S Sudhakara Gupta Vs Apsrtc Mushirabad Hyd and ors - Citation 435891 - Court Judgment

Judgment:
ORDER

J. Chelameswar, J

1. These writ appeals arise from out of a common judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 15-4-1997 in Writ Petition Nos.6008, 6016, 6029, 6159, 6261, 6373, 6388, 6425, 6436, 6604, 6611 and 4010 of 1997. The said writ petitioners questioned the notice issued to them by the A.P.S.R.T.C., the respondent herein seeking to terminate their respective 'licences' to run canteens, shops, stalls, cycle stands etc., in various bus stations and bus complexes of the respondent-Corporation,

2. The A.P.S.R.T.C., is a statutory Corporation formed under Road Transport Corporation Act an enactment made by the Parliament. Under the scheme of the said enactment, A.P.S.R.T.C. is a body corporate with perpetual succession capable of holding and disposing of property.

3. In order to provide transport facilities for the public, the A.P.S.R.T.C., runs a fleet of large number of buses all over the State-The respondent herein constructed a large number of bus stations all over the State. To provide facilities ancillary to its main service of transporting passengers, the A.P.S.R.T.C., has constructed in each one of the bus stations, space which is used for the purpose of housing canteens, shops, stalls etc. These facilities arc not provided by the respondent. Private entrepreneurs are invited to provide these facilities like running of the canteens and shops stalls etc., which sell a wide range of articles like newspapers, eatables, soft drinks etc., To enable the private entrepreneurs to carry on their business on the constructed premises owned by the respondent, the first respondent puts each of the private entrepreneur in some earmarked portion of its construction by a written agreement the terms of which varied from time to time and place to place, over the period of the last few decades.

4. The first respondent from time to time issued circulars purporting to lay down the guidelines, procedure and other incidental matters pertaining to allowance of private entrepreneurs to carry on their business on the property belonging to the first respondent.

5. Among the writ petitioners before this Honourable Court whose 'licenses' arc sought to be terminated, the earliest licenses are of April, 1988. So it would be better to examine the guidelines issued by the respondents from some time anterior to 1988. The respondent-Corporation produced the various circulars issued by them from time to time on this subject. The earliest of which, relevant for the purpose of this case, is Circular No.45/81 dated 7-9-1981. Under the said circular clause (i) the contract is to be given for a maximum period of three years subject to various other conditions mentioned in the circular. Clause (viii) of the General Conditions provides that the Corporation reserves its right to terminate the contract by giving due notice. The said circular was amended from time to time and in the year 1985 by virtue of Circular No.51/85 dated 30-11-1985, the respondents-Corporation replaced the earlier mentioned circular providing for a more comprehensive scheme.

6. Under Circular No.51/85, tenders were required to be called for after giving publicity in the local newspapers. A tender committee constituted, should scrutinise all the tenders. Clause 5 of the said Circular provided that the contract shall be for a period of 3 years at the first instance and shall be extended for another period of 3 years, subject to certain enhancements of rent. However, the total period of contract shall be six years. The General Conditions attached to the contract as given in Annexure 'A' to the said circular contemplate that the licence issued is terminable by giving one month's notice without assigning any reason.

7. Once again, the respondents-Corporation issued Circular No.38/96 dated 30-8-1986 modifying certain clauses of the earlier circular i.e., Circular No.51/85. Clause 2(ii) provided that after the expiry of the initial period of three years period of licence in the case of canteens, the contract be further extended for six more years, subject to the willingness of the contractor about enhanced rent as stipulated.

8. However, in view of the difference in the total period of contract brought in by Circular No.38/86, representations were made by the allottees of shops and stalls and the respondents-Corporation by Circular No.7/87 dated 31-1-1987 decided to make the total period of the contract uniform in all the cases i.e., by making it nine years to all the licensees whether they are canteens, shops, stalls, cycle stands etc.

9. In the year 1989, the respondents-Corporation issued another Circular No. 13/89 dated 6-3-1989. The reasons for the issuance of the Circular arc given in clause (1) of the said Circular as follows :

'APSRTC has been constructing Commercial complexes at various important Towns/Cities with a view toproviding facilities to the public besides fetching Revenues to the Corporation. It has been decided to lease out these stalls/ shops/Office on separate terms and conditions, by introducing the system of collecting 'ALLOTMENT ADVANCE'. The following guidelines are formulated for allotment of stalls/Shops/Office Space in the Commercial Complexes/'

What exactly is the 'Allotment Advance ' is to be decided by a process stipulated under the said Circular from case to case.

9. Clause (10) of the said Circular provides that this new scheme is applicable only to the stalls provided in the Commercial Complexes and does not apply to the stalls constructed in the bus stations. However, the response to the said procedure was very poor, the Corporation by Circular No.42/89 dated 18-8-1989 modified the scheme and gave up the scheme of 'Allotment Advance'.

10. It may be mentioned here that clause (13) of the General Conditions in the Annexure 'A' to the said Circular provided that the licence granted under the said Circular could be terminated by giving one month's notice without assigning any reasons.

11. The respondents-Corporation again by Circular No.5/90 dated 12-1-1990 issued a fresh scheme providing for the allotment of stalls, etc. the terms and conditions on which such allotment is made. Clause (2) of the said Circular categorically says :

'The new terms and conditions will be applicable in respect of the licenses awarded afresh hereafter.....'

Under clause (4) of the said Circular, the initial period of allotment is prescribed to be six years. Clause (4)(c) provided that:

'The maximum period permissible to hold the licence shall be 12 years subject to satisfactory performance and fulfilling other terms and conditions.'

Clause (7) which was provided as follows :

'Applicability of New Procedure to Existing Licensees : The existing licensees who have already completed nine years period, having got the licence of stall/shop, canteen in open tenders, many opt for renewal of their licences for 3 more years to complete to 12 years as per new procedures envisaged vide paras 4.0 to 6.0 above. The Regional Tender Committee can award such renewal, if it is satisfied about the overall performance of licensees.

In case of existing licensees who have as on now completed to 9 years period, they may change to new pattern and opt for renewal of their licenses for 3 more years at 15% compound increase in rent for completing maximum period of 12 years.'

Clause 7(1) reads as follows :

'The licences of such of the contractors who have not completed 9 years shall be allowed to continue as per the old procedure till completion of period. They shall be given a choice for opting to new pattern on successful completion of nine years.'

Clause (8) specifically provides that :

'..... . ...... .......

All oilier terms and conditions relating to termination of licence with a month's due notice by either side etc., shall hold good.'

By Circular No.31/95 dated 27-5-1995, the respondents-Corporation once again revised the scheme and under that scheme, clause (2) reads as follows:

'Licence Period: Canteens, Stalls/Shops. Office accommodation located in Bus Stations as well as Commercial Complexes, shall be allotted for an initial period of Four years only. Even in the Tender Notifications, the licence period shall be specified as Four years only.''

Clause (3) provided as follows :

'Extension of Licence Period : The licence period of the Canteens, Stalls/ Shops, Office accommodation etc. located in Bus Stations and Commercial Complexes can be extended (after completion of Four years licence period) for another two years by the Regional Manager, provided......

(a) the licensee has been paying the monthly licence fee regularly.

(b) the performance of the licensee is satisfactory in carrying out the business according to the provisions of the agreement and instructions issued by the Corporation from time to time.

Under no circumstances, the licence period shall be extended beyond 6 years i.e., initial licence period of four years plus-extension of licence period of two years.'

Thereby fixing the upper limit of total period of lease is six years. The respondents-Corporation thought that:

'With the implementation of these revised instructions, there will be uniformity in respect of the Canteens, Stalls/Shops, Space, Office accommodation etc., located in Bus Stations and Commercial Complexes with regard to the following :

(a) Constitution of Tender Committee

(b) Initial licence period

(d) Increase of licence fee

(e) Maximum licence period and

(f) Amount to be collected towards Security Deposit.'

Clause (7) reads as follows :

'Applicability of the Revised Instructions:-The revised instructions are applicable in respect of licences to be entered into, in response to the tenders to be called on or after 15-6-1995.

The existing licensees who have entered into agreement with the Corporation before 15-6-1995 shall be allowed to continue as per the old procedure till completion of the licence period. The instructions contained in the Circulars 1 to 3 cited at reference are deemed to have been modified to the extent as indicated above.''

Thus it can be seen that from time to time the respondent-Corporation has been changing the tenure of the licence. It appears that, apart from all these schemes mentioned above, the respondent-Corporation had been granting licenses on nomination basis which is beyond the scope of all these schemes. That practice was depricatcd by a Division Bench of this Honourable Court in a decision reported in APSRTC v. V. Mahesh, 1995 (3) ALD 898. The respondent-Corporation constituted a Committee to study the aspects relating to licensing of canteens etc., It appears in the meanwhile, that a Legislative Committee on Public Undertakings made some suggestions in this regard, the details of which of course are not placed before this Court.

12. Taking all these factors into the consideration, the first respondent-Corporation issued Circular No.64/96 dated 10-10-1996. Under the said Circular, the scheme is that different tenures are provided for different categories of licenses i.e., for Canteens and Dormitories : five years with reference to Stalls and Shops and Office accommodation : three years and with reference to cycle stands etc., the tenure was fixed at two years. The mode of allotment on nomination basis was discarded except in the circumstances and subject to conditions prescribed under clause (4) of the above mentioned Circular.

13. Clause 7 of the said Circular which ultimately is the provision which resulted in the present litigation reads as follows :

'' With these new guidelines all the existing licences shall be deemed to have been terminated at the end of their subsisting period of Agreement and no extension shall be given and fresh tenders shall be called for'.

and under the new scheme, clause (13) once again provides that licences granted under the new scheme are made terminable with a three month's notice on either side as against a period of notice of one month as prescribed in all the earlier schemes of the respondent-Corporation.

14. All the appellants-writ petitioners in the present appeals arc the persons who were granted licenses between 1-4-1988 and 12-4-1991. According to the appellants, the respective rights of these writ petitioners in each case depend upon the relevant scheme applicable to their cases i.e., the scheme propounded under Circular No.51/85 as amended Circular Nos-38/86 and 7/87 referred to above or under the scheme of the Circular No.5/90, coupled with the individual licence deeds entered into between each of the writ petitioners/appellants and the respondent-Corporation.

15. The first question that arises is what is the nature of these schemes framed by the respondent-Corporation under the various Circulars issued by it from time to time. Whether these Circulars create any enforceable legal right in favour of the writ petitioners claiming the benefit of these schemes. Secondly, what is the effect of the individual 'license deeds' vis-a-vis the relevant scheme.

16. It is relevant at this stage to examine the powers and the functions of the respondent-Corporation under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950.

17. Under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, the State Government is empowered to establish a Road Transport Corporation by a notification in the Official Gazette which is a body corporate with perpetual succession. By virtue of Section 5 of the Act, the Management of the Corporation is vested in the Board of Directors.

Section 18 of the Act reads as follows :

'18. General Duly of Corporation ;- It shall be the general duty of a Corporation so to exercise its powers, as progressively to provide or secure or promote the provision of, an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated., system of road transport services in the State or part of the State for which it is established and in any extended area :

Provided that nothing in this Section shall be construed as imposing on a Corporation, either directly or indirectly, any form of duty or liability enforceable by proceedings before any Court or tribunal, to which it would not otherwise be subject.''

Section 19 of the Act enumerates the various powers entrusted to the Corporation by the. Legislature. Section 19(2)(b) thereof reads as follows :

'(b) to acquire and hold such property, both movable and immovable, as the Corporation may deem necessary for the purpose of any of the said activities, and to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any property held by it.'

This sub-section enables the respondent-Corporation to acquire and hold property, as is the subject matter of the disputes in these cases, but also to lease, sell or otherwise transfer that property as the Corporation may deem necessary for the purpose of any one of its activities.

18. Section 44 provides for the rule making power which enables the State Government to make rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act. Section 45 invests the Corporation with a power to make regulations for the administration of the affairs of the Corporation.

19. These various schemes on which the appellants-writ petitioners rely upon and respondent-Corporation admits show, on a bare reading, that each of the schemes was framed pursuant to the resolution of the respondent-Corporation i.e., a decision of the Board of Management as contemplated under Section 5 of the Act.

20. Circular No.64/96 referred to earlier, demonstrates the above situation. Clause III of the said Circular reads as follows :

'Corporation Board after deliberating all the related aspects resolved through Resolution No.85/1996 : dated 28-8-1996 to modify the existing procedure of licensing of Canteens, Stalls/shops, space, office accommodation etc.,'

Clause IV of the said Circular reads as follows:

'IV. In pursuance of the above Resolution of the Corporation Board the following revised guidelines are issued

Such recitations can be found in every successive Circular examined by this Honourable Court in the present case, which were referred to earlier.

21. An examination of all the circumstances show that they are administrative decisions of the Managing Body of the respondent-Corporation to achieve uniformity in the transactions entered into by the various functionaries subordinate to it functioning at various places in the State.

22. Such administrative decisions are taken by large corporate bodies to see that different officers, do not, while entering into the transactions with third parties, thereby create different legal rights and obligations, though the purpose sought to be achieved by each one of the contracts is identical to the other. In the context of bodies which can be characterised as 'State' within the Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the requirement to achieve such uniformity is constitutionally mandated. Otherwise the doctrine of the rule of law would be practised more in breach than in observation. These decisions are binding on the various functionaries subordinate to the respondent-Corporation and its Board of Management. No such subordinate functionary can deviate from the decision taken by the Managing Board.

23. However, the further question whether these decisions create any legal rights in favour of the 3rd parties like the appellants herein is a matter to be examined.

24. Legal rights are created either by law or contract. When we use the expression 'law' by some form of law like legislation or subordinate legislation, known to the constitutional system which is capable of being enforced. We do not see how the administrative decisions of a Corporation like the present respondent are different from the administrative decisions of any other private Corporation functioning in the similar circumstances. The various Circulars issued by the respondent-Corporation referred to earlier cannot even be called as regulations made in exercise of the power under Section 45 of the Act, because such regulations can be made only with the previous sanction of the State Government, No material was placed before the Court to show that these Circulars can be brought within the ambit of Section 45. Therefore, in our opinion, the various Circulars do not create any enforceable legal rights in favour of the appellants/writ petitioners, being purely administrative instructions issued by the respondent-Corporation to its subordinates.

25. Therefore, the right of the appellants herein in each of the cases, flows from the individual deed of 'licence' entered into between the respondent-Corporation and the individual appellants.

26. There is nothing in the Road Transport Corporation Act to indicate that such administrative decisions taken by the Board of Management cannot be reviewed from time to time depending on the administrative requirements of the Board which in turn ought to be taken by the Board keeping in view the statutory guidelines enshrined in Section 18 of securing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated system of Road Transport services in the State.

27. The learned Counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that the Circulars issued from time to time created legitimate expectations in the minds of the appellants,therefore the respondent-Corporation cannot deviate from the positions with reference to each of the appellants, as occuring on the date of the respective license deeds and the relevant Circular in currency as on that date. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel relied on the judgments reported in P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Lid, v. Union of India, : 1996(86)ELT3(SC) and Madras City Wines Merchants' Association v. State of Tamil Nadu. : 1992(60)ELT674(SC) . In tact, the earlier decision on this doctrine of legitimate expectations reported in Union -of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, : AIR1994SC988 considered the origin, development, effect and implications of the doctrine thoroughly. At Page 548 of the said decision in para 35, the Supreme Court held:

'Legitimate expectations may come in various forms and owe their existence to different kind of circumstances and it is not possible to give an exhaustive list in the context of vast and fast expansion of the governmental activities. They shift and change so fast that the start of our list would be obsolete before we reached the middle. By and large they arise in cases of promotions which are in normal course expected, though not guaranteed by way of a statutory right, in cases of contracts, distribution of largess by the Government and in somewhat similar situations. For instance discretionary grant of licences, permits or the like, carry with it a reasonable expectation, though not a legal right to renewal or non-revocation, but to summarily disappoint that expectation may be seen as unfair without the expectant person being heard. But there again the Court has to see whether it was done as a policy or in the public interest either by way of G.O., rule or by way of a legislation. If that be so, a decision denying a legitimate expectation based on such grounds does not qualify for interference unless in a given case, the decision or action taken amounts to an abuse of power. Therefore the limitation is extremely confined and if the according of natural justice does notcondition the exercise of the power, the concept of legitimate expectation can have no role to play and the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the Court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the Legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the Court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. For instance if an authority who has full discretion to grant a licence prefers an existing licence holder to a new applicant, the decision cannot be interfered with on the ground of legitimate expectation entertained by the new applicant applying the principles of natural justice. It can therefore be seen mat legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. It would thus appear that there are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate expectation should not be substantively protected than the reasons as to why it should be protected. In other words such a legal obligation exists whenever the case supporting the same in terms of legal principles of different sorts, is stronger than the case against it. As observed in Attorney-General for New South Wales Case26: 'to strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the Courts a drift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law..' If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of rightguaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is 'not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits', particularly when element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney-General for New South Wales Case26 the Courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc. can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directive principles thwarted to further his own interests. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important.'

Once again, the Supreme Court in Madras City Wines' case (supra) had an occasion to consider the scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectations. After an exhaustive survey of the case law on this topic, at page 535, the Supreme Court held:

'From the above it is clear that legitimate expectation may arise-

(a) if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or

(b) because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue;

However, if there is a change of policy or in public interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise.'

Analysing the facts of the present case in the light of the above decision of the Supreme Court, the first aspect is whether there is an express promise given by a public authority. No doubt, the respondent-Corporation is a public authority. Then can it be said that the Circulars in issue are express promises For the reasons given by us earlier in that decision that the Circulars issued from time to time are the administrative decisions of the respondent-Corporation, Management Board for the guidance of its subordinates in the matter of awarding licenses to third parties like the appellants herein and in fact the rights and obligations between the appellants and the respondent-Corporation arc regulated by the respective 'licence deeds' executed between them would show that there is no express promise created by the Circulars.

The next aspect is to examine whether there is any existence of regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to be continued.

28. From the facts narrated earlier in this judgment, it can be seen that the tenure of licenses granted by the respondent-Corporation varied time to time. Circular No.51/85 initially gave a tenure of 3 years with a renewal clause of another 3 years, but later by amending Circulars, the renewal was to be for a period of 6 years there by making a total period of 9 years. Circular No.5/90 provided for an initial tenure of 6 years with a renewal clause of an equivalent tenure. Coming to Circular No.31/95, the initial tenure is for 4 years with a renewal power of 2 years. Therefore, it can be seen that there is no uniformity or regularity in practice which the claimant can expect to continue.

29. The other facet of these Circulars is that, the respondent-Corporation always applied its policy decision prospectively in connection with the licenses granted by it from time to time under the various Circulars.

30. On an examination of the various Circulars placed before us, we find that as a matter of fact, the respondent-Corporation has been implementing its policy decisions always prospectively and as a matter of fact it never terminated the existing licenses in the past as a matter of policy. It might have terminated individual licenses for the violation of the terms of the licenses. The further question that will have to be examined in this or individually could have expected reasonably, that their licenses would not be terminated, except on the grounds of violation of the conditions of the licenses as sought to be projected by the learned Counsel for the appellants We see no basis for such an expectation in the face of a specific condition in the 'licence deed' (one of which was filed in the Court before the learned single Judge. Both the learned Counsel agree that the said deed is representative of all the deeds entered into by the various appellants and respondent-Corporation) under clause 17 which reserves the right to terminate the licence by giving one month's notice without assigning any reasons. The fact that, earlier the said clause was never invoked, may not create any reasonable expectation in the minds of the appellants. If the Corporation did not wish to exercise such power, at all, the respondent-Corporation would not have incorporated the said clause in the licence deed.

31. Assuming for the sake of arguments, that it creates a reasonable expectation, that such a reasonable expectation created can legally be negatived if it is sought to be done as a matter of policy in the public interest as was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in P.T.R. Reports (Madras) Pvt. Lid's case (supra) at page 272 :

'The doctrine of legitimate expectations plays no role when the appropriate authorityis empowered to take a decision by an executive policy or under law.'

By virtue of Section 18 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, the respondent-Corporation is expected to secure an efficient, economical system of road transport services and for that purpose it can acquire, hold and transfer the property. Further Section 22 which lays down that 'it shall be the general principle of the Corporation that in carrying on its undertaking, it shall act on business principles', gives the necessary authority, in our view to the respondent-Corporation the power to take a policy decision to terminate the licences.

32. Whether such power was in fact exercised for achieving the above-mentioned/ objects and for a public purpose is the next question which will have to be enquired into.

33. In view of the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court earlier in the case of A.P.S.R. T.C. 's case (supra) at para 55 which reads as follows :

'Before closing this case we wish to record our disapproval and displeasure at the manner in which the officials of A.P. State Road Transport Corporation have 'dealt with the question of renewal of leases at all the bus stations in the State, Although, the Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and so cannot be equated with a profit earning private enterprise, from the table given below it is seen that the licence fee offered in the open tender system is at least 5 times higher than the licence fee offered by the existing contractors in the negotiations. The statute enjoins a duty on the Corporation under Section 3(a) and (c) of the Act to extend and improve the facilities for the transport and to provide an efficient and economical system of Road Transport apart from offering the advantage to the public, trade and industry by the development of road transport. The officers cannot act in a manner detrimental to the financial interests of the Corporation by extending the leases for several yearswithout inviting tenders thereby creating monopoly in favour of certain individuals. We arc inclined to think by such acts the Corporation is furthering private interests but not advancing in any measure of public interest. In this context, the view of the Supreme Court with regard to exercise of discretion of public authorities in transactions of commercial nature, must be noticed.'

and in view of the observations of the Legislative Committee on public undertakings that 'the licence period of six years for Canteens, Stalls/shops, space, Office accommodation etc., is of a long duration and may develop vested interests and suggested to examine the feasibility of reducing it, as it will enable the Corporation to realise more revenues, if tenders are called at frequent intervals' as can be seen from the note for consideration, of the Board of the respondent-Corporation dated 28-8-1996, we have no reason to hold that the respondent-Corporation did not act in public interest and for carrying out objectives entrusted to it under the Road Transport Corporation Act.

34. Therefore we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge was right in his conclusion that the writ petitions are to be dismissed.

35. Before parting with this case, we must mention that a great deal of argument was advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants saying that the various Circulars issued prior to the issuance of the impugned Circular No.64/96, did create an enforceable legal right in favour of the appellants and the Circular No.64/96 in so far as it sought to abridge the rights created under the earlier Circulars, is unconstitutional as such policy decisions to curtail the vested rights created earlier could be taken away only by the sovereign bodies and implemented through appropriate legislative device. It was farther contended that, since the respondent-Corporation is a non-sovereign legal entity, it could not by an administrative decision curtailthe vested rights by virtue of an administrative decision. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation made a bold attempt to advance the proposition that the Corporations like the present respondent which could be characterised as 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, to discharge the functions essentially within the dominion of State must necessarily be deemed to have been entrusted that modicum of sovereignty which is essential to it's effective functioning and achievement of the objects entrusted to it. In view of our findings that, the Circulars do not create any enforceable legal rights, we do not propose to examine this issue in the present case.

36. In the result, all the writ appeals and writ petition arc dismissed without costs.

37. An oral application is made by Mr. M. V, Ramana Reddy for leave to appeal under Article 133(1)(a) and (b). We are not inclined to grant leave as we do not consider the case as involving a substantial question of law of general importance which in the opinion of the Court needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

38. An oral request is made by Mr. M, V, Ramana Reddy for some time to the appellants-petitioners respectively to vacate the premises in question. The move is opposed by the learned Government Pleader for Transport stating that the process of selection and allotment of the new licences as long since started and that by grant of time, the policy decided upon by the A.P.S.R.T.C. would be frustrated.

39. However, considering the question, we allow the appellants-petitioners to give vacant possession of their respective premises to the respondents within 30 days from to-day on the undertaking that unless the premises are so vacated, each of the parties shall be deemed to be in contempt of this Court.

Subject	Constitution
Court	Andhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On	Sep-19-1997
Case Number	W.A. Nos. 491 of 1997 and Batch
Judge	Lingaraja Rath and;J. Chelameswar, JJ.
Reported in	1998(3)ALD116; 1997(5)ALT751
Acts	Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 - Sections 3, 5, 18, 19(2), 22, 44 and 45; Constitution of India - Articles 12, 14 and 133(1)
Appellant	S. Sudhakara Gupta
Respondent	Apsrtc, Mushirabad, Hyd. and ors.
Appellant Advocate	M/s. M.V. Rama Reddy for ;C. Ramachandra Raju, ;Mr. V. Eswaraiah, ;Mr. A. Sudarshan Reddy, ;Mr. N. Subba Rao, ;Mr. P. Sudhakar Reddy, ;Mr. Metta Chandrasekhar Rao and ;Mr. Phikhana Rama Rao, Advs.
Respondent Advocate	Mr. C.V. Ramulu, ;Mr. A.V. Sivaiah, ;Mr. Y. Vivekananda Swamy and ;Mrs. A. Vyjajanthi, SC for APSRTC

S. Sudhakara Gupta Vs. Apsrtc, Mushirabad, Hyd. and ors. - Court Judgment