G.M. Qureshi Vs. Ashraf Jehan - Court Judgment

P.S. Narayana, J.

1. Heard Sri V. Venkataramana, Counsel representing the appellant and Sri J. Prabhakar, Counsel representing the respondent.

2. The Second Appeal is preferred by the unsuccessful defendant in O.S.No. 1667/95 on the file of VII Junior Civil Judge, City Civil, Court Hyderabad. The respondent herein/ plaintiff filed O.S.No. 1667/95 on the file of VII Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for the reliefs of ejectment of the appellant/defendant from the suit schedule premises, delivery of vacant possession, arrears of rent for mesne profits and for costs of the suit. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, Issues were settled. P.W.1 and P.W.2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-6 were marked. Likewise, D.W.1 and D.W.2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-13 were marked. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the court of first instance had partly decreed the suit and aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein/defendant preferred A.S.No. 377/98 on the file of XI Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (Fast Track Court) and the learned Judge by the Judgment and decree dated 29-6-2001 had dismissed the Appeal with a modification of the Judgment and decree with regard to the period of the payment of mesne profits and aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful defendant in both the courts below had preferred the present Second Appeal.

3. The only question that had been raised is relating to the validity of quit notice Ex.A-1. The case of the respective parties, as reflected in the pleadings, can be summarized as hereunder:

4. The respondent/plaintiff pleaded that she is the owner of a building consisting of ground floor bearing Municipal No. 12-2-800/ C/1 and the first floor bearing Municipal No. 12-2-800/C/A. She leased out the ground floor portion to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1300/- under a rental agreement on 10-3-1992. There was no first floor on the date of lease. The first floor was constructed later on and a separate Municipal No. 12-2-800/C/A was also given to the first floor. The tenancy was for a period of 11 months commencing from 10-3-1992 and it had expired on 10-2-1993. After the expiry of the lease deed of eleven months under the rental agreement, the rental agreement was neither renewed nor extended. The defendant continued to be in possession on the ground floor and later on converted the same into a non-residential purpose without the consent of the plaintiff. Further, the defendant had not paid the monthly rents from 1-1-1994 till April 1994. The plaintiff issued a legal notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the monthly tenancy of the defendant in the suit schedule premises (ground floor) with effect from 10-12-1994, calling upon him to quit and hand over the peaceful possession to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also claimed arrears of rent in the quit notice. The defendant did not vacate the suit premises as demanded and got issued a reply notice with false and baseless allegations. Hence the plaintiff filed the suit to evict the defendant from the suit premises i.e., ground floor bearing Municipal No. 12-2-800/C/1 for arrears of rent from 1 -1 -1994 to 9-2-1994 and for mesne profits from 10-12-1994 to 25-4-1995 @ Rs. 1800/- per month and future mesne profits @ Rs. 1800/- per month from the date of suit till the date of recovery of possession of the suit property and for costs.

5. The appellant/defendant filed a written statement pleading that he is the tenant in respect of both the ground and the first floors under the lease agreement dated 10-3-1992 for Rs. 1300/- per month. He paid monthly rents till May 1995 to the son of the plaintiff from the very inception of the tenancy. The plaintiff obtained a separate Municipal No. 12-2-800/C/A to the first floor after letting over the entire ground floor and the first floor to him. During the year 1994 when the plaintiff tried to dispossess him from the suit premises, he filed a suit in O.S.No. 128/94 on the file of VII Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for permanent injunction to restrain the plaintiff from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of both the ground and the first floors. However, the court passed a final order in I.A.No. 22/94 in the said suit and granted a temporary injunction restraining the plaintiff in respect of the ground floor only and rejected the injunction in respect of the first floor. The plaintiff is having huge properties and she is living in some other house but not in the first floor as alleged. He had filed a petition before the court seeking permission to deposit the monthly rents from June 1996. The notice issued by the plaintiff under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is on false and concocted grounds. The notice of termination is bad, defective and not maintainable in law. The plaintiff has not complied with the legal requirements for filing the suit for ejectment, vacant possession and mesne profits against him. There is no default in payment of rents.

6. On the strength of the respective pleadings before the court of first instance, the following Issues and Additional Issue had been framed:

ISSUES:

1. Whether the notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not valid?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to eviction and vacant possession of the plaint schedule property?

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits as prayed for?

4. To what relief?

ADDITIONAL ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to arrears of rents as claimed for?

7. The plaintiff examined her husband and her son as P.W.1 and P.W.2 and Exs.A-1 to A-6 were marked and the defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and another witness as D.W.2 and Exs.B-1 to B-13 were marked. Both the courts on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that there was proper termination of tenancy and hence the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to the relief of eviction and also to other reliefs, which had been granted. The sole question which had been canvassed as already referred to supra is relating to the validity of the quit notice Ex.A-1. The appellate court in fact had framed a specific point for consideration as Point No. 2 and had discussed in detail this question at paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Judgment. All the other questions raised and canvassed by the appellant are only factual aspects. Both the courts on the strength of both the oral and documentary evidence --the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and D.W.1 and D.W.2 and Exs.A-1 to A-6 and B-1 to B-13, had recorded concurrent findings and had ultimately negatived the contentions raised by the appellant/defendant in this regard. Inasmuch as these are all factual aspects and concurrent findings had been recorded by both the courts below, I do not see any reason to disturb such findings which had been discussed in detail by both the courts below. Hence the said findings are hereby affirmed.

8. As far as the question relating to validity of the notice is concerned, in fact, I have gone through the reasons recorded at paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Judgment of the appellate court where, in detail, this aspect had been dealt with and ultimately a finding had been recorded that the quit notice issued by the plaintiff is in conformity with Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882. In the light of the said discussion in detail by the appellate court confirming the findings of the court of first instance in this regard, I do not see any reason to arrive at a different conclusion relating to the validity of the quit notice Ex.A-1.

9. Except this question, no other question rightly had been argued by the learned Counsel representing the appellant since the other questions are only the questions relating to factual aspects and also in the light of the fact that concurrent findings had been recorded by ooth the courts below. Hence, I do not see any substantial question of law involved in the Second Appeal and accordingly the Second Appeal shall stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The appellant is hereby granted a period of Eight months to vacate the premises.