Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi Vs. Managing Director, Apsrtc and anr. - Court Judgment

1. A Division Bench of this Court made the following reference to the Full Bench:

'Whether the right of appeal available under the Letters Patent Act is taken away by Section 100-A, C.P.C. in respect of matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having force of law.'

2. This LPA itself has been preferred against the orders of a learned single Judge of this Court in C.M.A. No. 88 of 1998. The matter arises under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The claim petition filed by the appellant herein seeking compensation for the injuries sustained by her in an accident has been dismissed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge), Nizamabad, against which an appeal was filed before the learned single Judge of this Court under Section 173 of the Act. The learned Judge dismissed the said appeal by order dated 14-6-2002, against which the present LPA has been filed.

3. The short question that falls for consideration is as to whether the letters patent appeal preferred against the order of the learned single Judge made in C.M.A. No. 88 of 1998 is maintainable?

4. This Court in S. Shiva Raja Reddy and others v. S. Raghu Raj Reddy, 1 : 2002(5)ALD181 (DB) held that 'all the letters patent appeals presented or filed before 1-7-2002 are maintainable whether they have been admitted or not. What is prohibited is filing of the letters patent appeals after 1-7-2002 i.e. after the new Act had come into force.'

5. We are required to notice that the Parliament made amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code') under Act 22 of 2002. For Section 100-A of the Principal Act (as substituted by Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (46 of 1999) the following section is substituted:

'100A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge.'

6. A plain reading of the said provision makes it abundantly clear that no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of a single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force. There is a complete prohibition of filing of further appeal against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge. It is a legislative declaration. The said legislative declaration prohibits preferring of a further appeal against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge even if an appeal is provided in any other law for the time being in force. The expression 'in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force' takes into its ambit of the legislations including the special enactments where a right of appeal may have been provided against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge to a Division Bench. What is prohibited is preferring of a further appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment and decree of a single Judge not only under the Letters Patent for any High Court, but also under any special enactments even if an appeal is provided in such special enactments.

7. The Division Bench in Shiva Raja Reddy (1 supra) interpreted the legal consequences that flow out of the newly inserted Section 100A into the Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits preferring of further appeals in certain cases. The Division Bench noticed the effect of non-obstante clause employed in Section 100A prohibiting the filing of letters patent appeals against the decrees and judgments of a learned single Judge - be it original or appellate decree or order. Section 100A of the Code makes it abundantly clear that what is prohibited is further appeal where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court.

8. It is true that no amendments as such are made to the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent remains intact. But what is prohibited is further appeal notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law.

9. In our considered opinion, the provisions contained in Section 100A of the Code are equally applicable to the proceedings arising under the special enactments also since Section 100A of the Code specifically prohibits further appeal against the judgment and decree or order made by a learned single Judge of a High Court. The language employed in Section 100A of the Code is simple, clear and free from any vagueness.

10. However, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai, : AIR1997SC4415 in support of his submission that the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded by a provision incorporated in the Code. The said judgment, in our considered opinion, not only does not support the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, but also is clearly against him. The Supreme Court observed:

'Even the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned expressly excludes appeals under letters patent. No such bar is discernible from Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act. It could not be seriously contended by learned counsel for the respondents that if clause 15 of the Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable.' (Emphasis is supplied).

11. Evidently, no provision similar to Section 100A of the Code, which prohibits filing of further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a learned single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in Letters Patent, had fallen for consideration in that case. On the other hand, it is implicit in the said judgment that the statutory enactment concerned can always exclude and affect the power flowing from the paramount charter under which an appeal may have been provided against the decree and judgment or order of a learned single Judge.

12. In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, : [2002]2SCR404 the question as to whether letters patent appeal was maintainable before the Letters Patent Bench against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed in an appeal preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had arisen for consideration. The Supreme Court held that 'by virtue of the Letters Patent 'an appeal' against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court would lie to a Division Bench. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not exclude an appeal under the Letters Patent. The word 'only' occurring immediately after the non-obstante clause in Section 54 refers to the forum of appeal. In other words, it provides that the appeal will be to the High Court and not to any other court e.g., the District Court. The term 'an appeal' does not restrict it to only one appeal in the High Court. The term 'an appeal' would take within its sweep even a letters patent appeal.'

13. The Supreme Court having held that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in no manner effects or restricts the right of an aggrieved individual to file a letters patent appeal observed that 'a Letters Patent is the charter under which the High Court is established. The powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.' (Emphasis is of ours).

14. We have already noticed that the newly incorporated Section 100A of the Code in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a learned single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law - be it against an original or appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single Judge.

15. In the case on hand, the Motor Vehicles Act itself does not provide for any further appeal against the decree or order passed by a learned single Judge to a Division Bench.

16. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the right of appeal available under the Letters Patent is taken away by Section 100A of the Code even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law.

17. The reference is answered accordingly.

18. The appeal fails and shall accordingly stand dismissed.