Pinka Dhanrjuna Rao and anr. Vs. State of A.P. Rep., by Authorised Officer, Land Reforms and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
civil - status of tribunal - section 5 of limitation act, 1963, section 20 of andhra pradesh land reforms (ceiling on agricultural holdings) act, 1973 and section 141 of code of civil procedure, 1908 - whether tribunal constituted under land reforms act be treated as 'court' - revision against orders of such tribunal lies before high court - procedures applied by court of civil jurisdiction applicable to such tribunal - held, such tribunal presided over by district judge comes within purview of definition of 'court' and not a 'persona designata'. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 1. these revision petitions raise an interesting question as regards applicability of section 5 of the limitation act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' for the sake of brevity) in a proceeding before the land reforms appellate tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the tribunal' for the sake of brevity). 2. an appeal was filed under section 20 of the a. aboobacker1 the supreme court inter alia held that the district judge acting as an appellate authority under the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act would be a 'court' and not a 'persona designata'.the apex court in the aforementioned judgment has clearly come to a conclusion that for the purpose of invoking the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the act only the following two conditions are required to be satisfied viz. ' 10. it was observed that if the aforementioned two requirements were satisfied, the consequences contemplated under section 29 (2) of the act would automatically follow. like the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act, there cannot be any doubt that the reforms act is a special act or a local law. 12. the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the apex court in officer on special duty (land acqn.orders.b. sinha, c.j.1. these revision petitions raise an interesting question as regards applicability of section 5 of the limitation act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' for the sake of brevity) in a proceeding before the land reforms appellate tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the tribunal' for the sake of brevity).2. an appeal was filed under section 20 of the a.p. land reforms (ceiling on agricultural holdings) act, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as 'the reforms act' for the sake of brevity). section 20 of the reforms act reads thus:'20. appeal:-- 1. the government may, by notification, constitute as many appellate tribunals as may be necessary for the purposes of this act, and shall specify in such notification, the jurisdiction of each such appellate tribunal. 2. each appellate tribunal constituted under sub-section (1) shall consist of not more than three members, of whom one shall be a person who holds or has held a civil post under the state, not below the rank of a district revenue officer, or a person who holds or has held or is qualified to hold the post of a district judge, and such person shall be the chairman of the tribunal. 3. an appeal shall lie against an order passed by the tribunal or the revenue divisional officer to the appellate tribunal within thirty days of the date of communication of the order, and the appellate tribunal shall pass such orders on the appeal as it deems fit and such order shall, subject to revision under section 21 4. the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 6 shall apply in relation to an appellate tribunal as they apply in relation to the tribunal with the substitution of references to the appellate tribunal for references to the tribunal. 5. where the government are aggrieved by an order passed by the tribunal or the revenue divisional officer, they may file an appeal to the appellate tribunal against that order.' 3. a revision against the order passed by the appellate authority lies before the high court.4. the question which arises for consideration is whether the tribunal constituted under section 20 of the reforms act would be a 'court' within the meaning of the provisions of the act or not?5. the act does not define a 'court'. however, by reason of the provisions of section 141 of the code of civil procedure, the provisions thereof shall apply in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction.6. in terms of the aforementioned provisions, thus, the procedure to be followed before the tribunal would be governed by the provisions of the code of civil procedure.7. in terms of the provisions of section 20 of the reforms act a tribunal is to be constituted. such types of tribunals are also constituted under motor vehicles act, as regards the claim for compensation arising out of an accident by reason of use of motor vehicles. 8. whether the 'tribunal' comes within the purview of definition of 'court' or not would depend upon the question as to whether such a tribunal would be under the control of the high court under article 235 of the constitution of india. as noticed herein before, in terms of section 21 of the reforms act a revision would lie before this court. thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the tribunal which is presided over by a district judge would be a 'court' and not a 'persona designata'. 9. it may be that for the purpose of preferring an appeal under the reforms act a specific period of limitation has been prescribed, but that by itself cannot be a ground for coming to the conclusion that having regard to the provisions of section 29 (2) of the act, the provisions of section 5 thereof shall not apply. in mukri gopalan v. c.p.aboobacker1 the supreme court inter alia held that the district judge acting as an appellate authority under the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act would be a 'court' and not a 'persona designata'. the apex court in the aforementioned judgment has clearly come to a conclusion that for the purpose of invoking the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the act only the following two conditions are required to be satisfied viz., '9. ... i) in such a case s.3 of the limitation act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule. ii) for determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing ss.4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.' 10. it was observed that if the aforementioned two requirements were satisfied, the consequences contemplated under section 29 (2) of the act would automatically follow. like the kerala buildings (lease and rent control) act, there cannot be any doubt that the reforms act is a special act or a local law. it is further evident that the appeal under section 20 of the reforms act provides for a period of limitation, which is different from the period prescribed by the schedule appended to the act. in that view of the matter, the provisions of the reforms act also fulfil the requirements laid down under section 29 of the act.11. this aspect of the matter has also been considered by a division bench of this court in mahendra kumar goyal v. addl.commissioner of civil supplies2 wherein mukri gopalan's case (1 supra) has been followed.12. the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the apex court in officer on special duty (land acqn.) v. shah manilal chandulal3. in that case, the apex court was considering the provisions of the land acquisition (amendment) act, 1984, whereby period of limitation was prescribed for the purpose of sections 4, 6 and 11 thereof and thereby the time occupied due to interim stay granted by the courts was also excluded. the apex court observed:'17. it is to be remembered that the land acquisition (amendment) act (68 of 1984) was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under sections 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay granted by the courts. taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18, the provisions of the limitation act were not expressly extended. though section 29(2) of the limitation act is available, and the limitation in proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 may be treated to be special law, in the absence of such an application by land acquisition (amendment) act (68 of 1984), the act specifically maintains distinction between the collector and the court and the collector/lao performs only statutory duties under the act, including one while making reference under section 18. it is difficult to construe that the collector/lao while making reference under section 18, as statutory authority still acts as a court for the purpose of section 5 of the limitation act.'13. thus, the said decision, instead of supporting the contention of the petitioners, runs counter thereto. 14. for the reasons aforementioned, this court does not find any merit in these applications, which are accordingly dismissed. but, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. These revision petitions raise an interesting question as regards applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the sake of brevity) in a proceeding before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' for the sake of brevity).

2. An appeal was filed under Section 20 of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Reforms Act' for the sake of brevity). Section 20 of the Reforms Act reads thus:

'20. Appeal:--

1. The Government may, by notification, constitute as many appellate Tribunals as may be necessary for the purposes of this Act, and shall specify in such notification, the jurisdiction of each such Appellate Tribunal.

2. Each Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (1) shall consist of not more than three members, of whom one shall be a person who holds or has held a civil post under the State, not below the rank of a District Revenue Officer, or a person who holds or has held or is qualified to hold the post of a District Judge, and such person shall be the Chairman of the Tribunal.

3. An appeal shall lie against an order passed by the Tribunal or the Revenue Divisional Officer to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the date of communication of the order, and the Appellate Tribunal shall pass such orders on the appeal as it deems fit and such order shall, subject to revision under Section 21

4. The provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 6 shall apply in relation to an Appellate Tribunal as they apply in relation to the Tribunal with the substitution of references to the Appellate Tribunal for references to the Tribunal.

5. Where the Government are aggrieved by an order passed by the Tribunal or the Revenue Divisional Officer, they may file an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against that order.'

3. A revision against the order passed by the appellate authority lies before the High Court.

4. The question which arises for consideration is whether the Tribunal constituted under Section 20 of the Reforms Act would be a 'Court' within the meaning of the provisions of the Act or not?

5. The Act does not define a 'Court'. However, by reason of the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions thereof shall apply in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

6. In terms of the aforementioned provisions, thus, the procedure to be followed before the Tribunal would be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

7. In terms of the provisions of Section 20 of the Reforms Act a Tribunal is to be constituted. Such types of Tribunals are also constituted under Motor Vehicles Act, as regards the claim for compensation arising out of an accident by reason of use of motor vehicles.

8. Whether the 'Tribunal' comes within the purview of definition of 'Court' or not would depend upon the question as to whether such a Tribunal would be under the control of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. As noticed herein before, in terms of Section 21 of the Reforms Act a revision would lie before this Court. Thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Tribunal which is presided over by a District Judge would be a 'Court' and not a 'persona designata'.

9. It may be that for the purpose of preferring an appeal under the Reforms Act a specific period of limitation has been prescribed, but that by itself cannot be a ground for coming to the conclusion that having regard to the provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Act, the provisions of Section 5 thereof shall not apply. In MUKRI GOPALAN v. C.P.ABOOBACKER1 the Supreme Court inter alia held that the District Judge acting as an appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would be a 'Court' and not a 'persona designata'. The Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment has clearly come to a conclusion that for the purpose of invoking the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Act only the following two conditions are required to be satisfied viz.,

'9. ...

i) In such a case S.3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule.

ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Ss.4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.'

10. It was observed that if the aforementioned two requirements were satisfied, the consequences contemplated under Section 29 (2) of the Act would automatically follow. Like the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, there cannot be any doubt that the Reforms Act is a special Act or a local law. It is further evident that the appeal under Section 20 of the Reforms Act provides for a period of limitation, which is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule appended to the Act. In that view of the matter, the provisions of the Reforms Act also fulfil the requirements laid down under Section 29 of the Act.

11. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in MAHENDRA KUMAR GOYAL v. ADDL.COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SUPPLIES2 wherein MUKRI GOPALAN's case (1 supra) has been followed.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court in OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY (LAND ACQN.) v. SHAH MANILAL CHANDULAL3. In that case, the Apex Court was considering the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, whereby period of limitation was prescribed for the purpose of Sections 4, 6 and 11 thereof and thereby the time occupied due to interim stay granted by the Courts was also excluded. The Apex Court observed:

'17. It is to be remembered that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984) was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under Sections 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay granted by the courts. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18, the provisions of the Limitation Act were not expressly extended. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is available, and the limitation in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 may be treated to be special law, in the absence of such an application by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984), the Act specifically maintains distinction between the Collector and the Court and the Collector/LAO performs only statutory duties under the Act, including one while making reference under Section 18. It is difficult to construe that the Collector/LAO while making reference under Section 18, as statutory authority still acts as a Court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.'

13. Thus, the said decision, instead of supporting the contention of the petitioners, runs counter thereto.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, this Court does not find any merit in these applications, which are accordingly dismissed. But, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.