SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/436442 |
Subject | Property |
Court | Andhra Pradesh High Court |
Decided On | May-01-2007 |
Case Number | WP Nos. 454, 1076, 1077 and 1798 of 2007 |
Judge | B. Prakash Rao and ;M. Venkateswara Reddy, JJ. |
Reported in | 2007(5)ALD1 |
Acts | Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 - Sections 8(1) and 8(6); Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Order 1, Rule 10 and 10(1); Constitution of India - Article 226 |
Appellant | P. Vijayalakshmi Devi and anr. |
Respondent | Mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikpet Mandal and ors. |
Appellant Advocate | M.P. Chandramouli, Adv. |
Respondent Advocate | Government Pleader for Respondent No. 1 and ;M. Subba Reddy, Adv. for ;P. Girish Kumar, Adv. for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 |
Disposition | Petition dismissed |
Excerpt:
- - though an attempt has been made from both sides to refer to the various contentions touching upon the claim as set up by the government as well as the petitioners herein and also trace of title by the proposed parties, however, having regard to the fact that these writ petitions arise out of the interlocutory orders passed in the l. further, it is now well settled that in an application filed under rule 10 of order i c. where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the court thinks just. under the said provision, before one can seek any impleadment in a proceeding, it should be satisfied that his presence would be necessary for determination of the real matter in dispute. even otherwise, it is now well settled that the rules of procedure are meant to aid the parties, but not to throw them out.b. prakash rao, j. 1. since all these writ petitions are directed against the common order, dated 20.9.2006, passed in i.a. nos. 1407 and 1253 of 2004; and 224 and 53 of 2005 in l.g.c. no. 87 of 1998 on the file of the special court under the a.p. land grabbing (prohibition) act, at hyderabad (for short 'the special court'), they are heard together and are being taken up together for disposal.2. heard sri m.p. chandramouli, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and sri m. subba reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents 2 and 3.3. the petitioners herein, who are respondents 3 and 4 in the aforesaid interlocutory applications and also the respondents in the main l.g.c. no. 87 of 1998 on the file of the special court, filed these writ petitions inter alia seeking for a writ of certiorari assailing the correctness of the common order, dated 20.9.2006, passed in i.a. no. 1407 of 2004 and batch in the said l.g.c. no. 87 of 1998, allowing the applications filed by the contesting respondents herein purported to be filed under order i rule 10 c.p.c. seeking to implead themselves as party respondents in the main l.g.c.4. initially, the government through the mandal revenue officer, shaikpet mandal, banjara hills, hyderabad, filed the said l.g.c. under section 8(1) of the a.p. land grabbing (prohibition) act, 1982 (for short 'the act') seeking to declare the contesting respondents herein as land-grabbers and for their consequent eviction, and other reliefs inter alia on the ground that the schedule land is a government land situated in sy. no. 403 (part) of shaikpet village falling in t.s. no. 5 part, block-h, ward no. 10, banjara hills, hyderabad. during the pendency of the said proceedings, the present applications came to be filed by the contesting respondents 2 and 3 seeking to implead themselves as party respondents in the said l.g.c. mainly on the ground that the respective proposed parties have purchased small extents of plots from the aforesaid survey number with varying areas under registered sale deeds from one o. venkaiah and since then they have been in possession and enjoyment of the property. their case is that the plots purchased by them are part and parcel of ac.5-00 of land situated at kancha tatti khana of shaikpet village, hyderabad and they traced the patta to one triambaka rao, s/o govinda rao and subsequently, the said triambaka rao selling the property in favour of o. venkaiah through an unregistered sale deed on a stamp paper no. 100274 in 1367 fasli and later, the said o. venkaiah and his; sons selling the property to one om prakash nagpal and others. further, it is also the case of the contesting respondents 2 and 3 herein in the affidavits, filed in support of the said applications, before the special court, that they have already made constructions in the plots purchased by them and the same were also assessed to house tax and that they are paying the tax to substantial extent; and that all the necessary applications for providing other facilities have also been made. while so, in july 2003, the mandal revenue officer, shaikpet village, visited their sites and sought to disturb the proposed parties stating that it is a government land, whereupon the proposed parties have submitted their representations to the collector and since no orders were passed, they filed writ petition nos. 19842 and 20667 of 2003 before this court seeking for a direction to consider their cases, wherein this court granted an interim order not to demolish the structures on the disputed site and not dispossess the petitioners therein. later on, the collector, hyderabad, rejected the claim of the proposed parties, on the ground that the said plots is already subject-matter of the litigation in l.g.c. no. 87 of 1998, which is pending before the special court. in spite of the said facts, the government filed the said l.g.c. only against the contesting respondents 2 and 3 herein, who are, in fact, not the owners of the disputed land, but are owners of adjacent land, without impleading the proposed parties. therefore, it necessitated them to file the present applications so as to assist the court for consideration of the entire dispute in a proper perspective.5. before the special court, the said applications were opposed by the writ petitioners herein inter alia raising several grounds and also levelling the allegations in respect of their own claim, title and interest, apart from their possession in respect of the disputed land. further, it was pointed out that having regard to the chequered events and the other litigation between them and one orsu venkatramulu in a suit in o.s. no. 1158 of 2000 on the file of v senior civil judge, city civil court, hyderabad, which is still pending, the question of impleading the proposed parties does not arise nor they are necessary and proper parties.6. the special court after taking into consideration the rival submissions of both the parties, and especially taking into account the fact that the land which is claimed by the proposed parties and the subject-matter involved in the main l.g.c. being one and the same and is part of the land in sy. no. 129/104 of shaikpet village, found that the proposed parties are necessary and proper parties to the l.g.c. and accordingly, allowed the interlocutory applications in the main l.g.c. hence, the present writ petitions.7. sri m.p. chandramouli, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, strenuously contended that even on a bare reading of the provision under rule 10(1) of order i c.p.c., it is clear that the proposed parties can in no circumstances or from any angle, be considered to be necessary and proper parties, more so, having regard to the scope and the nature of relief as contemplated under the provisions of the act, the question of impleading any other person at their own instance does not arise unless they come up themselves as applicants. to buttress that the proposed parties cannot be considered as necessary and proper parties for determination of the real matter in dispute, he sought to place reliance on the aforesaid rule 10(1) of order i c.p.c.8. sri m. subba reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents 2 and 3 herein, repelling the aforesaid submissions, contended that having regard to the decision already recorded by the special court, and having regard to the fact that the property claimed by the proposed parties and the subject-matter in the main l.g.c. being one and the same, the proposed parties have been rightly impleaded. he further contended that even by taking into account the effect of any final order that would be passed in the case under the provisions of the act, it cannot be said that the proposed parties are not necessary and proper parties.9. having heard learned counsel appearing on either side and also on perusal of the material available on record, it is seen that there is no dispute in regard to the chequered events, which led to the filing of the present writ petitions. there is also no dispute as regards the fact that an application has been filed by the state government before the special court seeking to declare the respondents therein as land-grabbers in respect of the very same land.10. the proposed parties claimed to be the purchasers under registered transactions in respect of the plots, which are again forming part of the same survey number, which is subject-matter in l.g.c. in fact, it is also pointed out by the proposed parties that the persons who have been initially added as respondents in l.g.c. are not in anyway connected with the disputed land and they are the neighbouring landowners and therefore, it is only the proposed parties who are to be impleaded in the l.g.c. even according to the proceedings of the collector, their possession is to the full knowledge of the contesting respondents herein. though an attempt has been made from both sides to refer to the various contentions touching upon the claim as set up by the government as well as the petitioners herein and also trace of title by the proposed parties, however, having regard to the fact that these writ petitions arise out of the interlocutory orders passed in the l.g.c, we refrain from going into in all those cases as set up or give any finding thereof. it is too early to have any say on the cases of either side. further, it is now well settled that in an application filed under rule 10 of order i c.p.c., the court should not go into the merits of the case as set up or the allegations made in support thereof or have any say in this regard. prima facie, it is to be seen as to whether there is any interest claimed by the proposed parties in respect of the subject-matter, and all other questions in regard to their rival claims as regards title, etc., should be left open for the decision to be taken by the special court after regular trial in the l.g.c.11. however, coming to the objection raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that even by a reading of rule 10(1) of order i c.p.c., there is no scope for allowing any such third parties to get themselves impleaded in an application filed under section 8(1) of the act, it is necessary to refer the said provision i.e., rule 10(1) of order i c.p.c., which reads thus:where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the court thinks just. 12. this provision has been the subject-matter of various decisions and has come up for consideration in various proceedings in varied contexts. under the said provision, before one can seek any impleadment in a proceeding, it should be satisfied that his presence would be necessary for determination of the real matter in dispute. there is no serious dispute to the fact that the subject-matter in the l.g.c. and the land as claimed by the proposed parties is one and the same. therefore, the subject-matter being common, and especially when two such rival claims are forthcoming in an application filed by the government to declare them as land-grabbers, necessarily the enquiry has to include the questions as to the lawful impleadment and the possession of the persons who assert. therefore, irrespective of the fact whether any question as regards the title, as such, may or may not arise between the proposed parties and the respondents in l.g.c, certainly, all such persons, who claim right, title and interest whatsoever in nature including the possession have to be added as parties so that the court will have the full assistance from varied angles, so that ultimately, the relief can be granted in appropriate manner after considering the lis from a proper perspective. therefore, mainly because such rival or independent claim is set up, it cannot be said that a party can be called as either necessary or proper party.13. considering similar such situation in bhogadi kannababu v. vuggina pydamma : air2006sc2403 , it was held as under:so far as the first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is concerned, it is on record that the application for impleadment was allowed by the high court which was affirmed by this court by rejecting a special leave petition, which relates to impleadment of respondent nos. 2 and 3 in the revision case. in an application for impleadment under order 1 rule 10 of the code of civil procedure, the only question that needs to be decided is whether the presence of the applicant before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the proceedings. therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, even if the respondent nos. 2 and 3 were added as parties, but by such addition it cannot be said that they were also entitled to succeed to the properties in question of late suryanarayana and therefore, entitled to evict the appellants. 14. in this regard, the important provision under the act, which is relevant for consideration of the aforesaid point in issue, is section 8(6) of the act, which reads as follows:every finding of the special court with regard to any alleged act of land-grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land-grabbing and of the persons who committed such land-grabbing, and every judgment of the special court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. 15. a reading of the above provision amply makes it clear that having regard to the special nature of the legislation and the word 'object' to thwart all such acts of a land-grabbing', it contemplates that the orders passed by the special court under the said provision would be binding on all persons having interest on such land. therefore, it is a very proper proposition and will have a serious effect of extending the binding nature of all such orders on all the persons who have any say or interest in respect of the very same subject-matter of the land-grabbing case.16. in this case, admittedly, the proposed parties claim to be purchasers of the plots in the very same subject-matter of land in l.g.c. therefore, it is a clear case, where it shows that the proposed parties have an interest in the very same land, though to a part thereof. in view of the same, we are of the opinion that the narrowed construction as sought to be pressed into service on behalf of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in respect of any such application filed under rule 10 of order i c.p.c., should not have any recourse under the binding provisions of the act. even otherwise, it is now well settled that the rules of procedure are meant to aid the parties, but not to throw them out. having regard to the discretion which has already been exercised by the special court in allowing the applications, on a satisfaction as to the existence of interest of the proposed parties in respect of the very same subject-matter of the land in l.g.c, we do not find any error in the impugned common order or valid ground to interdict with the same in exercise of powers under article 226 of the constitution of india.17. for the foregoing reasons, there are no merits in the writ petitions and the same are, accordingly, dismissed. however, there shall be no order as to costs.
Judgment:B. Prakash Rao, J.
1. Since all these writ petitions are directed against the common order, dated 20.9.2006, passed in I.A. Nos. 1407 and 1253 of 2004; and 224 and 53 of 2005 in L.G.C. No. 87 of 1998 on the file of the Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, at Hyderabad (for short 'the Special Court'), they are heard together and are being taken up together for disposal.
2. Heard Sri M.P. Chandramouli, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Sri M. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents 2 and 3.
3. The petitioners herein, who are respondents 3 and 4 in the aforesaid interlocutory applications and also the respondents in the main L.G.C. No. 87 of 1998 on the file of the Special Court, filed these writ petitions inter alia seeking for a writ of certiorari assailing the correctness of the common order, dated 20.9.2006, passed in I.A. No. 1407 of 2004 and batch in the said L.G.C. No. 87 of 1998, allowing the applications filed by the contesting respondents herein purported to be filed under Order I Rule 10 C.P.C. seeking to implead themselves as party respondents in the main L.G.C.
4. Initially, the Government through the Mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikpet Mandal, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad, filed the said L.G.C. under Section 8(1) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short 'the Act') seeking to declare the contesting respondents herein as land-grabbers and for their consequent eviction, and other reliefs inter alia on the ground that the schedule land is a Government land situated in Sy. No. 403 (part) of Shaikpet Village falling in T.S. No. 5 part, Block-H, Ward No. 10, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the present applications came to be filed by the contesting respondents 2 and 3 seeking to implead themselves as party respondents in the said L.G.C. mainly on the ground that the respective proposed parties have purchased small extents of plots from the aforesaid survey number with varying areas under registered sale deeds from one O. Venkaiah and since then they have been in possession and enjoyment of the property. Their case is that the plots purchased by them are part and parcel of Ac.5-00 of land situated at Kancha Tatti Khana of Shaikpet Village, Hyderabad and they traced the patta to one Triambaka Rao, S/o Govinda Rao and subsequently, the said Triambaka Rao selling the property in favour of O. Venkaiah through an unregistered sale deed on a stamp paper No. 100274 in 1367 Fasli and later, the said O. Venkaiah and his; sons selling the property to one Om Prakash Nagpal and others. Further, it is also the case of the contesting respondents 2 and 3 herein in the affidavits, filed in support of the said applications, before the Special Court, that they have already made constructions in the plots purchased by them and the same were also assessed to house tax and that they are paying the tax to substantial extent; and that all the necessary applications for providing other facilities have also been made. While so, in July 2003, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikpet Village, visited their sites and sought to disturb the proposed parties stating that it is a Government land, whereupon the proposed parties have submitted their representations to the Collector and since no orders were passed, they filed Writ Petition Nos. 19842 and 20667 of 2003 before this Court seeking for a direction to consider their cases, wherein this Court granted an interim order not to demolish the structures on the disputed site and not dispossess the petitioners therein. Later on, the Collector, Hyderabad, rejected the claim of the proposed parties, on the ground that the said plots is already subject-matter of the litigation in L.G.C. No. 87 of 1998, which is pending before the Special Court. In spite of the said facts, the Government filed the said L.G.C. only against the contesting respondents 2 and 3 herein, who are, in fact, not the owners of the disputed land, but are owners of adjacent land, without impleading the proposed parties. Therefore, it necessitated them to file the present applications so as to assist the Court for consideration of the entire dispute in a proper perspective.
5. Before the Special Court, the said applications were opposed by the writ petitioners herein inter alia raising several grounds and also levelling the allegations in respect of their own claim, title and interest, apart from their possession in respect of the disputed land. Further, it was pointed out that having regard to the chequered events and the other litigation between them and one Orsu Venkatramulu in a suit in O.S. No. 1158 of 2000 on the file of V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, which is still pending, the question of impleading the proposed parties does not arise nor they are necessary and proper parties.
6. The Special Court after taking into consideration the rival submissions of both the parties, and especially taking into account the fact that the land which is claimed by the proposed parties and the subject-matter involved in the main L.G.C. being one and the same and is part of the land in Sy. No. 129/104 of Shaikpet Village, found that the proposed parties are necessary and proper parties to the L.G.C. and accordingly, allowed the interlocutory applications in the main L.G.C. Hence, the present writ petitions.
7. Sri M.P. Chandramouli, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, strenuously contended that even on a bare reading of the provision under Rule 10(1) of Order I C.P.C., it is clear that the proposed parties can in no circumstances or from any angle, be considered to be necessary and proper parties, more so, having regard to the scope and the nature of relief as contemplated under the provisions of the Act, the question of impleading any other person at their own instance does not arise unless they come up themselves as applicants. To buttress that the proposed parties cannot be considered as necessary and proper parties for determination of the real matter in dispute, he sought to place reliance on the aforesaid Rule 10(1) of Order I C.P.C.
8. Sri M. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents 2 and 3 herein, repelling the aforesaid submissions, contended that having regard to the decision already recorded by the Special Court, and having regard to the fact that the property claimed by the proposed parties and the subject-matter in the main L.G.C. being one and the same, the proposed parties have been rightly impleaded. He further contended that even by taking into account the effect of any final order that would be passed in the case under the provisions of the Act, it cannot be said that the proposed parties are not necessary and proper parties.
9. Having heard learned Counsel appearing on either side and also on perusal of the material available on record, it is seen that there is no dispute in regard to the chequered events, which led to the filing of the present writ petitions. There is also no dispute as regards the fact that an application has been filed by the State Government before the Special Court seeking to declare the respondents therein as land-grabbers in respect of the very same land.
10. The proposed parties claimed to be the purchasers under registered transactions in respect of the plots, which are again forming part of the same survey number, which is subject-matter in L.G.C. In fact, it is also pointed out by the proposed parties that the persons who have been initially added as respondents in L.G.C. are not in anyway connected with the disputed land and they are the neighbouring landowners and therefore, it is only the proposed parties who are to be impleaded in the L.G.C. Even according to the proceedings of the Collector, their possession is to the full knowledge of the contesting respondents herein. Though an attempt has been made from both sides to refer to the various contentions touching upon the claim as set up by the Government as well as the petitioners herein and also trace of title by the proposed parties, however, having regard to the fact that these writ petitions arise out of the interlocutory orders passed in the L.G.C, we refrain from going into in all those cases as set up or give any finding thereof. It is too early to have any say on the cases of either side. Further, it is now well settled that in an application filed under Rule 10 of Order I C.P.C., the Court should not go into the merits of the case as set up or the allegations made in support thereof or have any say in this regard. Prima facie, it is to be seen as to whether there is any interest claimed by the proposed parties in respect of the subject-matter, and all other questions in regard to their rival claims as regards title, etc., should be left open for the decision to be taken by the Special Court after regular trial in the L.G.C.
11. However, coming to the objection raised by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that even by a reading of Rule 10(1) of Order I C.P.C., there is no scope for allowing any such third parties to get themselves impleaded in an application filed under Section 8(1) of the Act, it is necessary to refer the said provision i.e., Rule 10(1) of Order I C.P.C., which reads thus:
Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
12. This provision has been the subject-matter of various decisions and has come up for consideration in various proceedings in varied contexts. Under the said provision, before one can seek any impleadment in a proceeding, it should be satisfied that his presence would be necessary for determination of the real matter in dispute. There is no serious dispute to the fact that the subject-matter in the L.G.C. and the land as claimed by the proposed parties is one and the same. Therefore, the subject-matter being common, and especially when two such rival claims are forthcoming in an application filed by the Government to declare them as land-grabbers, necessarily the enquiry has to include the questions as to the lawful impleadment and the possession of the persons who assert. Therefore, irrespective of the fact whether any question as regards the title, as such, may or may not arise between the proposed parties and the respondents in L.G.C, certainly, all such persons, who claim right, title and interest whatsoever in nature including the possession have to be added as parties so that the Court will have the full assistance from varied angles, so that ultimately, the relief can be granted in appropriate manner after considering the lis from a proper perspective. Therefore, mainly because such rival or independent claim is set up, it cannot be said that a party can be called as either necessary or proper party.
13. Considering similar such situation in Bhogadi Kannababu v. Vuggina Pydamma : AIR2006SC2403 , it was held as under:
So far as the first submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is concerned, it is on record that the application for impleadment was allowed by the High Court which was affirmed by this Court by rejecting a special leave petition, which relates to impleadment of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the revision case. In an application for impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the only question that needs to be decided is whether the presence of the applicant before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the proceedings. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the appellants, even if the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were added as parties, but by such addition it cannot be said that they were also entitled to succeed to the properties in question of late Suryanarayana and therefore, entitled to evict the appellants.
14. In this regard, the important provision under the Act, which is relevant for consideration of the aforesaid point in issue, is Section 8(6) of the Act, which reads as follows:
Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land-grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land-grabbing and of the persons who committed such land-grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land.
15. A reading of the above provision amply makes it clear that having regard to the special nature of the legislation and the word 'object' to thwart all such acts of a land-grabbing', it contemplates that the orders passed by the Special Court under the said provision would be binding on all persons having interest on such land. Therefore, it is a very proper proposition and will have a serious effect of extending the binding nature of all such orders on all the persons who have any say or interest in respect of the very same subject-matter of the land-grabbing case.
16. In this case, admittedly, the proposed parties claim to be purchasers of the plots in the very same subject-matter of land in L.G.C. Therefore, it is a clear case, where it shows that the proposed parties have an interest in the very same land, though to a part thereof. In view of the same, we are of the opinion that the narrowed construction as sought to be pressed into service on behalf of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in respect of any such application filed under Rule 10 of Order I C.P.C., should not have any recourse under the binding provisions of the Act. Even otherwise, it is now well settled that the Rules of Procedure are meant to aid the parties, but not to throw them out. Having regard to the discretion which has already been exercised by the Special Court in allowing the applications, on a satisfaction as to the existence of interest of the proposed parties in respect of the very same subject-matter of the land in L.G.C, we do not find any error in the impugned common order or valid ground to interdict with the same in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
17. For the foregoing reasons, there are no merits in the writ petitions and the same are, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.