SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/447305 |
Subject | Limitation |
Court | Allahabad |
Decided On | Feb-05-1925 |
Reported in | AIR1925All247a |
Appellant | Ram Kishen and ors. |
Respondent | Baldeo Koeri and ors. |
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - the suit was thus clearly time barred as far as ram kishen is, concerned.stuart, j.1. the only points argued in this appeal are the points that the suit was not barred by limitation and that the sale was not for legal necessity.2. in respect of the first point the facts are very clear. ram kishen ram, das, ram subhag and ram karan the sons of ram raj brought a suit to set aside a sale which ram raj had made of certain ancestral property on the 18th february, 1907. the plaintiffs and ram raj are members of a joint hindu family governed by the mitakshara law. it has been found on the facts by the learned district judge and this finding cannot be attacked in second appeal that ram kiahen was over twenty-one at the time of the institution of the suit and that the other three plaintiffs who were minors at the time of the institution of the suit had not been born at the time that the alienation was made. the suit was thus clearly time barred as far as ram kishen is, concerned.3. it is also time-barred in regard to the remainder as they were not in existence at the time that the alienation was made, on the principles laid down in sita ram singh v. cheddi singh a.i.r. 1924 all. 789. the view taken by the learned judges had been accepted as correct by their lordships of the privy council in a recent suit from oudh ranodip v. permeswar prasad which has not yet come into the regular reports. it is reported in the all india reporter of 1925 at page 33.4. it has been suggested that their lordships of the privy council took a contrary view in banwari lal v. mahesh a.i.r. 1918 p.c. 118. it is not the case that they took a contrary view. they refused to interfere in that appeal in respect of alienation which had been made before the plaintiff was born. this finding is sufficient to dispose of the appeal.5. i need only add shortly that i agree with the finding of the learned district judge on the question of legal necessity. this appeal is dismissed with costs on the higher scale.
Judgment:Stuart, J.
1. The only points argued in this appeal are the points that the suit was not barred by limitation and that the sale was not for legal necessity.
2. In respect of the first point the facts are very clear. Ram Kishen Ram, Das, Ram Subhag and Ram Karan the sons of Ram Raj brought a suit to set aside a sale which Ram Raj had made of certain ancestral property on the 18th February, 1907. The plaintiffs and Ram Raj are members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law. It has been found on the facts by the learned District Judge and this finding cannot be attacked in second appeal that Ram Kiahen was over twenty-one at the time of the institution of the suit and that the other three plaintiffs who were minors at the time of the institution of the suit had not been born at the time that the alienation was made. The suit was thus clearly time barred as far as Ram Kishen is, concerned.
3. It is also time-barred in regard to the remainder as they were not in existence at the time that the alienation was made, on the principles laid down in Sita Ram Singh v. Cheddi Singh A.I.R. 1924 All. 789. The view taken by the learned Judges had been accepted as correct by their Lordships of the Privy Council in a recent suit from Oudh Ranodip v. Permeswar Prasad which has not yet come into the regular reports. It is reported in the All India Reporter of 1925 at page 33.
4. It has been suggested that their Lordships of the Privy Council took a contrary view in Banwari LaL v. Mahesh A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 118. It is not the case that they took a contrary view. They refused to interfere in that appeal in respect of alienation which had been made before the plaintiff was born. This finding is sufficient to dispose of the appeal.
5. I need only add shortly that I agree with the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of legal necessity. This appeal is dismissed with costs on the higher scale.