| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/448606 |
| Subject | Contract |
| Court | Allahabad |
| Decided On | Jan-31-1917 |
| Judge | Tudball and ;Muhammad Rafiq, JJ. |
| Reported in | (1917)ILR39All355 |
| Appellant | Mathuka Nath |
| Respondent | Cheddu and ors. |
Excerpt:
act no. ix of 1908 (indian limitation act), schedule i, article 116 - principal and agent--agent bound to render account at stated periods--suit for accounts against heirs of agent--limitation. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. tudball and muhammad rafiq, jj.1. this in a plaintiff's appeal. the plaintiff in the year 1891, appointed one hardeo as his agent for the purposes of managing certain zamindari, collecting its income and incurring necessary expenditure. the appointment was made under a duly registered mukhtarnama, wherein it was laid down that the agent was to render his accounts every six months. hardeo died on the 9th of march, 1911. the present suit was brought by the plaintiff against the sons of hardeo on the 7th of march, 1914, claiming a sum of rs. 4,367 odd as due to the plaintiff on account for the period from the year 1891 to 1911. the court below has held that the plaintiff was not entitled to go into any accounts for a period more than six years prior to the suit. it has gone into thy accounts from march, 1908, to march, 1911, and has found on these accounts that nothing is due to the plaintiff. it has therefore dismissed the suit. the plaintiff raises two points; first, that he was entitled to go into all accounts from 1891 up to the year 1911; and secondly, that the method in which the lower court has taken the accounts, even for the three years allowed, is incorrect, and that the accounts should be made up afresh. it must be noted that this is not a suit against an agent but against the heirs of an agent and article 89 of the limitation act does not apply. the article applicable is article 116, which provides limitation for a suit for compensation for the breach of a contract registered. it has been held in jhapajhannessa bibi v. bama sundari chaudhurani (1912)16 c.w.n. 1042 that in a case of this description article 116 applies, and that the plaintiff is only entitled to recover what may be due on accounts for the period of six years prior to the suit. in that case, as in the present case, the agent was bound under the contract to render accounts at fixed periods it is quite clear that hardeo at the time of his death, was not liable to render accounts for the whole period of his agency. under the contract between him and the plaintiff the latter had a cause of action at the end of every six months to sue hardeo for the accounts of those six months. at the date of hardeo's death limitation had already begun to run in his favour and in our opinion, it continued to run in favour of his heirs. we agree with the decision in the case mentioned above, and in this respect we think that the lower court was right in holding that the only accounts which could be examined were those which fell within the period of six years prior to the suit. our attention has been called to certain other rulings, some of this court. the facts of those cases do not coincide with the facts of the case before us, and those decisions, in our opinion, are not applicable. there remains the question of the method in which the court below has taken the accounts. in view of the evidence of the plaintiff's own witness, his own brother, jagannath saran, it is quite clear that the court below is justified in making calculations on the basis of the nikasi kham.2. this being so, there is no error in the accounts, and we think there is no force in this appeal. the result is that the appeal tail a and is dismissed with costs.
Judgment:Tudball and Muhammad Rafiq, JJ.
1. This in a plaintiff's appeal. The plaintiff in the year 1891, appointed one Hardeo as his agent for the purposes of managing certain zamindari, collecting its income and incurring necessary expenditure. The appointment was made under a duly registered mukhtarnama, wherein it was laid down that the agent was to render his accounts every six months. Hardeo died on the 9th of March, 1911. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff against the sons of Hardeo on the 7th of March, 1914, claiming a sum of Rs. 4,367 odd as due to the plaintiff on account for the period from the year 1891 to 1911. The court below has held that the plaintiff was not entitled to go into any accounts for a period more than six years prior to the suit. It has gone into thy accounts from March, 1908, to March, 1911, and has found on these accounts that nothing is due to the plaintiff. It has therefore dismissed the suit. The plaintiff raises two points; first, that he was entitled to go into all accounts from 1891 up to the year 1911; and secondly, that the method in which the lower court has taken the accounts, even for the three years allowed, is incorrect, and that the accounts should be made up afresh. It must be noted that this is not a suit against an agent but against the heirs of an agent and Article 89 of the Limitation Act does not apply. The article applicable is Article 116, which provides limitation for a suit for compensation for the breach of a contract registered. It has been held in Jhapajhannessa Bibi v. Bama Sundari Chaudhurani (1912)16 C.W.N. 1042 that in a case of this description Article 116 applies, and that the plaintiff is only entitled to recover what may be due on accounts for the period of six years prior to the suit. In that case, as in the present case, the agent was bound under the contract to render accounts at fixed periods It is quite clear that Hardeo at the time of his death, was not liable to render accounts for the whole period of his agency. Under the contract between him and the plaintiff the latter had a cause of action at the end of every six months to sue Hardeo for the accounts of those six months. At the date of Hardeo's death limitation had already begun to run in his favour and in our opinion, it continued to run in favour of his heirs. We agree with the decision in the case mentioned above, and in this respect we think that the lower court was right in holding that the only accounts which could be examined were those which fell within the period of six years prior to the suit. Our attention has been called to certain other rulings, some of this Court. The facts of those cases do not coincide with the facts of the case before us, and those decisions, in our opinion, are not applicable. There remains the question of the method in which the court below has taken the accounts. In view of the evidence of the plaintiff's own witness, his own brother, Jagannath Saran, it is quite clear that the court below is justified in making calculations on the basis of the nikasi Kham.
2. This being so, there is no error In the accounts, and we think there is no force in this appeal. The result is that the appeal tail a and is dismissed with costs.