Ranga Reddy Associates Vs. K. Shapoor Chenai and ors. - Court Judgment

T. Meena Kumari, J.

1. As all the above CCCAs have been filed questioning the judgment and decree dated 3.4.2003 of the learned XIII Additional Chief Judge, CCC (FTC), Hyderabad in OS. No. 69 of 2003 (Old OS No. 1201 of 1995), they have been clubbed together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The appellant in CCCA No. 74 of 2004 is the second defendant in the suit i.e., DBR Mills Employees Union (Reg.No. B-947) affiliated to INTUC Rep. by its General Secretary D. Srinivas. The appellant in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 i.e., M/s. Ranga Reddy Associates rep- by E.P. Ranga Reddy, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad, is the third party to the suit and he filed the said CCCA with the leave of this Court obtained on 22.9.2003 in CMP No. 20475 of 2003. However, the plaintiffs filed Review CMPs to review the said order. Those Review Petitions have been listed before us. The appellant in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 i.e., Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Limited (DBR Mills), 1-2-639, Elechibagauda, Lower Tank Bund Road, Hyderabad rep. by its Chairman and Managing Director is the Defendant No. 1 in the suit. Whereas the appellants in CCCA Sr.No. 55059 of 2003 are the third parties to the suit and they sought leave in CMP No. 21957 of 2003 to file the above CCCA.

3. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as they were arrayed in the suit and the third parties who filed CCCA Nos. 329 of 2003 and in CCCA Sr.No. 55059 of 2003 will be referred to third parties.

4. The facts which are necessary for disposal of the present appeals are as follows:

Originally, the first plaintiff Mrs. Khorshad Shapoor Chennai filed OS No. 1201 of 1995, which was subsequently re-numbered as OS No. 69 of 2003, against the first defendant seeking eviction from the leased property claiming Rs. 30,000/-towards damages with interest at the rate of 6@ per annum from the date of the suit, and Rs. 50,000/- to the first plaintiff towards the price of the half of the tamarind trees with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the suit and also claimed Rs. 10,00,000/- towards the wrongful deprivation of portion of the leased property with interest at the rate of 6%, to pay Rs. 3,014/- to the first plaintiff towards the damages for wrongful occupation of the leased property from 1.10.1995 with further damages at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- per annum till eviction together with interest at the rate of 6% p.a., and for costs.

5. The case of the first plaintiff is that the plaint schedule property originally belong to late Khan Bahadur Shapoor Edulji Chenoy and he had leased out the same to the first defendant under a registered lease deed dated 17th Aban 1328 Fasli (1918 A.D.), that the lease is a perpetual lease for 999 years; and that the first plaintiff had succeeded to the property in a civil suit in OS No. 38 of 1967 on the file of the Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad. She contended that the first defendant failed to pay rents from 1992 and they also cut the trees without her permission. The first plaintiff also stated in the plaint that a quit notice was issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 30.9.1995 terminating the lease with effect from 1.10.1995 and therefore the first defendant should be evicted from the plaint schedule property. Hence, the first plaintiff filed the suit for eviction and other reliefs as stated above.

6. The first defendant filed written statement opposing the claim for the first plaintiff for eviction inter alia contending that the plaint schedule property was an Arazi Maqta granted to Khan Bahadoor Shapoorji Chenoy by the late Nizam of Hyderabad. That this Chenoy had executed a registered permanent lease over the plaint schedule property in favour of the first defendant on 13th Aban 1328 Fasli and the first defendant has been in possession of the plaint schedule property since then. The first defendant further contended that in 1955, the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 came into force and under the said Act, all Inams in the entire Telangana Area are deemed to have been abolished and vested in the State. It is stated that under Section 9(2) of the said Act, if the holder of the Inam Land or the lessee converted any part of the said land for any purposes not connected with the agriculture, which is neither void nor illegal according to any other law in force, he will be deemed to be the owner of the said land. The first defendant has contended that a Memo No. 77508/J.A.I/93-94 dated 17.1.1994 was issued by the Secretary to the Government wherein it is stated that the first defendant was the absolute owner of the entire land and another letter No. B2/ 10268/1 dated 12.3.1994 was also issued by the Collector, Hyderabad District which supported the contention that the first defendant was the owner of the land. The first plaintiff has no interest, title or semblance of any right over the plaint schedule land. The first defendant further contended that by the date of coming into force of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, the land was included in the holding of the first defendant and after the Act also, it vested in the first defendant who owned it before that date. The case of the first defendant is that its possession, occupation and holding as permanent tenant are now enlarged as owners and recognized by the authorities vide Government Memo No. 7508/J.A.I/93-94 dated 17.1.1994 and No. B2/10268/1 dated 12.3.1994. The first defendant further contended that the lessor and lessee relationship between the first plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 ended in 1950 itself and that the first plaintiff was not entitled to claim rents from the first defendant and that under a mistake the defendant paid some amounts to the first plaintiff. In any event the first plaintiff is not the owner or lessor of the plaint schedule property and she has no locus standi to maintain the suit for eviction or other reliefs. There is no subsisting lease at all and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not attracted to the facts of these appeals.

The first defendant further stated in his written statement that it was declared as a Sick Industry. The entire matter is pending with the BIFR, New Delhi and the Defendant No. 1 cannot transfer the assets of the Mill and the first plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in the suit.

During the pendency of the suit, Ashish Developers and Builders (P) Limited rep. by its Managing Director Sri Raj Kumar Malpani filed IA No. 2457 of 1998 before the Trial Court to come on record as second plaintiff and the same was ordered on 15.3.1999. IA No. 97 of 1999 was filed by the DBR Mills Employees union (Regd.No. B-947) affiliated to INTUC rep. by its General Secretary D. Srinivas come on record as second defendant and the same was dismissed by the Trial Court on 17.3.1999. Later, the DBR Mills employees Union carried the matter before this Court in CRP No. 2728 of 2000 and this Court allowed the said CRP on 17.9.2001. Hence, the DBR Mills Employees Union came on record as the second defendant.

In the meanwhile, plaintiffs 1, 2 and Defendant No. 1 have agreed to compromise the matter and accordingly filed IA No. 359 of 1999. Later, the second defendant also came forward to sail with them and agreed for compromise as the first defendant authorities and Plaintiff No. 2 agreed to safeguard the interest of the second defendant. The first plaintiff, second plaintiff and the first defendant also deposed agreeing for compromise before the Court below on 15.6.1999. In view of the compromise reached between the parties, the suit was disposed of in terms of such compromise on 3.4.2003.

7. Questioning the said judgment and decree, the above CCCAs have been filed.

8. The main contention urged on behalf of the learned Counsel for the first defendant in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 was that the Court below ought not to have passed the decree in terms of the compromise petition filed on 8.3.1999 in IA No. 359 of 1999 under Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC. The learned Counsel has further argued that the first defendant is deemed to be the owner of the land in its occupation in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (for short 'Inams Abolition Act'). Further, it is also urged that the Government of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue (UC-III) Department in exercise of its powers under Section 34 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 issued a notice to the first plaintiff and others including the first defendant that it has decided to set aside the orders of the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Hyderabad dated 19.1.1984 passed in file No. F1/1368/76. Therefore even the transfer of six acres of land to the second plaintiff under the compromise filed on 16.3.1999 becomes illegal as such land came under the purview of the ULC Act, 1976. The learned Counsel further contends that such transfer is hit by Section 5(3) of the ULC Act. Since the compromise which was legal when it was filed into Court on 8.3.1999 became unlawful and illegal by 3.4.2003, the date on which the Trial Court pronounced its judgment in terms of the compromise. The learned Counsel further submits that when time was sought to file a detailed objections for recording of the compromise, the Court below ought not to have pronounced the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel further contends that under explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC, it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that the compromise entered into is lawful, but the Trial Court without satisfying itself as to whether such compromise is lawful or not passed the judgment and decree and hence the same is liable to be set aside. The learned Counsel further contends that under Section 5(3) of the ULC Act, a transfer of excess vacant land is null and void and such transfers are also illegal under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872.

9. The learned Counsel further submits that in view of the Memo of the State Government dated 17.12.1994 and the letter of the District Collector dated 12.3.1994, the first defendant is the owner of the plaint schedule land and as such the very suit for eviction by Plaintiff No. 1 against Defendant No. 1 is not maintainable as there is no landlord and tenant relationship in between them. It is stated that no consideration has been passed under the terms of the compromise for transfer of Ac. 6.00 to the first defendant and hence the compromise is void in the eye of law. Further, it has been contended that the first defendant has been declared as 'Sick Company' as defined under Section 3(o) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and as such any transfer of the land in occupation of the first defendant without permission of the BIFR is illegal.

10. The learned Counsel for the appellant in CCCA No. 74 of 2004 i.e., second defendant in the suit, submits that by virtue of the impugned judgment and decree, the valuable rights of the second defendant are under jeopardy and if the said judgment is allowed to stand, it would result in perpetuating the fraud played by the plaintiffs in the suit in collusion with the Management and the judgment and decree is contrary to Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC and therefore the impugned judgment and decree has to be set aside and the matter may be remanded to the Trial Court.

11. The appellant in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 is not a party to the suit. But, it filed the above CCCA with the leave obtained from this Court in CMP No. 20475 of 2003. The learned Counsel for the appellant in the CCCA Sri G. Veera Reddy submits that Plaintiff No. 1 is not the owner of the plaint schedule land and the first defendant is the owner of the land in question in view of the fact that after coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, under Section 9 of the said Act, a person who owns the buildings has title to the said land. Since the first defendant owns a building, ownership lies to the first defendant. The learned Counsel also reiterated the same contentions advanced on behalf of the first defendant with regard to the ownership of the land in question.

12. It has been submitted that the DBR Mills under the erstwhile Management became adverse in 1979-80 and the Management was changed in favour of Sri Krishnama Raju of Larsving Group. DBR Mills was declared Sick Industrial Company under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 and on 3.10.1987 BIFR appointed IFCI as operating agency for rehabilitation but the same has not been implemented because of the existing promoter did not show any interest and the unit was virtually abandoned and therefore the BIFR intended to windup DBR Mills and to that effect a show-cause notice was issued. To the said show-cause notice, the appellant in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 informed that it is interested in taking over in DBR Mills and deposited sum of Rs. 50 lakhs in no-lien accounts with the State Bank of Hyderabad and accordingly the DBR Mills were taken over by the RR Associates. He further contends that no suit is maintainable against the first defendant under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Company Act, 1985.

13. The learned Counsel further contends that in a suit for eviction and damages, the Court below ought not to have impleaded the second plaintiff. The Court below should have seen that the compromise entered into between the Plaintiff No. 2 and S. Krishnama Raju who is no more the Managing Director of DBR Mills is collusive one and is also opposed to the public policy. The Court below should have seen that the parties in the suit wanted a judgment and decree with regard to the land over which they did not have any right whatsoever. He further submits that the competent authority deleted the said land from holding of Plaintiff No. 1 which has become final and hence the first plaintiff cannot be termed as a Landlady. The learned Counsel further contends that the lower Court should have seen that when the matter is pending before the BIFR, it should not have passed judgment and decree in terms of compromise on the basis of the orders of AAIFR dated 6.1.2000.

14. The appellants in CCCA Sr.55059 of 2003 are the third parties to the suit and they want to prefer this appeal with the leave of this Court. The appellants herein are the Trade Union Leaders and with a view to safeguard the interest of the employees of the DBR Mills Limited they want to file the present appeal. The main contention of the appellants herein are that the suit is not maintainable. The Court below ought not to have decreed the suit in terms of the compromise since entering of the compromise itself is illegal and if the same is not set aside, the interest of the employees would be put to untold hardship.

15. With the background of the facts of the case, the learned Counsel for the appellants in CCCA No. 329 and 350 of 2003 have brought to the notice of this Court the provisions of Inam Abolition Act and the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It has also been contended that the compromise is opposed to the public policy as contained under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The case of the appellants is that the assets of the first defendant are not transferable as the proceedings are pending before BIFR and any transfer of property in respect of which BIFR proceedings are pending, the same cannot be acted upon.

16. It has been contended that as per Order 43, Rule 1(A)(2) of CPC 1908, even though the suit is disposed of in terms of compromise, an appeal can be maintainable by raising a plea that the appellants are entitled to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded. It has also been argued that in pursuance of the order of the BIFR granting injunction, the Court below ought not to have recorded the compromise decree.

17. The learned Counsel appearing in CCCA No. 74 of 2004 i.e., Defendant No. 2, has also argued that in the terms of compromise, the mode of payment was not mentioned in terms of the compromise and the second defendant would not get any benefit out of the compromise. He also contends that the rights of the workmen have not been safeguarded. The learned Counsel adopted the arguments of the Counsel appearing in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 in all other aspects i.e., the first defendant is the owner of the land in view of the Inams Abolition Act and recognizing the ownership of the first defendant over the land by the Government and the District Collector in their letters in 1994 itself.

18. Contradicting the above pleadings, the Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs has argued that the appellants cannot be permitted to raise the pleas contrary to the findings of the lower Court and contrary to the facts of the case. It has also been contended that the appellants are precluded from urging the new facts. The learned Counsel for the second plaintiff has argued that Defendant No. 1 company is not the owner of the land and the lease hold right does not confer ownership on the lessee in view of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has also been argued that once the quit notice was issued, the relationship of the landlord and tenant would be terminated and the first defendant would be called as Tenant at Sufferance. He further contended that as per Section 9 of CPC, all lawful civil rights are enforceable. The learned Counsel further contends that a suit for eviction is maintainable against the first defendant as per Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The learned Counsel has also advanced his arguments that the compromise can be entered into in a suit for eviction by the landlord and the compromise cannot be a replica of the plaint and in a compromise, a deviation can be made from the original claims of the parties before the Court.

19. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs contends that the defendants have chosen to contest the suit by filing a written statement and meanwhile the parties have reached the compromise. The learned Counsel has further argued that after amendment to the CPC in the year 1976, the legislature has thought that the compromise can go beyond the subject-matter of the suit so long as it is not unlawful. It is submitted that the facts relied upon by the appellants do not contemplate a case. It has also been argued that the proceedings of the BIFR do not confer title on the first defendant and even if those orders confer or recognize the title of the first defendant, the same have no force at all as those orders have not been passed by the Civil Court or any authority under Urban Land Ceiling Act etc., and hence the first defendant cannot take shelter from the orders of the BIFR.

20. Referring to the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellants with regard to the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the learned Counsel has argued that the subject-matter under BIFR is the assets of the company and hence the land in question in the suit cannot become the assets of the company. It is his further contention that no injunction has been passed by any authorities restraining the first defendant from entering into a compromise over the suit schedule property as the fact of tenancy is not in dispute. The learned Counsel also further argued with reference to the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act that as per Section 9 of the said Act, there is no waste of the land as the land is not agricultural land and the possession of the tenant would amounts to permissible possession on behalf of the owner. It has also further argued that the orders passed by the different authorities is with regard to the computation of the land of the landlord and tenant and no final orders have been passed.

21. The learned Counsel further contends that the compromise will not deviate the provisions of law and is not opposed to public policy. Further submits that there was a cloud in the title of the land before compromise and the same was removed by virtue of the compromise. The orders of the different authorities did not say that 16 acres which is the subject-matter of the compromise is not protected. The learned Counsel has further argued that out of 16 acres, 10 acres have been shared by the tenant i.e., Defendant No. 1 and six acres by Plaintiff No. 2 in pursuance of the agreement entered into with the Plaintiff No. 1 and the surplus area will go to the tenant, which is the subject-matter pending before the Urban Land Ceiling Act.

In view of the fact that the respective parties are in possession of the property and no land has been vested with the Government and as the Government has no authority whatsoever as the land did not vest with the Government, the agreement as well as the compromise entered into between the parties is not opposed to the public policy.

22. During the pendency of the cases, the second plaintiff i.e., second respondent in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 filed CMP No. 6476 of 2004 requesting this Court to receive the following documents and to mark them as Exs.A1 to A8:

1. Proceedings of the BIFR dated 31.5.1996 in Case No. 109/87

2. Proceedings of the BIFR dated 12.3.1996 in Case No. 109/87

3. Proceedings of the BIFR dated 22.1.1996 in Case No. 109/87

4. Proceedings of the BIFR dated 16.6.1995 in Case No. 109/87

5. Affidavit of the MD of R1 firm dated 28.4.1999 in WP No. 10110 of 1999

6. Order of AAIFR dated 14.10.1996 in Appeal No. 151 of 1996 counter

7. Affidavit filed by Mr. Krishnam Raju, MD. of R1 in CRP No. 2728 of 2000 dated 12.7.2001

8. Order under Section 269UL(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961 in file No. AA/HYD/1 (85)4/98-99 dated 23.7.2001 in favour of the petitioner, R2.'

23. The appellant in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 filed CMP No. 30407 of 2003 and CMP No. 6634 of 2004 to receive the following documents and to mark them as Exs.B1 to B4:

1. Memo No. 60432/UC.III (1)/93-5 dated 14.10.2002

2. Certified copy of the order of the BIFR dated 13.4.1994

3. Certified copy of the order of the BIFR dated 2.12.1994

4. Original order of the Special Officer and . Competent Authority, ULC, Hyderabad in Pro.No. H1/7543/76 dated 31.12.1993

The above CMPs to receive and mark those documents as Exs.A1 to A8 and Exs.B1 to B4 have been allowed and those documents were marked with the consent of all the parties as they are necessary to appreciate the contentions and for adjudication of the matter.

24. With regard to the pleas raised by the workers union i.e., Defendant No. 2, (CCCA No. 74 of 2004), the learned Counsel for the second plaintiff Sri Md. Ali submits that the Workers Union is not a landlord and it has nothing to do with the compromise entered into. He further submits that out of the protected area of 16 acres, 10 acres will go to Defendant No. 1 and six acres will go to Plaintiff No. 2 and the surplus six acres would enure to the benefit of the Defendant No. 2 as the same is still pending with the Government. The learned Counsel has further argued that it is not the case of the tenant that the compromise was entered into by playing fraud and as there is no allegation of fraud, the compromise as recorded by the Court below cannot be set aside.

25. The argument of the first defendant before the BIFR was that it should be treated as a Sick Company. Later, it has shifted his stand before the authorities on different occasions and hence he cannot go beyond the statement made before the different authorities and also his own deposition before the lower Court which was made on oath on 15.6.1999.

26. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has further argued that the appellant in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 has filed IA No. 981 of 1999 to come on record as one of the defendants in the suit but the same was dismissed on 20.1.2003. The appellant did not question the said dismissal order by filing revision and without doing so, he filed the appeal with the leave of the Court. The learned Counsel has further argued that the observations made by the earlier Bench while granting leave are not binding as the same were made while, dealing with an interlocutory application.

27. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submits that the first defendant has taken different stands before the different authorities. He further contends that the first defendant filed SLP (Civil) No. 17294 of 1998 against the dismissal of the writ petition by the Delhi High Court in CWP No,4283 of 1996 and the said SLP has been withdrawn before the Apex Court on 18.11.1998 on the ground that he is going to compromise. Thus, he contends that the first defendant with an intention to put an end to the litigation has entered into compromise and at no point of time, he stated that the compromise was entered into by playing fraud. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has argued that the agreement was entered into and payments were made to the respective parties and the landlady of the land attested the compromise. The learned Counsel has further re-iterated his argument that the land is not the asset of the company and no injunction as such from any of the authorities including BIFR and SICA to transfer the land.

28. As the appellants have argued at length referring to different provisions of the statutory enactments, we had to go necessarily into the arguments with reference to the provisions referred by them from various enactments like Inams Abolition Act and Urban Land Ceiling Act and the various orders of the BIFR and the additional evidence adduced.

29. The undisputed fact remains that the suit has been field by the plaintiff for eviction of the appellant in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 on the ground of committing default of payment of rent payable for lease for the Fasli 1403 to 1404 i.e., 1993 to 1993. A perusal of the documents show that the first defendant filed a statement under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and in pursuant to the same, the competent authority has declared the protected area in Proceedings No. H1/7543/76 dated 31.12.1993 which is marked as Ex.B4. In the said proceedings, the ULC Authorities have declared the protected area as follows:

'The total area protected and the vacant land available in the premises are as follows:

1. Total area ...87692.002. Area protected:i. Non-vacant land ...1041.05ii. Dwelling units ...15336.00iii. Non-dwelling units ... 47014.95...63392.00----------Balance ..24300.00-----------Out of the vacant land of 24300.00 square meters, the declarant firm is entitled to retain 1000.00 square meters under Section 4(i)(b) of the Act and the remaining area of 23300.00 square meters of vacant land held by the declarant firm is in excess of the ceiling limit.'

30. Ex.B3 is the notice issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh Revenue (UC.III) Department in Memo No. 60432/ UC.III(1)/93-5 dated 14.10.2002 for computation of the holding of the landlady i.e., Plaintiff No. 1 and others. In the said notice, it has been observed as follows;

'And whereas, the Government after careful examination, in exercise of powers conferred on them under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976, have decided to set aside the orders of the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Hyderabad dated 19.1.1984 passed in the file No.F1/ 1368/76 and direct him to recomputed the holdings of Mrs. F.R. Chenoy, Mrs. K.S. Chenoy and Master Darious Chenoy by including the lands which were given to D.B.R. Mills on perpetual lease as per provision of explanation under Section (2)(1) of the Urban Land (Ceilings and Regulation) Act, 1976, as the orders are not in conformity with the aforesaid provisions of Act.'

31. During the course of arguments, much reliance has been placed on various orders of the BIFR and therefore we are constrained to look into the orders passed by different authorities for proper adjudication of the subject-matter of the appeal.

32. The order of the BIFR in Case No. 109/87(020/94) dated 31.5.1996, relating to the first defendant company, is marked as Ex.A1. At paras 3 and 4 it has been observed as follows;

'xxx xxx

We have carefully considered the matter and taken into account all the contentions put forward on behalf of DBR Mills Limited in their Memorandum dated 18.12.1995 and papers filed thereafter. Without prejudice to our later observations, we find that the company has failed to submit any certificate or declaration or order of any competent Court or authority which conclusively establishes that the type of title that this company had over this land since it had become a lessee of the person or persons who had been allotted this land originally has changed in the manner, as claimed by the Company. It has been claimed that the Andhra Pradesh Government, has, by its order Lr.No. B2/10268/91 dated 12.3.1994 issued a clarification under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Inams Abolition Act, 1955 that the informant , company should be deemed to be the owner of the aforesaid demised Inam land. According to the company, the Government's order has further clarified that there is no need for any authority to give any such authentication or any order to indicate that the informant company is the owner. We have perused the copy of the said order which has been submitted by the company. The same does not specifically refer to vesting of any title in the land in the company. It only clarifies the general legal position as was stated to obtain under Sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. The State Government order talks about the holder of the Inams land being deemed to be the owner of the said land subject to certain conditions and provisions. The last sentence of the order significantly says that it is for the person who owns the building to assert his title based on such relevant documents. Evidently, this cannot be construed as an order proving the title of the company in the land in question. On the other hand, the representative of the Government of Andhra Pradesh submitted in the hearing held on 22.1.1996 that the matter regarding ownership has been going on with them since 1988 and the company's M.D. had filed applications at least on three occasions from 1988 onwards claiming ownership on the land which according to the Government is not correct. He also stated that the lease for the land was initially given in the name of one Shri Shapur Shenoy and not in the name of the company.

4. It is seen from the documents submitted by the company that it continued to pay the lease rent to Mrs. K.S. Chenoy till around 1994 when it unilaterally stopped what it calls unlawful payments of rents whereupon a suit was filed by Mrs. Chenoy before the Hon'ble Court of 4th Additional Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad in OS No. 1201 of 1995 which is being contested. This further shows that the company does not have any undisputed title over the land, as claimed by it.

5. Under the provisions of SICA, from which we derive our authority, we are not competent to decide any question as to the title over the land.

xxxx'

33. In Ex.A2, BIFR Order dated 12.3.1996, the BIFR observed as follows:

'..... Had the company accounted for the land in its books at the time when it became owner it would not have been in a position to present the picture which it is trying to do today. At this stage, however, the question of title is also a subject-matter of dispute with the heirs of original lessor to whom the company was paying lease rentals till very recently and who have reportedly filed a writ in the High Court after the company unilaterally stopped these payments in 1994.

4. ..... The Bench pointed out that they are not trying to interpret API Act. This has to be done either by Government of Andhra Pradesh or some Civil Courts where the title of the land is asserted.

5..... The Bench again pointed out that the ownership of company was not being ascertained as it was not a matter falling under SICA....'

34. Another order of the BIFR dated 22.1.1996 is marked as Ex.A3 wherein the following observations have been made:

'3. ..... The Bench observed that the referred memo from Government provides only a clarification regarding interpretation of law and is in no way a certificate conveying ownership to the company.

4..... On being asked whether the company is claiming ownership of land today, Shri Rangaraju submitted that they are clear that ownership vests with them and their claim to be considered today is not regarding ownership but regarding its net worth being positive on account of which it is seeking discharge from BIFR.xXXX, The Government's reply even now in no way confirms ownership of land by the company....'

35. The affidavit filed by the first defendant in WP No. 10199 of 1999 in support of the said writ petition questioning the orders of the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction rep. By its Registrar, New Delhi and others in Appeal No. 144/98 dated 13.4.1999 is marked as Ex.A5. In Ex.A5, the first defendant stated as follows with regard to the fact of entering into the compromise of the suit in question:

'The said SLP came up for hearing before, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on 18.11.1998 then the Petitioner No. 1 withdrew the SLP stating that it would move the High Court in review and point out that a suit in regard to the land in dispute is pending and that it is about to be compromised and that the petitioner is willing to pay of all the creditors. The petitioner submits that the suit No. 1201/95 on the file of the IV Senior Civil Judge, CCC, Hyderabad and is now compromised and the compromise memo and affidavit of the Inamdar are herewith filed as Document Nos. 3 and 4.'

36. The Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi in its order dated 14.10.1996 observed as follows:

'The learned Counsel for the 13th respondent submitted that the provisions of the State Act do not have any application at all to the appellant as the appellant is not an inamdar coming within the purview of the Act. It is the admitted case that the land in question was taken on perpetual lease by the appellant from Inamdar. The State Act confers benefits only to the Inamdars as tenants as occupants of agricultural lands and that too on payment of premium as per law. Counsel urged that a person like the appellant having the leasehold right under the Inamdar cannot claim the status of Inamdar or claim any right of inamdar and his position can only be as a lessee and nothing more than that.'

37. The second defendant filed CRP No. 2728 of 2000 aggrieved by the order of the IV Senior Civil Judge, CCC, Hyderabad in IA No. 97 of 1999 dated 17.3.1999 wherein the request of the DBR Mills Employees Union to come on record as second defendant was rejected. In the said CRP, Sri S. Krishnam Raju being the Chairman and Managing Director of the first defendant filed counter. It was marked as Ex,A7. In Ex.A7, the stand taken by the first defendant at para 10 is as follows:

'With reference to para 5, I deny that the petitioner (second defendant herein) will be benefited if M/s. Ranga Reddy Associates (new promoter) takes over the management of the sick unit. It is true that a compromise memo was filed before the Court below. However a compromise decree has not been passed till date. Xxx The development if any envisaged under the compromise is only for a small portion of the area under occupation and does not envisage destruction of the factory building.

38. A perusal of the above orders would go to show that there is no order of injunction prohibiting any of the authorities from entering into any agreement nor any order has been placed before this Court that the land is the asset of the first defendant. Thus, the claim of the first defendant that the land in question belongs to it has no force at all.

39. The next question that remains is the compromise decree and judgment can be set aside in the absence of the plea that the compromise was reached by playing fraud. It is not the case of any of the parties to these CCCAs that the compromise was entered into by playing fraud and hence the question of setting aside the said judgment and decree on the ground of playing fraud on the Court does not arise.

40. The next contention urged on behalf of the appellants is that the Court below should not have recorded the compromise as the said compromise itself is illegal and hence the judgment and decree of the Court below is liable to be set aside.

41. The defendants did not bring to the notice of the Court below which terms of compromise would be termed as illegal and the reason for such either by way of affidavit or counter and therefore the Court below cannot presume that the terms of the compromise are illegal. Since the compromise petition has been filed and after recording the sworn statement of the Managing Director of the first defendant and other persons to the suit, the Court below acted upon the said compromise petition and hence the contention of the appellants that the compromise itself is illegal and has no force.

42. It has to be looked into whether the compromise entered into by the parties fulfills the requirements of Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC. It has to be seen that the compromise was signed by the second plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 and also the Defendant No. 2 which was attested by the first plaintiff. The learned Counsel for the second plaintiff has argued that as the agreement of compromise is not void, it does not fit into the explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC.

43. It has been argued that the appellant's Managing Director in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 i.e., Managing Director of the first defendant, has given sworn statement in the compromise petition before the Court below. In that statement, he stated as follows:

'On 15.3.1999, we have compromised the matter along with first plaintiff. Accordingly, we have filed the compromise memo. I have gone through the various terms and conditions of the said compromise memo and they are correct. In pursuance of the agreement entered with us, the second plaintiff paid Rs. 1 core 50 lakhs to us. As per the original agreement between us and the second plaintiff and also as per the understanding reached, it is the second plaintiff who has to bear all the expenses requires in connection with the execution of any registered documents, obtaining permission and sanctions from the appropriate authorities. Out of the total extent of 22 acres, the agreement between us and second plaintiff is subject of 16 acres. Which is cleared by ULC. Out of this 16 acres, the rights in 6 acres is exclusively given to second plaintiff. It is further agreed that remaining 10 acres shall belong to defendant. Similarly the balance 6 acres of land in respect of which matter is pending in the High Court and Government shall belong to defendant.'

From the above sworn statement, it is clear that the first defendant entered into an agreement with the second plaintiff. Pursuant to the said agreement, the first defendant received Rs. 1.50 crores from the Plaintiff No. 2 prior to date of giving his sworn statement i.e., 15.6.1999. Having received the said amount in the year 1999, the first defendant cannot be permitted to say in the year 2003 that entering into the said compromise itself is illegal.

44. The order of the Income Tax Authorities dated 23.7.2001 issued to the first plaintiff has been marked as Ex.A8. In Ex.A8, it has been noted that as per the agreement dated 3.12.1998, the sale consideration was paid. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, office of the Appropriate Authority, Bangalore has clarified that this 'no objection' applies only to the transferors) and transferee(s) whose name(s) are specified on top of this certificate.

45. The learned Counsel further contends that the appellants in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 and CCCA Sr.No. 5509 of 2003 are not aggrieved persons and they cannot challenge the compromise decree. We find force in the contentions of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. It has to be seen that they are neither affected parties nor parties to the suit and therefore this Court is of the view that the appeals filed by them i.e., CCCA No. 329 of 2003 and CCCA Sr.No. 5509 of 2003 are liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.

46. The learned Counsel for the second plaintiff has further argued that the first defendant having derived the benefit under the compromise cannot challenge it on the ground that the compromise ought not to have been recorded. It is also argued that one of the Counsel have attacked the compromise decree on the ground of fraud. But, no material to show that the plaintiffs played fraud have been filed except raising a bald allegation that the compromise decree is vitiated by way of fraud. In the absence of any material to show that one of the parties to the suit played fraud, it is not safe to set aside the compromise decree particularly in view of the fact that the first defendant benefited by receiving the consideration from out of the said compromise decree.

47. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs contends that the first defendant did not register its name as occupant and no order has been passed in favour of the first defendant that the land in question vests with it under the Inams Abolition Act. For better appreciation of the case, it is necessary to deal with certain provisions of the Inams Abolition Act.

48. Section 9 of the Inams Abolition Act deals with vesting of certain buildings and Inam lands used for non-agricultural purposes. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act, every private building situated within an inam shall with effect from the date of vesting, vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date. Section 9(2) says that where an Inam land has been converted for any purpose unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land provided that such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force. However, Sub-section (3) of Section 9 says that the vesting of private buildings or lands under Sub-section (1) or (2) shall be subject to the payment of non-agricultural assessment that may be imposed by Government from time to time.

49. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has also further argued with reference to Section 11 of the Inams Abolition Act that where before the date of vesting an inamdar has created, either by way of lease or otherwise, any right in any inam land which vests in State other than the lands specified in Clauses (a) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4, including rights in any forest mines or minerals, quarries, fisheries or ferries, the transaction shall be deemed to be valid and all rights and obligations arising there under on or after the date of vesting, shall be enforceable by or against the Government.

50. At this stage, it is necessary to look into the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act, which enables the registration of the Inamdar as occupants. As per Section 4(1)(c), every inamdar shall, with effect from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all inam lands other than lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the Inamdar.

51. In view of the above provisions, the learned Counsel for the second plaintiff has argued that the first defendant company should have registered as an occupant to claim the land as the asset of the company. It is stated that as the first defendant has not registered its name, it cannot claim that the land vests with it. The learned Counsel also submits that the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 455 Revenue (U.C.I) Department dated 29.7.2002 fixing guidelines for allotment of excess land under Section 23 of the Act which are already under occupation of third parties. In the said GO it is made that on payment of the amounts prescribed for the excess land occupied and after such verification and inspection as may be considered necessary, proposals for allotting the excess land in the name of the occupier thereof shall be sent to Government and the third party occupants over the excess land shall apply for allotment in the form shown in Schedule II to the said GO. But, in terms of the said GO, the first defendant did not send any proposal claiming allotment of the excess land as an occupier thereof. Non-applying for it would goes to show that it is not in occupation of the land in question and it did not assert that the land in question is in its occupation. We find force in the said contention.

52. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submits that the CCCAs are not maintainable in view of the bar imposed under Section 96(c) of the CPC. As per Section 96(c) of the CPC, no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. The learned Counsel submits that since these CCCAs have been filed questioning the compromise decree, the same have to be dismissed.

53. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the defendants submits that as on the date of passing of compromise decree, the terms of the compromise which were entered in 1999 are not existing and the first defendant has no power to transfer the property in view of the orders of the BIFR and the said fact has been brought to the notice of the Court below, the Court below passed the decree and hence the same is liable to be set aside.

54. Further, the Managing Director of the first defendant in his sworn statement recorded in the compromise petition has stated that as per the original agreement in between them and the second plaintiff and also as per the understanding reached, it is the second plaintiff who has to bear all the expenses required in connection with the execution of any registered documents, obtaining permission etc. He further stated that out of the total extent of 22 acres, the agreement in between them and the second plaintiff is subject of 16 acres, which is cleared by ULC. Out of the 16 acres, the rights in 6 acres is exclusively given to the second plaintiff. He also stated that they filed a compromise memo and he has gone through the various terms and conditions of the said compromise memo and they are correct. The Court below also observed that the true spirit of Order 23, Rule 3 reiterated the compromise has to be implemented unless there is a fraud. As no fraud has been pleaded, the Court below acted upon the compromise particularly basing on recording of the evidence of the Managing Director of the first defendant.

55. The learned Counsel for the appellant in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 has argued that though in the body of the judgment it has been observed that Managing Director of the first defendant was examined but in the appendix of the evidence to that judgment, it has been shown that none were examined and hence the Trial Court hurriedly disposed of the matter without considering the facts.

56. It is to be noted that the Managing Director of the first defendant was examined in the Interlocutory Application No. 399 of 1999, which was filed requesting the Court to dispose of the suit in terms of the compromise and hence in the appendix of evidence, the Trial Court mentioned that none were examined. It is to be observed that the fact of deposition of the parties to the suit on the compromise was recorded in the body of the decree which reads as follows:

'The compromise recorded by examining PW1, 2 and RW1 by IV Senior Civil Judge, CCC, Hyderabad on 15.6.1999, which is part of compromise memo. Hence they are annexed to the decree.'

The above omission in the judgment even though recorded in the decree is only an omission. Even if it is omitted in the appendix of evidence, it can be termed as irregularity which would not affect the validity of the judgment in view of the above para.

57. From various orders of the BIFR and other authorities, no injunction has been granted by any of the authorities against the company from alienating the subject-matter of the property. There is no either injunction or prohibition. There is no order or any material is placed before this Court to show that the land has become the asset of the company. The compromise which was reached between the parties are within the parameters of the protected area declared by the competent authority in its order dated 31.12.1993 i.e., Ex.B4.

58. The conduct of the appellant in CCCA No. 350 of 2003 i.e., first defendant in taking various stands before various authorities and also the statement he has made in the affidavit filed in WP No. 10199 of 1999 i.e., Ex.A5 would go to show that he has agreed for the compromise and the conduct of the first defendant which is evident from the orders of the various authorities extracted in earlier paras and in the affidavit filed before the Supreme Court while withdrawing the SLP would go to show that he is interested to enter into compromise. Having derived the benefit from the compromise for nearly four years, the first defendant wants to question the judgment in the present CCCA No. 350 of 2003 would show that he wants to approbate and reprobate of his own case and evidence. It is to be seen that the first defendant enjoyed the benefits derived from the compromise nearly for a period of four years. It is also to be observed that no material is placed before this Court that the Civil Court has been apprised of all the orders of the authorities though ample time was available to the defendants to apprise the same.

59. The learned Counsel for the second defendant placed reliance in support of his contention that the Workers of a Company have locus to appear and to be heard in a winding up petition and he placed reliance in the case of National Textile Worker's Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, : (1983)ILLJ45SC . It is to be seen that this is not a winding up petition and moreover the first defendant has undertaken to protect the interests of the second defendant and if he had any grievance over the first defendant, the second defendant as well can initiate separate proceedings against the first defendant and it can not plead that the Court below should not act upon the petition filed for compromise particularly when there is no whisper of fraud from anybody.

60. Sri Veera Reddy, the learned Counsel appearing in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 submits that the Courts cannot accept the proposal to sell the surplus land of a sick industry to another company and clear the dues of the mortgagee bank and creditors, pay salaries of the workmen. The Counsel submits that in the instant case, the Court acting on the compromise deed in which the first defendant sick industry was permitted to transfer its land for consideration is bad since it goes contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Pronab Kumar Sur, : [2003]3SCR393 , No doubt true that the Apex Court in the said judgment has found fault for accepting the sick company's proposal to sell its surplus land to another company. But, in this case, it is not that the land in question belongs to the first defendant in view of the fact that it is being continued in possession on lease and hence it cannot be said that the terms of the compromise deed is contrary to law and the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the case.

61. The Supreme Court in its latest Judgment in the case of C. and M.D. N.T.P.C. Limited v. R.C. Builders and Contractors, : AIR2004SC1330 , on the principle that one who knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract, at para 36 and 37 extracted the following passages from Halsbury's laws and American Jurisprudence:

'In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition Vol.16 (Reissue) para 957 at page 844 it is stated:

On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate a special species of estoppel has arisen. The principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate express two propositions:

(1) That the person in question, having a choice between two courses of conduct is to be treated as having made an election from which he cannot resile.

(2) That he will be regarded, in general at any rate, as having so elected unless he has taken a benefit under or arising out of the course of conduct, which he has first pursued and with which his subsequent conduct is inconsistent.'

37. In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Volume 28, 1966 page 677-680 it is stated:

'Estoppel by the acceptance of benefits:

Estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance and retention, by one having knowledge or notice of the facts, of benefits from a transaction, contract, instrument, regulation which he might have rejected or contested. This doctrine is obviously a branch of the rule against assuming inconsistent positions.

As a general principle, one who knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance.

This rule has to be applied to do equity and must not be applied in such a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.

xxxx xxxxx xxxxxx'

62. In the case of R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, 1992 AIR SCW 3337, the Apex Court has held that a person cannot be permitted to say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.

63. In this case also, the defendants having obtained some advantage by entering into compromise with the plaintiffs, they cannot turn round and say that such compromise, agreement is void.

64. The learned Counsel for the second plaintiff placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of S.I.T. Assocn, : [1992]2SCR999 , in support of his contention that suspension of legal proceedings against a sick industrial company under Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act does not cover a proceedings instituted by a landlord of a sick industrial company for the eviction of the company from premises let out to it. Hence, merely because the proceedings against the first defendant are pending, it does not prevent the landlord to initiate eviction proceedings and therefore the contention of the Defendant No. 1 that the eviction proceedings does not lie has no force.

65. In support of the contention of the learned Counsel for the second plaintiffs that where State has not taken possession after issuing vesting order, it shall be deemed that the landowner does have the right to seek exemption, he placed reliance in the case of Special Officer and Competent Authority, ULC v. P.S. Rao, : (2000)7SCC213 .

66. The Delhi High Court in the case of Krishan Mohan Singh v. Sri Chand Gupta, : AIR1993Delhi365 , it has been held that statement made by the parties and recorded in Court's proceedings and signed by parties and their Counsel would constitute written instrument of compromise as contemplated under Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC. It has also been held that the proceedings recorded in Court signed by the parties is also called instrument. In this case, the defendants entered into compromise with the plaintiffs and derived the benefit from the second plaintiff and the first defendant's Managing Director has given statement on oath in the Court about the fact of entering into compromise and hence the compromise and sworn statement are binding on the parties to the suit and the Court below rightly acted on those instruments while passing the decree of compromise.

67. The Supreme Court in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, : AIR1991SC2234 , has held that a compromise decree if not vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake is binding and operates as res judicata as also estoppel between the parties. In the said judgment, it has also been held that a judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight and a compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. In the appeals filed by Defendants 1 and 2, the judgment is passed basing on the terms of compromise entered into between the plaintiffs and Defendants 1 and 2 and hence the said judgment is binding on them.

68. The learned Counsel Sri Subba Reddy appearing for Sri M.S. Ramachandra Rao placed reliance in the case of Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, : [1976]1SCR878 , in support of his contention that while recording a compromise decree duty cast on the Court is to see whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In these cases, as held above, no infringement of any law has been made out by the defendants, particularly, in view of the fact that they failed to produce any injunction or order from any authority restraining the alienation of the property in question. In the absence of such orders, it cannot be held that recording of compromise does not violate the requirements of the law.

69. The learned Counsel Sri Subba Reddy placed reliance in the case of Dr. Sunil Kumar v. Amolaksing (Died Per LRs), : 2000(3)ALD657 , in support of his contention that an appeal can be laid even against the compromise decree under Order 43, Rule 1(A) (2) of the CPC. A learned Single Judge of this Court observed that the Apex Court in an attempt to reconcile the provision of Section 96(3) and Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1(A) of Order 43, has categorically held that inasmuch as the amended provisions of the Code took away the right of appeal and even the right to challenge the compromise decree and as the parties are left without any remedy to challenge the compromise decree, Rule 1(A)(2) of Order 43 has been incorporated, so as to enable the parties to question the validity of compromise by preferring an appeal against the decree. In the said case, the learned Judge has held that since Ex.A1 in that suit is in dispute, the appeal is maintainable even though it is a compromise one. But, in the instant case, entering into compromise is not disputed and executing the said compromise deed and the terms therein are also not in dispute and hence appeals, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, are not maintainable.

70. The learned Counsel Sri Subba Reddy also relied on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Board of Education of Samavesham of TEC, Nellore v. State of A.P., : 2001(2)ALD527 (DB), in support of his contention, that no consent order can be passed contrary to the public policy or constitutional provisions. In this case, no material has been placed to show that the said compromise has affected the public policy or constitutional provisions. In the earlier paras, we held that by entering into such compromise, it did not affect the public policy or they reached the agreement contrary to the provisions of law. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the case.

71. In the impugned judgment, the Court below has recorded the submission of the learned Counsel for the first defendant that the Counsel for the first defendant has orally opposed the compromise stating that the delay caused financial drain to him and now wants to have a fresh compromise taking the matter to the arbitration. The appellants have not chosen to file affidavit of the learned Counsel. But, in view of Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC that once compromise takes place it has to be implemented unless there is a fraud. Since the allegation of fraud has not been attributed to the plaintiffs and considering the fact that the first defendant enjoyed the benefit, the opposition made by the first defendant to the compromise cannot be accepted. The Court below by taking all these factors into consideration decreed the suit in terms of compromise which they filed in IA No. 399 of 1999.

72. Finally, it is the arguments of the appellants that the plaintiffs did not pay the Court fee and hence the judgment and decree cannot be passed. It is true that in the decree itself, the Trial Court with regard to payment of Court fee held as follows:

'It is hereby directed to pay the Court fee if any required to pay.'

Therefore, it goes to show that the said judgment will have the binding effect only on payment of the Court fee. As the Trial Court in its decree did not assess the value of the property relating to compromise and payment of Court fee thereon, the matter is remanded to the Trial Court with a direction to assess the value of the property relating to compromise and the Court fee payable thereon within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such assessment, the respective parties are directed to pay the same within a period of two months thereafter in the Court below.

73. For the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any reason to set aside the said decree and judgment in OS No. 69 of 2003 on the file of the XIII Additional Chief Judge, CCC (FTC), Hyderabad. Accordingly, CCCA Nos. 350 of 2003 and 74 of 2004 are dismissed.

74. Since in the earlier paras, we have taken a view that the appellants in CCCA No. 329 of 2003 and CCCA Sr. No. CCCA 131/04 of 2003 are not the affected parties much less they are not parties to the suit and they have no locus standi to question the said judgment and decree. Therefore, these appeals are liable to be dismissed and they are also dismissed accordingly. No costs.

75. In view of dismissal of CCCANo. 329 of 2003, no orders need be passedin the review petitions filed by the plaintiffsand hence those review petitions have beenclosed.