Naguluri Krishna Kumar Goud Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Agriculture and Co-operation Department and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/447142
SubjectConstitution
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided OnJul-18-2002
Case NumberW.P. No. 11117 of 2002
JudgeAR. Lakshmanan, C.J. and ;Ghulam Mohammed, J.
Reported in2002(5)ALT160
ActsWarehousing Corporation Act, 1962 - Sections 31(8)
AppellantNaguluri Krishna Kumar Goud
RespondentGovernment of Andhra Pradesh, Agriculture and Co-operation Department and ors.
Appellant AdvocatePabhakar Sripada, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateSC for APSWC for Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 and ;C.V. Ramulu, S.C. for C.G. for Respondent No. 4
DispositionPetition dismissed
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - as a general rule, the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do, so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce, and that demand was met by a refusal halsbury's laws of england, 3rd edn.ar. lakshmanan, c.j.1. this writ petition is filed seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent no. 1 to refer the financial irregularities committed by the 3rd respondent during the period from 30-6-2001 to 22-12-2001 as managing director of the respondent no. 2 corporation, for audit to the comptroller and auditor-general of india under section 31(8) of the warehousing corporation act, 1962.2. the writ petition, as framed, is not maintainable in law. the supreme court in s.i. syndicate ltd. v. union of india, : [1975]1scr956 while dealing with an identical matter, has observed as follows:'as a general rule, the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do, so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce, and that demand was met by a refusal halsbury's laws of england, 3rd edn., vol.13, p.106- followed.3. in yet another similar case reported in kamini kumar das choudhury v. state of west bengal, : [1973]1scr718 the honourable supreme court ruled:'a demand for justice and its refusal must precede the filing of a petition asking for direction or writ of mandamus.'4. a division bench of kerala high court in malabar cements ltd. v. mukundan, 1999 (2) klt 282 presided over by one of us (ar. lakshmanan, j., as he then was), while dealing with an identical case held:'it is settled law that no decision adverse to any party shall be taken without giving the affected party an effective opportunity of meeting the allegations against him before such decision is taken. this principle requires that every person whose right is affected must have a reasonable notice of the case he has to meet. he must be furnished with the information upon which the action (in the instant case ext. p-1) is based. he must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence and to meet the case against him. in the instant case, such a reasonable opportunity to be heard was not given to the appellant by this court. the case was decided in the absence of the appellant and a vigilance enquiry was ordered on that basis. it is settled by a catena of decisions of this court and the apex court that a decision taken on the basis of information gathered on the back of the party affected, without giving him an opportunity to rebut such information or material, is opposed to the principles of natural justice. this principle is attracted in the instant case since a proper opportunity was not given to the appellant to meet the case against it by filing a counter-affidavit and producing evidence. we are of the opinion that when a serious allegation is made before this court, this court is bound to issue notice to the person or persons against whom such allegation is made, affording an opportunity of hearing.'5. admittedly, the present writ petition was not preceded by a demand, which was met by a refusal. therefore, following the law laid down by the supreme court and the kerala high court, we dismiss the present writ petition as not maintainable at this stage.
Judgment:

AR. Lakshmanan, C.J.

1. This Writ Petition is filed seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to refer the financial irregularities committed by the 3rd respondent during the period from 30-6-2001 to 22-12-2001 as Managing Director of the Respondent No. 2 Corporation, for audit to the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India under Section 31(8) of the Warehousing Corporation Act, 1962.

2. The Writ Petition, as framed, is not maintainable in law. The Supreme Court in S.I. Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, : [1975]1SCR956 while dealing with an identical matter, has observed as follows:

'As a general rule, the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do, so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the Mandamus desires to enforce, and that demand was met by a refusal Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol.13, P.106- Followed.

3. In yet another similar case reported in Kamini Kumar Das Choudhury v. State of West Bengal, : [1973]1SCR718 the Honourable Supreme Court ruled:

'A demand for justice and its refusal must precede the filing of a petition asking for direction or Writ of Mandamus.'

4. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Malabar Cements Ltd. v. Mukundan, 1999 (2) KLT 282 presided over by one of us (AR. Lakshmanan, J., as he then was), while dealing with an identical case held:

'It is settled law that no decision adverse to any party shall be taken without giving the affected party an effective opportunity of meeting the allegations against him before such decision is taken. This principle requires that every person whose right is affected must have a reasonable notice of the case he has to meet. He must be furnished with the information upon which the action (in the instant case Ext. P-1) is based. He must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence and to meet the case against him. In the instant case, such a reasonable opportunity to be heard was not given to the appellant by this Court. The case was decided in the absence of the appellant and a vigilance enquiry was ordered on that basis. It is settled by a catena of decisions of this Court and the Apex Court that a decision taken on the basis of information gathered on the back of the party affected, without giving him an opportunity to rebut such information or material, is opposed to the principles of natural justice. This principle is attracted in the instant case since a proper opportunity was not given to the appellant to meet the case against it by filing a counter-affidavit and producing evidence. We are of the opinion that when a serious allegation is made before this Court, this Court is bound to issue notice to the person or persons against whom such allegation is made, affording an opportunity of hearing.'

5. Admittedly, the present Writ Petition was not preceded by a demand, which was met by a refusal. Therefore, following the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the Kerala High Court, we dismiss the present Writ Petition as not maintainable at this stage.