Jayanthi Kanakavalli Vs. K. Louis Raju and ors. - Court Judgment

L. Narasimha Reddy, J.

1. This appeal is filed under Section 384 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, (for short 'the Succession Act'), assailing the order of the I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, dated 30.4.2001, in O.P. No. 140 of 1999.

2. Respondents 1 to 6 filed the O.P., under Section 372 of the Act, for grant of succession certificate, so as to enable them to receive the service benefits of Mr. K. Nagaraju. According to them, Mr. K. Nagaraju, husband of 1st respondent and father of respondents 2 to 6, was employed in the South Central Railways, and since 1991, his whereabouts are not known. They pleaded that they undertook extensive search for him, and lodged a complaint with the police on 30.8.1991. Since the search by them and the police did not yield any result, they made an application to the South Central Railways, for payment of the service benefits of Mr. K. Nagaraju by contending that a presumption can be drawn that he is no more. It was pleaded that the 1st respondent was married to Mr. K. Nagaraju on 28.4.1971, and Respondents 2 to 6 were borne out of that wedlock.

3. Since the appellant herein made a rival claim before the 7th Respondent, she was impleaded as 1st respondent in the O.P. She pleaded that she was married to Nagaraju, way back on 5.1.1967, in the Andhra Evalangical Luthern Church, Luthernagar, Rajahmundry. She filed a marriage certificate. She also pleaded that out of their wedlock, one daughter, by name, Ragini, was born, and that she is 32 years of age by the time she filed the counter-affidavit.

4. On consideration of the material before it, the Trial Court granted Succession Certificate in favour of Respondents 1 to 6.

5. Mr. D. Vijaya Chandra Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has proved her marriage with Nagaraju, by filing Ex.B.1, and in view of the specific provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (for short 'the Act'), the factum of marriage stands proved conclusively. He submits that the Trial Court did not take the same into account and had issued the succession certificate, contrary to the provisions of the Act. He also submits that the marriage of the 1st respondent with Nagaraju, even if true, is invalid, being subsequent to the one with the appellant. He places reliance upon some precedents.

6. Sri P.N.A. Christian, learned Counsel for Respondents 1 to 6, on the other hand, submits that the document-Ex.B.1, does not conform to the provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of the Act, and as such, no presumption can be drawn, as regards the same. He submits that except making a self-serving statement, both as to marriage and birth of a female child, the appellant did not adduce any evidence before the Trial Court to substantiate her plea.

7. Respondents 1 to 6 approached the Trial Court with an application under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, for grant of succession certificate, so as to enable them to receive the service benefits payable to one Mr. Nagaraju. It was pleaded that the 1st respondent was married to Nagaraju, in the year 1971, and that Respondents 2 to 6 are the children of that couple. This application was resisted by the appellant by pleading that she was married to Mr.Nagaraju in the year 1967, and the subsequent marriage of Mr.Nagaraju with the 1st respondent, even if true, is invalid in law. The Trial Court framed two points, namely;

1. Whether the 1st petitioner is the legally wedded wife of K.Nagaraju and whether Petitioners 2 to 6 are their children and if so whether they are entitled for grant of succession certificate in respect of the petition schedule debts?

2. Whether the 1st respondent is the wife of K.Nagaraju?

8. To substantiate their claim, the Respondents 1 to 6 examined PWs.1 and 2 and filed documents Exs.A.1 to A.11. The appellant examined herself as RW.1 and filed Ex.B.1. The Trial Court accepted the contention of the Respondents 1 to 6 and granted succession certification in their favour.

9. The main ground, on which the appellant assails the order under appeal, is that Ex.B.1, the marriage certificate, evidencing her marriage with Mr. Nagaraju, was not appreciated, as required under the provisions of the Act.

10. The Act prescribes the procedure for solemnization of marriages of Indian Christians. It is not necessary to refer to other provisions of the Act, in detail. Section 6 of the Act provides for grant of licences to ministers of religion to solemnize marriage within such territories, as may be notified. Section 9 of the Act provides for grant of licences to persons, to grant certificates of marriage between Indian Christians. The conditions to be fulfilled at the time of marriage between Christians, are stipulated under Section 60 of the Act. Apart from prescribing the age limits and prohibiting marriage between persons having a living spouse, it mandates that a declaration be made by the intending husband, in the presence of persons, licenced under Section 9 and two credible witnesses. Issuance of a certificate, in respect of marriages solemnized in accordance with Section 60, is provided for under Section 61 of the Act. Such certificate is to be signed by the person licenced under Section 9. Section 61 also mandates that a certificate, in accordance with the relevant provisions, shall be received in any suit, touching on the validity of the marriage as conclusive proof of the performance of marriage. In effect, the legal fiction, provided for, under Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, gets attracted, with regard to such certificates.

11. It hardly needs any emphasis that where any law mandates that a particular document shall be treated as a conclusive proof, the party relying upon such document, cannot be required to lead any evidence to substantiate that. In Cheeranthoodika Ahmmedkutty v. Parambur Mariakutty Umma, : [2000]1SCR725 , the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with an identical provision, viz., Section 72-K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. After referring to Section 4 of the Evidence Act and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Chettian Veetil Ammad v. Taluk Land Board, : [1979]3SCR839 , and the relevant passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, their Lordships held that no evidence can be permitted to be adduced, to disprove the conclusiveness of such category of documents, and that the only exception to this rule is that, the party opposing it may plead and prove fraud or collusion as to the factors vitiating such document, but not beyond that. The same principle applies to the certificates issued under Section 61. This Court, in G.Adinarayana v. B.Abelu, 1964 (2) An.WR 136, held that the burden to prove the existence of a marriage, always rests upon the person, who sets up of the same.

12. If there did not exist any other document, except Ex.B.1, in relation to the marriage of Mr. Nagaraju, the legal fiction, provided for, under Section 61, can certainly not be drawn in favour of the appellant herein. However, the 1st respondent has come forward with another certificate, issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 provides for a similar fiction as to conclusiveness of the marriage certificate issued thereunder. Under both the enactments, the parties are required to declare that .they do not have a living spouse at the time of marriage. If one is to go by the conclusiveness attached to the certificates, Ex.B.1, deserves to be given preference, being anterior in point of time. However, Ex.A.I stands on a higher, if not, similar footing, for the reason that Mr. Nagaraju has declared that he did not have any living spouse, when he married the 1st respondent in 1971.

13. When two documents, which are backed by a legal fiction, or conclusiveness of the same strength as to their truth and validity are relied upon by the parties opposing each other, the Court would be under obligation to assess their relative acceptability. In a way, but only in a way, it can be said that the conclusiveness attached to these two documents pitted against each other, almost stand nutralised and they have to be weighed on the basis of other principles of evidence. Viewed from this angle, it can be said that Ex.B.1 is not supported by any other evidence, whereas several documents are filed to corroborate Ex.A.1. In such an event, the evidence on record, Ex.A.1 deserves to be accepted. The fact, however remains that the appellant appears to have not chosen to adduce any evidence reeling under the impression that the conclusiveness attached to Ex.B.1, under Section 61, would subserve her purpose.

14. What emerges from this discussion is that it is not safe either to discard Ex.B.1 or to take Ex.A.1 as a conclusive piece of evidence, unless further steps are taken by the parties. In that view of the matter, the appellant herein deserves to be given another opportunity to adduce such evidence as she intends to do in respect of her plea. On this short ground, the order under appeal is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Trial Court fresh consideration. It shall be open to the parties to adduce such further evidence as they intend to do. It is made clear that since Exs.A.1 and B.1 are attached conclusiveness by the relevant statutes under which they were issued, their acceptability or otherwise, would depend on the further evidence, that may be adduced in corroboration of the same. The payment of service benefits was already delayed by several years on account of the uncertainty of the situation. The Trial Court shall endeavor to dispose of the matter, as early as possible, and not later than four months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

15. Accordingly, the CMA is allowed as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.