then no further steps shall be taken in either House of Parliament and the motion pending in the House shall not be proceeded with. It is clear from sub-section (1) of Section 6 that a finding of 'not guilty recorded by the Committe in its report terminates the process of remova1 of the concerned judge initiated in accordance with Section 3(1) of the Act. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 6 provide for the situation where the report of the Committee contains a finding that the Judge is 'guilty' of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity. Sub-section (2) prescribes that the motion admitted by the Speaker Chairman underSection 3(1) of the Act shall then be taken up for consideration by the House together with the report of the committee. It is in this situation and in this manner that the parliamentary part of the process of removal of a Judge commences requiring the House to consider the motion for removal of the Jude . Sub-section (3) lays down that if the motion is adopted by each House of parliament in accordance with provisions of Clause (4) of Article 124, then the misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge shall be deemed to have been proved and the address praying for the removal of the Judge shall be presented to the President in the prescribed manner. Thus, there will be no occasion for appeal under Article 136 where report of the Committee is of not guilty. It was held that the finding of 'guilty' made by the Committee is not a final decision but is an inchoate finding prior to the stage of making the final decision, which alone is required to be subject to judicial review. It was observed that the finding of 'guilty' made by the Committee is only a recommendation to the parliament to commence its process and to act on lhat finding which, at best, is tentative and inchoate at the stage of submission of the report under Sec-lion 4 of the Act. It was pointed out in Para 57 that the decisions of the Apex Court indicate that one of the considerations which has weighed with the Court for holding a statutory authority to be a tribunal under Article 136 is finality orcpnclu-siveness and the binding nature of the determination by such authority. Thus. Inquiry Committee was not held to be a tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution.

17. It would appear that to determine the question whether an authority is a tribunal, the nature of the order passed by the authority andalso the characteristic of the body which is called upon to adjudicate upon the matter in dispute are material considerations. Even a judicial authority may in a given situation, act in administrative or executive capacity. In that situation the authority would not be a tribunal. Likewise an administrative authority even if required to act judicially would not be a tribunal if it is not invested with the inherent judiciat power of the State. As pointed out earlier, under Section 16-A(7), the Regional Deputy Director of Education may find the persons who are in actual control of the affairs of an institution, yet those persons may not be recognised as constituting the committee of management. By way of illustration, such a situation may obtain where valid election has been held, but the previous committee of management has not allowed the nowly elected persons to have actual control of affairs of the institution. In such a case, even though members of previous committee of man-agement may be in actual control of the affairs of the authority, they may not be recognised as constituting the committee of management. Whether the persons who are found to be in actual control of the affairs of an institution are to be recognised as constituting the committee of management of the institution under sub-section (7) of Section 16-A is essentially administrative in character. The finding of the Deputy Director of Education as to the persons in actual control of affairs of the institution does not decide the dispute as to the entitlement to be members of the committee of management. He is not entrusted with the duty to act judicially, though he must act fairly. He has no trappings of the Court. This finding as to the persons in actual control of the affairs of an institution lacks in finality or conclu-siveness and binding nature, which is associated with the decisions of a Court or a tribunal, Therefore, the Regional Deputy Director of Education is not a tribunal within the meaning of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules.

18. We have pointed out that in the Committee of management, U.M. Vidyalaya Khasvegpur v. State of U.P., 1994 All CJ 939, reliance was placed on Sita Ram Lal v. D.I.O.S. Azamgarh, 1994 All CJ 180, observing that similar view had been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in that case. However, that casedid not arise from an order passed under Section 16-A(7) of the Act.There, the question was whether the Inspector deciding an appeal under sub Clause (f) of Regulation 3(1), Chapter 2 of the Regulations made under Sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C of the Act from an appeal under sub-clause(e) of the aforesaid Regulation is a tribunal within the meaning of Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. The relevant provision was materially different in that case from Clause (7) of Section 16-A of the Act. Sub-Clause (e) of the Regulation provides that every dispute about the seniority of the teacher shall be decided by the committee of management, giving reasons for the decisions. Sub-clause (f) says that any teacher aggrieved from the decision of the committee of management under sub-clause (e) may prefer an appeal to the Inspector within 15 days from the date of communication of such decision to such teacher and the decision of the Inspector in appeal shall be final and shall be given effect to by the committee of management. It was held that the District Inspector of Schools, while deciding the dispute regarding seniority of the teachers, has to give notice to the parties, look into the papers which may be filed by them, give an opportunity to produce evidence and considering respective case of the parties to determing the dispute by a reasoned order. Further, it it was observed that he has trappings of a Court and this power has been vested under Clause (f) of Regulation 3(1). As such he was held to be a tribunal. The terms of the relevant provisions which fell for consideration in that case being different from those in the instant case, that decision is of no avail for determining the controversy in the instant case.

19. In the result, we hold that the Deputy Director of Education cannot be said to be functioning as a tribunal within the meaning of Rule 5 in Chapter VI11 of the Allahabad High Court Rules while exercising the powers conferred on him under sub-section (7) of Section 16-A of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Accordingly, we answer the reference in the negative.

20. Order accordingly.