M.A. Sami Khan and ors. Vs. the District Collector and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/436277
SubjectElection;Civil
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided OnMar-26-1992
Case NumberWrit Appeal Nos. 211 and 212 of 1992
JudgeS.C. Pratap, C.J. and ;B. Subhashan Reddy, J.
Reported in1992(1)ALT611
ActsConstitution of India - Article 226; Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 - Sections 61 and 67(1)
AppellantM.A. Sami Khan and ors.
RespondentThe District Collector and ors.
Appellant AdvocateM.V. Ramana Reddy, ;G. Prakasam and ;P. Innayya Reddy, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateGovt. Pleader for Co-op., ;S. Venkata Reddy and ;S.R. Ashok, Advs.
Excerpt:
- - suffice it to state that the learned judge was well justified in dismissing the writ petitions. he has given his own good and sound reasons for doing so. many of the question are such as would necessitate further materials and better particulars. now, well settled is the position that once an election process is set in motion, courts would not interfere, stall or stultify the same. it is best, therefore, that the process once set in motion is not interrupted. it is best left undisturbed and allowed to be completed. adjudication of their status as members or otherwise may as well turn out to be a futile exercise. 9. we are also in agreement with the observations of the learned judge on the deficiencies and inadequacies in the andhra pradesh co-operative societies act, 1964, and the rules made thereunder in matters relating to admission of members and preparation and publication of voters list, and the need to have a fresh look into the provision relating to 'deemed admission of members' to avoid last-minute manipulations to suit the need of certain individual members, and also to provide for an opportunity to file objections of at least a limited nature against the voters list, enjoining the publication thereof well in advance of the election programme, and setting out guidelines relating to the nature and extent of scrutiny by the election officer. officers and authorities with even administrative powers are expected to give some reasons in support of the orders passed and which orders may well become subject-matter of judicial review. we fail to see how the arbitration case cannot be said to attract section 61 of the act. (a) the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.orders.c. pratap, c.j.1. these two writ appeals are preferred by the respective original writ petitioners against the judgment dated 27th february 1992 of the learned single judge dismissing their respective writ petitions.2. the dispute relates to, what we understand from the bar, one of the prime co-operative societies in this country having as its members persons who have been, or are, in high places in different walks of life. the society is known as 'the jubilee hills co-operative house building society ltd., at hyderabad'. this, society was registered sometime in the year 1962 and about 1398 acres of land was alloted to it by the state government in one of the prime locations in this city.3. apart from the earlier elections, the impugned elections to the managing committee of this society were notified on 10th february 1992. the commencement of the election process set the ball rolling for various disputes between the members of the society as also between the existing members and the alleged new members thereof. an arbitration case was also filed under section 61 of the andhra pradesh co-operative societies act, 1964 (hereafter 'the said act') by some of the members; but, before the same could be decided, the present writ petitions were filed. while these petitions were pending, the arbitration case was dismissed holding that the case did not attract section 61 of the said act. both these petitions (along with a third petition not relevant for the disposal of these two petitions) were heard together by the learned single judge who, by his detail judgment and for reasons stated therein dismissed the same. hence these two appeals.4. we have heard in extenso counsel appearing for the appellants and the respondents in these two appeals and have also gone through the judgment under appeal. it is not necessary to restate the facts and circumstances. the same have been succinctly set out in the judgment under appeal. suffice it to state that the learned judge was well justified in dismissing the writ petitions. he has given his own good and sound reasons for doing so. and we find ourselves in agreement therewith. this, indeed, is a case involving several disputed questions of fact. some of these may be mixed questions of fact and law. the same cannot be satisfactorily or appropriately adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction. many of the question are such as would necessitate further materials and better particulars. indeed, even oral evidence cannot be safely ruled out. the learned judge has made his own remarks and observations on different aspects of the disputes and has rightly held that considering the inherent limitations of his jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution it would not be possible to adjudicate upon the rival claims and contentions.5. the petitioners are, however, not without remedy. the andhra pradesh co-operative societies act, 1964, provides for effective remedy in disputes such as this. under section 61 of the act, notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society, arises among the classes of the members of the society specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of sub-section (1) of section 61, such dispute shall be referred to the registrar for decision. on such dispute being referred, the registrar is empowered under section 62 of the act to elect to decide the dispute himself; or transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the government with power in that behalf; or refer it for disposal to an arbitrator. under sub-section (4) of section 62 power is conferred to make even such interlocutory orders as may be considered necessary pending final decision on the dispute. position thus is that one aggrieved had, indeed still has, remedy open by way of an arbitration case under section 61 of the act.6. still further, under sub-section (3) of section 61 of the act, every dispute relating to, or in connection with any election to a committee of a society referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 31 shall be referred for decision to a subordinate judge, or where there is no such subordinate judge, to the district judge having jurisdiction over the place where the main office of the society is situate. thus, one aggrieved by the elections also has an effective remedy under section 61(3) of the act.7. yet another reason for not interfering is equally important. the election process for elections to the managing committee of this society stood already set in motion when the writ petitions were filed. what is more, the said election process has since been almost complete save and except declaration of results which stood stayed by virtue of an interim order of this court in the present appeals. now, well settled is the position that once an election process is set in motion, courts would not interfere, stall or stultify the same. election process once commenced must be permitted to run its logical course till the end. if courts interfere in the midst of an election process, and litigation being what it is, no election will ever be expeditiously completed. it is best, therefore, that the process once set in motion is not interrupted. it is best left undisturbed and allowed to be completed. one aggrieved by the result of the election or by any one or the other aspect relating thereto has, as earlier indicated, his remedy open by way of an election dispute.8. then again, this is not the end of their difficulties. one of the questions raised and vehemently urged before the learned single judge as also before us, relates to as many as 1375 members alleged by one side to have been admitted to membership in a manner not legal and valid, and by the other side alleged to have been admitted in a manner otherwise. these members are, however, not parties to the present proceedings. in the circumstances, any order having adverse impact on those not parties cannot bind them. adjudication of their status as members or otherwise may as well turn out to be a futile exercise. apart from other reasons, this then would be one more reason for this court not going into the rival claims and contentions in these proceedings and adjudicating thereupon. again, as observed by the learned single judge:'in my opinion, though there are certain suspicious circumstances surrounding the admission of members, it is not possible for me to say clinchingly that the records were manipulated and the evidence was created by the respondent-chairman or other members of the managing committee. it is a contentious issue raising disputed questions of fact which cannot be resolved without a further probe and without a detailed examination of the records, registers and the concected documents. in such a state of affairs, i cannot assume at this stage that the admission of 1375 members is vitiated by fraud and their inclusion in the voters list is ab initio void or illegal'.it is not possible to say or hold that the learned single judge was not right in these observations.9. we are also in agreement with the observations of the learned judge on the deficiencies and inadequacies in the andhra pradesh co-operative societies act, 1964, and the rules made thereunder in matters relating to admission of members and preparation and publication of voters list, and the need to have a fresh look into the provision relating to 'deemed admission of members' to avoid last-minute manipulations to suit the need of certain individual members, and also to provide for an opportunity to file objections of at least a limited nature against the voters list, enjoining the publication thereof well in advance of the election programme, and setting out guidelines relating to the nature and extent of scrutiny by the election officer. we hope and expect that these observations will not be in vain and the state government will consider the same and do the needful expeditiously. in the process much of the litigation relating to elections to co-operative societies could be obviated.10. coming to the arbitration case, it is unfortunate mat the deputy registrar (housing) dismissed a.r.case no. 3/92-g by his cryptic order of 17th february 1992 that it did not attract section 61 of the a.p. co-operative societies act this was hardly the way to adjudicate a dispute. officers and authorities with even administrative powers are expected to give some reasons in support of the orders passed and which orders may well become subject-matter of judicial review. this would all the more be so if the order is quasi judicial. and this again more so when the registrar tinder the act is a civil court with the jurisdiction of the actual civil court being barred. the manner in which the case stood disposed of by the deputy registrar is highly unsatisfactory. rather it reflects abdication of his responsibility to decide the same. even on merits we find the said order to be unsustainable. we fail to see how the arbitration case cannot be said to attract section 61 of the act. indeed, the nature of the dispute and the facts and circumstances squarely attract the said provision which, in sub-section (1) thereof, indicates an all comprehensive coverage viz., 'any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society'. the instant dispute covers all these three aspects. impression cannot be said to be unfounded that the dy. registrar found the easy way out to dispose of the proceedings. counsel on either side before us stated that though the said order of the deputy registrar has not been expressly challenged in these or by a separate writ petition, there is no objection to setting aside the same and restoring the arbitration case for its hearing and decision on its own merits and in accordance with law on the basis that it is covered by section 61 of the act. direction accordingly is being given in the final order below.11. under section 62 of the act, the registrar on receipt of reference of a dispute under section 61, may (a) elect to decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the government with power in that behalf, or (c) refer it for disposal to an arbitrator. counsel on either side are now agreed that the arbitration case supra which is being restored, may, in the exercise of powers under section 62(1) of the act, be referred for adjudication to an arbitrator to be nominated by this court. thus, it is agreed that the dispute be referred to an arbitrator and it is further agreed that the arbitrator be nominated by this court.12. in all the circumstances, the following order is passed in these appeals:(a) the appeals fail and the same are dismissed. no order as to costs. advocate's fee rs. 300/- per appeal.(b) order dated 17th february, 1992 of the deputy registrar (housing) dismissing arbitration case, a.r.c.no3/92-g, is set aside and the said case is restored, and as agreed by counsel on either side, the said dispute is referred for its adjudication on merits and in accordance with law to sri b.n. raman (retd. chief secretary) being the arbitrator nominated by us. the deputy registrar (housing) shall give effect to this direction and transmit all papers and proceedings in the matter to the said arbitrator. the arbitrator to make his award within four months of the reference of the dispute to him with liberty to have this time extended if occasion so arises.(c) liberty to the parties in writ appeal no. 212 of 1992 to raise dispute under section 61 of the act, if so advised. the same should, however, be done latest by 10th april, 1992, by filing an arbitration case accordingly under section 61 of the act if so done, the arbitration case accordingly filed, should also be referred to the same arbitrator aforesaid for its adjudication on merits and in accordance with law, along with the above reference.(d) the costs, charges and expenses of the arbitrator to initially come out of the funds of the society. the ultimate liability thereof shall be as per the order of the arbitrator. towards costs, charges and expenses of the arbitrator, the chairman-incharge or the president of the society, as the case be, shall, in the first instance, deposit with the arbitrator an amount of rs. 20,000/-(rupees twenty thousand only) out of the funds of the society.(e) interim orders stand vacated. the result of the elections already held should now be declared. while doing so, the votes of the existing members and those of the newly inducted members kept in separate boxes, should be separately counted with an appropriate record thereof maintained. the persons-in-charge will continue to hold such charge (subject to conditions attached thereto) till such time as the results are delcared and the elected body assumes charge.
Judgment:
ORDER

S.C. Pratap, C.J.

1. These two writ appeals are preferred by the respective original writ petitioners against the judgment dated 27th February 1992 of the learned Single Judge dismissing their respective writ petitions.

2. The dispute relates to, what we understand from the Bar, one of the prime co-operative societies in this country having as its members persons who have been, or are, in high places in different walks of life. The society is known as 'The Jubilee Hills Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., at Hyderabad'. This, Society was registered sometime in the year 1962 and about 1398 acres of land was alloted to it by the State Government in one of the prime locations in this city.

3. Apart from the earlier elections, the impugned elections to the managing committee of this Society were notified on 10th February 1992. The commencement of the election process set the ball rolling for various disputes between the members of the Society as also between the existing members and the alleged new members thereof. An arbitration case was also filed under Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (hereafter 'the said Act') by some of the members; but, before the same could be decided, the present writ petitions were filed. While these petitions were pending, the arbitration case was dismissed holding that the case did not attract Section 61 of the said Act. Both these petitions (along with a third petition not relevant for the disposal of these two petitions) were heard together by the learned Single Judge who, by his detail judgment and for reasons stated therein dismissed the same. Hence these two appeals.

4. We have heard in extenso Counsel appearing for the appellants and the respondents in these two appeals and have also gone through the judgment under appeal. It is not necessary to restate the facts and circumstances. The same have been succinctly set out in the judgment under appeal. Suffice it to state that the learned Judge was well justified in dismissing the writ petitions. He has given his own good and sound reasons for doing so. And we find ourselves in agreement therewith. This, indeed, is a case involving several disputed questions of fact. Some of these may be mixed questions of fact and law. The same cannot be satisfactorily or appropriately adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction. Many of the question are such as would necessitate further materials and better particulars. Indeed, even oral evidence cannot be safely ruled out. The learned judge has made his own remarks and observations on different aspects of the disputes and has rightly held that considering the inherent limitations of his jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution it would not be possible to adjudicate upon the rival claims and contentions.

5. The petitioners are, however, not without remedy. The Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, provides for effective remedy in disputes such as this. Under Section 61 of the Act, notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society, arises among the classes of the members of the society specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 61, such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision. On such dispute being referred, the Registrar is empowered under Section 62 of the Act to elect to decide the dispute himself; or transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with power in that behalf; or refer it for disposal to an arbitrator. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 62 power is conferred to make even such interlocutory orders as may be considered necessary pending final decision on the dispute. Position thus is that one aggrieved had, indeed still has, remedy open by way of an arbitration case under Section 61 of the Act.

6. Still further, under Sub-section (3) of Section 61 of the Act, every dispute relating to, or in connection with any election to a committee of a society referred to in clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 31 shall be referred for decision to a Subordinate Judge, or where there is no such Subordinate Judge, to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the place where the main office of the society is situate. Thus, one aggrieved by the elections also has an effective remedy under Section 61(3) of the Act.

7. Yet another reason for not interfering is equally important. The election process for elections to the Managing Committee of this Society stood already set in motion when the writ petitions were filed. What is more, the said election process has since been almost complete save and except declaration of results which stood stayed by virtue of an interim order of this Court in the present appeals. Now, well settled is the position that once an election process is set in motion, Courts would not interfere, stall or stultify the same. Election process once commenced must be permitted to run its logical course till the end. If Courts interfere in the midst of an election process, and litigation being what it is, no election will ever be expeditiously completed. It is best, therefore, that the process once set in motion is not interrupted. It is best left undisturbed and allowed to be completed. One aggrieved by the result of the election or by any one or the other aspect relating thereto has, as earlier indicated, his remedy open by way of an election dispute.

8. Then again, this is not the end of their difficulties. One of the questions raised and vehemently urged before the learned Single Judge as also before us, relates to as many as 1375 members alleged by one side to have been admitted to membership in a manner not legal and valid, and by the other side alleged to have been admitted in a manner otherwise. These members are, however, not parties to the present proceedings. In the circumstances, any order having adverse impact on those not parties cannot bind them. Adjudication of their status as members or otherwise may as well turn out to be a futile exercise. Apart from other reasons, this then would be one more reason for this Court not going into the rival claims and contentions in these proceedings and adjudicating thereupon. Again, as observed by the learned Single Judge:

'In my opinion, though there are certain suspicious circumstances surrounding the admission of members, it is not possible for me to say clinchingly that the records were manipulated and the evidence was created by the respondent-Chairman or other members of the Managing Committee. It is a contentious issue raising disputed questions of fact which cannot be resolved without a further probe and without a detailed examination of the records, registers and the concected documents. In such a state of affairs, I cannot assume at this stage that the admission of 1375 members is vitiated by fraud and their inclusion in the voters list is ab initio void or illegal'.

It is not possible to say or hold that the learned Single Judge was not right in these observations.

9. We are also in agreement with the observations of the learned Judge on the deficiencies and inadequacies in the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, and the Rules made thereunder in matters relating to admission of members and preparation and publication of voters list, and the need to have a fresh look into the provision relating to 'deemed admission of members' to avoid last-minute manipulations to suit the need of certain individual members, and also to provide for an opportunity to file objections of at least a limited nature against the voters list, enjoining the publication thereof well in advance of the election programme, and setting out guidelines relating to the nature and extent of scrutiny by the Election Officer. We hope and expect that these observations will not be in vain and the State Government will consider the same and do the needful expeditiously. In the process much of the litigation relating to elections to co-operative societies could be obviated.

10. Coming to the arbitration case, it is unfortunate mat the Deputy Registrar (Housing) dismissed A.R.Case No. 3/92-G by his cryptic order of 17th February 1992 that it did not attract Section 61 of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act This was hardly the way to adjudicate a dispute. Officers and authorities with even administrative powers are expected to give some reasons in support of the orders passed and which orders may well become subject-matter of judicial review. This would all the more be so if the order is quasi judicial. And this again more so when the Registrar tinder the Act is a civil court with the jurisdiction of the actual Civil Court being barred. The manner in which the case stood disposed of by the Deputy Registrar is highly unsatisfactory. Rather it reflects abdication of his responsibility to decide the same. Even on merits we find the said order to be unsustainable. We fail to see how the arbitration case cannot be said to attract Section 61 of the Act. indeed, the nature of the dispute and the facts and circumstances squarely attract the said provision which, in Sub-section (1) thereof, indicates an all comprehensive coverage viz., 'any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society'. The instant dispute covers all these three aspects. Impression cannot be said to be unfounded that the Dy. Registrar found the easy way out to dispose of the proceedings. Counsel on either side before us stated that though the said order of the Deputy Registrar has not been expressly challenged in these or by a separate writ petition, there is no objection to setting aside the same and restoring the arbitration case for its hearing and decision on its own merits and in accordance with law on the basis that it is covered by Section 61 of the Act. Direction accordingly is being given in the final order below.

11. Under Section 62 of the Act, the Registrar on receipt of reference of a dispute under Section 61, may (a) elect to decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with power in that behalf, or (c) refer it for disposal to an arbitrator. Counsel on either side are now agreed that the arbitration case supra which is being restored, may, in the exercise of powers under Section 62(1) of the Act, be referred for adjudication to an arbitrator to be nominated by this Court. Thus, it is agreed that the dispute be referred to an arbitrator and it is further agreed that the arbitrator be nominated by this Court.

12. In all the circumstances, the following order is passed in these appeals:

(a) The appeals fail and the same are dismissed. No order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 300/- per appeal.

(b) Order dated 17th February, 1992 of the Deputy Registrar (Housing) dismissing arbitration case, A.R.C.no3/92-G, is set aside and the said case is restored, and as agreed by Counsel on either side, the said dispute is referred for its adjudication on merits and in accordance with law to Sri B.N. Raman (Retd. Chief Secretary) being the Arbitrator nominated by us. The Deputy Registrar (Housing) shall give effect to this direction and transmit all papers and proceedings in the matter to the said Arbitrator. The Arbitrator to make his Award within four months of the reference of the dispute to him with liberty to have this time extended if occasion so arises.

(c) liberty to the parties in Writ Appeal No. 212 of 1992 to raise dispute under Section 61 of the Act, if so advised. The same should, however, be done latest by 10th April, 1992, by filing an arbitration case accordingly under Section 61 of the Act If so done, the arbitration case accordingly filed, should also be referred to the same Arbitrator aforesaid for its adjudication on merits and in accordance with law, along with the above reference.

(d) The costs, charges and expenses of the Arbitrator to initially come out of the funds of the Society. The ultimate liability thereof shall be as per the order of the Arbitrator. Towards costs, charges and expenses of the Arbitrator, the Chairman-Incharge or the President of the Society, as the case be, shall, in the first instance, deposit with the Arbitrator an amount of Rs. 20,000/-(rupees twenty thousand only) out of the funds of the Society.

(e) Interim orders stand vacated. The result of the elections already held should now be declared. While doing so, the votes of the existing members and those of the newly inducted members kept in separate boxes, should be separately counted with an appropriate record thereof maintained. The persons-in-charge will continue to hold such charge (subject to conditions attached thereto) till such time as the results are delcared and the elected body assumes charge.