Emperor Vs. Kadhe Mal - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/447839
SubjectCriminal
CourtAllahabad
Decided OnJul-07-1919
JudgePiggott, J.
Reported in(1920)ILR42All24
AppellantEmperor
RespondentKadhe Mal
Excerpt:
act no. i of 1812 (indian evidence act), section 38 - evidence--admissibility of statement made by a witness since deceased. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. piggott, j.1. this appeal is closely connected with another which i have just disposed of, but the two cases differ in one essential point. in a certain civil suit in which one debi singh was being sued as a defendant for the recovery of a certain sum ' of money, debi singh produced in evidence a receipt purporting to have been given him by one kishan singh. the civil court decided against the genuineness of that receipt, and eventually debi singh was put on his trial for having produced in evidence a forged document, knowing it to be forged, and kadhe mal was separately placed on his trial for abetment of the forgery and for having given false evidence before the civil court. the two accused persona were tried separately, as required by the law, but in reality there had been no separate trial. the learned sessions judge commences his judgment against kadhe mal with the remark that the receipt in question has already been found to be a forged document in the trial of dobi singh. he does not of course mean to say that this fact is conclusive against kadhe mal; but he has assumed that the evidence against kadhe mal is the same as that against debi singh and that the same court must necessarily come to the same finding in the two cases. now kishan singh, whose signature appears on the receipt, had died before criminal proceedings were taken. the deposition which he had made at the civil trial was admissible in evidence against debi singh, but was not admissible against kadhe mal. if both the cases had been tried with the aid of jury, and kadhe mal's case had come before a different jury, it would have been the duty of the court to exclude from evidence the statement which kishan singh had made at the trial in the civil suit, and the jury would have been asked to return a verdict as against kadhe mal on the evidence available after the exclusion of that deposition. in my opinion no jury could have returned a verdict of guilty without having before them the sworn testimony of kishan singh, as i have pointed out in my judgment on debi singh's appeal, this sworn testimony is the decisive feature in the case. the rest of the prosecution evidence amounts to circumstantial evidence corroborating kishan singh's statement and warranting the court in believing him to have spoken the truth. it is not, in my opinion, evidence such as to justify affirmatively the finding that the receipt in question is a forged document. it may be that kadhe mal has been unduly fortunate in the circumstances of his trial, but the law requires him to be tried separately from debi singh, and i cannot overlook the fact that the evidence against the two men is by no means the same. i accept the appeal of kadhe mal, set aside the conviction and sentence against him and direct that he be released.
Judgment:

Piggott, J.

1. This appeal is closely connected with another which I have just disposed of, but the two cases differ in one essential point. In a certain civil suit in which one Debi Singh was being sued as a defendant for the recovery of a certain sum ' of money, Debi Singh produced in evidence a receipt purporting to have been given him by one Kishan Singh. The Civil Court decided against the genuineness of that receipt, and eventually Debi Singh was put on his trial for having produced in evidence a forged document, knowing it to be forged, and Kadhe Mal was separately placed on his trial for abetment of the forgery and for having given false evidence before the Civil Court. The two accused persona were tried separately, as required by the law, but in reality there had been no separate trial. The learned Sessions Judge commences his judgment against Kadhe Mal with the remark that the receipt in question has already been found to be a forged document in the trial of Dobi Singh. He does not of course mean to say that this fact is conclusive against Kadhe Mal; but he has assumed that the evidence against Kadhe Mal is the same as that against Debi Singh and that the same court must necessarily come to the same finding in the two cases. Now Kishan Singh, whose signature appears on the receipt, had died before criminal proceedings were taken. The deposition which he had made at the civil trial was admissible in evidence against Debi Singh, but was not admissible against Kadhe Mal. If both the cases had been tried with the aid of jury, and Kadhe Mal's case had come before a different jury, it would have been the duty of the court to exclude from evidence the statement which Kishan Singh had made at the trial in the civil suit, and the jury would have been asked to return a verdict as against Kadhe Mal on the evidence available after the exclusion of that deposition. In my opinion no jury could have returned a verdict of guilty without having before them the sworn testimony of Kishan Singh, As I have pointed out in my judgment on Debi Singh's appeal, this sworn testimony is the decisive feature in the case. The rest of the prosecution evidence amounts to circumstantial evidence corroborating Kishan Singh's statement and warranting the court in believing him to have spoken the truth. It is not, in my opinion, evidence such as to justify affirmatively the finding that the receipt in question is a forged document. It may be that Kadhe Mal has been unduly fortunate in the circumstances of his trial, but the law requires him to be tried separately from Debi Singh, and I cannot overlook the fact that the evidence against the two men is by no means the same. I accept the appeal of Kadhe Mal, set aside the conviction and sentence against him and direct that he be released.