State of Andhra Pradesh, Represented by Advocate-general Vs. J. Venkataratnam, President, - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - during their stay in the bar association, they were treated well and the members of bar expressed their views politely. at the out-set, i hereby expressly and humbly record my unequivocal regrets and apologies for the incident complained of and 1 tender my unconditional apology without venturing to go into the merits of the allegations levelled against me. the bar council of india has made its position clear to the effect '(a) bar council of india is against resorting to strike excepting in rarest of rare cases involving the dignity and independence of the judiciary as well as of the bar; if it happens, it will be bad not only for the profession but also for freedom, democracy and rule of law in the country. 932, a division bench of the madras high court condemned boycott of courts in very severe terms. it is well known that several clients are paying through their nose by borrowing heavily to their advocates and it is a matter of life and death for them. failure of a lawyer to attend to his cases in court would not only be breach of contract and breach of trust but also professional misconduct. on this aspect, the first and second respondents were good enough to admit their participation in the said incident, whereas the other respondents denied their participation.orderd. reddeppa reddi, j.1. this contempt case has been taken cognizance of by this court suo motu under section 15 of the contempt of courts act, 1971 (for short 'the act') against almost all the members including the president, secretary and members of executive committee of the bar association, rajahmundry, on the basis of report dt. 22-8-1995 of the district judge, rajahmundry, to answer a serious charge of interference and obstruction with the administration of justice, viz. they wrongfully detained the district judge and two other judicial officers of rajahmundry by preventing them from going to their chambers and courts for one hour, i.e., from 10-15 a.m. to 11-15 a.m. on 22-8-1995.2. the gist of the report of the district judge, rajahmundry is as follows: the president and the secretary of the bar association, rajahmundry, the 1st and 2nd respondents herein, respectively, approached him on 21-8-1995 and informed him that in pursuance of the resolution dt. 18-8-1995 of the joint action committee of andhra pradesh state advocates, the members of the bar association, rajahmundry would prevent the judicial officers from entering into their chambers for a period of one hour on 22-8-1995. his advice to convince them that the proposed action of theirs was not proper was not cherished by them. as usual, on 22-8-1995 himself and his colleagues, viz, i additional and ii additional district judges reached the court premises at 10-15 a.m. in a government vehicle. as the car crossed the main gate, the president and the secretary and the executive committee members along with 100 other senior and junior members of rajahmundry bar association, forming themselves into a human chain, stopped and prevented it from proceeding further. then, some of them went to the other complex, where munsif magistrates courts are located and prevented the munsif magistrates from entering into their chambers. caught up in such piquant situation, they got down from the car and requested the members of the bar to give way for them to go to their chambers. but, it had no desired effect. instead, it was made clear that they would not be permitted to proceed towards their chambers. however, they were asked to go to the bar association. left with no alternative and as a measure of tact, they followed the advocates to the bar association, where they were made to sit till 11-15 a.m. during their stay in the bar association, they were treated well and the members of bar expressed their views politely. at 11-15 a.m. they were allowed to leave for their chambers. the local inspector of police and sub-inspector of police were also present throughout.3. the district judge, rajahmundry along with his report dt. 22-8-1995 sent two lists of advocates-one naming 87 advocates, who are alleged to have prevented himself and two other additional district judges, and the other naming 90 advocates, who are alleged to have prevented the munsif magistrates working at rajahmundry, based on the said information, initially cognizance was taken only against respondents 1 and 2 and notice was ordered to them by order dt. 22-12-1995. later by order dt. 25-3-1996 cognizance was taken against the other respondents also and there was a direction to issue notices to them. however, notices could not be served on respondents 18, 19, 26,34, 41,51, 53,59, 63,70, 71, 75, 76, 109, 121, 122, 129, 134, 142, 143, 168 and 176. then, on the direction of this courts to specifically state whether they are practising advocates and/or the members of the bar association, rajahmundry, the district judge by his report dt. 7-8-1996, stated that except respondent no. 51 all others are neither advocates nor members of the bar association, rajahmundry. regarding respondent no. 51, his report is silent. in fact, he was not asked to verify whether respondent no. 51 was an advocate or not. thus, the fact remains that notice was not served on respondent no. 51. in the circumstances, we presume that he is neither an advocate nor a member of the bar association.4. on receipt of notice and in answer to the charge of contempt, each of the respondents filed a separate counter affidavit. the first and the second respondents in their counter-affidavits almost admit the material averments made in the report of the district judge, rajahmundry. they only add that the district judge and other judicial officers came to the bar association on their own volition and they were not forced to go to the bar association. however, they expressed regrets as to what had happened and tendered unconditional apology in the following terms:'at the out-set, i hereby expressly and humbly record my unequivocal regrets and apologies for the incident complained of and 1 tender my unconditional apology without venturing to go into the merits of the allegations levelled against me.'the other respondents, on whom notices were served, having denied their participation in the incident, that took place on 22-8-1995, also offered their unconditional apology in the following terms:'however without going into the details of the charge levelled against me, i humbly tender my unconditional apology to the incident that is alleged to have done by me on that day and i pray that the hon'ble court may be pleased to accept my unconditional apology and drop the contempt proceedings against me.'5. from the perusal of the report submitted by the district judge, rajahmundry and the counter-affifavits filed by the respondents, there is no dispute about two things: one, advocates were boycotting the courts during the relevant period. two, the district judge and all other judicial officers working at rajahmundry were prevented from discharging their duties for one hour i.e., from 10-15 a.m. to 11-15 a.m. on 22-8-10-1996.(sic. 1995).6. boycott of courts by advocates has become a regular feature throughout the country. this contempt case is an off-shoot of one such boycott of all the subordinate courts in the state for over two months i.e., from 5-7-1995 to 11-9-1995, spearheaded by the joint action committee of a.p. state advocates, demanding withdrawal of mandal nyaya pancyayat act enacted by a.p. legislative assembly and sent for the assent of the president of india. this was resorted to with the apprehension that the said piece of legislation, if implemented, would adversely affect the interests of members of bar in general and those practising in moffusil courts in particular. it is, thus, evident that the members of the bar were more concerned about their own interests and never they cared for the interests of their clients. we are sure, that this is not befitting the dignity and professional ethics expected of from honourable members of the legal profession.7. the matter has become a grave concern for all courts including the apex court. in fact, the said issue came up for consideration before the supreme court in common cause v. union of india, 1995 (1) scale 6. therein, notice was given to the bar associations and state bar councils all over the country. then a meeting was convened to consider the suggestions made by the bar associations/state bar councils. their suggestions were taken into consideration. the bar council of india has made its position clear to the effect '(a) bar council of india is against resorting to strike excepting in rarest of rare cases involving the dignity and independence of the judiciary as well as of the bar; and (b) whenever strikes become inevitable, efforts shall be made to keep it short and peaceful to avoid causing hardship to the litigant public.' finally, it was decided that instead of the court going into the wider question whether or not the members of the legal profession can resort to strike or abstain from appearing in cases in court in which they are engaged, the following directions should be issued by way of interim arrangement:'(1) in the rare instance where any association of lawyers including statutory bar councils considers it imperative to call upon and/or advise members of the legal profession to abstain from appearing in courts on any occasion, it must be left open to any individual members/members of that association to be free to appear without let, fear or hindrance or any other coercive steps.(2) no such member who appears in court or otherwise practises his legal profession, shall be visited with any adverse or penal consequences whatever, by any association of lawyers, and shall not suffer any expulsion or threat of expulsion therefrom.(3) the above will not preclude other forms of protest by practising lawyers in courts such as, for instance, wearing of arm bands and other forms of protest which in no way interrupt or disrupt the court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant. any such form of protest shall not however be derogatory to the court or to the profession.(4) office-bearers of a bar association (including bar council) responsible for taking decisions mentioned in clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are implemented in the spirit of what is stated in clauses (1) and (2) and (3) above.'this was by order dt. 7-12-1994. yet, the bar associations in the state and the bar council of andhra pradesh, who participated in the above case, passed resolutions in the very next year to boycott all subordinate courts in the entire state. however, we refrain ourselves from making any comment on their conduct, for they are not parties to this proceeding.8. boycott of courts was deprecated not only by courts but also by eminent jurists in the country. in u.p. sales tax service association v. taxation bar association, : air1996sc98 , k. ramaswamy, j. referred to the views of some of the eminent jurists. we consider it apt to reproduce them here.'17. shri k.k. venugopal, a leading senior member of this bar and ex-president of the supreme court bar association, in his article 'the legal profession at the turn of the century' (1989) 1 nlsj 121), opined that boycott amounts to contempt of court and the advocates participating in the strike keep their clients as hostages and their interests in jeopardy. shri p.p. rao, another senior member of this bar and former president of the supreme court bar association in his article ''strike by professionals' published in indian advocate-journal of the bar association of india (vol. xxiii 1991 (part i)-opined that it amounts to professional misconduct. shri h.m. seervai, a noted distinguished jurist in his article 'lawyers' strike and the duty of the supreme court' republished in the indian advocate (vol. xxiii 1991 (part i) opined that lawyers ought to know that at least as long as lawful redress is available to aggrieved lawyers, there is no justification for lawyers to join in an illegal conspiracy to commit a gross, criminal contempt of court, thereby striking at the heart of the liberty conferred on every person by our constitution. strike is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. the principle is that those who have duties to discharge in a court of justice are protected by the law and are shielded by the law to discharge those duties, the advocates in return have duty to protect the courts. for, once conceded that lawyers are above the law and the law courts, there can be no limit to lawyers taking the law into their hands to paralyse the working of the courts. 'in my submission', he said that 'it is high time that the supreme court and the high court make it clear beyond doubt that they will not tolerate any interference from anybody or authority in the daily administration of justice. for in no other way can the supreme court and the high court maintain the high position and exercise the great powers conferred by the constitution and the law to do justice without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.'18. shri nariman, yet another learned member of this court and president of the bar association of india and editor of the indian advocate- in his article 'boycott--a lawyer's weapon' published in the journal 'indian advocate' (vol. xviii 1978 nos. 1&2), opined that when the lawyers boycott the courts, confidence in the administration of justice is shaken. the longer the boycott the greater the jeopardy to the system. the boycotting of a court by members privileged to practise there is virtually holding justice to ransom. it certainly contributes to the law's delays. an absentation from the courts by those who have held themselves out as practising, there is a threat to the administration of law and undermines the rule of law which is the bedrock of our constitution. he ended with a quotation by sir norman macleod (jivanlal varajarao desai, re (air 1920 bom. 168) that 'those who live by the law should keep the law'.19. in a recent article by r.d. sharma, published in the pioneer dated 9-8-1994 it is stated that law courts do not belong to the lawyers alone. they belong to the people. lawyers must realize the untold hardships and miseries to which the litigants are subjected to and the extent to which the cause of justice suffers on each day they boycott the courts on one pretext or another. it is this realisation which needs to be asserted vigorously than ever before. it is, therefore, stated that the public image of the lawyers admittedly is at its nadir and if remedial steps are not initiated from within, a day will come when society finds it convenient to dispense with them altogether. if it happens, it will be bad not only for the profession but also for freedom, democracy and rule of law in the country.'9. in madras sugars limited v. state of tamilnadu, 1995-2 l.w. 932, a division bench of the madras high court condemned boycott of courts in very severe terms. srinivasar, j. speaking for the division bench blurted:' it is high time that the members of the noble profession realised their responsibilities and in particular their paramount duty to their respective clients. we notice with anguish that boycotting courts has become a regular feature in this state and almost throughout the year, one section or the other of the members of the bar abstain from courts. it is with aching heart, we find that the advocates declare and proclaim solidarity only in the matter of boycotting courts though not in other matters in which solidarity is necessary.'his lordship then referred to the stringent remarks of the supreme court in (1) mr.'p' an advocate (air 1963 sc 1313) (2) p.d. khandekar v. bar council of maharashtra : air1984sc110 ; (3) s.j. chaudhary v. state : 1984crilj340 ; (4) salil dutta v. t.m. and m.c. private ltd., : [1993]1scr794 ; (5) j.s. jadhav v. mustafa haji mohammad yusuf : (1993)iillj1225sc ; bar council of maharashtra v. m.v. dadhalkar (6) : [1976]1scr306 ; and (7) state of u.p. v. u.p. state law officers association : [1994]1scr348 and concluded as under:'in our opinion no advocate has a right to abstain from court without first returning the briefs to his clients and refunding the fees received from them. it is well known that several clients are paying through their nose by borrowing heavily to their advocates and it is a matter of life and death for them. failure of a lawyer to attend to his cases in court would not only be breach of contract and breach of trust but also professional misconduct.'10. in the instant case, the members of the bar association, rajahmundry were not content with mere boycotting of courts. they proceeded a step further and prevented the judicial officers from entering into their chambers or courts for one hour on 22-8-1995. may be, they have not used force against the officers. but it makes no difference, for we are of the considered view that mere prevention or obstruction of the judicial officers from entering into their chambers or courts, thereby disabling them from discharging their duties, is sufficient to hold the persons responsible for it guilty of interference and obstruction with the administration of justice.11. then remains the crucial question whether the respondents participated in the incident that took place on 22-8-1995 and prevented the judicial officers from entering into their chambers or courts. on this aspect, the first and second respondents were good enough to admit their participation in the said incident, whereas the other respondents denied their participation. however, each one of them tendered his unconditional apology. we have no reason to think that the apology offered by them is not bona fide, though we are not prepared to believe their version of non-participation in the incident. moreover, sri m.s.k. sastry, senior advocate, leading the arguments on behalf of the respondents did, at no stage, try to justify the conduct of the respondents. instead, from the beginning he has been appealing to us for dropping the proceedings by accepting the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents. having given our earnest consideration to his submissions, we have decided to accept the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents without going into the question whether those respondents, who denied their participation in the incident, have in fact participated or not.'the legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. it is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are all its honourable members. although entry to the profession may be held by acquiring a mere qualification on technical competence, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct, both in and outside the court. the legal profession is different from other professions in that, what the lawyers do affect not only an individual, but the administration of justice, which is the foundation of the civilised society. both, as a leading member of the intelligentia of the society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others, both in his professional and in his private and public life. the society has a right to expect of him such ideal behaviour. if the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalised. no service will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible.'this sound advice of justice p.b. sawant given in re: sanjiv datia : 1995crilj2910 , we hope and expect, will ever be remembered by every member of the legal profession.12. in the light of the above discussion and for the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss this contempt case against respondents 18, 19, 26, 34, 41, 51, 53, 59, 63, 70, 71, 75, 76, 109, 121, 122, 129, 134, 142, 143, 168, and 176 on whom no notice was served and drop the same against the other respondents by accepting the unconditional apology tendered by them. it is, accordingly, disposed of.

Judgment:
ORDER

D. Reddeppa Reddi, J.

1. This contempt case has been taken cognizance of by this Court suo motu under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short 'the Act') against almost all the members including the President, Secretary and Members of Executive Committee of the Bar Association, Rajahmundry, on the basis of report dt. 22-8-1995 of the District Judge, Rajahmundry, to answer a serious charge of interference and obstruction with the administration of justice, viz. they wrongfully detained the District Judge and two other Judicial Officers of Rajahmundry by preventing them from going to their chambers and Courts for one hour, i.e., from 10-15 a.m. to 11-15 a.m. on 22-8-1995.

2. The gist of the report of the District Judge, Rajahmundry is as follows: The President and the Secretary of the Bar Association, Rajahmundry, the 1st and 2nd respondents herein, respectively, approached him on 21-8-1995 and informed him that in pursuance of the resolution dt. 18-8-1995 of the Joint Action Committee of Andhra Pradesh State Advocates, the members of the Bar Association, Rajahmundry would prevent the Judicial Officers from entering into their chambers for a period of one hour on 22-8-1995. His advice to convince them that the proposed action of theirs was not proper was not cherished by them. As usual, on 22-8-1995 himself and his colleagues, viz, I Additional and II Additional District Judges reached the Court premises at 10-15 a.m. in a Government vehicle. As the car crossed the main gate, the President and the Secretary and the Executive Committee Members along with 100 other senior and junior members of Rajahmundry Bar Association, forming themselves into a human chain, stopped and prevented it from proceeding further. Then, some of them went to the other complex, where Munsif Magistrates Courts are located and prevented the Munsif Magistrates from entering into their chambers. Caught up in such piquant situation, they got down from the car and requested the members of the Bar to give way for them to go to their chambers. But, it had no desired effect. Instead, it was made clear that they would not be permitted to proceed towards their chambers. However, they were asked to go to the Bar Association. Left with no alternative and as a measure of tact, they followed the advocates to the Bar Association, where they were made to sit till 11-15 a.m. During their stay in the Bar Association, they were treated well and the members of bar expressed their views politely. At 11-15 a.m. They were allowed to leave for their chambers. The local Inspector of Police and Sub-Inspector of Police were also present throughout.

3. The District Judge, Rajahmundry along with his report dt. 22-8-1995 sent two lists of advocates-one naming 87 advocates, who are alleged to have prevented himself and two other Additional District Judges, and the other naming 90 advocates, who are alleged to have prevented the Munsif Magistrates working at Rajahmundry, Based on the said information, initially cognizance was taken only against respondents 1 and 2 and notice was ordered to them by order dt. 22-12-1995. Later by order dt. 25-3-1996 cognizance was taken against the other respondents also and there was a direction to issue notices to them. However, notices could not be served on respondents 18, 19, 26,34, 41,51, 53,59, 63,70, 71, 75, 76, 109, 121, 122, 129, 134, 142, 143, 168 and 176. Then, on the direction of this Courts to specifically state whether they are practising advocates and/or the members of the Bar Association, Rajahmundry, the District Judge by his report dt. 7-8-1996, stated that except respondent No. 51 all others are neither advocates nor members of the Bar Association, Rajahmundry. Regarding respondent No. 51, his report is silent. In fact, he was not asked to verify whether respondent No. 51 was an Advocate or not. Thus, the fact remains that notice was not served on respondent No. 51. In the circumstances, we presume that he is neither an advocate nor a member of the Bar Association.

4. On receipt of notice and in answer to the charge of contempt, each of the respondents filed a separate counter affidavit. The first and the second respondents in their counter-affidavits almost admit the material averments made in the report of the District Judge, Rajahmundry. They only add that the District Judge and other Judicial Officers came to the Bar Association on their own volition and they were not forced to go to the Bar Association. However, they expressed regrets as to what had happened and tendered unconditional apology in the following terms:

'At the out-set, I hereby expressly and humbly record my unequivocal regrets and apologies for the incident complained of and 1 tender my unconditional apology without venturing to go into the merits of the allegations levelled against me.'

The other respondents, on whom notices were served, having denied their participation in the incident, that took place on 22-8-1995, also offered their unconditional apology in the following terms:

'However without going into the details of the charge levelled against me, I humbly tender my unconditional apology to the incident that is alleged to have done by me on that day and I pray that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to accept my unconditional apology and drop the contempt proceedings against me.'

5. From the perusal of the report submitted by the District Judge, Rajahmundry and the counter-affifavits filed by the respondents, there is no dispute about two things: One, advocates were boycotting the Courts during the relevant period. Two, the District Judge and all other Judicial Officers working at Rajahmundry were prevented from discharging their duties for one hour i.e., from 10-15 a.m. to 11-15 a.m. on 22-8-10-1996.(sic. 1995).

6. Boycott of Courts by advocates has become a regular feature throughout the Country. This contempt case is an off-shoot of one such boycott of all the Subordinate Courts in the State for over two months i.e., from 5-7-1995 to 11-9-1995, spearheaded by the Joint Action Committee of A.P. State Advocates, demanding withdrawal of Mandal Nyaya Pancyayat Act enacted by A.P. Legislative Assembly and sent for the assent of the President of India. This was resorted to with the apprehension that the said piece of legislation, if implemented, would adversely affect the interests of members of bar in general and those practising in moffusil Courts in particular. It is, thus, evident that the members of the bar were more concerned about their own interests and never they cared for the interests of their clients. We are sure, that this is not befitting the dignity and professional ethics expected of from honourable members of the legal profession.

7. The matter has become a grave concern for all Courts including the Apex Court. In fact, the said issue came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Common Cause v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCALE 6. Therein, notice was given to the Bar Associations and State Bar Councils all over the Country. Then a meeting was convened to consider the suggestions made by the Bar Associations/State Bar Councils. Their suggestions were taken into consideration. The Bar Council of India has made its position clear to the effect '(a) Bar Council of India is against resorting to strike excepting in rarest of rare cases involving the dignity and independence of the judiciary as well as of the Bar; and (b) whenever strikes become inevitable, efforts shall be made to keep it short and peaceful to avoid causing hardship to the litigant public.' Finally, it was decided that instead of the Court going into the wider question whether or not the members of the legal profession can resort to strike or abstain from appearing in cases in Court in which they are engaged, the following directions should be issued by way of interim arrangement:

'(1) In the rare instance where any association of lawyers including statutory Bar Councils considers it imperative to call upon and/or advise members of the legal profession to abstain from appearing in Courts on any occasion, it must be left open to any individual members/members of that association to be free to appear without let, fear or hindrance or any other coercive steps.

(2) No such member who appears in Court or otherwise practises his legal profession, shall be visited with any adverse or penal consequences whatever, by any association of lawyers, and shall not suffer any expulsion or threat of expulsion therefrom.

(3) The above will not preclude other forms of protest by practising lawyers in Courts such as, for instance, wearing of arm bands and other forms of protest which in no way interrupt or disrupt the Court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant. Any such form of protest shall not however be derogatory to the Court or to the profession.

(4) Office-bearers of a Bar Association (including Bar Council) responsible for taking decisions mentioned in Clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are implemented in the spirit of what is stated in Clauses (1) and (2) and (3) above.'

This was by order dt. 7-12-1994. Yet, the Bar Associations in the State and the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, who participated in the above case, passed resolutions in the very next year to boycott all Subordinate Courts in the entire State. However, we refrain ourselves from making any comment on their conduct, for they are not parties to this proceeding.

8. Boycott of Courts was deprecated not only by courts but also by eminent jurists in the country. In U.P. Sales Tax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association, : AIR1996SC98 , K. Ramaswamy, J. referred to the views of some of the eminent jurists. We consider it apt to reproduce them here.

'17. Shri K.K. Venugopal, a leading senior member of this Bar and Ex-President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, in his article 'THE LEGAL PROFESSION AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY' (1989) 1 NLSJ 121), opined that boycott amounts to contempt of Court and the advocates participating in the strike keep their clients as hostages and their interests in jeopardy. Shri P.P. Rao, another senior member of this Bar and former President of the Supreme Court Bar Association in his article ''STRIKE BY PROFESSIONALS' published in Indian Advocate-Journal of the Bar Association of India (Vol. XXIII 1991 (Part I)-opined that it amounts to professional misconduct. Shri H.M. Seervai, a noted distinguished jurist in his article 'LAWYERS' STRIKE AND THE DUTY OF THE SUPREME COURT' republished in the Indian Advocate (Vol. XXIII 1991 (Part I) opined that lawyers ought to know that at least as long as lawful redress is available to aggrieved lawyers, there is no justification for lawyers to join in an illegal conspiracy to commit a gross, criminal contempt of Court, thereby striking at the heart of the liberty conferred on every person by our Constitution. Strike is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. The principle is that those who have duties to discharge in a Court of justice are protected by the law and are shielded by the law to discharge those duties, the advocates in return have duty to protect the Courts. For, once conceded that lawyers are above the law and the law Courts, there can be no limit to lawyers taking the law into their hands to paralyse the working of the courts. 'In my submission', he said that 'it is high time that the Supreme Court and the High Court make it clear beyond doubt that they will not tolerate any interference from anybody or authority in the daily administration of justice. For in no other way can the Supreme Court and the High Court maintain the high position and exercise the great powers conferred by the Constitution and the law to do justice without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.'

18. Shri Nariman, yet another learned member of this Court and President of the Bar Association of India and Editor of the INDIAN ADVOCATE- in his article 'Boycott--A LAWYER'S WEAPON' published in the journal 'INDIAN ADVOCATE' (Vol. XVIII 1978 Nos. 1&2), opined that when the lawyers boycott the courts, confidence in the administration of justice is shaken. The longer the boycott the greater the jeopardy to the system. The boycotting of a Court by members privileged to practise there is virtually holding justice to ransom. It certainly contributes to the law's delays. An absentation from the Courts by those who have held themselves out as practising, there is a threat to the administration of law and undermines the rule of law which is the bedrock of our Constitution. He ended with a quotation by Sir Norman Macleod (JIVANLAL VARAJARAO DESAI, Re (AIR 1920 BOM. 168) that 'those who live by the law should keep the law'.

19. IN A RECENT ARTICLE BY R.D. SHARMA, PUBLISHED IN THE PIONEER dated 9-8-1994 it is stated that law Courts do not belong to the lawyers alone. They belong to the people. Lawyers must realize the untold hardships and miseries to which the litigants are subjected to and the extent to which the cause of justice suffers on each day they boycott the Courts on one pretext or another. It is this realisation which needs to be asserted vigorously than ever before. It is, therefore, stated that the public image of the lawyers admittedly is at its nadir and if remedial steps are not initiated from within, a day will come when society finds it convenient to dispense with them altogether. If it happens, it will be bad not only for the profession but also for freedom, democracy and rule of law in the country.'

9. In Madras Sugars Limited v. State of Tamilnadu, 1995-2 L.W. 932, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court condemned boycott of courts in very severe terms. Srinivasar, J. speaking for the Division Bench blurted:

' It is high time that the members of the noble profession realised their responsibilities and in particular their paramount duty to their respective clients. We notice with anguish that boycotting courts has become a regular feature in this State and almost throughout the year, one section or the other of the members of the Bar abstain from courts. It is with aching heart, we find that the advocates declare and proclaim solidarity only in the matter of boycotting Courts though not in other matters in which solidarity is necessary.'

His Lordship then referred to the stringent remarks of the Supreme Court in (1) Mr.'P' an Advocate (AIR 1963 SC 1313) (2) P.D. Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra : AIR1984SC110 ; (3) S.J. Chaudhary v. State : 1984CriLJ340 ; (4) Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd., : [1993]1SCR794 ; (5) J.S. Jadhav v. Mustafa Haji Mohammad Yusuf : (1993)IILLJ1225SC ; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dadhalkar (6) : [1976]1SCR306 ; and (7) State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association : [1994]1SCR348 and concluded as under:

'In our opinion no advocate has a right to abstain from Court without first returning the briefs to his clients and refunding the fees received from them. It is well known that several clients are paying through their nose by borrowing heavily to their advocates and it is a matter of life and death for them. Failure of a lawyer to attend to his cases in Court would not only be breach of contract and breach of trust but also professional misconduct.'

10. In the instant case, the members of the Bar Association, Rajahmundry were not content with mere boycotting of courts. They proceeded a step further and prevented the Judicial Officers from entering into their chambers or courts for one hour on 22-8-1995. May be, they have not used force against the Officers. But it makes no difference, for we are of the considered view that mere prevention or obstruction of the Judicial Officers from entering into their chambers or courts, thereby disabling them from discharging their duties, is sufficient to hold the persons responsible for it guilty of interference and obstruction with the administration of justice.

11. Then remains the crucial question whether the respondents participated in the incident that took place on 22-8-1995 and prevented the Judicial Officers from entering into their chambers or courts. On this aspect, the first and second respondents were good enough to admit their participation in the said incident, whereas the other respondents denied their participation. However, each one of them tendered his unconditional apology. We have no reason to think that the apology offered by them is not bona fide, though we are not prepared to believe their version of non-participation in the incident. Moreover, Sri M.S.K. Sastry, Senior Advocate, leading the arguments on behalf of the respondents did, at no stage, try to justify the conduct of the respondents. Instead, from the beginning he has been appealing to us for dropping the proceedings by accepting the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents. Having given our earnest consideration to his submissions, we have decided to accept the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents without going into the question whether those respondents, who denied their participation in the incident, have in fact participated or not.

'The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are all its honourable members. Although entry to the profession may be held by acquiring a mere qualification on technical competence, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct, both in and outside the Court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that, what the lawyers do affect not only an individual, but the administration of justice, which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both, as a leading member of the intelligentia of the society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others, both in his professional and in his private and public life. The society has a right to expect of him such ideal behaviour. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalised. No service will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible.'

This sound advice of Justice P.B. Sawant given in Re: Sanjiv Datia : 1995CriLJ2910 , we hope and expect, will ever be remembered by every member of the legal profession.

12. In the light of the above discussion and for the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss this contempt case against respondents 18, 19, 26, 34, 41, 51, 53, 59, 63, 70, 71, 75, 76, 109, 121, 122, 129, 134, 142, 143, 168, and 176 on whom no notice was served and drop the same against the other respondents by accepting the unconditional apology tendered by them. It is, accordingly, disposed of.