Bojjapu Sanyasamma Vs. District Collector and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 2. the appellant in the second appeal is unsuccessful plaintiff, who seeks to assail judgment and decree in as no.b. prakash rao, j.1. since both these matters are connected and between the same parties in respect of similar subject-matter, they have been taken up together for disposal at the admission stage.2. the appellant in the second appeal is unsuccessful plaintiff, who seeks to assail judgment and decree in as no. 117 of 1999, dated 8-4-2003 on the file of the vi additional district judge (fast track court), rajahmundry, dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant and confirming the judgment and decree in os no. 79 of 1987, dated 22-3-1999 on the file of the senior civil judge, peddapuram.3. in the crp, petitioners are the rival claimants, who are aggrieved of the orders in ia no. 212 of 2003 in op no. 172 of 1990, dated 26-8-2003 on the file of the senior civil judge, peddapuram, rejecting application filed by them seeking for withdrawal of the amounts as awarded in the reference.4. heard sri r.k. suri, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the second appeal and the respondents in the revision, and sri ch. dhanunjaya, learned counsel having filed caveat, appearing on behalf of the respondents in the second appeal and the petitioners in the revision.5. the facts, in brief, are that the main appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant seeking for declaration that she is the absolute owner of the suit schedule land and for consequential injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 from making payment of compensation amount to any person other than the plaintiff.6. the case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that she is fostered daughter of karri ayyanna and karri puramma. further, it is stated that the suit schedule property is self-acquired property of karri ayyanna and during his lifetime, he settled the said property in favour of his wife karri puramma, as per the settlement deed dated 16-6-1961 and thereafter, karri puramma died on 20-3-1979 and so, the plaintiff is their only legal representative. further, it is also claimed that the said karri puramma executed a will deed on 27-12-1976 in favour of the plaintiff and therefore, she is entitled for the same.7. contesting the suit claim, the case of the defendants is that of total denial in regard to any inheritance or succession by the plaintiff and also they challenged the correctness and validity of the will relied on by the plaintiff.8. on framing of issues and conducting regular trial wherein both sides let in their evidence in support of their rival contentions, the trial court dismissed the suit holding that the will deed relied on by the plaintiff, which is marked as ex.a12, is not valid and further the defendants 3 to 11 are entitled to the suit schedule property as legal heirs of late kondal rao who was the adopted son of late karri ayyanna and karri puramma. in appeal preferred by the appellant herein, the lower appellate court reiterated the same findings upholding the claim of the defendants. thus, the entire claim of the defendants was on the basis that late kondal rao was the adopted son of karri ayyanna and karri puramma and therefore, they, being heirs of late kondal rao, are entitled for the suit schedule properties and all other incidental benefits.9. the defendants had filed an application in ia no. 212 of 2003 in op no. 172 of 1990 before the trial court for withdrawal of the amounts basing upon the judgment at the relevant point of time and claimed that they are entitled for the amount as determined in the reference. however, the trial court rejected the said application on the ground of pendency of this second appeal.10. the learned counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously submitted that having regard to the specific pleas taken both alternatively, the trial court did not properly answer the same nor there is any proper consideration in this regard.11. the learned counsel appearing for the respondents sought to repel the said contention and submitted that there is absolutely no proper foundation laid for any such plea and especially in view of the finding of both the courts rejecting the appellant's claim, no indulgence need be shown nor there is any error warranting interference.12. considering the submissions made and on perusal of material, the only question that falls for consideration is whether the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property is sustainable?13. except taking through the entire evidence and material on record, the learned counsel for the appellant did not try to make out any question of law involved in the present case. having regard to the fact that both the courts below concurrently disbelieved ex.a12 will deed set up by plaintiff, it is not open for this court to reassess any evidence or to give a different conclusion in exercise of powers under section 100 cpc.14. falling back on the alternative plea of plaintiff as a heir as per the personal law, it is the case of considering the fact that the appellant is a member of the family and so, the courts below ought to have taken into consideration the shares to which all such members are entitled.15. admittedly, the appellant/plaintiff is claiming as a fostered daughter karri ayyanna and karri puramma and not as any other heir as per the personal law. whereas the case of the defendants is based upon adoption, which has been upheld by both the courts below. having regard to the findings of fact arrived at by both the courts below even alternatively on the adoption and upholding the claim of defendants, it cannot be said that the plaintiff who claims only as a fostered daughter would be entitled to any share as per the personal law. in the circumstances, i do not find any question of law, much less substantial one, to warrant interference under section 100 cpc. the second appeal is accordingly dismissed. no costs.16. consequent to the rejection of claim made by the appellant/plaintiff, there cannot be any impediment in regard to the claim made by the defendants for withdrawal of the amount. the crp is accordingly allowed. consequently, interlocutory application no. 212 of 2003 filed by the defendants stands allowed. no costs.