Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr. - Court Judgment

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			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
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		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
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		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
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		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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Code Context
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			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
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		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
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		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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(i) contempt of court - time barred proceedings - section 20 of contempt of courts act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by court for contempt of court after one year is barred by limitation under section 20. (ii) property - injunction order - order 39 rule 2-a of code of civil procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of order of injunction in terms of order 39 rule 2-a. - - 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on pallav sheth v. he placed strong reliance on the state of bihar v.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma',
	'args' => array(
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		(int) 1 => 'thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma'
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma'
$args = array(
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	(int) 1 => 'thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma'
)
$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/439331/thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma'
$ctype = ' High Court'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
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			'id' => '439331',
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			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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c.y. somayajulu, j.1. plaintiffs in os no. 29 of 1986 on the file of the court of the subordinate judge, nandyal, preferred as no. 1204 of 1994 to this court against the decree of dismissal and filed cmp no. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. a learned single judge of this court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. subsequently respondents in the appeal filed cmp no. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. by an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single judge of this court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are.....

Judgment:

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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C.Y. Somayajulu, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
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		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
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1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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			'circuit' => null
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	),
	'casename_url' => 'thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma',
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
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5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
)
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'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
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The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
)
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CMP No. 7898 of 2001:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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			'circuit' => null
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	),
	'casename_url' => 'thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma',
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
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9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
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			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
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11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
)
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13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	),
	'casename_url' => 'thiruvalkani-k-nagaraj-vs-sarojamma',
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$title_for_layout = 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '439331',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Thiruvalkani K Nagaraj Vs Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr - Citation 439331 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '439331',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
			'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
			'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
			'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
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			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51926/contempt-of-courts-act-1971-complete-act">Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a> - Sections 20; <a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908</a> - Order 39, Rule 2A',
		'appealno' => 'CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and CC No. 1174 of 2001 in AS No. 1204 of 1994',
		'appellant' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Thiruvalkani K. Nagaraj Vs. Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'casenote' => '(i) Contempt of Court - time barred proceedings - Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - initiation of proceedings suo motu by Court for contempt of Court after one year is barred by limitation under Section 20.
(ii) Property - injunction Order - Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - respondent undertook not to alienate suit property - injunction Order against respondent vacated on this ground - alienation made by respondent - impugned act of respondent in violation of Order of injunction in terms of Order 39 Rule 2-A.


 -  -  1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.C. Rangappa, Adv. in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 and ;Adv. General in Suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'counseldef' => 'Y. Rama Rao, Adv. in suo motu CC No. 1174 of 2001',
		'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2002-06-10',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.</p><p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'</p><p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.</p><p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.</p><p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.</p><p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.</p><p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --</p><p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'</p><p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.</p><p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:</p><p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.</p><p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.</p><p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.</p><p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.</p><p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.</p><p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.</p><p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.</p><p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.</p><p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.</p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2002(4)ALD481; 2002(6)ALT429',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thiruvalkani Sarojamma and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Property;Contempt of Court',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>C.Y. Somayajulu, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Plaintiffs in OS No. 29 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, preferred AS No. 1204 of 1994 to this Court against the decree of dismissal and filed CMP No. 14374 of 1994 seeking an injunction restraining the respondents in the appeal from alienating the properties covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal. A learned single Judge of this Court granted an ex parte order of injunction on 28-10-1994. Subsequently respondents in the appeal filed CMP No. 18845 of 1994 to vacate the ex parte order of injunction dated 28-10-1995. By an order dated 2-12-1994, a learned single Judge of this Court, taking into consideration the averment in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal that they are not trying to alienate any properties in question, feeling that there is no need to continue the interim injunction granted on 28-10-1994, in view of the statement, vacated the ex parte injunction, by making it clear that the averment contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the appeal are recorded and so if respondents in the appeal were to alienate or alter the nature of the property covered by the suit during the pendency of the appeal AS No. 1204 of 1994 in this Court, they would be 'doing so at their own peril.'',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Against the said order, appellants who are the petitioners in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 filed LPA No. 17 of 1995. By an order dated 12-8-1996 a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16 of 1995 observing that the statement of the respondents in the counter-affidavit filed before the learned single Judge that they are not trying to alienate the properties is treated as an undertaking that they would not alienate or encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, disposed of the appeal confirming the order of the learned single Judge.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Subsequent to the disposal of LPA No. 16 of 1995 respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal alienated portions of the plaint schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 by document No. 1652 of 1997 in respect of S. No. 659/1F and document No. 2719 of 1998 in respect of 20 cents in S. No. 659/1G and 5.1/2 cents in S. No. 659/lF. After coming to know about the said alienation appellants filed CMP No. 15271 of 2000 in LPA No. 16 of 1995 under Order XXXIV, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC to punish respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for disobeying the order in LPA No. 16 of 1995 dated 16-8-1996. By an order dated 8-9-2000, the said petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on the ground that as temporary injunction pending disposal of the appeal was granted by a learned single Judge and was confirmed with a modification in appeal cannot be taken as an injunction granted by a Letters Patent Bench, and so Letters Patent Bench cannot pass an order under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC and dismissed the said CMP with a further observation that dismissal of that CMP cannot be taken to mean that they expressed a view on the question of breach of injunction. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said CMP No. 15271 of 2000 this petition is filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC by the appellants to punish the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal for their violation of the undertaking given by them.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. When the said CMP, came up for hearing before me, I issued a suo motu contempt notice and the said proceedings are registered as CC No. 1174 of 2001 against the respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal. After receipt of notice they appeared in person and filed their counter.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Learned Counsel for the respondents in CC No. 1174 of 2001 placing strong reliance on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors., 2001 (5) Supreme 763, contended that since the sales said to have been made by the respondents are of the years 1997 and 1998 and since this Court registered a suo motu contempt in 2001, the same is barred by time in view of Section 20 of <a>Contempt of Courts Act, 1971</a>.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. In Pallav Seth case (supra) referred to above the Supreme Court held --',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'',
	(int) 8 => '<p>The factum of violation of the undertaking given by the respondents came to my knowledge only when CMP No. 7898 of 2000 came up for hearing before me. Knowledge of a particular Judge may not be of any conseqeunce because Court is indivisible. The factum of the violation of the undertaking was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of this Court earlier in CMP No. 15271 of 2000, and the Division Bench by its order dated 8-9-2000 dismissed the said CMP with certain observations. So it should be taken that the factum of violation of the undertaking came to the notice of this Court when CMP No. 15271 of 2000 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. But no suo molu action for contempt was initiated. Therefore in view of the ratio in Pallav Seth case (supra), suo motu proceedings cannot but be dropped because this Court did not initiate proceedings for contempt within one year from the date of its knowledge. Therefore further proceedings in this CC No. 1174 of 2001 are dropped in view of the bar of limitation.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>CMP No. 7898 of 2001:',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since no period of limitation is prescribed for moving the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC and since immediately after knowledge of the alienations made by the respondents, petitioners moved the LPA. Bench for taking action against the respondents, and since the said Bench on the ground that the order of injunction was passed by a learned single Judge did not pass any order, petitioners were obliged to file this petition and contended that since violation of undertaking also is 'contempt', of Court and respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 are liable to be punished under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A CPC. He placed strong reliance on The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited and Ors., : [1997]2SCR152 , Samee Khanv. Bindu Khan, : AIR1998SC2765 , Ashok Nagar Welfare Association (Regd) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., : (1998)1SCC371 , Matadin Garwal v. Syed Abdul Razack, 1993 (3) ALT 780 (D.B.), Gurumurthi Chetty v. Sella Perumal Pillai, AIR 1936 Mad. 651, Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza, : AIR1986Ker63 , Mohammed Sheriff and Ors. v. State of Kerala, : AIR1986Ker67 , Babulal Parekh v. Lachminarayan Swalram and Ors., : AIR1964Ori53 , Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Anr., : 1979CriLJ952 , in support of his contention.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 is that they did not give any undertaking and so question of violation of undertaking given by them does not arise and hence this petition for punishing them for an alleged violation of an order of injunction is not maintainable, because no injunction as such is passed against them.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The ratio in the various decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a Court acts on an undertaking given by a party, in substance its amounts to an injunction restraining him from acting in breach thereof, and if he acts in breach thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to deal with the breach in appropriate manner.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. The respondents in CMP No. 7898 of 2001 did not in so many words state that they are giving an undertaking that they will not alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal, but they categorically stated, in the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf, that they are not trying to alienate the property in question. A learned single Judge acting on this categorical statement, made in the counter-affidavit, by his order dated 2-12-1994 vacated the earlier order of injunction granted, and made it clear that the averments contained in para 15 of the counter-affidavit filed on their behalf is recorded, and if they alienate or alter the nature of the suit land, they would be doing so at their own risk. On appeal in LPA No. 16 of 1995, a Division Bench, in no uncertain terms, held that the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is treated as their undertaking not to alienate or otherwise encumber the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. That order became final. If they felt aggrieved by that order an appeal should have been preferred against the said order. But they did not do so. So that order became final. Therefore, it is clear that this Court understood and treated the averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents as an undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, and on that basis only passed an order in their favour. Thus there is an implied undertaking by the respondents that they will not alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners that undertaking amounts to an injunction restraining them from alienating the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, respondents alienating a part of the suit property, by two sale deeds mentioned in the petition, (the execution of which is not denied by the respondents) cannot but be said to a violation of an order of injunction within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. It is brought to my notice during the course of arguments that respondents executed another sale deed in respect of another item of the suit property, and that petitioners would come up with another application shortly for contempt. The act of the respondents in bringing it existence sale deeds in respect of some of the items of the suit property in violation of the undertaking given by them as held the Letters Patent Bench) that they would not alienate the suit property during the pendency of appeal, is but an act of violation of an order of implied injunction against them.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Respondents creating third party interest in violation of their undertaking would cause prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it may be necessary to set at naught the alienations made by the respondents. Since an order adverse to the alienees under the sale deeds cannot be passed without notice and since it is necessary to hear the purchasers before an order setting aside the sales is made, petitioners are directed to take out notice to the purchasers of parts of the suit property under the registered sale deeds dated 3-4-1997 and 25-7-1998 mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of this petition by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due, to appear before this Court on 8-7-2002 to pass further orders in respect of those sale deeds.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Since respondents, inspite of knowledge that their statements in the affidavit filed on their behalf are taken as undertaking not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the appeal, chose to alienate a part of the suit property, to keep up the Majesty of law and the dignity of Court, it is necessary to impose punishment upon them for the breach committed by them.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In the above circumstances, respondents are ordered to be detained in the civil prison for a period of two (2) months from the date of their arrest under Order 39, Rule 2-A CPC. The petition is ordered accordingly.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>15. After the above order is dictated, a request is made on behalf of the Counsel for respondents that since respondents intend to prefer an appeal, the sentence imposed against the respondents may be suspended till they prefer an appeal. At the request of Counsel for respondents, the order of sentencing the respondents to imprisonment for two (2) months is suspended till 30-6-2002.',
	(int) 19 => ''
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