Emperor Vs. Gulzari Lal - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/447825
SubjectCriminal
CourtAllahabad
Decided OnFeb-07-1902
JudgeJohn Stanley, C.J.
Reported in(1902)ILR24All254
AppellantEmperor
RespondentGulzari Lal
Excerpt:
act no. xlv of 1860 (indian penal code), section 406--criminal breach of trust--charge--criminal procedure code, sections 222, 231. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. john stanley, c.j.1. there are no grounds for this application, gulzari lal was tried and convicted of the embezzlement of suing of money amounting in the aggregate to rs. 37-3-6, moneys paid to him as patwari of a certain village by the tenants under the court of wards, and which he represented that he had authority to collect. in the charge the aggregate amount of the items is slated, and, in addition to that, the particulars giving the dates and the amounts of three payments are also stated. it is to be observed that the alleged criminal breach of trust was committed within the period of one year, and therefore the provisions of sub-section 2 of section 222 of the code of criminal procedure apply. this sub-section is in the following terms: 'when the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust, or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of section 234: provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates' shall not exceed one year.' it seems to me clear that particulars as required by this section had been given--in fact more particulars than it was necessary to give to the-accused were given in the charge. it has been argued by the learned vakil for the applicant that because it was in the power, or may have been in the power, of the prosecution to supply fuller particulars, they right to have done so, and are not entitled to the benefit of the latter part of the section. i find, however, nothing in the code of criminal procedure to warrant such an argument. this case is not governed by the decision of their lordships of the privy council in the case of subrahmania ayyar v. king-emperor (1901) i.l.r. 25 mad. 61 s.c. 5 c.w.n. 866 inasmuch as in that case the offences with which the accused was charged extended over a period longer than a year. for these reasons the application is refused. the applicant must surrender himself and undergo the rest of his sentence.
Judgment:

John Stanley, C.J.

1. There are no grounds for this application, Gulzari Lal was tried and convicted of the embezzlement of suing of money amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 37-3-6, moneys paid to him as patwari of a certain village by the tenants Under the Court of Wards, and which he represented that he had authority to collect. In the charge the aggregate amount of the items is slated, and, in addition to that, the particulars giving the dates and the amounts of three payments are also stated. It is to be observed that the alleged criminal breach of trust was committed within the period of one year, and therefore the provisions of Sub-section 2 of Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply. This sub-section is in the following terms: 'When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust, or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of Section 234: provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates' shall not exceed one year.' It seems to me clear that particulars as required by this section had been given--in fact more particulars than it was necessary to give to the-accused were given in the charge. It has been argued by the learned vakil for the applicant that because it was in the power, or may have been in the power, of the prosecution to supply fuller particulars, they right to have done so, and are not entitled to the benefit of the latter part of the section. I find, however, nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure to warrant such an argument. This case is not governed by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Subrahmania Ayyar v. King-Emperor (1901) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 61 S.C. 5 C.W.N. 866 inasmuch as in that case the offences with which the accused was charged extended over a period longer than a year. For these reasons the application is refused. The applicant must surrender himself and undergo the rest of his sentence.