Rathod Hari Ram Vs. Apsrtc Through Depot Manager, Nirmal and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/443520
SubjectMotor Vehicles
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided OnOct-01-1996
Case NumberAppeal Against Order No. 975 of 1990
JudgeB.K. Somasekhara, J.
Reported in1996(4)ALT657
ActsMotor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Sections 110A
AppellantRathod Hari Ram
RespondentApsrtc Through Depot Manager, Nirmal and anr.
Respondent AdvocateK. Harinath, Adv. for the Respondent No. 1
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - , are good grounds for condoning the delay. but when he could not approach the tribunal for such a long time, it must be presumed that but for compelling reasons he would not have failed to file the claim petition within the period of limitation. that itself lends assurance that he had a plausible explanation for the delay which he tried to do his best to present but the tribunal by a mechanical process without appreciating such circumstances led itself into a wrong conclusion and the wrong decision.b.k. somasekhara, j.1. the appellant who is a police constable is said to have suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 13-3-1986 whereas he filed the claim petition under section 110-a of the mv act on 14-12-1988 along with an application i.a. 175/89 before the motor accident claims tribunal, adilabad for condonation of delay of 13 months. the reason for such a delay was said to be due to the appellant - claimant being undergoing treatment for serious injuries in the hospital for over one year. the tribunal after hearing both the sides did not agree with the claimant about the reason for the delay and therefore dismissed the claim petition as barred by limitation by dismissing the application for condonation of delay.2. the learned advocate for the appellant has contended that in a motor vehicle claim case the tribunal should be liberal in condoning the delay if plausible and possible reasons are afforded. the law in this regard also appears to be settled. in a motor vehicle case sufficient cause pleaded for condonation of delay in filing the claim petition should be liberally construed. (rama kishen v. u.p.s.r.t.c., 1994 supp. (2) scc 507, national insurance company v. swarnalatha das, : air 1993 sc1259 , basavaiah v. ashok kumar, 1985 (1) kan.l.j. 256 and krishna bai v. desur, 1981 acj 263). illiteracy, ignorance, desperation, prolonged, illness etc., are good grounds for condoning the delay. the victims of accidents not only suffer physically but also mentally and economically. possibly the compensation in money value may not be even reimbursed by any forum. however the appellant, a police constable, cannot be said to be totally ignorant of such rights. but when he could not approach the tribunal for such a long time, it must be presumed that but for compelling reasons he would not have failed to file the claim petition within the period of limitation. that itself lends assurance that he had a plausible explanation for the delay which he tried to do his best to present but the tribunal by a mechanical process without appreciating such circumstances led itself into a wrong conclusion and the wrong decision. the explanation which was given by the appellant-claimant for the delay in filing the petition being long hospitalisation due to the very injuries suffered in the accident testified by him or sworn to in the affidavit was sufficient to be accepted.the appeal is allowed. the order of the tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the tribunal for registering the petition as a claim petition and to dispose of the same in accordance with law. no costs.
Judgment:

B.K. Somasekhara, J.

1. The Appellant who is a Police Constable is said to have suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 13-3-1986 whereas he filed the claim petition Under Section 110-A of the MV Act on 14-12-1988 along with an application I.A. 175/89 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Adilabad for condonation of delay of 13 months. The reason for such a delay was said to be due to the appellant - claimant being undergoing treatment for serious injuries in the hospital for over one year. The Tribunal after hearing both the sides did not agree with the claimant about the reason for the delay and therefore dismissed the claim petition as barred by limitation by dismissing the application for condonation of delay.

2. The learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that in a motor vehicle claim case the Tribunal should be liberal in condoning the delay if plausible and possible reasons are afforded. The law in this regard also appears to be settled. In a motor vehicle case sufficient cause pleaded for condonation of delay in filing the claim petition should be liberally construed. (Rama Kishen v. U.P.S.R.T.C., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 507, National Insurance Company v. Swarnalatha Das, : AIR 1993 SC1259 , Basavaiah v. Ashok Kumar, 1985 (1) Kan.L.J. 256 and Krishna Bai v. Desur, 1981 ACJ 263). Illiteracy, ignorance, desperation, prolonged, illness etc., are good grounds for condoning the delay. The victims of accidents not only suffer physically but also mentally and economically. Possibly the compensation in money value may not be even reimbursed by any forum. However the appellant, a police constable, cannot be said to be totally ignorant of such rights. But when he could not approach the Tribunal for such a long time, it must be presumed that but for compelling reasons he would not have failed to file the claim petition within the period of limitation. That itself lends assurance that he had a plausible explanation for the delay which he tried to do his best to present but the Tribunal by a mechanical process without appreciating such circumstances led itself into a wrong conclusion and the wrong decision. The explanation which was given by the appellant-claimant for the delay in filing the petition being long hospitalisation due to the very injuries suffered in the accident testified by him or sworn to in the affidavit was sufficient to be accepted.

The Appeal is allowed. The Order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for registering the petition as a claim petition and to dispose of the same in accordance with law. No costs.