| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/447307 |
| Subject | Property |
| Court | Allahabad |
| Decided On | Feb-03-1927 |
| Reported in | AIR1930All89 |
| Appellant | Farhatullah |
| Respondent | Mohammad and ors. |
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 1091 of 1924 relate to certain construction in the nature of houses and to the digging of a well on plot 82 inside a village abadi. the zamindar sued for the demolition of the houses and the filling up of the well. ' the tenant has now added to his house and has dug a well somewhere on this plot 72. 2. the various circumstances under which these constructions are made and in which land or houses come into the possession of individuals are very often very obscure, unless the matter has already at some time been the subject of litigation. it has been found that the constructions in the nature of houses are new and that the well was not constructed with the consent of the zamindar. this is a perfectly fair criticizm, but for the reasons that i have given above i am not prepared to hold the defendant too strictly bound to his pleading. on the other hand through a series of cases what, if i may say so appears to me to be the practical and sensible proposition has crystallised, that a tenant may build either a house or a well inside his house or on land actually appurtenant to and adjoining his house, which forms part of the site on a portion of which his house stands provided at any rate that such construction is not detrimental to the other interests of the zamindar: 281. the result is that in my opinion both appeals must fail and they are dismissed accordingly with costs.boys, j.1. this and the connected s.a. no. 1091 of 1924 relate to certain construction in the nature of houses and to the digging of a well on plot 82 inside a village abadi. the zamindar sued for the demolition of the houses and the filling up of the well. the facts of these cases very rarely appear with precision. but as i appreciate the facts in this case it has been found that there is plot 72 in the village; that on a portion of that plot there is the house of the defendant tenant; that the whole of the plot has been recorded as in his exclusive possession ever since 1903: that no portion whatever of the plot is 'uftada.' the tenant has now added to his house and has dug a well somewhere on this plot 72.2. the various circumstances under which these constructions are made and in which land or houses come into the possession of individuals are very often very obscure, unless the matter has already at some time been the subject of litigation. this frequently results in the pleadings being proportionately ill-informed. in this case the tenant set up that the constructions complained of were of very old standing, and as regards the well, that it had been dug with the consent of the zamindar. it has been found that the constructions in the nature of houses are new and that the well was not constructed with the consent of the zamindar. but it has been also held that the consent of the zamindar was not necessary, with the result that the whole suit has been dismissed by the lower appellate court. the trial court had partly decreed and partly dismissed and hence there were two appeals before the lower appellate court, and the plaintiff's case being wholly dismissed by the lower appellate court has resulted in the two present appeals. it has been urged first that the suits were dismissed on a ground which was never set up by the defendant tenant. this is a perfectly fair criticizm, but for the reasons that i have given above i am not prepared to hold the defendant too strictly bound to his pleading.3. the second point taken is that the tenant had no power to make these constructions without the consent of the zamindar. i have had a number of rulings quoted to me on this disputed point by counsel for either party. in chhatarpal v. gajadhar [1914] 25 i.c. 59, there is nothing to show that the land was in any way appurtenant to the house. it is merely described as having been near the house. it may have been wholly separate. in mohammad taqi v. dori a.i.r. 1924 all. 723, and in jagannath v. gurdyal [1911] 10 i.c. 284, it would appear that the land on which the constructions were built was not in the exclusive possession of the tenant. on the other hand through a series of cases what, if i may say so appears to me to be the practical and sensible proposition has crystallised, that a tenant may build either a house or a well inside his house or on land actually appurtenant to and adjoining his house, which forms part of the site on a portion of which his house stands provided at any rate that such construction is not detrimental to the other interests of the zamindar: see bhagwan das v. mohammad yahia [1913] 35 all. 292; mahadeo rai v. jan mohammad : air1925 all341 ; mahabal liurmi v. sarju [1917] 4 o.l.j. 454 and sheo sahai v. rajeshwari [1919] 6 o.l.j. 281. the result is that in my opinion both appeals must fail and they are dismissed accordingly with costs.
Judgment:Boys, J.
1. This and the connected S.A. No. 1091 of 1924 relate to certain construction in the nature of houses and to the digging of a well on plot 82 inside a village abadi. The zamindar sued for the demolition of the houses and the filling up of the well. The facts of these cases very rarely appear with precision. But as I appreciate the facts in this case it has been found that there is plot 72 in the village; that on a portion of that plot there is the house of the defendant tenant; that the whole of the plot has been recorded as in his exclusive possession ever since 1903: that no portion whatever of the plot is 'uftada.' The tenant has now added to his house and has dug a well somewhere on this plot 72.
2. The various circumstances under which these constructions are made and in which land or houses come into the possession of individuals are very often very obscure, unless the matter has already at some time been the subject of litigation. This frequently results in the pleadings being proportionately ill-informed. In this case the tenant set up that the constructions complained of were of very old standing, and as regards the well, that it had been dug with the consent of the zamindar. It has been found that the constructions in the nature of houses are new and that the well was not constructed with the consent of the zamindar. But it has been also held that the consent of the zamindar was not necessary, with the result that the whole suit has been dismissed by the lower appellate Court. The trial Court had partly decreed and partly dismissed and hence there were two appeals before the lower appellate Court, and the plaintiff's case being wholly dismissed by the lower appellate Court has resulted in the two present appeals. It has been urged first that the suits were dismissed on a ground which was never set up by the defendant tenant. This is a perfectly fair criticizm, but for the reasons that I have given above I am not prepared to hold the defendant too strictly bound to his pleading.
3. The second point taken is that the tenant had no power to make these constructions without the consent of the zamindar. I have had a number of rulings quoted to me on this disputed point by counsel for either party. In Chhatarpal v. Gajadhar [1914] 25 I.C. 59, there is nothing to show that the land was in any way appurtenant to the house. It is merely described as having been near the house. It may have been wholly separate. In Mohammad Taqi v. Dori A.I.R. 1924 All. 723, and in Jagannath v. Gurdyal [1911] 10 I.C. 284, it would appear that the land on which the constructions were built was not in the exclusive possession of the tenant. On the other hand through a series of cases what, if I may say so appears to me to be the practical and sensible proposition has crystallised, that a tenant may build either a house or a well inside his house or on land actually appurtenant to and adjoining his house, which forms part of the site on a portion of which his house stands provided at any rate that such construction is not detrimental to the other interests of the zamindar: see Bhagwan Das v. Mohammad Yahia [1913] 35 All. 292; Mahadeo Rai v. Jan Mohammad : AIR1925 All341 ; Mahabal liurmi v. Sarju [1917] 4 O.L.J. 454 and Sheo Sahai v. Rajeshwari [1919] 6 O.L.J. 281. The result is that in my opinion both appeals must fail and they are dismissed accordingly with costs.