New India Assurance Company Ltd. Rep. by Its Divisional Manager Vs. K. Bharath Kumar and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- practice & procedure repeal of act; [bilal nazki, c.v. ramulu & d. appa rao, jj] rules framed under the old (repealed) act held, rules framed under the repealed act do not remain in force once the act is repealed unless repealing act provided otherwise. - 6. the contention of the learned counsel for the insurer is that inasmuch as the documents relied on by the claimants themselves, clearly establish that the load being carried in the lorry was mud and as it is not the case of any of the claimants that the victims travelling in the lorry are the owners of the mud that was being transported in the lorry, it cannot be said that the victims in the accident were travelling in the lorry as owners or the representatives of the owner of the goods that were being transported in the lorry and as the victims seem to have boarded the lorry as passengers to go from one place to another place, in view of the ratio in asha rani's case, the insurer is not liable to pay the compensation payable to the claimants. the tribunal as also the high court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this court in satpal singh (supra). the said decision has been overruled only in asha rani (supra). we, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be sub-served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. and as all these claim petitions were disposed of prior to the apex court deciding baljit kaur's case 2004 (1) ald 98 (sc) :air 2004 sc 1340, the insurer may be made liable to pay the compensation payable to the claimants and it can be directed to recover the amount paid by it from the owners, because the act is a social welfare legislation, and so the poor claimants may not be put to the ordeal of proceeding against the owners, who may not be wealthy, for recovery of the amounts due to them and relied on an un-reported decision in c. 8. before considering liability of the insurance company, i would like to consider the contention of the learned counsel for the claimants that the tribunal, in view of the ratio in kore laxmi's case (supra), did not commit any error in granting more compensation than what was sought in a claim petition filed under section 140 of the act. and the charge sheet show that the victims were travelling on the mud being carried in the body of the lorry, and as the claimants failed to adduce reliable evidence to show that there were any goods belonging to any of the victims in the lorry at the time of the accident, it is clear that all the victims were travelling only as passengers in the lorry. taking that fact into consideration the said aspect, the apex court held the tribunal as also the high court had proceeded in the terms of the decision of this court in satpal sing's case (supra), the said decision has been overruled in asha rani's case (supra), we, therefore, opined that the interest of justice will be sub-served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimants, if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. according to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. those decisions clearly lay down that the insurer is not liable to pay compensation in respect of passengers in a goods vehicle.c.y. somayajulu, j.1. as all these appeals arise out of the claim petitions filed in connection with the same accident, they are being disposed of by a common judgment.2. the claimants in all the claim petitions, filed under the provisions of the motor vehicles act, 1988 (for 'the act') before the tribunal, out of which these appeals arise, are either the victims or the legal representatives of the victims who died in the accident caused by a lorry bearing no. aak 6759 due to the rash and negligent driving of its driver.3. the claim petitions were filed by the injured seeking compensation for the injuries sustained by them and the legal representatives of the deceased victims filed claim petition seeking compensation for the death of the victims in the accident. the owner of the lorry chose to remain ex parte in all the claim petitions. the insurer, who filed all these appeals, contested the claim petitions mainly on the ground that it is not liable to pay the compensation payable to the claimants as the victims were travelling as passengers in a goods vehicle.4. the tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry and passed awards for various amounts in favour of the claimants against the owner and insurer also on the basis that the victims were travelling with their goods and so in view of the ratio in new india assurance co. limited v. asha rani vi (2001) sdt 43 : 2001 (6) alt 14.4 (dnsc), the insurer also is liable to pay compensation to the claimants.5. the point for consideration in these appeals is whether the insurer is not liable to pay the compensation payable to the claimants.6. the contention of the learned counsel for the insurer is that inasmuch as the documents relied on by the claimants themselves, clearly establish that the load being carried in the lorry was mud and as it is not the case of any of the claimants that the victims travelling in the lorry are the owners of the mud that was being transported in the lorry, it cannot be said that the victims in the accident were travelling in the lorry as owners or the representatives of the owner of the goods that were being transported in the lorry and as the victims seem to have boarded the lorry as passengers to go from one place to another place, in view of the ratio in asha rani's case, the insurer is not liable to pay the compensation payable to the claimants. it is also contended that the tribunal erred in passing an award for more than rs. 50,000/- in favour of the claimants in c.m.a. no. 1569 of 2003 though the claim petition is filed under section 140 of the act, on the assumption that there is no difference between the claim petitions filed under section 140 and section 166 of the act except payment of court fee and so it has jurisdiction to pass an award for higher amount than rs. 50,000/- even in a claim petition filed under section 140 of the act. the contention of the learned counsel for the claimants is that even assuming that claimants were travelling as passengers in the lorry involved in the accident inasmuch as the law with regard to liability of the insurer was not settled till asha rani's case, overruling new india assurance company limited v. satpal singh : air2000sc235 , and as a three judge bench of the apex court in national insurance company limited v. baljit kaur and ors. : air2004sc1340 , observed:we, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. the tribunal as also the high court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this court in satpal singh (supra). the said decision has been overruled only in asha rani (supra). we, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be sub-served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. for the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination before the tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer.and as all these claim petitions were disposed of prior to the apex court deciding baljit kaur's case 2004 (1) ald 98 (sc) : air 2004 sc 1340, the insurer may be made liable to pay the compensation payable to the claimants and it can be directed to recover the amount paid by it from the owners, because the act is a social welfare legislation, and so the poor claimants may not be put to the ordeal of proceeding against the owners, who may not be wealthy, for recovery of the amounts due to them and relied on an un-reported decision in c.m.a. nos. 554 of 2001 and batch, dated 19-09-2007, where a learned judge directed the insurer to pay the compensation as awarded by the tribunal in the first instance and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. relying on kore laxmi and ors. v. united india insurance company limited, nizamabad district and ors. : 2003(6)ald182 , he contended that in a claim petition filed under section 140 of the act also the tribunal, in cases, where it feels that the claimants are entitled to higher compensation, has jurisdiction to pass an award for higher amount because quoting of wrong provision to law is not of any consequence.7. in reply to the contention of the learned counsel for the insurer is that inasmuch as the apex court in new india assurance company limited v. basavva and anr. : air2004kant455 , national insurance company limited v. prema devi and ors. : (2008)5scc403 and this court in rachala bichamma and ors. v. abdul hakeem and ors. : 2007(4)alt344 dismissed the claims against the insurer on the basis of ratio in asha rani's case (supra), and as the apex court in para 11 of oriental insurance company limited v. raj kumari and ors. 2008 scj 295 (sc) observed:it is true that in certain cases this court has, after looking into the fact situation, directed the insurance company to make payment with liberty to recover the amount in excess of the liability from the insured. those decisions were given on the facts situation of the cases concerned.the claimants are not entitled to any direction against the insurer. in further reply, the learned counsel for the claimants contended that inasmuch as the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the insurer, are rendered by two-judge benchs, and as baljit kaur's case (supra), rendered by a three judge bench, still holds the field, the ratio therein is binding by relying on the following observation in divisional controlelr, ksrtc v. mahadeva shetty and anr. : air2003sc4172 .the decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the court, while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. therefore, while applying the decision to a later case, the court dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the principle laid down by the previous decision. a decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. the scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. the only thing binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. the task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty as without an investigation into the facts, it cannot be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of a no moment. mere casual expressions carry no weight at all, nor every passing expression of a judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement having the weight of authority.8. before considering liability of the insurance company, i would like to consider the contention of the learned counsel for the claimants that the tribunal, in view of the ratio in kore laxmi's case (supra), did not commit any error in granting more compensation than what was sought in a claim petition filed under section 140 of the act. it is also his contention that in raj kumari's case (supra) the apex court did not make the insurer liable in the first instance because the owenr is a very solvent private limited company.9. in my considered opinion kore laxmi's case (supra) is not much of assistance in deciding the question whether in a claim petition filed under section 140 of the act, the tribunal can award more compensation than what is contemplated by section 140 of the act because that case arose out of a claim made under section 163-a of the act, but not under section 140 of the act. here it is pertinent to read section 141 of the act, which reads:141. provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent disablement: (1) the right to claim compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to (any other right, except the right to claim under the scheme referred to section 163-a (such other right hereafter) in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this act or of any other law for the time being in force).(2) a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place.(3) notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation under section 140 is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first-mentioned compensation and:(a) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall be liable to pay (in addition to the first-mentioned compensation) only so much of the second-mentioned compensation as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the first-mentioned compensation;(b) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is equal to or more than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall not be liable to pay the second-mentioned compensation.10. so, it is clear that the compensation payable under section 140 of the act, is different from the proceedings initiated under either section 166 or section 163-a of the act. therefore, a claim petition filed under section 140 of the act cannot be treated as a claim petition either under section 166 or section 163-a of the act. that apart the government of andhra pradesh, by virtue of the power conferred on it by section 176 of the act, framed rules called the a.p. motor vehicles rules, 1989 (for short 'the rules') as per which claims made under section 166 of the act which is in chapter xii containing sections 165 - 176, are governed by rule 455 of the rules and the claim made under chapter x containing sections 140 - 144, are governed by rule 476 of the rules. a plain reading of rules 455 and 476 shows that the procedure to be adopted for disposal of an application under chapter x is different from the procedure to be followed for disposal of cases filed under chapter xii of the act, because as per rule 476(3) of the rules, the tribunal, for the purpose of adjudicating and awarding a claim under chapter-x of the act, has to follow the procedure for summary trial of a case as contained in the code of criminal procedure, 1973, and for the purpose of disposal of applications under section 166 of the act (as per rule 473 of the rules), some of the provisions of cpc mentioned therein are made applicable. so, it is clear that applications under section 140 or 163-a of the act have to be treated differently from applications, under section 166 of the act. in fact, section 140 of the act prescribes the amounts for which awards can be passed by the tribunal, and section 141 of the act makes it clear that the amount awarded in a claim made under section 140 of the act has to be taken into consideration in awarding compensation in the claims made under section 166 of the act. in view thereof, question of a tribunal treating an application made under section 140 of the act as an application under section 166 of the act and passing an award for more amount than that is contemplated by section 140 of the act, does not arise.11. in fact, in the kore laxmi's case (supra) the attention of the learned judges was not drawn to the rule position with regard to the applications under chapters x and xii. that apart, the bench, in that case, was dealing with an application made under section 163a of the act, in which, the compensation payable is governed by the second schedule to the act, and in fact, section 140 of the act prescribes the amounts for which an award can be passed by the tribunal. when the section itself prescribes amount for which award can be passed, question of the tribunal granting more amount than that is mentioned in the section, does not arise. in view thereof, the assumption on the part of the tribunal that there is no difference between an application under section 140 and an application under section 166 of the act, except payment of court fee, is not a correct view and so, i have no hesitation in holding that the tribunal erred in awarding more compensation than what is contemplated by section 140 of the act, in a claim made under section 140 of the act.12. the f.i.r. in these cases was registered on a complaint given by the village administrative officer, who went to the scene of accident after coming to know about the accident. in his report, the village administrative officer stated that the lorry met with an accident due to the rash and negligent driving of its driver and that some persons travelling on the mud being transported in the lorry died and some other persons received injuries and that those injured were shifted to hospital from the scene of accident. 13. in the charge sheet filed by the police against the driver of the lorry in connection with the said accident, marked as ex.a-2 in o.p. no. 482 of 1996, out of which, c.m.a. no. 1569 of 2002 arises, it is stated that the driver, while proceeding from jadcherla side towards kalwakurthy on state high-way with a load of mud, useful in manufacturing cement, carried several passengers over the mud in the lorry and that as those passengers fell under the mud being transported in the lorry, six of them died and six others received injuries. so, it is clear that at least 12 persons were being carried as passengers on the mud being transported in the lorry involved in the accident, which is contrary to rule 252 of the rules, which reads:252. carrying of persons in goods vehicle carriage: (1) no person shall be carried in the cab of a goods vehicle beyond the number for which there is seating accommodation at the rate of 284 millimeters measured along the seat, excluding the space reserved for the driver for each person and not more than (seven persons in all) shall be carried in any goods vehicle.(2) no person shall be carried in a gods vehicle upon the goods or otherwise in such a manner that such person is in danger of falling from the vehicle and in no case shall any person be carried in a goods vehicle, in such a manner that any part of his person when he is in sitting position is at a height exceeding 32 metres from the surface upon which the vehicle rests;(3) no person other than a person connected to the conveyance of goods shall travel in a goods vehicle;(4) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule (1) the regional transport authority or the state transport authority, may subject to such conditions as it thinks fit allow a large number of persons to be carried in a goods vehicle;(5) nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorize the carriage of any person for hire or reward on any goods vehicle, unless there is in force in respect of the vehicle a permit authorizing the use of the vehicle for such purpose, and save in accordance with the provisions of such permit.14. as the f.i.r. and the charge sheet show that the victims were travelling on the mud being carried in the body of the lorry, and as the claimants failed to adduce reliable evidence to show that there were any goods belonging to any of the victims in the lorry at the time of the accident, it is clear that all the victims were travelling only as passengers in the lorry. even assuming that victims boarded the lorry with some of their 'goods' those 'goods', they might be carrying, would not be 'goods' within the meaning of section 2(13) of the act. for section 147 of the act to apply, for making the insurer also liable, the 'owner' or 'the representative of the owner' of the 'goods' that are being transported in the lorry i.e. goods vehicle, must have engaged that lorry for transport of those 'goods' from one destination to another destination. as the f.i.r. and the charge sheet, relied on by the claimants show that the lorry involved in the accident was engaged for transport of mud useful in manufacturing cement from one place to another place and as the victims and others boarded the lorry in the midway and were travelling on the mud being transported in the lorry, even assuming that the victims in the accident were carrying some 'goods' with them, these 'goods' being carried by them would only be their personal affects but not 'goods' meant for being transported by the lorry from one place to another, falling under section 2(13) of the act to make the insurer also liable by virtue of section 147 of the act, because the owner of the goods, which have to be transported in the lorry, usually enters into an agreement with the owner of the lorry for transport of those 'goods' from one place to another. if the driver of the lorry picks up some persons who are carrying some articles or goods with them, those persons cannot be treated as persons that have engaged lorry for transport of the goods being carried by them from one place to another place. such persons can only be treated as passengers travelling in the lorry with their persons affects. in such cases, the driver of the lorry (goods vehicle) would be deemed to be using that goods vehicle as a 'stage carriage' by permitting persons to board the lorry in the mid-way as passengers to be carried from one place to another, which exactly is prohibited by the act and rules made thereunder.15. in the above circumstances and in the facts and circumstances of these cases, there can be no doubt that the victims in these cases were travelling as passengers, as they cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be the owner of the goods or the authorized representatives of the owner of the goods i.e. mud that was carried in that vehicle. if the owner of the mud that was being carried in the lorry involved in the accident or his authorized representative were to be one of the victims in the accident, they would positively be covered by section 147 of the act, because the vehicle involved in the accident was engaged for transporting mud. in view thereof the tribunal erred in holding that the insurer is liable to compensation to the claimants on the basis that the victims were travelling therein as owners of the goods that were being transported therein.16. now the question is whether the insurer can be directed to pay the compensation payable to the claimants and recover the same from the owner, as contended by the learned counsel for the claimants?17. it is no doubt true that raj kumari's case (supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the insurer, the apex court held that inasmuch as the insured is a private limited company doing transport business, and as no material was placed on record to show that the claimants would have difficulty in recovering the awarded amount from it, modified the order of the high court and directed the insurer to pay rs. 50,000/- with interest and directed the balance to be paid by the insurer to the owner.18. the accident in baljit kaur's case (supra) which was decided by the apex court on 06-01-2004 occurred on 19-02-1999. in that case the tribunal by relying on satpal singh's case (supra) passed an award against the insurer also though the victim was a passenger in a goods vehicle. the high court upheld the verdict of the tribunal and observed that in the event of the owner committing a breach of the terms and conditions of the insurer, the insurer would be entitled to recover the amount of compensation paid by it from the owner. taking that fact into consideration the said aspect, the apex court heldthe tribunal as also the high court had proceeded in the terms of the decision of this court in satpal sing's case (supra), the said decision has been overruled in asha rani's case (supra), we, therefore, opined that the interest of justice will be sub-served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimants, if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.19. so it is clear that in the fact situation of that case, the apex court felt that it would be appropriate to direct the insurer to meet the liability in the first instance and recover the said amount from the owner subsequently. it did not hold that in all cases decided prior to 06-01-2004, a direction to the insurer to meet the liability in the first instance and recover the same from the owner, has to be given. in fact the apex court in raj kumar's case (supra) did refer to the said decision and stated as follows:12. ...it is not everything said by a judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. the only thing in a judges decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. according to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. an inferential finding of facts is the inference which the judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. a decision is an authority for what it actually decides. what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. the enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (see: state of orissa v. sudhansu sekhar misra and ors. : (1970)illj662sc and union of india and ors. v. dhanwanti devi and ors. : (1996)6scc44 . a case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. the words used by judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in act of parliament. in quinn v. leathem (1901) ac 495 (h.l.), earl of halsbury lc observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.20. courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact-situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. observations of courts are neither to be read as euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. these observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. to interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. they interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. in london graving dock co. ltd. v. horton 1951 ac 737 at p.761, lord mac dermot observed:the matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of willes, j as though they were part of an act of parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. this is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.21. in home office v. dorset yacht co. 1970 (2) all er 294 lord reid said, 'lord atkins speech...is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. it will require qualification in new circumstances.' megarry, j in (1971) 1 wlr 1062 observed: 'one must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of russell l.j. as if it were an act of parliament.' and, in herrington v. british railways board 1972 (2) wlr 537 lord morris said:there is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.22. circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.16. the following words of lord denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. to decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.***precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. my plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.in fact, in national insurance company limited v. bommithi subbhayamma and ors. : (2005)12scc243 , decided on 21-02-2005 i.e. about one year after baljit kaur's case (supra), a division bench of the apex court, consisting of a learned judge, who was a party to baljit kaur's case (supra) also, allowed the appeal by the insurer and directed the claimants to recover the amounts from the owner of the vehicle only without giving a direction to the insurer to pay the compensation awarded in the first instance. in prema devi's case (supra), decided on 29-02-2008, a two-judge bench of the apex court allowed the appeal filed by the insurer in a claim petition filed by a passenger in a goods vehicle, and dismissed the claim petition against the insurer and directed the claimants to recover the amount awarded from the owner of the offending vehicle. no direction to the insurance company to pay the compensation in the first instance and to recover the same from the owner was given there. therefore, i am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the claimants that in view of the observations made in the baljit kaur's case (supra), the claimants are entitled to recover the amount from the insurer in the first instance and the insurer could recover from the owner subsequently.23. the learned counsel for the claimants faintly made a request to refer the case to a division bench in view of the alleged conflict between rachala bichamma's case (supra) and c.m.a. no. 554 of 2001, dated 19-09-2007, in the sense that the learned judge in c.m.a. no. 554 of 2001 directed the insurer to pay the amount in the first instance and recover that amount from the owner subsequently, and another learned single judge in rachala bichamma's case (supra), dismissed the appeal of the owner to direct the insurer also to be made liable to pay the compensation awarded against him. i do not see any conflict in the ratio in those two decisions. those decisions clearly lay down that the insurer is not liable to pay compensation in respect of passengers in a goods vehicle. in the fact situation in c.m.a. no. 554 of 2001, the learned judge gave a direction to the insurer to pay the compensation in the first instance and recover the same from the owner later.24. in fact, in rachala bichamma's case (supra), the tribunal dismissed the claim filed by the legal representatives of a victim in an accident, who died while he was travelling as a passenger in a goods vehicle, due to his own negligence, and that award was confirmed by the learned judge who held that the insurer is not liable to pay compensation in respect of passengers in a goods vehicle and the owner in that case is also not liable to pay compensation because the accident did not occur due to the negligence of his driver, but had occurred due to the negligence of the victim himself.' the fact situation in both the cases is different. so in the fact situation of that case, question of making the insurer liable, did not arise because the owner himself was not liable to pay the compensation to the victims. that way also, there is no conflict between the above two judgments. the apex court in raj kumar's case (supra), in fact, allowed the appeal of the insurer and dismissed the claim against it.25. in view of the above legal position, no direction in the nature requested by the learned counsel for the claimants can be given and i hold that the insurer is not liable to pay the compensation, payable to the claimants. accordingly, the point is answered.26. in the result, the appeals are allowed and the awards passed against the insurer are set aside and the claims against it are dismissed, granting liberty to the claimants to recover the amount due to them from the owner of the vehicle.27. no order as to costs.