| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/447303 | 
| Subject | Civil | 
| Court | Allahabad | 
| Decided On | Nov-06-1923 | 
| Reported in | AIR1925All5 | 
| Appellant | Thakur Mahipal Singh | 
| Respondent | Athal Singh and anr. | 
Excerpt:
 - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978)  held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board.  the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal  whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled].  -  800 as well as furnished sureties for the same. 4. under this deed they undertook to produce the judgment-debtor in court on the date the appeal was dismissed, and if they failed to produce him they held themselves liable to pay the decretal amount.sulaiman, j.1. this appeal arises out of certain execution proceedings. mahipal singh brought a suit for a simple money decree against raghunandan which was decreed sometime ago. an appeal was presented to the district judge, and was dismissed. while a second appeal was pending in this court the decree was put in execution and the judgment-debtor was arrested and brought to the court of first instance. on his behalf an application has been made that the proceedings should be stay-ad inasmuch as a second appeal was pending in the high court. the learned munsiff passed an order that the judgment-debtor should be released provided he deposited in court a security bond for rs. 800 as well as furnished sureties for the same. on the 8th april 1921 a security bond signed by two persons hardeo singh and athal singh was presented which was accepted as sufficient by the court and the judgment-debtor was released.2. the second appeal was ultimately dismissed on the 23rd june 1921, and after its dismissal the decree-holder applied to the court of first instance for execution of the decree against the sureties. on objections being raised by the sureties the application was dismissed as against them. that order was upheld in appeal and the decree-holders have now come up in execution second appeal and urge that the sureties are liable.3. it is true that the security bond was not quite in conformity with the order of the court. no objection to it, however, was raised on behalf of the decree-holder and it was accepted as sufficient by the court. it is now impossible to go behind it and hold that the sureties are liable for anything more than what they had undertaken under this deed.4. under this deed they undertook to produce the judgment-debtor in court on the date the appeal was dismissed, and if they failed to produce him they held themselves liable to pay the decretal amount. it is not disputed that after the dismissal of the appeal no notice was ever sent to the sureties to produce the judgment-debtor in court. it was practically impossible to know beforehand on what date the appeal would be finally disposed of by the high court.5. the decree-holders since then took no stops to call upon the sureties to produce the judgment-debtor in court. a reasonable construction of the document is that sureties undertook to produce him in court after the dismissal of the appeal when they were called upon to do so.6. before the lower appellate court the learned vakil for the decree-holders was expressly asked whether he wanted the judgment-debtor to be brought into court inasmuch as the sureties wore ready to produce him. the reply was that he did not want him as he had become an insolvent, and it was no use having him up in court. in these circumstances i am unable to hold that the sureties made a default and are liable to pay the decretal amount.7. it may be that the judgment-debtor got himself released on furnishing security which was really not in strict compliance with the order of the munsif. it was, however, to some extent the fault of the decree-holders themselves that they did not examine the security bond at the time. the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs including in this court fees on the higher scale.
Judgment:Sulaiman, J.
1. This appeal arises out of certain execution proceedings. Mahipal Singh brought a suit for a simple money decree against Raghunandan which was decreed sometime ago. An appeal was presented to the District Judge, and was dismissed. While a second appeal was pending in this Court the decree was put in execution and the judgment-debtor was arrested and brought to the Court of first instance. On his behalf an application has been made that the proceedings should be stay-ad inasmuch as a second appeal was pending in the High Court. The learned Munsiff passed an order that the judgment-debtor should be released provided he deposited in Court a security bond for Rs. 800 as well as furnished sureties for the same. On the 8th April 1921 a security bond signed by two persons Hardeo Singh and Athal Singh was presented which was accepted as sufficient by the Court and the judgment-debtor was released.
2. The second appeal was ultimately dismissed on the 23rd June 1921, and after its dismissal the decree-holder applied to the Court of first instance for execution of the decree against the sureties. On objections being raised by the sureties the application was dismissed as against them. That order was upheld in appeal and the decree-holders have now come up in execution second appeal and urge that the sureties are liable.
3. It is true that the security bond was not quite in conformity with the order of the Court. No objection to it, however, was raised on behalf of the decree-holder and it was accepted as sufficient by the Court. It is now impossible to go behind it and hold that the sureties are liable for anything more than what they had undertaken under this deed.
4. Under this deed they undertook to produce the judgment-debtor in Court on the date the appeal was dismissed, and if they failed to produce him they held themselves liable to pay the decretal amount. It is not disputed that after the dismissal of the appeal no notice was ever sent to the sureties to produce the judgment-debtor in Court. It was practically impossible to know beforehand on what date the appeal would be finally disposed of by the High Court.
5. The decree-holders since then took no stops to call upon the sureties to produce the judgment-debtor in Court. A reasonable construction of the document is that sureties undertook to produce him in Court after the dismissal of the appeal when they were called upon to do so.
6. Before the lower appellate Court the learned vakil for the decree-holders was expressly asked whether he wanted the judgment-debtor to be brought into Court inasmuch as the sureties wore ready to produce him. The reply was that he did not want him as he had become an insolvent, and it was no use having him up in Court. In these circumstances I am unable to hold that the sureties made a default and are liable to pay the decretal amount.
7. It may be that the judgment-debtor got himself released on furnishing security which was really not in strict compliance with the order of the Munsif. It was, however, to some extent the fault of the decree-holders themselves that they did not Examine the security bond at the time. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs including in this Court fees on the higher scale.