Elkapalli Latchaiah and Another Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/439872
SubjectConstitution
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided OnAug-18-2001
Case NumberWP No. 16282 of 2001
JudgeS.B. Sinha, C.J. and ;V.V.S. Rao, J.
Reported in2001(5)ALD679; 2001(5)ALT410
ActsAndhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 - Sections 19(3), 19(L) and 39; Constitution of India - Articles 14, 21, 25, 26 and 243-F; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 10
AppellantElkapalli Latchaiah and Another
RespondentGovt. of A.P. and Others
Appellant AdvocateMr. S. Ramachandra Rao for Mr. K.R. Prabhakar, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateAddl. Advocate-General
DispositionPetition dismissed
Excerpt:
constitution - validity of provision - section 19 (3) of andhra pradesh panchayat raj act, 1994 and articles 14, 21 and 243-f of constitution of india - petition filed challenging rejection of nomination filed for contesting election for post of sarpanch on ground of having more than two children - right to privacy or marriage under article 21 is not absolute right and subject reasonable restrictions - population explosion is matter of concern and restriction imposed for this purpose cannot be said to be unreasonable - even right to contest election is merely statutory right and not constitutional right - right to vote and to contest elections flows from act and can be curtailed by reasons thereof - section 19 (3) is not violative of article 14 as it is not case where class legislation has been made - petitioner cannot give reason of getting married and having children before passing of said act - held, provision debarring from contesting election is valid. - - strong reliance, in this connection, has been placed on the decisions of the apex court in r. the constitution like all other laws is subject to same interpretative rules, but being suprema lex no word in the constitution is considered surplus or superfluous nor can any word be ignored. it has to keep pace with the aspirations and need of the society as well as to take into consideration the changing concept of the value. we fail to find any constitutional infirmity or any element of arbitrariness in these provisions. we, also, fail to understand how the provisions of section 19(l) and section 39 of the act are against the basic structure or features of the constitution. the modesty and self respect may perhaps preclude the disclosure of such personal problems like whether her menstrual period is regular or painless, the number of conceptions taken place; the corporation would do well to delete such columns in the declaration.s.b. sinha, c.j. 1. the vires of subsection (3) of section 19 of the andhra pradesh panchayat raj act, 1994 (act no.13 of 1994), hereinafter referred to as 'the act' for the sake of brevity, falls for consideration in this writ petition.2. the fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. the petitioners have filed their nominations for contesting to the post of sarpanch and their nominations have not bee accepted on the ground that a person who is having more than two children is disqualified from contesting the election. the case of the petitioners is that the first petitioner was married in 1988 and he got three children and the second petitioner was married in 1986 and he had four children.3. mr. s. ramachandra rao, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that having regard to the fact that the persons having more than two children are entitled to contest the election to the legislative assemblies and parliament, the restriction imposed in terms of sub-section (3) of section 19 is unreasonable. the learned counsel would contend that clause (1) of article 243-f providing for disqualification of membership and thus, sub-clause (b) clause (1) of section 243 providing for disqualification of membership must be confined to sub-clause (a) and no law purported to have been made in terms of sub-clause (b) can impose a condition which is not provided for in terms of sub-clause (a).4. the learned advocate-general appearing on behalf of the state, however, would submit that the question is covered by two decisions of this court in b.k. parthasarathi v. govt. of a.p., : 2000(1)ald199 (db), are gangadhar v. zilla praja parishad, karimnagar, : 1999(5)ald585 .5. it is not in dispute that a division bench of this court in b.k. parthasarathy (supra) has declared the said provision to be intra vires. the learned counsel, mr. ramachandra rao, who incidentally had appeared before the division bench, however, would submit that, as this aspect of the matter had not been taken into consideration, the said decision must be held to have been rendered per incuriam. the learned counsel further contends that right to privacy, which would include the right to procreation, being a basic feature of the constitution, cannot be taken away. the right to privacy, contends the learned counsel, is guaranteed to the citizen in terms of article 21 and thus sub-section (3) of section 19 of the act must be held to be unconstitutional. strong reliance, in this connection, has been placed on the decisions of the apex court in r. rajagopal v. state of t.n., : air1995sc264 , people's union for civil liberties v. union of india, : air1997sc568 and gobind v. state of m.p., : 1975crilj1111 . it was submitted that control of population is not one amongst the objectives of the act and by reason of the said provision an element of arbitrariness has been introduced and thus the said provision must be held to be violative of article 14 of the constitution of india.6. clause (1) of article 243-f of the constitution of india reads thus:'a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a panchayat- (a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the legislature of the state concerned : provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years; (b) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the legislature of the state.' 7. the said provision provides for two types of legislations; (1) which prescribes disqualification for the purpose of elections to the legislatures of the state and (2) who is disqualified by or under any law made by the legislature of the state.8. if the submission of mr. ramachandra rao is to be accepted, sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of article 243-f becomes otiose. the constitution like all other laws is subject to same interpretative rules, but being suprema lex no word in the constitution is considered surplus or superfluous nor can any word be ignored. in chandra mohan v. state of u.p., air 1966 sc 1987, it was held that the courts have to find out the express intention from the words of the constitution. it cannot be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. it being a living and organic document is law not only for the present but in the future and therefore broad and liberal spirit should inspire..9. right to privacy or a right to marriage may be a right under article 21 of the constitution of india, but such a right is not absolute. it is one thing to say that the person has a right to privacy or right to marriage and consequently right to procreation, but the same would not mean that no restriction as regards the said right can be put for other purposes whatsoever. population explosion is a matter of great concern of the state. if certain measures are effected for controlling the population explosion, it cannot be said that such law would be unconstitutional.10. the question in a different context arose for consideration in ntf mills ltd. v. the 2nd punjab tribunal air 1957 sc 329. the apex court held that the provisions of the industrial disputes act, 1947 doesnot infringe articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the constitution of india. in dc&g; mills v. shambhu nath, : (1978)illj1sc , the apex court followed the said decision and after dealing with the constitutional validity of section 10 of the industrial disputes act, 1947, which was already upheld earlier, held as under:'if this court held section 10 intra vires and repelled the objection under article 14 of the constitution it would not be permissible to raise the question again by submitting that a new ground could be raised to sustain the objection. it is certainly easy to discover fresh grounds of attack to sustain the same objection, but that cannot be permitted once the law has been laid down by this court holding section 10 of the act does not violate article 14 of the constitution'.11. in mukesh kumar ajmera v. state of rajasthan, , a question arose whether section 19(l) of the rajasthan panchayat raj act was ultra vires. the division bench answered the question in the negative holding:'the disqualification provided in section 19(c) cannot be said to be against the basic human dignity or against the right to life and personal liberty. the right to be elected is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. it is a statutory right which flows from the statute. a statutory right created under the statute is subject to the limitations provided under a particular statute. according to section 19, every person registered as a voter of a panchayat raj institution, is qualified for election as a panch or a member of the panchayat raj institution. the right to be elected, thus, flows from section 19 of the act and, therefore, this right accrues to a person concerned is subject to the restrictions contained in section 19 or other provisions of the act.'it was observed :'right to privacy and liberty are not absolute rights. a law imposing reasonable restrictions upon it for compelling interest of state must be held to be valid. the restriction imposed in section 19(l) does not outrage the dignity of the individual. the object of this provision is to control population growth and family planning and such type of interference is necessary in a democratic society in the economic welfare of the country. the restrictions have been laid down with a social purpose, i.e., to fulfil the mandate given in the directive principles enshrined in the constitution. if the population growth is not controlled and family planning is not observed then looking to the limited sources available with the country, it will be difficult for the state to achieve these goals'.the learned judges opined:'law is enacted to serve the need of the society. it has to keep pace with the aspirations and need of the society as well as to take into consideration the changing concept of the value. it is only with an intention to serve the social purpose, namely, to control the problem of population explosion that these provisions have been enacted. we fail to find any constitutional infirmity or any element of arbitrariness in these provisions. there is no invasion of any constitutional right of any person. there is, also, no invasion on the part of the legislature in marital right of a person concerned or a right or procreation of children. it is a statutory right guaranteed under the panchayat raj act to be elected but that right is with certain restrictions and if somebody wants to assert that right, he has to abide by such restrictions because this statutory right is subject to statutory restrictionscontained in the act. we are, therefore, of the opinion that the restrictions imposed in section 19(l) neither outrage the dignity of a person nor it infringes any of the fundamental rights, common law right or a marital right of procreation of a child. we, also, fail to understand how the provisions of section 19(l) and section 39 of the act are against the basic structure or features of the constitution. there is a reasonable nexus in framing these provisions with the object sought to be achieved. the object which is sought to be achieved is to implement the family planning programme and restrict the family to check the population explosion which is one of the major problems which india is facing today. though having more than two children does not, in any, affect the workings of the sarpanch, panch or a member of a panchayat raj institution but the population explosion has affected the economic condition of the state and it is with the purpose to implement the mandate of the directive principles of the state policy that this measure was considered necessary. these provisions according to us also, do not violate articles 25 and 26 of the constitution of india as there is no invasion of any of the right to freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. these provisions, also, do not invade the right of petitioners of freedom to profess his/her religious affairs. a person out of the marital life, can produce more than two children but in that case the statutory right conferred upon a voter under the act will not be available to him as these are the rights created under the statute and are subject to the statutory limitations. there is, thus, no violation of articles 25 and 26 of the constitution of india'. 12. the said decision, therefore, is an authority for the proposition to the effectthat such a provision is not unconstitutional. this aspect of the matter has been considered by a division bench of this court in b.k. parthasarathi v, govt. of a.p. (supra), are gangadhar v. zilla proja parishad, karimnagar (supra).13. in parthasarathy (supra), the division bench of this court has held that section 19(3) merely creates a legal disability on the part of any person who has procreated more than two children as on the relevant date of seeking an elected office under the act. referring to govind v. state of madhya pradesh, : 1975crilj1111 , it was observed:'as discussed above, 'the right of privacy' which is held to be a facet of article 21 of the constitution, in this country must also be subjected to similar restrictions which are held constitutionally permissible in the context of the other facets of the right guaranteed under article 21 of the constitution of india. the supreme court in govind's case (supra) held that even the right under article 21 is not an absolute right'.14. we agree with the said decision. the said decision, in our opinion, cannot be said to have been rendered per incuriam only because certain aspects of the matter had not been brought to its notice. the doctrine of sub silentio would be applicable when a question as regards the applicability of a statute was not considered as has been held by the apex court in a-one granites v. state of u.p., 2001 air scw 848. but such a question does not arise in the instant case inasmuch as the questions raised in this application had been considered by this court.15. yet again in gade lakshmi mangraju v. state of andhra pradesh, 2001 air scw 2508, a question has arisen for consideration as to whether the protection provided by the high court to the promoteesin excess of quota would mean that their seniority inter se will also not be disturbed. following its earlier decision in j. chandrasekhar reddy v. d. arora, 1993 air scw 3970, the apex court held:'the original decision had been rendered by justice r.n. misra (as his lordship then was) and the very learned judge in the subsequent decision has also interpreted as to what has been held in the first decision and has categorically said that the promotees prior to 31-12-1982 even beyond the quota meant for them will be allowed to continue in the promotional post and also their seniority inter se will not be disturbed in any manner. it may be stated that so far as the seniority of these persons are concerned, it is not governed by the recruitment rules, but by the andhra pradesh state and subordinate services rules. having examined all the decisions placed before us, we do not find that in any decision a view has been taken that only the court has protected their promotion and not their seniority, and possibly that is the reason why recently a bench of this court in the case of j. chandrashekher reddy (1999 supp scc 638) (supra) did not interfere with on being approached by the direct recruits of r&b; department'. 16. the decisions cited by the learned counsel may now be noticed. in r. rajagopal (supra), the apex court upholding the right to privacy as being implicit in right to life and guaranteed to the citizens of this country by article 21, it was held to be right to life alone. in people's union for civil liberties (supra), it was held that right to privacy is a part of article 21 of the constitution of india.17. in gobind (supra), it has been held:'the right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development. therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of india and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterise as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute'.18. in state of maharashtra v.madhukar n. mardikar, : (1991)iillj269sc , it was held that even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to right to privacy. in meera mathur v. life insurance corporation of india, : (1992)illj322sc , it was held:'....... it is said that she gave afalse declaration regarding the last menstruation period with a view to suppress her pregnancy. the modesty and self respect may perhaps preclude the disclosure of such personal problems like whether her menstrual period is regular or painless, the number of conceptions taken place; how many have gone full term etc. the corporation would do well to delete such columns in the declaration. if the purpose of the declaration is to deny the maternity leave and benefits to a lady candidate who is pregnant at the time of entering the service (the legality of which we express no opinion since not challenged).'19. by reason of section 19(3) of the act, no person's right to privacy has been taken away. the right to contest election is merely a statutory right and not a constitutional right. in terms of article 243-f of the constitution of india, the state is entitled to make law providing for disqualification. right to vote and right to contest the elections by the petitioners having flown from the act, such a right can also be curtailed by reasons thereof,particularly having regard to clause (1) of article 243-f of the constitution of india. in any event, as noticed hereinbefore, right to privacy is not an absolute right. in mr. 'x' v hospital 'z', : air1999sc495 , the apex court has held that such a right is subject to the right of others.20. the submission of the learned counsel to the effect that sub-section (3) of section 19 is violative of article 14 of the constitution of india is misplaced. by reason of the said provision, no classification has been made, which is impermissible under the constitution of india. it is not a case where class legislation has been made. the persons who answer the description of section 19(3) stand on equal footing. only because the petitioners had married earlier or their children were born prior to coming into force of the act would not mean that such a right is absolute.21. for the reasons aforementioned,there is no merit in this writ petition, whichis accordingly dismissed. there will be noorder as to costs.
Judgment:

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. The vires of subsection (3) of Section 19 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (Act No.13 of 1994), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the sake of brevity, falls for consideration in this writ petition.

2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioners have filed their nominations for contesting to the post of Sarpanch and their nominations have not bee accepted on the ground that a person who is having more than two children is disqualified from contesting the election. The case of the petitioners is that the first petitioner was married in 1988 and he got three children and the second petitioner was married in 1986 and he had four children.

3. Mr. S. Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that having regard to the fact that the persons having more than two children are entitled to contest the election to the Legislative Assemblies and Parliament, the restriction imposed in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 19 is unreasonable. The learned Counsel would contend that clause (1) of Article 243-F providing for disqualification of membership and thus, sub-clause (b) clause (1) of Section 243 providing for disqualification of membership must be confined to sub-clause (a) and no law purported to have been made in terms of sub-clause (b) can impose a condition which is not provided for in terms of sub-clause (a).

4. The learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State, however, would submit that the question is covered by two decisions of this Court in B.K. Parthasarathi v. Govt. of A.P., : 2000(1)ALD199 (DB), Are Gangadhar v. Zilla Praja Parishad, Karimnagar, : 1999(5)ALD585 .

5. It is not in dispute that a Division Bench of this Court in B.K. Parthasarathy (supra) has declared the said provision to be intra vires. The learned Counsel, Mr. Ramachandra Rao, who incidentally had appeared before the Division Bench, however, would submit that, as this aspect of the matter had not been taken into consideration, the said decision must be held to have been rendered per incuriam. The learned Counsel further contends that right to privacy, which would include the right to procreation, being a basic feature of the Constitution, cannot be taken away. The right to privacy, contends the learned Counsel, is guaranteed to the citizen in terms of Article 21 and thus sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act must be held to be unconstitutional. Strong reliance, in this connection, has been placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., : AIR1995SC264 , People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, : AIR1997SC568 and Gobind v. State of M.P., : 1975CriLJ1111 . It was submitted that control of population is not one amongst the objectives of the Act and by reason of the said provision an element of arbitrariness has been introduced and thus the said provision must be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

6. Clause (1) of Article 243-F of the Constitution of India reads thus:

'A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a Panchayat-

(a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State concerned :

Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years; (b) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State.'

7. The said provision provides for two types of legislations; (1) which prescribes disqualification for the purpose of elections to the Legislatures of the State and (2) who is disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State.

8. If the submission of Mr. Ramachandra Rao is to be accepted, sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of Article 243-F becomes otiose. The Constitution like all other laws is subject to same interpretative rules, but being suprema lex no word in the Constitution is considered surplus or superfluous nor can any word be ignored. In Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1987, it was held that the Courts have to find out the express intention from the words of the Constitution. It cannot be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. It being a living and organic document is law not only for the present but in the future and therefore broad and liberal spirit should inspire.

.9. Right to privacy or a right to marriage may be a right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but such a right is not absolute. It is one thing to say that the person has a right to privacy or right to marriage and consequently right to procreation, but the same would not mean that no restriction as regards the said right can be put for other purposes whatsoever. Population explosion is a matter of great concern of the State. If certain measures are effected for controlling the population explosion, it cannot be said that such law would be unconstitutional.

10. The question in a different context arose for consideration in NTF Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal AIR 1957 SC 329. The Apex Court held that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 doesnot infringe Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution of India. In DC&G; Mills v. Shambhu Nath, : (1978)ILLJ1SC , the Apex Court followed the said decision and after dealing with the constitutional validity of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which was already upheld earlier, held as under:

'If this Court held Section 10 intra vires and repelled the objection under Article 14 of the Constitution it would not be permissible to raise the question again by submitting that a new ground could be raised to sustain the objection. It is certainly easy to discover fresh grounds of attack to sustain the same objection, but that cannot be permitted once the law has been laid down by this Court holding Section 10 of the Act does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution'.

11. In Mukesh Kumar Ajmera v. State of Rajasthan, , a question arose whether Section 19(L) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act was ultra vires. The Division Bench answered the question in the negative holding:

'The disqualification provided in Section 19(c) cannot be said to be against the basic human dignity or against the right to life and personal liberty. The right to be elected is neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law right. It is a statutory right which flows from the statute. A statutory right created under the statute is subject to the limitations provided under a particular statute. According to Section 19, every person registered as a voter of a Panchayat Raj Institution, is qualified for election as a Panch or a Member of the Panchayat Raj Institution. The right to be elected, thus, flows from Section 19 of the Act and, therefore, this right accrues to a person concerned is subject to the restrictions contained in Section 19 or other provisions of the Act.'

It was observed :

'Right to privacy and liberty are not absolute rights. A law imposing reasonable restrictions upon it for compelling interest of State must be held to be valid. The restriction imposed in Section 19(L) does not outrage the dignity of the individual. The object of this provision is to control population growth and family planning and such type of interference is necessary in a democratic society in the economic welfare of the country. The restrictions have been laid down with a social purpose, i.e., to fulfil the mandate given in the Directive Principles enshrined in the Constitution. If the population growth is not controlled and family planning is not observed then looking to the limited sources available with the country, it will be difficult for the State to achieve these goals'.

The learned Judges opined:

'Law is enacted to serve the need of the society. It has to keep pace with the aspirations and need of the society as well as to take into consideration the changing concept of the value. It is only with an intention to serve the social purpose, namely, to control the problem of population explosion that these provisions have been enacted. We fail to find any constitutional infirmity or any element of arbitrariness in these provisions. There is no invasion of any constitutional right of any person. There is, also, no invasion on the part of the Legislature in marital right of a person concerned or a right or procreation of children. It is a statutory right guaranteed under the Panchayat Raj Act to be elected but that right is with certain restrictions and if somebody wants to assert that right, he has to abide by such restrictions because this statutory right is subject to statutory restrictionscontained in the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the restrictions imposed in Section 19(L) neither outrage the dignity of a person nor it infringes any of the fundamental rights, Common Law right or a marital right of procreation of a child.

We, also, fail to understand how the provisions of Section 19(L) and Section 39 of the Act are against the basic structure or features of the Constitution. There is a reasonable nexus in framing these provisions with the object sought to be achieved. The object which is sought to be achieved is to implement the family planning programme and restrict the family to check the population explosion which is one of the major problems which India is facing today. Though having more than two children does not, in any, affect the workings of the Sarpanch, Panch or a Member of a Panchayat Raj Institution but the population explosion has affected the economic condition of the State and it is with the purpose to implement the mandate of the Directive Principles of the State Policy that this measure was considered necessary. These provisions according to us also, do not violate Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India as there is no invasion of any of the right to freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. These provisions, also, do not invade the right of petitioners of freedom to profess his/her religious affairs. A person out of the marital life, can produce more than two children but in that case the statutory right conferred upon a voter under the Act will not be available to him as these are the rights created under the statute and are subject to the statutory limitations. There is, thus, no violation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India'.

12. The said decision, therefore, is an authority for the proposition to the effectthat such a provision is not unconstitutional. This aspect of the matter has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in B.K. Parthasarathi v, Govt. of A.P. (supra), Are Gangadhar v. Zilla Proja Parishad, Karimnagar (supra).

13. In Parthasarathy (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held that Section 19(3) merely creates a legal disability on the part of any person who has procreated more than two children as on the relevant date of seeking an elected office under the Act. Referring to Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, : 1975CriLJ1111 , it was observed:

'As discussed above, 'the right of privacy' which is held to be a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, in this country must also be subjected to similar restrictions which are held constitutionally permissible in the context of the other facets of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in Govind's case (supra) held that even the right under Article 21 is not an absolute right'.

14. We agree with the said decision. The said decision, in our opinion, cannot be said to have been rendered per incuriam only because certain aspects of the matter had not been brought to its notice. The doctrine of sub silentio would be applicable when a question as regards the applicability of a statute was not considered as has been held by the Apex Court in A-One Granites v. State of U.P., 2001 AIR SCW 848. But such a question does not arise in the instant case inasmuch as the questions raised in this application had been considered by this Court.

15. Yet again in Gade Lakshmi Mangraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2001 AIR SCW 2508, a question has arisen for consideration as to whether the protection provided by the High Court to the promoteesin excess of quota would mean that their seniority inter se will also not be disturbed. Following its earlier decision in J. Chandrasekhar Reddy v. D. Arora, 1993 AIR SCW 3970, the Apex Court held:

'The original decision had been rendered by Justice R.N. Misra (as His Lordship then was) and the very learned Judge in the subsequent decision has also interpreted as to what has been held in the first decision and has categorically said that the promotees prior to 31-12-1982 even beyond the quota meant for them will be allowed to continue in the promotional post and also their seniority inter se will not be disturbed in any manner. It may be stated that so far as the seniority of these persons are concerned, it is not governed by the Recruitment Rules, but by the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Services Rules.

Having examined all the decisions placed before us, we do not find that in any decision a view has been taken that only the Court has protected their promotion and not their seniority, and possibly that is the reason why recently a Bench of this Court in the case of J. Chandrashekher Reddy (1999 Supp SCC 638) (supra) did not interfere with on being approached by the direct recruits of R&B; Department'.

16. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel may now be noticed. In R. Rajagopal (supra), the Apex Court upholding the right to privacy as being implicit in right to life and guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21, it was held to be right to life alone. In People's Union for Civil Liberties (supra), it was held that right to privacy is a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

17. In Gobind (supra), it has been held:

'The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterise as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute'.

18. In State of Maharashtra v.Madhukar N. Mardikar, : (1991)IILLJ269SC , it was held that even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to right to privacy. In Meera Mathur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, : (1992)ILLJ322SC , it was held:

'....... It is said that she gave afalse declaration regarding the last menstruation period with a view to suppress her pregnancy. The modesty and self respect may perhaps preclude the disclosure of such personal problems like whether her menstrual period is regular or painless, the number of conceptions taken place; how many have gone full term etc. The Corporation would do well to delete such columns in the declaration. If the purpose of the declaration is to deny the maternity leave and benefits to a lady candidate who is pregnant at the time of entering the service (the legality of which we express no opinion since not challenged).'

19. By reason of Section 19(3) of the Act, no person's right to privacy has been taken away. The right to contest election is merely a statutory right and not a constitutional right. In terms of Article 243-F of the Constitution of India, the State is entitled to make law providing for disqualification. Right to vote and right to contest the elections by the petitioners having flown from the Act, such a right can also be curtailed by reasons thereof,particularly having regard to clause (1) of Article 243-F of the Constitution of India. In any event, as noticed hereinbefore, right to privacy is not an absolute right. In Mr. 'X' v Hospital 'Z', : AIR1999SC495 , the Apex Court has held that such a right is subject to the right of others.

20. The submission of the learned Counsel to the effect that sub-section (3) of Section 19 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is misplaced. By reason of the said provision, no classification has been made, which is impermissible under the Constitution of India. It is not a case where class legislation has been made. The persons who answer the description of Section 19(3) stand on equal footing. Only because the petitioners had married earlier or their children were born prior to coming into force of the Act would not mean that such a right is absolute.

21. For the reasons aforementioned,there is no merit in this writ petition, whichis accordingly dismissed. There will be noorder as to costs.