Pearey and ors. Vs. State - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/447437
SubjectCriminal
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided OnFeb-04-1952
Case NumberCriminal Revn. No. 206 of 1951
JudgeWali Ullah, J.
Reported inAIR1953All5
ActsCode of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898 - Sections 350(1)
AppellantPearey and ors.
RespondentState
Appellant AdvocateBageshwari Sahai, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateJ.R. Bhatt, Asst. Govt. Adv.
DispositionRevision allowed
Excerpt:
criminal - fair trial - section 350(1)(a) - witnesses must be examined, cross examined and reexamined - non compliance of the provisions - cannot be said to be a fair and proper trial. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 2. they went up in appeal to the learned sessions judge, but the appeal was unsuccessful. learned counsel has contended that the expression 'resummoning and rehearing',clearly implies that the witnesses in question must be summoned again and heard afresh i. the learned judge, who heard the appeal has observed that he was satisfied that the applicants had not been prejudiced by the fact that the material witnesses of fact were not examined afresh. in the nagpur case cited above, it was held by the learned judge, after an examination of a number of cases decided by various courts is india, including our own, that the failure of the learned magistrate who concluded the trial to comply strictly with proviso (a) to section 350 (l) vitiated the trial. on the other hand, it seems to me that the expression 'resummoned and reheard' clearly indicates that the witnesses named by the accused person must be resummoned and reheard i. 1 am accordingly satisfied that in this case, the proviso (a) to section 350 (l), criminal p.orderwali ullah, j.1. the applicants have been tried and convicted of an offence under section 379, penal code. they have been sentenced to pay a fine of rs. 25 each or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.2. they went up in appeal to the learned sessions judge, but the appeal was unsuccessful.3. they have now come up in revision to this court. 4. one of the main points urged by learned counsel in this court is that the proviso (a) to section 350(i), criminal p. c., was not complied with fully by the learned magistrate who decided the case and therefore the conviction of the applicants is vitiated in law.5. it appears that the trial of the applicants proceeded before two other magistrates before it came to the court of the present magistrate--the tahsildar magistrate--who decided the case. it appears that all the five prosecution witnesses in the case had been examined before other magistrates. when the case was taken up by the tahsildar magistrate, an application was made on behalf of the applicants that they wanted a de novo trial and that the prosecution witnesses might be produced afresh. this application made by the applicants was resisted by the complainant. at this stage, it appears that the counsel for the applicants made a statement that two of the witnesses viz. p. ws. 4 and 5, who were formal witnesses might not be resummoned and reheard: in other words, that their evidence, already recorded might be acted upon in the trial by the tahsildar magistrate. it was, however, claimed that the other three witnesses viz. p. ws. 1 to 3---witnesses of fact must be resummoned and reheard. the learned magistrate, however, allowed only fresh cross-examination of these witnesses. then the case proceeded further. defence evidence was taken and the trial actually ended later in the conviction and sentenced the applicants.6. learned counsel for the applicants has contended, in the first place, that the trial of the applicants was vitiated in law inasmuch as the proviso (a) to section 350 (l) was not complied with. learned counsel has contended that the expression 'resummoning and rehearing', clearly implies that the witnesses in question must be summoned again and heard afresh i. e. that the witnesses should be examined in chief, then cross-examined and, if necessary, re-examined. if this interpretation is correct, obviously the proviso (a) to section 350 (l) has not been complied with in this case.7. in support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the case of nathu balajee v. emperor, a. i. r. 1945 nag. 207. it was held in that case by a learned single judge of that court that the witnesses should be heard afresh from the start and that it was not enough merely to allow them to be cross-examined again. admittedly this has not been done in the present case. therefore, it is contended, there has been a violation of the provisions of proviso (a) to section 350 (l), criminal p. c.8. the question is what is the consequence, if any, of this non-compliance on the validity or otherwise of the trial and conviction of the applicants. the learned judge, who heard the appeal has observed that he was satisfied that the applicants had not been prejudiced by the fact that the material witnesses of fact were not examined afresh. in the nagpur case cited above, it was held by the learned judge, after an examination of a number of cases decided by various courts is india, including our own, that the failure of the learned magistrate who concluded the trial to comply strictly with proviso (a) to section 350 (l) vitiated the trial.9. mr. bhatt, the assistant government advocate, has relied strongly on the case of in re ramamuni reddi in a. i. r. 1938 mad. 724, decided by a learned single judge of that court. in that case, the learned magistrate had merely allowed the witnesses to be further cross-examined and it was held that that amounted to a mere irregularity which did not vitiate the trial. with respect, i am not able to share the view of the learned judge of the madras high court. on the other hand, it seems to me that the expression 'resummoned and reheard' clearly indicates that the witnesses named by the accused person must be resummoned and reheard i. e. heard afresh. merely allowing cross-examination or further cross-examination of a witness so named by an accused person would not be sufficient compliance with the provisions contained in proviso (a) to section 350 (l), criminal p. c. 1 am accordingly satisfied that in this case, the proviso (a) to section 350 (l), criminal p. c. was not complied with as the result of which the applicants did not have a fair and proper trial of their cases.10. in view of what i have said above, it is not necessary to consider certain other objections which have been raised by learned counsel in the application for revision.11. the result is that i allow the application in revision and set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the applicants. the fine, if paid, shall be refunded.
Judgment:
ORDER

Wali Ullah, J.

1. The applicants have been tried and convicted of an offence under Section 379, Penal Code. They have been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25 each or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.

2. They went up in appeal to the learned Sessions Judge, but the appeal was unsuccessful.

3. They have now come up in revision to this Court.

4. One of the main points urged by learned counsel in this Court is that the proviso (a) to Section 350(i), Criminal P. C., was not complied with fully by the learned Magistrate who decided the case and therefore the conviction of the applicants is vitiated in law.

5. It appears that the trial of the applicants proceeded before two other Magistrates before it came to the Court of the present Magistrate--the Tahsildar Magistrate--who decided the case. It appears that all the five prosecution witnesses in the case had been examined before other Magistrates. When the case was taken up by the Tahsildar Magistrate, an application was made on behalf of the applicants that they wanted a de novo trial and that the prosecution witnesses might be produced afresh. This application made by the applicants was resisted by the complainant. At this stage, it appears that the counsel for the applicants made a statement that two of the witnesses viz. p. ws. 4 and 5, who were formal witnesses might not be resummoned and reheard: in other words, that their evidence, already recorded might be acted upon in the trial by the Tahsildar Magistrate. It was, however, claimed that the other three witnesses viz. p. ws. 1 to 3---witnesses of fact must be resummoned and reheard. The learned Magistrate, however, allowed only fresh cross-examination of these witnesses. Then the case proceeded further. Defence evidence was taken and the trial actually ended later in the conviction and sentenced the applicants.

6. Learned counsel for the applicants has contended, in the first place, that the trial of the applicants was vitiated in law inasmuch as the proviso (a) to Section 350 (l) was not complied with. Learned counsel has contended that the expression 'resummoning and rehearing', clearly implies that the witnesses in question must be summoned again and heard afresh i. e. that the witnesses should be examined in chief, then cross-examined and, if necessary, re-examined. If this interpretation is correct, obviously the proviso (a) to Section 350 (l) has not been complied with in this case.

7. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the case of Nathu Balajee v. Emperor, A. I. R. 1945 Nag. 207. It was held in that case by a learned single Judge of that Court that the witnesses should be heard afresh from the start and that it was not enough merely to allow them to be cross-examined again. Admittedly this has not been done in the present case. Therefore, it is contended, there has been a violation of the provisions of proviso (a) to Section 350 (l), Criminal P. C.

8. The question is what is the consequence, if any, of this non-compliance on the validity or otherwise of the trial and conviction of the applicants. The learned Judge, who heard the appeal has observed that he was satisfied that the applicants had not been prejudiced by the fact that the material witnesses of fact were not examined afresh. In the Nagpur case cited above, it was held by the learned Judge, after an examination of a number of cases decided by various Courts is India, including our own, that the failure of the learned Magistrate who concluded the trial to comply strictly with proviso (a) to Section 350 (l) vitiated the trial.

9. Mr. Bhatt, the Assistant Government Advocate, has relied strongly on the case of In re Ramamuni Reddi in A. I. R. 1938 Mad. 724, decided by a learned single Judge of that Court. In that case, the learned Magistrate had merely allowed the witnesses to be further cross-examined and it was held that that amounted to a mere irregularity which did not vitiate the trial. With respect, I am not able to share the view of the learned Judge of the Madras High Court. On the other hand, it seems to me that the expression 'resummoned and reheard' clearly indicates that the witnesses named by the accused person must be resummoned and reheard i. e. heard afresh. Merely allowing cross-examination or further cross-examination of a witness so named by an accused person would not be sufficient compliance with the provisions contained in proviso (a) to Section 350 (l), Criminal P. C. 1 am accordingly satisfied that in this case, the proviso (a) to Section 350 (l), Criminal P. C. was not complied with as the result of which the applicants did not have a fair and proper trial of their cases.

10. In view of what I have said above, it is not necessary to consider certain other objections which have been raised by learned counsel in the application for revision.

11. The result is that I allow the application in revision and set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the applicants. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded.