Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs Vs. Annaluru Narasimha Rao and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - it appears that as the defendants failed to put in appearance despite service of notices, the suit was decreed ex parte on 26-12-1997. the petitioner-appellant i. however, the state government failed to take any action with the result the suit was decreed ex parte.orderc.v.n. sastri, j.1. heard the learned counsel for both parties. this is an application to condone the delay of 439 days in filing the appeal. the suit is filed by the respondent for declaration that he is a freedom fighter and for arrears of pension, for grant of acs.5-00 of wet land or acs.10-00 of dry land and for grant of railway pass along with a companion. it appears that as the defendants failed to put in appearance despite service of notices, the suit was decreed ex parte on 26-12-1997. the petitioner-appellant i.e., the ministry of home affairs, central government, new delhi, who figures as the first defendant in the suit, has filed the present appeal with a petition for condonation of delay stating that on receipt of notice, it addressed the state government to defend the suit and also sent para-wise remarks for preparing the pleadings. however, the state government failed to take any action with the result the suit was decreed ex parte. it is further stated that the petitioner came to know about the judgment and decree of the tower court only on receipt of a letter from the respondent along with a photo copy of the judgment and decree in the matter. on receipt of the same, the state government was requested to obtain a certified copy of the decree and judgment but there was no response. thereupon the matter was referred to the central government standing counsel for legal advice and as per the advice tendered by the counsel, the appeal was filed with a delay of 439 days. 2. the respondent filed a counter opposing the petition and stating inter alia that prior to the filing of the suit, he applied for grant of freedom-fighter's pension to the government of india in 1972-73 with all original jail certificates and the petitioner has full knowledge of the suit in the year 1992 itself when the notices were served upon him on the application filed for permitting the respondent to file the suit as an indigent person. it is further stated in the counter-affidavit that after the decree was passed, the respondent addressed a letter dated 30-12-1997 enclosing a copy of the judgment dated 26-12-1997, for sanction of freedom fighter's pension in compliance with the judgment. it is further stated that the deputy speaker of the a.p. legislative assembly wrote a d.o. letter dated 31-1-1998 to the union minister for home affairs marking a copy to the petitioner herein with a request to consider his case for sanctioning the freedom-fighter's pension. in response to this the joint secretary, ministry of home affairs by letter dated 4-3-1998 informed the hon'ble deputy speaker that his case was under consideration. likewise he received a letter dated 1-4-1998 from the prime minister's office informing him that his case was referred to the ministry of home affairs for consideration. finally on 6-1-1999 he received a letter from the petitioner herein stating that an appeal was already filed in the high court against the judgment of the trial court. but no such appeal was filed and the present appeal was filed long afterwards i.e., 8-6-1999. the explanation offered for the delay is neither true nor valid. 3. even assuming that the petitioner had no knowledge about the judgment and decree of the trial court prior to the receipt of the letter addressed by the respondent on 30-12-1997 which was admittedly received by the petitioner, there is no satisfactory explanation for the subsequent delay. the affidavit filed in support of the petition is vague. it is not stated as to when the state government was addressed to obtain a copy of the judgment and decree or when exactly a copy application was made. no details of the alleged correspondence between the petitioner and the standing counsel are also given in the affidavit. further the assertion in the reply dated 6-1-1999 addressed by the under-secretary to the government of india to the respondent that an appeal was already filed in the high court is obviously false as no such appeal was filed. may be they were contemplating to file an appeal but, in fact, no such appeal was filed. the respondent is now aged 74 years. the suit was filed in the year 1992 informa pauperies. prior to filing the suit the respondent applied for freedom-fighter's pension enclosing the relevant certificates. in the trial court the respondent appears to have filed as many as 27 documents, which were marked as exhibits, in support of his claim. on consideration of the said documents, the trial court decreed the suit. in the normal circumstances, as this is a matter involving public funds, i would have been inclined to condone the delay. but having regard to the above facts and circumstances, i do not find any valid grounds to condone the inordinate delay of 439 days in filing the present appeal. the application is accordingly dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

C.V.N. Sastri, J.

1. Heard the learned Counsel for both parties. This is an application to condone the delay of 439 days in filing the appeal. The suit is filed by the respondent for declaration that he is a freedom fighter and for arrears of pension, for grant of Acs.5-00 of wet land or Acs.10-00 of dry land and for grant of railway pass along with a companion. It appears that as the defendants failed to put in appearance despite service of notices, the suit was decreed ex parte on 26-12-1997. The petitioner-appellant i.e., the Ministry of Home Affairs, Central Government, New Delhi, who figures as the first defendant in the suit, has filed the present appeal with a petition for condonation of delay stating that on receipt of notice, it addressed the State Government to defend the suit and also sent para-wise remarks for preparing the pleadings. However, the State Government failed to take any action with the result the suit was decreed ex parte. It is further stated that the petitioner came to know about the judgment and decree of the tower Court only on receipt of a letter from the respondent along with a photo copy of the judgment and decree in the matter. On receipt of the same, the State Government was requested to obtain a certified copy of the decree and judgment but there was no response. Thereupon the matter was referred to the Central Government Standing Counsel for legal advice and as per the advice tendered by the Counsel, the appeal was filed with a delay of 439 days.

2. The respondent filed a counter opposing the petition and stating inter alia that prior to the filing of the suit, he applied for grant of freedom-fighter's pension to the Government of India in 1972-73 with all original jail certificates and the petitioner has full knowledge of the suit in the year 1992 itself when the notices were served upon him on the application filed for permitting the respondent to file the suit as an indigent person. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that after the decree was passed, the respondent addressed a letter dated 30-12-1997 enclosing a copy of the judgment dated 26-12-1997, for sanction of freedom fighter's pension in compliance with the judgment. It is further stated that the Deputy Speaker of the A.P. Legislative Assembly wrote a D.O. letter dated 31-1-1998 to the Union Minister for Home Affairs marking a copy to the petitioner herein with a request to consider his case for sanctioning the freedom-fighter's pension. In response to this the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs by letter dated 4-3-1998 informed the Hon'ble Deputy Speaker that his case was under consideration. Likewise he received a letter dated 1-4-1998 from the Prime Minister's Office informing him that his case was referred to the Ministry of Home Affairs for consideration. Finally on 6-1-1999 he received a letter from the petitioner herein stating that an appeal was already filed in the High Court against the judgment of the trial Court. But no such appeal was filed and the present appeal was filed long afterwards i.e., 8-6-1999. The explanation offered for the delay is neither true nor valid.

3. Even assuming that the petitioner had no knowledge about the judgment and decree of the trial Court prior to the receipt of the letter addressed by the respondent on 30-12-1997 which was admittedly received by the petitioner, there is no satisfactory explanation for the subsequent delay. The affidavit filed in support of the petition is vague. It is not stated as to when the State Government was addressed to obtain a copy of the judgment and decree or when exactly a copy application was made. No details of the alleged correspondence between the petitioner and the Standing Counsel are also given in the affidavit. Further the assertion in the reply dated 6-1-1999 addressed by the Under-Secretary to the Government of India to the respondent that an appeal was already filed in the High Court is obviously false as no such appeal was filed. May be they were contemplating to file an appeal but, in fact, no such appeal was filed. The respondent is now aged 74 years. The suit was filed in the year 1992 informa pauperies. Prior to filing the suit the respondent applied for freedom-fighter's pension enclosing the relevant certificates. In the trial Court the respondent appears to have filed as many as 27 documents, which were marked as exhibits, in support of his claim. On consideration of the said documents, the trial Court decreed the suit. In the normal circumstances, as this is a matter involving public funds, I would have been inclined to condone the delay. But having regard to the above facts and circumstances, I do not find any valid grounds to condone the inordinate delay of 439 days in filing the present appeal. The application is accordingly dismissed.