| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/447282 |
| Subject | Civil |
| Court | Allahabad High Court |
| Decided On | Dec-31-1969 |
| Judge | John Edge, Kt., C.J. and; Banerji, J. |
| Reported in | (1895)ILR17All86 |
| Appellant | Queen-empress |
| Respondent | Teja and ors. |
Excerpt:
act no. xlv of 1860 (indian penal code), section 396 - dacoity in the course of which murder is committed--facts necessary to establish the offence provided for in section 396. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - it is clearly proved that on the 29th of april 1892, a dacoity was committed at the village of hath kant, in the commission of which dacoity a villager named janki prasad was shot dead by one of the dacoits.john edge, kt., c.j. and banerji, j.1. teja and zaharia have appealed against sentences of death passed upon them for the offence of dacoity with murder, under section 396 of the indian penal code. it is clearly proved that on the 29th of april 1892, a dacoity was committed at the village of hath kant, in the commission of which dacoity a villager named janki prasad was shot dead by one of the dacoits. there is evidence showing that the person who fired the shot was zaharia. janki prasad and the dacoits who actually killed him were outside the house. at the time teja was inside the house, plundering it. the evidence leaves no doubt that these two men were members of the gang of dacoits engaged actually in that dacoity. as to zaharia there can be no question that he has brought himself within section 396 of the indian penal code. but as to teja it is necessary to consider whether the fact that the murder was committed outside the house at a time when he was inside the house takes his case out of section 396. in the case of queen-empress v. umrao singh i.l.r. 16 all. 437, a bench of this court said in its judgment: 'we are also of opinion that to establish a liability to the punishment provided in this section (section 396) it is necessary to prove that the person said to be liable was one of the persons who were conjointly committing dacoity, and was present when the act of murder in the dacoity was committed.' further on it was said: 'there is room for such doubt, particularly in the case of girwar singh and raghubar singh, for there is no evidence which places them within the house of hira lal at the time when the murder was committed.'2. if those two statements to which we have referred are to be taken as of general application, we entirely dissent from their correctness as statements of law. it is probable that in that particular case in which that judgment was delivered girwar singh and raghubar singh were not proved to have been conjointly with the others committing dacoity. however, on that we need express no opinion. in our opinion it matters not, when in the commission of a dacoity a murder is committed, whether the particular dacoit charged under section 396 was inside the house or outside the house, or whether the murder was committed inside or outside the house, so long only as the murder was committed in the commission of that dacoity. in our opinion these two men were, properly convicted of the offence punishable under section 396 of the indian penal code. we dismiss their appeals, and, confirming the convictions and sentences, we direct that those sentences be carried into effect.
Judgment:John Edge, Kt., C.J. and Banerji, J.
1. Teja and Zaharia have appealed against sentences of death passed upon them for the offence of dacoity with murder, under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. It is clearly proved that on the 29th of April 1892, a dacoity was committed at the village of Hath Kant, in the commission of which dacoity a villager named Janki Prasad was shot dead by one of the dacoits. There is evidence showing that the person who fired the shot was Zaharia. Janki Prasad and the dacoits who actually killed him were outside the house. At the time Teja was inside the house, plundering it. The evidence leaves no doubt that these two men were members of the gang of dacoits engaged actually in that dacoity. As to Zaharia there can be no question that he has brought himself within Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. But as to Teja it is necessary to consider whether the fact that the murder was committed outside the house at a time when he was inside the house takes his case out of Section 396. In the case of Queen-Empress v. Umrao Singh I.L.R. 16 All. 437, a Bench of this Court said in its judgment: 'We are also of opinion that to establish a liability to the punishment provided in this section (Section 396) it is necessary to prove that the person said to be liable was one of the persons who were conjointly committing dacoity, and was present when the act of murder in the dacoity was committed.' Further on it was said: 'There is room for such doubt, particularly in the case of Girwar Singh and Raghubar Singh, for there is no evidence which places them within the house of Hira Lal at the time when the murder was committed.'
2. If those two statements to which we have referred are to be taken as of general application, we entirely dissent from their correctness as statements of law. It is probable that in that particular case in which that judgment was delivered Girwar Singh and Raghubar Singh were not proved to have been conjointly with the others committing dacoity. However, on that we need express no opinion. In our opinion it matters not, when in the commission of a dacoity a murder is committed, whether the particular dacoit charged under Section 396 was inside the house or outside the house, or whether the murder was committed inside or outside the house, so long only as the murder was committed in the commission of that dacoity. In our opinion these two men were, properly convicted of the offence punishable under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. We dismiss their appeals, and, confirming the convictions and sentences, we direct that those sentences be carried into effect.