Employees State Insurance Corporation Vs. Sri Lakshmi Tulasi Granites and anr. - Court Judgment

P.S. Narayana, J.

1. This civil miscellaneous appeal is filed as against an order dated 29-10-2001 made in OP No. 118 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, under Section 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter in short referred to as 'the Act' for the purpose of convenience).

2. The first respondent as petitioner filed O.P. No. 118 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, under Sections 75, 76 and 77 of the Act praying for a declaration that the notices dated 18-8-1994 and 6-9-1994 issued by the appellant-first respondent are illegal, invalid and ultra vires of their powers and for a consequential injunction. The learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, in the light of the respective pleadings of the parties having framed the points for consideration, appreciated the evidence of PW. 1, Exs. A1 to A8, RW. 1, Exs. B1 to B20 and came to the conclusion that the impugned demands are not in accordance with law and allowed the petition as prayed for directing the parties to bear their own costs. Aggrieved by the same, the first respondent in OPNo. 118 of 1994 aforesaid, Employees' State Insurance Corporation represented by its Regional Director, had preferred the present civil miscellaneous appeal.

3. Contentions of Sri B.G. Reminder Reddy : Sri B.G. Ravinder Reddy, learned Counsel representing the appellant-Respondent No. 1, had pointed out to grounds 3 and 4 and would contend that these are the substantial questions of law to be decided in the present civil miscellaneous appeal. The learned Counsel would submit that even if the stand taken by the first respondent as petitioner to be accepted, this is a matter concerned with lease and it is immaterial whether the relevant period of demand is covered by the lease period or not. The learned Counsel also would contend that when there is such transfer, the liability of the prior establishment would pass on and the subsequent establishment be it by way of gift, lease or licence would be bound to make contribution, no doubt, only subject to the limitations specified by the proviso to the effect that the liability of the transferee shall be limited to the value of the assets obtained by him by such transfer. The learned Counsel would contend that this is not the stand taken by the first respondent-petitioner. While further elaborating his submissions the learned Counsel also had pointed out to Section 45-A of the Act and further had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 77 of the Act. The learned Counsel would maintain that the period of five years specified in Section 77 of the Act would be applicable if the proceedings are commenced before the Employees' Insurance Court by an application by the Corporation and this bar of limitation if any cannot be extended to a case when an order was made under Section 45-A of the Act, and at any rate, this provision cannot be made applicable when the first respondent-petitioner had approached the Court for declaration as specified above. The learned Counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions and would maintain that this is a consistent view, which had been taken and in the light of the same, the view expressed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, on the aspect of limitation also cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel while further elaborating his submissions had taken this Court through the evidence of RW. 1 and also several of the documents relied upon Exs. B1 to B20 and would maintain that the records are clear that this unit or establishment was covered by the provisions of the Act, and hence, it may have to be taken that the same state of affairs would continue unless and otherwise the same is established to be otherwise. The learned Counsel would point out that the proprietrix of the first respondent-petitioner had not entered into the witness box to explain the stand in relation thereto and one Padala Srinivasa Reddy was examined as PW. 1 who no doubt had deposed to certain facts and hence even if the aspect of number of employees to be taken into consideration the findings recorded by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, cannot be sustained. Hence, the learned Counsel would conclude that viewed from any angle the demands made by the corporation cannot be said to be unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case.

4. Contentions of Sri N. Sivareddy : Sri N. Sivareddy, learned Counsel representing first respondent-petitioner had taken this Court through the averments made in OP No. 118 of 1994 and the stand taken by PW. 1 and also had taken this Court through the findings which had been recorded by the learned Judge. The learned Counsel would maintain that clear findings had been recorded by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, that no acceptable evidence had been placed before the Court evidencing the transfer, when that being so, the question of applying Section 93-A of the Act would not arise. The Counsel also would point out that even otherwise in the light of the evidence of PW. 1, who has knowledge about all the facts, and also Exs. A1 to A8 the number of employees being clear, the unit or establishment in question would not fall within the ambit of the Act. The learned Counsel also would contend that even otherwise the demands had been made after a long lapse of time and hence after recording appropriate findings, the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, arrived at correct conclusion that such demands cannot be made after a long lapse of time by virtue of operation of bar of limitation. While concluding, the learned Counsel also would contend that at any rate no substantial question of law as such is involved inasmuch as several factual controversies had been positively decided to favour of the first respondent-petitioner, and hence, the civil miscellaneous appeal is bound to fail.

5. Heard the Counsel, perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry.

6. For the purpose of convenience, the parties hereinafter would be referred to as petitioner and first respondent as shown in OP No. 118 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry.

7. As already referred to supra the petitioner had questioned the notices dated 18-8-1994 and 6-9-1994 issued by the first respondent as illegal and ultra vires of their powers and also prayed for the consequential injunction. The following substantial questions of law had been pointed out which are specified as hereunder.

1. Whether the unit/establishment was transferred to M/s. Lakshmi Tulasi Granites even in the year 1992 and as per Section 93-A of the Act the old employer as well as the new employer are jointly and severally liable to pay the dues up to the date of transfer of the unit/establishment cannot be said that the claim made by the corporation is unsustainable?

2. Whether the findings recorded by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, on question of limitation relating to recovery of contributions from the employer under the Act in the light of Section 77 of the Act be sustained?

8. The petitioner had pleaded that the petitioner M/s. Sri Lakshmi Tulasi Granites, Rajahmundry, represented by its proprietrix had started its business during the year 1992 after taking the unit in question on lease and the petitioner had been regular in maintaining registers required to be maintained under the relevant labour legislations and the said registers would go to show that the employees of the petitioner always had been less than 10 in number, and hence, specific stand was taken that the unit/establishment is not covered by the provisions of the Act. It was also stated that the first respondent issued a notice during the year 1993 proposing to apply the provisions of the Act to the petitioner establishment and thereupon the petitioner submitted various representations informing the respondent corporation about the number of employees of the petitioner establishment right from the commencing of the business and requested the authorities to consider the case and see that the notice issued is withdrawn. But, however, the corporation did not properly appreciate the various contentions raised by the petitioner in various representations submitted from time to time and on the other hand confirmed their stand that the provisions of the Act are applicable to the petitioner unit/establishment without any proper basis whatsoever. It is also stated that the corporation got issued a notice dated 6-9-1994 in pursuance of earlier notices and the corporation also threatened the petitioner with penal consequences under the provisions of the Act for non-submission of returns and payment of contributions for the years 1992-93 and 1993-94 and further the corporation also issued yet another notice dated 18-8-1994 initiating coercive steps for recovery of a sum of Rs. 47,701-55 paise from the petitioner and it is stated that this amount represents assessment made by the corporation on ad-hoc basis. It is also specifically stated that in the notice dated 18-8-1994 issued by the appellant (hereinafter referred to 'the Corporation' for the purpose of convenience) it shows that the petitioner unit/establishment was formerly known as Lazarus Metal Industries. It is also further stated that the petitioner has nothing to do with M/s Lazarus Metal Industries and the petitioner started the business only during the year 1992 after taking machinery on lease from third parties. Hence, the petitioner cannot be made liable.

9. The corporation filed an elaborate written statement substantially denying several of the averments made in the petition. It is stated that the petitioner unit was originally covered under the name M/s. Mary Matha Granite Grinding Works, Ramadaspet, Rajahmundry, under the Code No. 51-0857-47 on the basis of respondent-Corporation Inspector's report dated 31-3-1979. It is also stated that the respondent's Inspector visited the unit for inspection to examine whether petitioner's unit would fall under the provisions of the Act. The Inspector found 15 employees working in petitioner's factory and the same is being run with the aid of power. It is also stated that the petitioner's factory representative had given a letter dated 31-3-1979 that there was 15 casual workers working in the factory. As the factory satisfied the conditions of employing 10 or more persons and using the power in manufacturing process, the factory was provisionally covered by the provisions of the Act with effect from 31-3-1979 and an intimation about the coverage of petitioner's factory vide this Office Lr. No. AP/Ins.I/51-0857-47/SF, dated 21-4-1979, and Sri Lazarus was the proprietor. The corporation also had taken a clear stand that number of letters was addressed to Lazarus to comply with the provisions of the Act, but he did not comply with the provisions of the Act. Hence, the corporation framed the contributions on ad hoc basis and issued recovery letters to the Collector, East Godavari District, for recovery of arrears from 31-3-1979 onwards. It is further specifically stated that the name of the said factory was changed as M/s. Lazarus Metal Industries in 1983 by the same proprietor Sri Lazarus and it was covered under a new Code No. 52-7184-57 with effect from dated 2-7-1982. Further, specific stand is taken that as the factory and the owner being the same, the claims were being continued and correspondence was being done with Lazarus for the periods from 31-3-1979 to 30-9-1987 and even ultimately the claim amount came to Rs. 47,701-55, paise. Further specific stand is taken that the above unit/establishment/factory had been leased out to Mrs. V.V. Padmavathi, wife of Sri V. Manohar Reddy, by Lazarus in the year 1992, vide Inspector's report dated 24-11-1992, and the same was being run in the name of M/s. Lakshmi Tulasi Granites, Rajahmundry, under the same Code No. 52-7184-57. In the light of the correspondence and the proceedings, the corporation had taken a specific stand that the stand taken by the petitioner that the demands made are unsustainable, cannot be sustained.

10. The learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, at Para 6 framed the following points for consideration.

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to seek relief of declaration as prayed for?

2. To what other relief?

After proceeding to discuss with these points for consideration at Paras 9 and 10, again at Para 11 the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, framed the following important points for consideration.

1. Whether the petitioner is the purchaser of unit of T. Lazarus'?

2. Whether the provisions of E.S.I. Act are applicable to the establishment of the petitioner?

11. Further, the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, proceeded to discuss the oral and documentary evidence commencing from Paras 12 to 38 and ultimately came to the conclusion that such demands cannot be sustained and allowed the petition as prayed for directing the parties to bear their own costs.

12. The evidence of PW. 1 and RW. 1 is available on record and Exs. A1 to A8 and Exs. B1 to B20 were marked. The brother of Padmavathi, proprietrix of the petitioner establishment, Padala Srinivasa Reddy, was examined as PW. 1 who had deposed about the relationship and also deposed that the unit was taken on lease by the petitioner and their business is no way concerned with M/s. Lazarus Metal Industries and M/s. Mary Matha Grinding Works and they had not taken the unit from the said two concerns and they are not liable to pay any contributions to the corporation. This witness also deposed that the petitioner never engaged 10 or more at anytime and the petitioner is maintaining wage and attendance register. Ex.A-1 is wage register for 1993-94. Ex.A2 is wage register for 1992-93. Exs.A3 and A4 are attendance registers for the years 1992-93 and 1993-94. This witness also deposed that the provisions of the Act are not applicable. This witness also deposed that the Corporation had sent notice demanding to pay Rs. 47,701-55 paise due from M/s. Lazarus Industries. Exs.A5 is the said notice. Ex.A6 is the notice sent to them demanding payment of contribution. They are not liable to pay the said amount. This witness is cross-examined in elaboration. This witness in cross-examination deposed that it is not true to suggest that the petitioner firm belongs to Lazarus and further deposed that the lease agreement was in between Ramakrishna Reddy and Padmavathi. Before taking stone crusher on lease for a period of one year, it was kept idle and he does not know who had been running the said stone crusher prior to that period. This witness also deposed that to his knowledge the lease deed in between them was not sent to E.S.I. Office. The signature on letter dated 9-12-1992 is that of Manohar Reddy. Exs. B1 is the said letter. This witness also deposed that he had no document to show that he has been looking after the affairs of Padmavathi, who is his sister and Manohar Reddy is husband of Padmavathi. This witness also deposed that Manohar Reddy would appear as witness in this case. It is needless to say that the said Manohar Reddy was not examined. This witness also denied certain suggestions that petitioner is fighting this litigation and Lazarus is behind the petitioner. This witness also in cross-examination deposed that the petitioner had taken the unit on lease from one Ramakrishna Reddy, but they had not enquired from whom the said Reddy had taken the unit on lease and they had not enquired the said Ramakrishna Reddy whether the unit was covered under the provisions of the Act or not. Certain other suggestions had been denied. This is the evidence of PW. 1.

13. Though PW. 1 deposed that the husband of the proprietrix V.V. Padmavathi would be examined, neither the husband of the proprietrix nor the proprietrix had been examined. The brother of the proprietrix had examined himself as PW. 1. It is also needless to say that the registers, which had been relied upon by PW. 1 are in relation to the later period, at any rate, not covering the whole period for which the demand had been made.

14. As against this evidence, the evidence of RW. 1 is available on record, who is no doubt a retired Inspector of the corporation, but, however, this witness specifically deposed that from 1977 to 1980 he worked at Rajahmundry, and the petitioner is covered by the provisions of the Act and he inspected the premises of Mary Matha Granites Stone Works, Ramdaspet, Rajahmundry, on 31-3-1979 and prepared inspection report. T. Lazarus was the proprietor. Ex.B2 is the Inspector's report dated 31-3-1979. The clerk of Mary Matha Granite Works was present and gave a letter that there were 15 employees. Ex.B3 is the said letter. This witness also deposed about Ex.B4 proceeding issued by the respondent registering Mary Matha Granite Grinding Stone Works on 21-4-1979. Ex.B5 is the letter addressed to the District Collector, East Godavari, Kakinada, Ex.B6 is the memorandum issued to Lazarus Metal Industries by the respondent dated 4-7-1984, Ex.B7 is the show cause notice issued dated 10-7-1984, Exs.B8 to B17 are the letters dated 12-5-1985, 14-4-1986, 16-2-1987, 13-8-1987, 10-3-1988, 14-3-1988, 14-4-1988, 4-1-1992, 23-12-1992 and 24-11-1992 respectively and further deposed relating to Exs.B18 Enquiry Report by the Inspector of the corporation relating to the unit of Lazarus Metal Industries, dated 24-11-1992. Ex.B19 is the letter written by T. Lazarus to the Inspector of E.S.I. Corporation and Ex.B20 is the office copy of order made under Section 45-A of the Act.

15. Exs.Al, A2, A3, A4 are the wage registers for the years 1993-94, 1992-93, 1992-93 and 1993-94. Ex.A5 is the notice dated 18-8-1994, Ex.A6 is the show cause notice dated 6-9-1994, Ex.A7 is the Xerox copy of certificate of registration of petitioner unit issued by the A.P. General Sales Tax Rules, 1957, dated 6-9-1993. The learned Judge, on appreciation of the evidence available on record at Para 38, recorded the following conclusions:

1. The respondent-Corporation failed to establish that petitioner purchased the crushing unit from T. Lazarus.

2. The claim of respondent-corporation under Ex.A5 demanding payment of contributions due from 31-3-1979 till 9/87 is barred under the proviso to explanation (b) Clause (1A) of Section 77(1) of ESI Act, as amended by Act 28/89.

3. The petitioner establishment is not covered by provisions of ESI Act.

16. As already referred to supra, neither the proprietrix nor husband of the proprietrix had been examined and the brother of the proprietrix was examined as PW. 1. The contents of Ex. B1 letter in fact had been referred to even by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, and the same reds as hereunder.

Dear Sir,

With reference to your visit to our establishment of v. Manohara Reddy, husband of Smt. v.V. Padmavathi, proprietor informs I am looking after the affairs of the unit. In this connection I have to inform that this unit was taken over by Sri P. Ramakrishna Reddy, 1A-1-2, Prakashnagar, Rajahmundry, who purchased the unit from Sri T. Lazarus. The agreement copy between the two parties will be supplied to you within one month.

Thanking you.

Yours faithfully,

V. Manohara Reddy

(V. Manohara Reddy)

Likewise, Ex. B18 Enquiry Report dated 24-11-1992 submitted by B. Subrahmanyam, Inspector, ESI Corporation, reads as hereunder:

Visited the factory for conducting the inspection after giving prior intimation. But, the unit was sold by Sri T. Lazarus one year back to M/s. Lakshmi Tulasi Granites, who informed that their records will not be available in the premises and kept at owner's office situated at some other place. Therefore, I will submit another report in due course. When I enquired regarding T. Lazarus he directed the his house.

I met Mr. T. Lazarus in his house and requested him to produce the records up to the date of selling the unit. He informed that he did not have any record, as his unit has not worked even prior to his selling the unit one year back. He also contends that his unit is not coverable under the Act. Then I told him, if he shows the records then that will be decided. In this connection letter given by him is enclosed for reference. The house address is also given.

Therefore, necessary further action may please be taken.

17. It is pertinent to note that in Ex.B 19 the letter dated 24-11-1992 addressed by Lazarus it was stated that the unit had been sold away in the year 1991 to the petitioner. It is not in controversy that the corporation made the order under Section 45-A of the Act. The said provision deals with determination of contributions in certain cases and the same reads as hereunder:

Determination of contributions in certain cases:-(1) Where in respect of a factory or establishment no returns, particulars, registers or records are submitted, furnished or maintained in accordance with the provisions of Section 44 or any Inspector or other official of the Corporation referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 45 is (prevented in any manner) by the principal or immediate employer or any other person, in exercising his functions or discharging his duties under Section 45, the Corporation may, on the basis of information available to it, by order determine the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of that factory or establishment:

(Provided that no such order shall be passed by the Corporation, unless the principal or immediate employer or the person in charge of the factory or establishment has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.)(2) An order made by the Corporation under Sub-section (1) shall be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under Section 75 or for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under Section 45-A (or the recovery under Section 45-C to Section 45-I).

18. Section 77 of the Act deals with commencement of proceedings. Section 77(1) specifies that the proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by application and (b) specifies as hereunder:

(b) the cause of action in respect of a claim by the Corporation for recovering contributions (including interest and damages) from the principal employer shall be deemed to have arisen on the date on which such claim is made by the Corporation for the first time:Provided that no claim shall be made by the Corporation after five years of the period to which the claim relates;

19. Relating to the applicability of Section 77 of the Act when demands are made by the Corporation the learned Judge of this Court in AAO No. 215 of 1992, dated 11th September, 2002 observed as hereunder.

The Division Bench of the Madras High Court has categorically held that the limitation applies only in case the Corporation approaches the ESI Court by filing an application in which event the claim cannot be made beyond five years. But if the arrears are arrived at by taking recourse to Section 45A what is required is that a notice has to be issued calling upon the employer to furnish the details and thereafter the liability of the employer is determined which can be challenged under Section 75 of the Act. Admittedly in the instant case the order was passed under Section 45A of the Act. In such an event the question of limitation on the part of the Corporation would not arise and the order as passed by the Corporation is well within its jurisdiction.

20. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Regional Director, ESI Corporation, Madras-34 v. Mis. Henry Wooleey and Co. Prop. S. Murugesan Family Trust, by Trustee Executor, Salem 1999 (2) Law Weekly 762, while dealing with the scope of the proviso to Section 77 of the Act observed that the section relates to commencement of proceedings before ESI Court and Sub-section 1-A relates to period of limitation and the proviso will apply only in respect of claim made by the Corporation before the Insurance Court and the claim and demand made by the Corporation by virtue of Section 45-A of the Act is not barred by limitation.

21. In Standard Literature Co. (P) Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation Ltd., Chennai and Anr. 2001 (1) LLJ 907, learned Judge of the Madras High Court while dealing with Sections 45-A, 45-B and Section 77 and the proviso thereto and the applicability thereof held that Section 77 of the Act relates to commencement of the proceedings before the Employees Insurance Court and the proviso mentioned therein will apply only in respect of claim made by the Corporation before the Insurance Court.

22. Reliance also was placed on a decision of Allahabad High Court in Allahabad Canning Co. v. Regional Director, E.S.J.C, Kanpur and Ors. 2000 (3) LLJ (Suppl.) 597. Certain submissions were made in relation to the applicability of the decision of the Apex Court in Good Year India Ltd. v. Regional Director, E.S.I.C. and Ors. : (1997)IILLJ366SC . It had been pointed out that the decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case and at any rate the same is distinguishable. In the said decision Good Year India Ltd. v. Regional Director, E.S.I.C. and Ors. (supra), it was held that the provisions of Sections 45-B, 75 and 77 as they stood prior to the amendment of the Act by the Amendment Act 28 of 1989 reveal that the cause of action for contribution would arise only after the decision by the Insurance Court in the proceedings is laid under Section 75 of the Act. Until then, cause of action cannot be said to have arisen. In other words, there is no bar of limitation. Thus, there is no bar of limitation for payment of the contribution.

23. Here is a case an order was passed under Section 45-A of the Act by the Corporation and the Corporation never commenced the proceedings. On the contrary the petitioner filed the present OP No. 118 of 1994 questioning the demands made by the Corporation to make the contributions. Hence, in the light of the decisions referred to supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that the proviso to Section 77 of the Act specified above cannot be made applicable in a case of this nature and hence it cannot be said that the demands made by the Corporation are in anyway barred by limitation, since no such bar as such is imposed by the provisions of the Act.

24. Submissions in elaboration were made by the respective Counsel on the aspect of applicability or otherwise of Section 93-A of the Act. Section 93-A of the Act deals with liability in case of transfer of establishment and the said provision reads as hereunder:

93-A. Liability in case of transfer of establishment:-Where an employer, in relation to a factory or establishment, transfers that factory or establishment in whole or in part, by sale, gift, lease or licence or in any other manner whatsoever, the employer and the person to whom the factory or establishment is so transferred shall jointly and severally be liable to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or any other amount payable under this Act in respect of the periods up to the date of such transfer:Provided that the liability of the transferee shall be limited to the value of the assets obtained by him by such transfer.

25. The Counsel representing the Corporation laid specific emphasis on the proviso, which specifies provided that the liability of the transferee shall be limited to the value of the assets obtained by him by such transfer. The learned Counsel also laid further stress on the words in the said provision 'by sale, gift, lease or licence or in any other manner Whatsoever, It is needless to say that this legislation is beneficial legislation and welfare legislation and this is an Act aimed at to provide for certain benefits to certain employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and make certain provisions in other matters in relation thereto. In the light of the object specified above, the provision of Section 93-A specifically refers to sale, gift, lease or licence or in any other manner whatsoever and the proviso further emphasize that the liability of the transferee, which shall be limited to the value of the assets obtained by him by such transfer. It is needless to say that the proviso may have to be read along with the provision as such and the lease also is covered by Section 93-A of the Act.

26. In the light of the elaborate correspondence, the series of letters and also Exs. B1 and B18, B19 in particular, and further in comparison with numbers there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the petitioner unit/establishment/factory is the self same one of Lazarus which had been taken on lease. Though a contention had put forth, the same was taken from one Ramakrishna Reddy, it is pertinent to note that all the prior details had not been spoken to PW. 1 though specific questions were posed to PW. 1. It is also pertinent to note that PW. 1 is the just brother of the proprietrix. Neither the proprietrix nor the husband of the proprietrix, the author of Ex. B1, had been examined at least to explain whether or to get over the contents of Ex. B1. When that being so, the petitioner cannot be permitted to contend otherwise to escape the liability, especially, in the light of the clear language employed in Section 93-A of the Act specified supra.

27. Yet another contention had been advanced relating to the number of employees. It is only an attempt to escape the liability to make contributions. This Court is of the said opinion, especially, in the light of the clear evidence of RW. 1 well further explained, by virtue of Ex.B2 the preliminary inspection report dated 4-4-1979, Ex.B6 the memorandum issued relating to Lazarus Metal Industries, Ex. B18 Enquiry Report of Inspector of the Corporation in relation to the unit of Lazarus Metal Industries dated 24-11-1992, Ex.B19 the letter written by Lazarus to the Inspector of the Corporation and Ex. B1 dated 9-12-1992 and further the correspondence by way of letters relating to the number of employees employed in the unit/establishment/factory.

28. Hence, viewed from any angle the findings recorded by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, cannot be sustained. The impugned order accordingly is hereby set aside and the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed. Inasmuch as the first respondent-petitioner is only a transferee, the parties to the litigation to bear their own costs.