Sunder Khatik Vs. Mahadeo Pande - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/447735
SubjectBanking
CourtAllahabad
Decided OnJan-22-1925
Reported inAIR1925All282a; 87Ind.Cas.796
AppellantSunder Khatik
RespondentMahadeo Pande
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - this finding is opposed to the negotiable instruments act, section 13 as amended by act viii of 1919. this document is clearly a negotiable instrument within the meaning of explanation i to section 13 as amended by act viii of 1919. reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the opposite party on the case of mokhdum baksh v.ryves, j.1. the plaintiff brought the suit out of which this application arises to recover rs. 300 principal and rs. 186 interest due on a promissory note executed by the defendant. it has been founded by both courts and it is indeed apparent on the face of the document itself that originally there was no agreement to pay interest and that the agreement to pay interest at rs. 2 per cent, per mensem was interpolated after the note was written. both courts have found that this was done without the knowledge or consent of the defendant. the courts, however, have held that 8. 87 of the negotiable instruments act which renders a negotiable instrument absolutely void where a material alteration has been made in it does not apply, because this particular note is not a negotiable instrument for it makes the payment due to a specified person only. this finding is opposed to the negotiable instruments act, section 13 as amended by act viii of 1919. this document is clearly a negotiable instrument within the meaning of explanation i to section 13 as amended by act viii of 1919. reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the opposite party on the case of mokhdum baksh v. shaukat ali (1915) 13 a.l.j. 683. that was a decision of 1915 before the act was amended. it seems to me that as the law now stands the court had no option but to dismiss the suit on its finding that the promissory note sued upon had been materially altered. i, therefore, allow this application, set aside the decrees of the courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.
Judgment:

Ryves, J.

1. The plaintiff brought the suit out of which this application arises to recover Rs. 300 principal and Rs. 186 interest due on a promissory note executed by the defendant. It has been founded by both Courts and it is indeed apparent on the face of the document itself that originally there was no agreement to pay interest and that the agreement to pay interest at Rs. 2 per cent, per mensem was interpolated after the note was written. Both Courts have found that this was done without the knowledge or consent of the defendant. The Courts, however, have held that 8. 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which renders a negotiable instrument absolutely void where a material alteration has been made in it does not apply, because this particular note is not a negotiable instrument for it makes the payment due to a specified person only. This finding is opposed to the Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 13 as amended by Act VIII of 1919. This document is clearly a negotiable instrument within the meaning of Explanation I to Section 13 as amended by Act VIII of 1919. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the opposite party on the case of Mokhdum Baksh v. Shaukat Ali (1915) 13 A.L.J. 683. That was a decision of 1915 before the Act was amended. It seems to me that as the law now stands the Court had no option but to dismiss the suit on its finding that the promissory note sued upon had been materially altered. I, therefore, allow this application, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.