Mewa Ram Vs. Ram Gopal - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/448724
SubjectCompany
CourtAllahabad
Decided OnFeb-17-1926
Reported inAIR1926All337; 97Ind.Cas.90
AppellantMewa Ram
RespondentRam Gopal
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - in these appeals it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion as to the right inter he of the members, of any illegal association because we are satisfied that in neither of these cases the number of partners exceeded 20. 2. admittedly the number of persons who executed the two deeds of partnership is only 10 and 12 respectively.sulaiman, j.1. first appeals nos. 373 and 374 of 1922 are connected and the same substantial questions of law arise in these appeals. these appeals arise out of two separate suits brought for dissolution of partnership. the substantial pleas raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant, rai bahadur lala mewa ram, were: (1) that the partnership in question consisted of more than 20 members and was therefore illegal within the meaning of section 4 of the indian companies act (7 of 1913) and (2) that the partnership being an illegal association, no suit for the dissolution of partnership was maintainable in a court of law. the learned subordinate judge has held that as a matter of fact the number of partners in either of these associations did not exceed 20 and therefore the association was not illegal. in these appeals it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion as to the right inter he of the members, of any illegal association because we are satisfied that in neither of these cases the number of partners exceeded 20.2. admittedly the number of persons who executed the two deeds of partnership is only 10 and 12 respectively. the only way in which the defendant can urge that the number exceeds 20 is by saying that many of these executants are members of joint hindu families consisting of a large number of other members and if all other members of this family were to be counted, the total number exceeded 20. we are of opinion that this is not the tight method of calculating the number in order to ascertain whether the association consists of 20 or more members. if each of the executants entered into this partnership in his own individual capacity, he admittedly counts as one. on the other hand, if he entered into the partnership in his representative capacity on behalf of his family, then his joint family must be considered to be a unit and must be deemed to be one person within section 4 of the indian companies act. this view is in accord with the pronouncement of a division bench of this court in moti ram v. muhammad abdul jalil air 1924 all 414. we therefore think that the view taken by the learned subordinate judge that the partnerships in question were not illegal associations was correct. there is therefore no force in these appeals.mukerji, j.3. i entirely agree. i have just one word to add and that is as to the interpretation of section 4 of the indian companies act (7 of 1913).4. where a person lends his name to a partnership contract he is a person' constituting the total number of partners. behind his back there may be a joint hindu family or he may be representing a firm consisting of himself and several other members. in either case, so far as the other partners are affected, the party joining in the contract is the only person with whom they are concerned. the share owned by the individual member may have to be, in the case of a partition in the family or dissolution of partnership, divided among certain parties. but that fact cannot affect the other members in the partnership in question. in this view the party joining constitutes only one person and not more than one parson.5. these appeals are dismissed with costs.
Judgment:

Sulaiman, J.

1. First Appeals Nos. 373 and 374 of 1922 are connected and the same substantial questions of law arise in these appeals. These appeals arise out of two separate suits brought for dissolution of partnership. The substantial pleas raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant, Rai Bahadur Lala Mewa Ram, were: (1) that the partnership in question consisted of more than 20 members and was therefore illegal within the meaning of Section 4 of the Indian Companies Act (7 of 1913) and (2) that the partnership being an illegal association, no suit for the dissolution of partnership was maintainable in a Court of law. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that as a matter of fact the number of partners in either of these associations did not exceed 20 and therefore the association was not illegal. In these appeals it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion as to the right inter he of the members, of any illegal association because we are satisfied that in neither of these cases the number of partners exceeded 20.

2. Admittedly the number of persons who executed the two deeds of partnership is only 10 and 12 respectively. The only way in which the defendant can urge that the number exceeds 20 is by saying that many of these executants are members of joint Hindu families consisting of a large number of other members and if all other members of this family were to be counted, the total number exceeded 20. We are of opinion that this is not the tight method of calculating the number in order to ascertain whether the association consists of 20 or more members. If each of the executants entered into this partnership in his own individual capacity, he admittedly counts as one. On the other hand, if he entered into the partnership in his representative capacity on behalf of his family, then his joint family must be considered to be a unit and must be deemed to be one person within Section 4 of the Indian Companies Act. This view is in accord with the pronouncement of a Division Bench of this Court in Moti Ram v. Muhammad Abdul Jalil AIR 1924 All 414. We therefore think that the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the partnerships in question were not illegal associations was correct. There is therefore no force in these appeals.

Mukerji, J.

3. I entirely agree. I have just one word to add and that is as to the interpretation of Section 4 of the Indian Companies Act (7 of 1913).

4. Where a person lends his name to a partnership contract he is a person' constituting the total number of partners. Behind his back there may be a joint Hindu family or he may be representing a firm consisting of himself and several other members. In either case, so far as the other partners are affected, the party joining in the contract is the only person with whom they are concerned. The share owned by the individual member may have to be, in the case of a partition in the family or dissolution of partnership, divided among certain parties. But that fact cannot affect the other members in the partnership in question. In this view the party joining constitutes only one person and not more than one parson.

5. These appeals are dismissed with costs.