| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/447606 |
| Subject | Civil |
| Court | Allahabad High Court |
| Decided On | Dec-31-1969 |
| Judge | Arthur Strachey, C.J. and ;Knox, J. |
| Reported in | (1899)ILR21All181 |
| Appellant | In Re: Madho Ram |
Excerpt:
act no. xviii of 1879 (legal practitioners' act), section 36 - order including a person's name in the list of touts--revision--statute 24 and 25 vic., cap. liv, section 15--powers of superintendence of the high court. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - as regards revision, such cases are clearly not criminal proceedings to which the revisional powers of the high court under section 439 of the code of criminal procedure would apply.arthur strachey, c.j.1. this is an application to the court to set aside an order passed by the district judge of saharanpur under section 36 of th6 legal practitioners' act, xviii of 1879, as amended by section 4 of act no. xi of 1896. that order of the district judge was an order including the name of this petitioner in the list of persons proved to the satisfaction of the judge habitually to act as touts. the only ground stated in the petition to us is: 'because the finding is against the weight of the evidence.' we are of opinion that this court ought not to interfere, on any such ground as that, with an order passed by a subordinate court under section 36 of the legal practitioners' act. the law gives no right of appeal to this court from any such order. as regards revision, such cases are clearly not criminal proceedings to which the revisional powers of the high court under section 439 of the code of criminal procedure would apply. they do not fall within the powers of civil revision conferred by section 622 of the code of civil procedure. there remain only the powers of superintendence conferred by section 15 of the high courts act. under that section this court has, no doubt, very wide powers of superintendence over the proceedings of subordinate courts; and it is possible to imagine cases in which, in the exercise of those powers, it might be the court's duty to interfere with an order passed under section 36 of the legal practitioners' act. although under section 36 the courts have an extremely large discretion in framing lists of touts and including the names of particular individuals in such lists, the conditions prescribed by the section must of course be observed: for instance, no person's name is to be included unless he has had an opportunity of showing cause against such inclusion, and in all oases the person must be proved to the court's satisfaction habitually to act as a tout, and must be so proved by evidence, whether of general repute or otherwise. but in considering whether this court should interfere in the exercise of its powers of superintendence, one must bear in mind, first, that the test prescribed by section 36 is proof to the satisfaction of the court framing the list and of no other tribunal; and, secondly, that it is settled that this court is not competent, under section 15 of the high courts' act, to interfere with the order of a subordinate court, merely on the ground of error in law or error in fact. its powers of superintendence are not applicable where the only question is whether the decision of the lower court is against the weight of evidence. that is the only question raised by the present petition. it is admitted that there is evidence upon which the lower court has acted--evidence on the one side and on the other. we must, therefore, decline to interfere and must dismiss the application.
Judgment:Arthur Strachey, C.J.
1. This is an application to the Court to set aside an order passed by the District Judge of Saharanpur under Section 36 of th6 Legal Practitioners' Act, XVIII of 1879, as amended by Section 4 of Act No. XI of 1896. That order of the District Judge was an order including the name of this petitioner in the list of persons proved to the satisfaction of the Judge habitually to act as touts. The only ground stated in the petition to us is: 'Because the finding is against the weight of the evidence.' We are of opinion that this Court ought not to interfere, on any such ground as that, with an order passed by a subordinate Court under Section 36 of the Legal Practitioners' Act. The law gives no right of appeal to this Court from any such order. As regards revision, such cases are clearly not criminal proceedings to which the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply. They do not fall within the powers of civil revision conferred by Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There remain only the powers of superintendence conferred by Section 15 of the High Courts Act. Under that Section this Court has, no doubt, very wide powers of superintendence over the proceedings of subordinate Courts; and it is possible to imagine cases in which, in the exercise of those powers, it might be the Court's duty to interfere with an order passed under Section 36 of the Legal Practitioners' Act. Although under Section 36 the Courts have an extremely large discretion in framing lists of touts and including the names of particular individuals in such lists, the conditions prescribed by the Section must of course be observed: for instance, no person's name is to be included unless he has had an opportunity of showing cause against such inclusion, and in all oases the person must be proved to the Court's satisfaction habitually to act as a tout, and must be so proved by evidence, whether of general repute or otherwise. But in considering whether this Court should interfere in the exercise of its powers of superintendence, one must bear in mind, first, that the test prescribed by Section 36 is proof to the satisfaction of the Court framing the list and of no other tribunal; and, secondly, that it is settled that this Court is not competent, under Section 15 of the High Courts' Act, to interfere with the order of a Subordinate Court, merely on the ground of error in law or error in fact. Its powers of superintendence are not applicable where the only question is whether the decision of the lower Court is against the weight of evidence. That is the only question raised by the present petition. It is admitted that there is evidence upon which the lower Court has acted--evidence on the one side and on the other. We must, therefore, decline to interfere and must dismiss the application.