SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/448631 |
Subject | Civil |
Court | Allahabad |
Decided On | Aug-09-1944 |
Reported in | AIR1945All28 |
Appellant | Surya Pal Singh |
Respondent | Netrapal Singh |
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - this proves, if anything, that the learned judge of the court below did not accept the account books of the defendant as good and reliable. whether the account books were good and genuine account books and such as commanded the confidence of the court is a pure question pi fact on which the finding of the lower appellate court must be accepted and, sitting in second appeal, i cannot say that the learned judge was wrong in rejecting the defendant's account books. chunni air1927all623 ,to both these cases but they were of opinion that the point did not emerge quite clearly from the judgment at least, in ganga singh v.sinha, j.1. this is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of profits for the years 1342 to 1345 f. for rs. 135-8-4 by a cosharer against the lambardar under section 226, agra tenancy act (3 of 1926). various defences were raised but the. two with which i am concerned at this stage, were that the rents of the years in suit were subsequently remitted under the orders of the government and, in any case, the suit could be decreed only on the basis of actual collections. the learned assistant collector held that subsequent remissions by the government did not absolve the lambardar from the responsibility of making collections during the years in question. it decreed the suit for a sum of rs. 98-4-0 on the basis of gross rental minus the actual remissions. the defendants went in appeal to the learned district judge. he affirmed the finding of the trial court on both the points. against the above decree the defendant has come before me in second appeal.2. mr. sanyal, the learned counsel for the appellant, argues that his client should not be charged for the rents of the years in suit owing to the remissions by the government. i think the view taken by the courts below on this question is correct. it was open to the lambardar to make some effort for the realisation of the rent during the years in suit and on the findings it cannot be doubted that he made none. to allow the defendant to take advantage of this plea is to put a premium on his own negligence.3. the next contention of mr. sanyal is that the account books which he had produced were all that he was called upon to produce under the law as it stood on the material date and the courts below were wrong in insisting upon his complying with the provisions of section 232 inasmuch as this section found a place for the first time in the act of 1939 which came into force long after the years in question. he also contends that it is for the plaintiff to establish the negligence of the lambardar. i agree with him that it is for the cosharer who brings a suit for accounts to establish the negligence of the lambardar. i also agree with him that the account books produced by him need not have complied with the provisions of section 232, u.p. tenancy act of 1939. but this did not absolve him from the obligation to produce before the court account books which commanded the confidence of the court and which were genuine. the finding of the court, as i read it, is to the effect that there was discrepancy between the sinha prepared by the patwari and the amount of the collections shown in the defendant's account books. this proves, if anything, that the learned judge of the court below did not accept the account books of the defendant as good and reliable. whether the account books were good and genuine account books and such as commanded the confidence of the court is a pure question pi fact on which the finding of the lower appellate court must be accepted and, sitting in second appeal, i cannot say that the learned judge was wrong in rejecting the defendant's account books.4. it is also argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that he should not have been saddled with the sum due on account of the sir and khudkasht in the hands of the other cosharers. in support of this proposition he has relied upon koka v. chunni : air1927all623 there are certain observations in this judgment which, no doubt, lend countenance to his contention, but this case is in the teeth of the earlier case, ganga singh v. ram sarup ('16) 3 a.i.r. 1916 all. 155 and also kundan lal v. basant rai ('24) 11 a.i.r. 1924 all. 935 indeed, the attention of their lordships was invited in koka v. chunni : air1927all623 , to both these cases but they were of opinion that the point did not emerge quite clearly from the judgment at least, in ganga singh v. ram sarup ('16) 3 a.i.r. 1916 all. 155. with the utmost respect to their lordships i must say that my reading of this ruling leads me to a different result. i find that the real basis of their decision was that in a suit for accounts the lambardar is liable for the profits accruing from the sir and khudkasht in the hands of the other cosharers. if it is permissible to say so, again with profound respect, my own view is in consonance with the view taken in ganga singh v. ram sarup ('16) 3 a.i.r. 1916 all. 155. i, am fortified in this view of mine by a later pronouncement of bennet j. in sohanpal singh v. the special manager, court of wards of the estate of amir begum : air1937all113 these are the only points which have been raised in this case. i, therefore, dismiss this second appeal but under the circumstances of the case i make no order as to costs.
Judgment:Sinha, J.
1. This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of profits for the years 1342 to 1345 F. for Rs. 135-8-4 by a cosharer against the lambardar under Section 226, Agra Tenancy Act (3 of 1926). Various defences were raised but the. two with which I am concerned at this stage, were that the rents of the years in suit were subsequently remitted under the orders of the Government and, in any case, the suit could be decreed only on the basis of actual collections. The learned Assistant Collector held that subsequent remissions by the Government did not absolve the lambardar from the responsibility of making collections during the years in question. It decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 98-4-0 on the basis of gross rental minus the actual remissions. The defendants went in appeal to the learned District Judge. He affirmed the finding of the trial Court on both the points. Against the above decree the defendant has come before me in second appeal.
2. Mr. Sanyal, the learned Counsel for the appellant, argues that his client should not be charged for the rents of the years in suit owing to the remissions by the Government. I think the view taken by the Courts below on this question is correct. It was open to the lambardar to make some effort for the realisation of the rent during the years in suit and on the findings it cannot be doubted that he made none. To allow the defendant to take advantage of this plea is to put a premium on his own negligence.
3. The next contention of Mr. Sanyal is that the account books which he had produced were all that he was called upon to produce under the law as it stood on the material date and the Courts below were wrong in insisting upon his complying with the provisions of Section 232 inasmuch as this section found a place for the first time in the Act of 1939 which came into force long after the years in question. He also contends that it is for the plaintiff to establish the negligence of the lambardar. I agree with him that it is for the cosharer who brings a suit for accounts to establish the negligence of the lambardar. I also agree with him that the account books produced by him need not have complied with the provisions of Section 232, U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939. But this did not absolve him from the obligation to produce before the Court account books which commanded the confidence of the Court and which were genuine. The finding of the Court, as I read it, is to the effect that there was discrepancy between the sinha prepared by the patwari and the amount of the collections shown in the defendant's account books. This proves, if anything, that the learned Judge of the Court below did not accept the account books of the defendant as good and reliable. Whether the account books were good and genuine account books and such as commanded the confidence of the Court is a pure question pi fact on which the finding of the lower appellate Court must be accepted and, sitting in second appeal, I cannot say that the learned Judge was wrong in rejecting the defendant's account books.
4. It is also argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that he should not have been saddled with the sum due on account of the sir and khudkasht in the hands of the other cosharers. In support of this proposition he has relied upon Koka v. Chunni : AIR1927All623 There are certain observations in this judgment which, no doubt, lend countenance to his contention, but this case is in the teeth of the earlier case, Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup ('16) 3 A.I.R. 1916 All. 155 and also Kundan Lal v. Basant Rai ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 All. 935 Indeed, the attention of their Lordships was invited in Koka v. Chunni : AIR1927All623 , to both these cases but they were of opinion that the point did not emerge quite clearly from the judgment at least, in Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup ('16) 3 A.I.R. 1916 All. 155. With the utmost respect to their Lordships I must say that my reading of this ruling leads me to a different result. I find that the real basis of their decision was that in a suit for accounts the lambardar is liable for the profits accruing from the sir and khudkasht in the hands of the other cosharers. If it is permissible to say so, again with profound respect, my own view is in consonance with the view taken in Ganga Singh v. Ram Sarup ('16) 3 A.I.R. 1916 All. 155. I, am fortified in this view of mine by a later pronouncement of Bennet J. in Sohanpal Singh v. The Special Manager, Court of Wards of the Estate of Amir Begum : AIR1937All113 These are the only points which have been raised in this case. I, therefore, dismiss this second appeal but under the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.