Suryadevara Pullayya and Another Vs. Suryadevara Satyanarayana - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
property - joint property - sections 2, 68 and 90 of evidence act, 1872 and hindu law - suit filed for partition of joint family property - defendant opposed suit producing registered partition deed and stating that suit property was not joint property - partition deed was registered 30 years earlier - under section 4 court is not bound to call upon party relying upon document to prove it - person who opposes presumption has to disprove it - calling up attesting witness in proof of execution not necessary under section 68 - petitioners fail to prove that suit property was joint property - held, suit for partition not maintainable. - - basavayya died in 1955 and even thereafter ananthayya and satyanarayana continued to be joint and defendant was managing the joint family properties as ananthayya was of very weak intellect. out of surplus joint family funds the defendant spent considerable amounts for marriage of his first daughter and the first plaintiff did not object to it because of his love and affection for the daughter of the defendant. with the plaintiffs at the instance of second plaintiff, who is intelligent even though she is dumb. on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence the learned trial judge held that the plaintiffs utterly failed to establish that the partition set up by the defendant is not true and valid and that the defendant and father of the first plaintiff never constituted members of the joint family subsequent to 1956, and therefore, the suit schedule properties are not at all joint family acquisitions of ananthayya and the defendant. he also submits that the presumption drawn by the trial court based on section 90 of the indian evidence act is erroneous and that the lower court failed to exercise discretion in drawing presumption with regard to ex. bl the defendant failed to prove that it is valid and binding on the plaintiffs. the law on this aspect of the case is well settled. 14. therefore, having regard to the well settled principles of law, it must be held that in the first instance the burden of proof that any particular property is joint family property is upon the person who claims it as coparcenery property and that there is no presumption that because one member of the family separated himself there has been separation with regard to all. therefore, in the absence of any unimpeachable evidence, the plaintiffs should fail. the learned trial judge was correct in concluding that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the partition set up by the defendant is not true and valid. for these reasons, i must hold that the plaintiffs failed to prove that after the death of basavayya, satyanarayana and ananthayya lived jointly and possessed joint family properties on the date of filing of the suit. b1, the defendant was given responsibility to discharge joint family debt as well as maintaining their mother ptillamma. pw1 however, failed to disprove by duly discharging the burden which absolutely lies on him. bl is validly proved and the appellants have failed to disprove the partition covered by a registered partition deed, it is not necessary to go into this question including the validity of ex. (2) when the partition is effected between the members of the hindu undivided family which consists of minor coparceners it is binding on the minors also if it is done in good faith and in bonafide manner keeping into account the interests of the minors. bl which is a registered deed disproved the case of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs failed to discharge initial burden by cogent, sufficient and satisfactory evidence that ex. b2, b3 and the admission made by pw1 that pullamma was living with the defendant show that the defendant was given more property to discharge the family debts as well as to maintain his mother.1. this appeal is filed by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the court of subordinate judge dismissing os no.279 of 1983. the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition of the properties shown in the plaint 'a' and !b' schedules into two equal shares by metes and bounds and for putting the plaintiffs in separate possession of one such share. in this appeal the parties are referred as per their status in the suit. the case set up in the plaint as follows.2. the second plaintiff is the wife of one ananthayya and the first plaintiff is his son. ananthayya and satyanarayana, the sole defendant, are brothers. it is the allegation that they constituted hindu joint family and ananthayya died on 5-3-1983 intestate and undivided with the defendant. therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to half share in the joint family properties. it is also stated that the first plaintiffs grandfather basavayya had three sons, namely, jaggayya, ananthayya and satyanarayana, when the defendant was minor, during the lifetime of basavayya, eldest son of jaggayya got separated from the joint family and thereafter basavayya and his two younger sons, ananthayya and satyanarayana continued to be joint. basavayya died in 1955 and even thereafter ananthayya and satyanarayana continued to be joint and defendant was managing the joint family properties as ananthayya was of very weak intellect. he, however, used to do hardwork attending to cultivation and other agricultural operations. with the income of the joint family properties other properties were purchased from time to time, but the defendant obtained sale deeds in his name or in the name of himself and his brother. the second plaintiff was a dumb woman and therefore she was exploited by putting her to hardwork. therefore, the father of the second plaintiff took her along with the first plaintiff to his house and since then she has been under protection and maintenance of her father and after her father's death her brother is taking care of them. the first plaintiff was assisting his maternal dumb uncle subbaya in agricultural operations besides helping ananthayya and satyanarayana in such operations. he was having cordial relations with them. out of surplus joint family funds the defendant spent considerable amounts for marriage of his first daughter and the first plaintiff did not object to it because of his love and affection for the daughter of the defendant. the first plaintiff with the approval of his father has been requesting the defendant to partition the joint family properties but the defendant has been postponing it. as the defendant is evading to co-operate with the plaintiffs in effecting partition even after the death of ananthayya, the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition of joint family properties.3. the defendant opposed the suit claim by filing a written statement as follows: the eldest brother of ananthayya and defendant by name jaggayya got himself separated long before the death of basavayya. after the death of basavayya the defendant and ananthayya lived together jointly. in1956 the defendant and ananthayya partitioned their joint family properties and since then they have been separately living and enjoying the properties exclusively and separately. after partition in 1956 ananthayya began to live with his father-in-law along;with the plaintiffs at the instance of second plaintiff, who is intelligent even though she is dumb. by the time of partition between him and his brother the joint family was having debts to an amount of rs.3,000/- which includes the amount payable towards 'pasupukumkuma' to their three sisters which was utilised by the joint family. by that time the defendant was not married and the defendant's mother was to be maintained. therefore, relatives and mediators suggested that the defendant should discharge family debts and maintain his mother. accordingly, major share was given to the defendant which was agreed to by the first plaintiffs father. in the said partition an extent of acs.1-49 in d.nos.16 and 15/1 of mogulur village fell to the share of father of the first plaintiff, which had been in exclusive possession and enjoyment since the time of partition. at that time, the value of the lands was even less than rs.300/- per acre. the land given to ananthayya was more in value than the land, which fell to the share of the defendant. the defendant was given an extent of acs.8.48 to his share besides house site of acs.0.12. subsequently, the defendant sold acs. 1.60 in d.no.6 of battinapudu village to neetcan butchaiah about seven years back and the defendant purchased acs.0.06 of hayrick yard in rs no.66/4 shown in item 3 of plaint 'a' schedule properties. the defendant also denied that items 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of plaint 'a' schedule are joint family properties stating that he himself purchased these properties out of his income. he also stated that item 1 of plaint a schedule is given to the defendant's eldest sister rukminatnma towards pasupu kumkuma. he also stated that the land admeasuring acs.2.72 in rs no,102 of kunikanapadu village shown as item 13 is the property of defendant's mother who executed a will dated 8-7-1964 bequeathing the property giving equal shares to ananthayya and satyanarayana but giving only life interest to ananthayya. after the death of his mother, pullamma, ananthayya and satyanarayana have been enjoying their respective shares in item no.13. after the death of ananthayya, the defendant has been exclusively enjoying the said item of the property. there is no joint family status between the defendant and the first plaintiffs father, as they had already partitioned their joint family properties in 1956. the defendant also denied the correctness of the plaint a and b schedules stating that there are no movable properties shown as joint family properties. all the movable properties were possessed by the defendant as own properties and the plaintiffs or ananthayya cannot have any right to claim share in them. accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the suit.4. the trial court framed the following issues for trial.(i) whether the defendant and the father of the first plaintiff constituted members of a hindu joint family?(ii) whether plaint schedules are correct?(iii) whether the properties mentioned in the plaint 'a' and 'b' schedules are the joint family acquisitions of ananthayya, father of 1st plaintiff and the defendant?(iv) whether the plaintiff's are entitled to 1/2 share in the plaint 'a' and 'b' schedule properties or to any share and if so to what share?(v) whether the defendant is liable to render account?(vi) to what relief?5. the plaintiffs examined pws. 1 to 4 and no documents were marked for the plaintiffs. the defendant examined dws.l to 4 and marked exs.b1 to b12. on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence the learned trial judge held that the plaintiffs utterly failed to establish that the partition set up by the defendant is not true and valid and that the defendant and father of the first plaintiff never constituted members of the joint family subsequent to 1956, and therefore, the suit schedule properties are not at all joint family acquisitions of ananthayya and the defendant. accordingly, the trial court dismissed the suit.6. in this appeal sri d. ramalinga swamy, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the trial court has not framed proper issues having regard to the pleadings of the parties. he further contends that the trial court ought to have framed a specific issue as to whether there was partition in 1956 as alleged by defendant. the trial court erred in throwing burden of proof on the plaintiffs ignoring the settled position of law that the burden is on the person who disputes the joint family nature of the properties. he also submits that the family of basavayya and thereafter the plaintiffs father and the defendant is agricultural family and therefore the contention of the defendant that he did not acquire other properties cannot be believed. the joint family continued to exist even as on the date of filing the suit and therefore subsequent acquisitions are to be treated as joint family acquisitions until and unless contrary is proved. he also submits that the presumption drawn by the trial court based on section 90 of the indian evidence act is erroneous and that the lower court failed to exercise discretion in drawing presumption with regard to ex.bl. even if there is presumption in respect of the partition deed ex.bl the defendant failed to prove that it is valid and binding on the plaintiffs. in the alternative, the learned counsel submits that ex.bl partition deed is unconscionable, unjust and improper and the same was obtained by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation and undue-influence taking advantage of the fact that ananthayya was living alone under the care and shelter of the defendant till his death. it is further submitted that after the death of basavayya his two sons ananthayya and satyanarayana continued as joint family and therefore in the absence of unimpeachable evidence that even after execution of ex.b1 partition deed ananthayya and satyanarayana did not live separately, the court should draw presumption that joint family continued to exist. from this point of view the learned counsel submits that oral partition set up by the defendant which was reduced to writing in 1958 never took place and therefore in the absence of any oral partition ex.bl cannot be believed.7. the learned counsel for the defendant/respondent submits that the grounds of fraud, coercion and inequitable partition would be relevant if the plaintiffs admit partition. in this case the plaintiffs deny any partition between ananthayya and satyanarayana and therefore these questions are irrelevant. having regard to the circumstances mentioned in ex.b1 the partition cannot be said to be inequitable. in a suit for partition when plaintiff comes forward praying for a simple partition it is always open to the defendant as a defence to plead prior partition in which event it is for the plaintiff to disprove such partition especially when the prior partition is evidenced by registered document. even after filing the written statement the plaintiffs did not take any steps for amendment of the plaint by filing rejoinder taking the plea of fraud or coercion specifically. in any event, the learned counsel submits that the burden of proof lies on the person who pleads fraud, coercion and misrepresentation and in the absence of any evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs ex.bl is valid. the learned counsel for the respondent also submits that ananthayya, father of the first plaintiff, never questioned ex.b1 during his life time for more than 23 years. the plaintiffs kept quiet till the death of ananthayya and then filed a suit, though he admittedly became major even during the lifetime of ananlhayya.8. having regard to the rival contentions the points that arise for consideration in this appeal are:1. whether the registered partition deed ex.bl is true, valid and binding on the plaintiffs?2. whether the plaintiffs are entitled to contend that ex.b1 partition deed is obtained by fraud, undue-influence and coercion seeking relief of partition? and,3. to what relief?in re points 1 and 2:9. as both the points are inter-related, it is necessary to consider both of them together. the incidental questions as to the validity of the will executed by the mother of the defendant ex.b10, and the question relating to the correctness of the suit schedule property will also be considered.10. the learned counsel for the appellants submits that when the existence of the joint family is admitted the burden lies on the person who denies the joint nature of the properties. therefore, according to the learned counsel when once it is pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs that ananthayya and salyanarayana lived jointly after the death of their father the burden on the defendant to show that the properties are not joint family properties. the law on this question is welt-settled and it is not necessary to refer to all the judgments.11. in bhagwati prasad v. rameshwari kuer, atr 1952 sc 72, the supreme court held:the general principle undoubtedly is that a hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved........ there is no presumption on the plaintiffs side too that because one member of the family separated himself, there has been separation with regard to all. it would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or that they remained united. the burden would undoubtedly lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief.12. in raghavamma v. chenchamma, : [1964]2scr933 , the supreme court held that when once evidence has been adduced on both sides, the burden of proof ceased to have any practical importance. the observations are as under:whether there is a partition in a hindu joint family is, therefore, a question of fact; notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the members of the joint family were separated from the rest, the plaintiff who seeks to get a specified extent of land on the ground that it fell to the share of the testator has to prove that the said extent of land fell to his share; but when evidence has been adduced on both sides, the burden of proof ceases to have any practical importance.13. in mudigowda v. ramachandra, : [1969]3scr245 , the supreme court dealing with the question on burden of proof as to the nature of joint family property, relied on the judgment of the privy council in appalaswami v. suryanarayanamurti, air 1947 pc 189 and observed as under:the law on this aspect of the case is well settled. of course there is no presumption that a hindu family merely because it is joint, possesses any joint property. the burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property is, therefore, in the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparcenery property. but if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. this is however subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. it is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate.14. therefore, having regard to the well settled principles of law, it must be held that in the first instance the burden of proof that any particular property is joint family property is upon the person who claims it as coparcenery property and that there is no presumption that because one member of the family separated himself there has been separation with regard to all. in this case, the oral partition in 1956 was reduced into registered partition deed ex.b1. therefore, in the absence of any unimpeachable evidence, the plaintiffs should fail. the learned trial judge was correct in concluding that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the partition set up by the defendant is not true and valid. further, admittedly basavayya and his three sons constituted joint family. jaggayya, the eldest son partitioned in 1954 or 1955. after that, basavayya, and his other sons continued as joint family till 1956, when according to the defendant there was oral partition, which was reduced into writing and registered on 15-3-1958. in this context, the oral evidence adduced is not of any significant assistance.nonetheless as the learned counsel for the appellants has placed the entire evidence before this court, it is only proper to refer to the oral evidence briefly.15. pw1 is the plaintiff no. 1 himself. admittedly, in 1956 or 1958 he was 16 or 17 years of age and his evidence is not of much help. he does not speak anything against the case set up by the defendant. it could not be possible for him. in the cross-examination indeed he admits that even by the date of death of basavayya, he was not staying in maternal uncle's home and that he does not know whether ananthayya and defendant effected any partition in writing. pw2 is the cousin of the defendant. likewise, pws.3 and 4 are cousins of the defendant and ananthayya. both of them say that ananthayya and satyanarayana were living together jointly and looking after their agriculture. pw3 says that after jaggayya separated from basavayya the latter and the two sons were living jointly. the evidence of pws.2, 3 and 4 pales into insignificance in view of the evidence of dw1 (defendant) who said that after partition also ananthayya was staying with satyanarayana. the mere living together does not lead to any presumption that the property held by both of them was joint family property. as observed by the supreme court whether the property is joint family property or not, is a question of fact and should be proved by cogent and convincing evidence, especially when there is a registered partition deed evidencing partition. dws.2 and 4 are also related to ananthayya and satyanarayana. dw2 was examined to identify the signature of kotaiah who attested ex.blo, will. dw3 says that partition took place between the defendant and his brother basavayya 35 years back and that he was present along with suryadevara amarayya, suryadevara chantayya, kondamaneni nagayya, chirumamilla narasayya. in his cross-examination dw3 also gives details of the joint family properties before partition. dw4 was examined to identify the signature of the second attestor of ex.b 10 will.16. as against the documentary evidence of (ex.bl) which is also supported by the evidence of dw1 and dw3, we have only oral evidence of pws.2, 3 and 4. even the evidence of pw2 who says that ananthayya and satyanarayana were living together as members of the joint family and the evidence of pws.3 and 4 who were not able to say definitely is of no help to the plaintiffs case. be it noted that pw3 expresses ignorance whether or not the property was partitioned by basavayya with his two other sons. similarly, pw4 doubts whether ananthayya and satyanarayana were living jointly throughout. importantly, pw1 in his cross-examination except saying that he does not know whether his father and the defendant effected partition between them, never asserted that the property is joint family property. for these reasons, i must hold that the plaintiffs failed to prove that after the death of basavayya, satyanarayana and ananthayya lived jointly and possessed joint family properties on the date of filing of the suit.17. the next question to be considered is whether ex.bl will has been validly proved. it is indisputable that ex.bl dated 15-3-1958 is a registered document and therefore section 90 of the evidence act is attracted. under ex.b1, the defendant and the father of the first plaintiff executed partition deed and the same was registered on 15-3-1958. it reveals that defendant was unmarried at that time, that as the joint family property is not extensive they orally partitioned in the presence of relatives and elders and enjoying their respective shares since 1956 and so as to avoid any disputes, as to the partition they decided to reduce the oral partition into writing. it was agreed under ex.bl that 'a' schedule property was allotted to the father of the first plaintiff and the property worth about rs.4,000/- was given to the defendant. under ex.b1, the defendant was given responsibility to discharge joint family debt as well as maintaining their mother ptillamma.18. it is no doubt true that except dw1, the defendant, nobody connected with ex.bl was examined. under section 68 of the evidence act, 1872, the necessity of examining attesting witnesses arises only when a document is required by law to be attested. further, even when a document is required to be proved by examining an attesting witness, the same is subject to the condition that the attesting witness is alive and is capable of giving evidence. the proviso under section 68 of the evidence act makes it very clear that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of execution of a document not being a will which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of indian registration act unless its execution is specifically denied by the person who purports to have executed the document. in this case, dw1, the defendant himself speaks about ex.b1. the first plaintiff who is the son of ananthayya, the other executant of ex.bl is denying ex.bl. in these circumstances, the fact that ex.bl is registered and falls within the proviso to section 68 of the evidence act and the fact that dw1 whose evidence is not impeached, goes to show that ex.bl is validly proved.19. further, as per section 90 of the evidence act, no other proof can be insisted upon in proof of recitals of ex.bl. section 90 of the evidence act reads as under:where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.20. if the document to be proved is thirty years old, the court 'may presume' that the signature and any other part of such document which purports to be in handwriting of any particular person is that person's handwriting and that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. section 4 of the evidence act explains that the clause 'may presume' means that the court may presume a fact unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it. the defendant relied on ex.b1 and also section 90 of the evidence act. pw1 however, failed to disprove by duly discharging the burden which absolutely lies on him. therefore, as per section 90, no further proof is required.21. the learned counsel for the appellants submits that having regard to the words 'may presume' used in section 90 of the evidence act, the court should use proper discretion in presuming the document to be proved. it is no doubt true that when something may be presumed, it is for the court to come to the conclusion that it is proved or call upon the party relying on the document to prove it. having regard to the language of section 4 of the evidence act, it is, however, not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that in every case the court is bound to call upon the party relying on the document to prove it. on the other hand, when once a document which is thirty years old is produced and the party relying on the same insists upon the presumption as to its proof under section 90 of the evidence act, the parry who opposes such presumption has to disprove it. if he fails in the attempt to disprove, nothing remains to be done and the court shall have to presume the proof and validity of the document. in a case where the party opposing a document disproves by convincing evidence, then the court is bound to call upon the other party to prove it.22. in lakhi bamah v. padma kanta kalita, : [1996]2scr1043 , the apex court held that if the document which is thirty years old is produced from proper custody, then only the signature on the document can be presumed is denied. it was held:section 90 of the evidence act is founded on necessity and convenience because it is extremely difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature or execution of old documents after lapse of thirty years. in order to obviate such difficulties or improbabilities to prove execution of an old document, section 90 has been incorporated in the evidence act, which does away with the strict rule of proof of private documents. presumption of genuineness may be raised if the document in question is produced from proper custody. it is, however, the discretion of the court to accept the presumption flowing from section 90. there is, however, no manner of doubt that judicial discretion under section 90 should not be exercised arbitrarily and not being informed by reasons.23. the learned counsel for the appellants also relied on the following passage from the judgment of a division bench of madras high court in ramaswami goundan v. subbaraya goundan, air 1948 madras 388.section 90 states that the court may draw the presumption referred to in the section and not that it must draw the presumption, and indeed in many cases, it would be most dangerous to draw the presumption that a document was genuine merely because it was 30 years old according to the recitals in the document and came from proper custody. in such a case the proper course is to mark the document as exhibit without requiring formal proof and then consider, having regard to the evidence and surrounding circumstances, whether it is or is not genuine.24. in ravjappa v. nilakanta rao, air 1962 mys. 53, the learned counsel relied on the following passage:.........hence before raising anypresumption under section 90, great deal of circumspection is necessary lest the balance should be tilted in favour of an undeserving cause. the courts ought to be careful to see that provision is not made the forger's paradise. section 90 states that the court may draw a presumption and not that it must draw a presumption................ in many cases itwould be most dangerous to draw the presumption that a document was genuine merely because it was thirty years old according to the recitals in the document and came from proper custody.25. the learned counsel for the appellants also relied on the judgments of the bombay high court in rangu v. rambha, : air1967bom382 and ghio-ahu v. sheo ratan, : air1981all3 , which are to the same effect.26. the principle in all the judgments is that while drawing presumption, the court should exercise sound discretion having regard to the attendant penumbral circumstances and if there is any doubt as to the signature on the document, the party relying on the document should be called upon to prove the same. in this case, no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to seriously challenge the execution of ex.bl by ananthayya. indeed, the case was laid on the foundation that there was no partition at all. therefore, it is not open to the plaintiffs/appellants to question ex.bl having regard to the fact that after filing of the written statement no effort was made to file a rejoinder and request the trial court to frame a proper issue on the question.27. in this context, it is to be mentioned that the learned counsel for the appellants made elaborate submission on each item of plaint 'a' schedule property, probably to challenge the contention of the defendant that except the properties covered by ex.bl, all other properties were purchased by him subsequent to 1952. in view of my holding that ex.bl is validly proved and the appellants have failed to disprove the partition covered by a registered partition deed, it is not necessary to go into this question including the validity of ex.b10 -un-registered will. when the plaintiffs/ appellants want to challenge the contention of the defendant that mother, pullamma executed ex.b10 giving equal share to ananthayya and defendant, and ananlhayya being given only life interest giving vested remainder in his half share to the defendant, the plaintiffs ought to have taken steps for framing proper issue on the question. the submission with regard to various items of suit schedule property was made only to disprove that the partition was inequitable or unconscionable.28. learned counsel nextly contends that ex.bl was obtained by fraud and coercion. again this court must observe that this question would not arise. if the appellants admit ex.bl, the other question whether it is vitiated by fraud or coercion or whether the partition is inequitable and unconscionable are incidental and related questions. in any event, the alleged inequity in the partition of property cannot be a ground for avoiding ex.b1 on the mere allegations of fraud and coercion.29. the learned counsel for the appellants relied on ratnam chettiar v. s.m. kuppuswqmi, : [1976]1scr863 , in support of the proposition that partition which is detrimental to the interests of minors can always be reopened whatever be the length of time when the partition took place. there cannot be any dispute on the principle. it is accepted principle of hindu law that minor coparceners are also bound by the partition effected by their predecessors-in-title. it is, however, subject to the condition that fraud or misrepresentation or unjust and unfair distribution of the property would only give a cause of action to the minors to challenge the partition subject to law of limitation. the reopening of partition presupposes that minors accept the partition and prove that it is unjust and unfair and detrimental to their interest. in ratnam chettiar's case (supra), the supreme court on consideration of authorities laid down the following principles.(1) a partition effected between the members of the hindu undivided family by their own volition and with their consent cannot be reopened, unless it is shown that the same is obtained by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue influence. in such a case the court should require a strict proof of facts because an act inter vivos cannot be lightly set aside.(2) when the partition is effected between the members of the hindu undivided family which consists of minor coparceners it is binding on the minors also if it is done in good faith and in bonafide manner keeping into account the interests of the minors.(3) where, however, a partition effected between the members of the hindu undivided family which consists of minors is proved to be unjust and unfair and is detrimental to the interests of the minors, the partition can certainly be reopened whatever the length of time when the partition took place. in such a case it is the duty of the court to protect and safeguard the interests of the minors and the onus of proof that the partition was just and fair is on the party supporting the partition.(4) where there is a partition of immovable and movable properties but the two transactions are distinct and separable or have taken place at different times, if it is found that only one of these transactions is unjust and unfair it is open to the court to maintain the transaction which is just and fair and to reopen the partition that is unjust and unfair.30. in the case on hand, the suit was filed for partition alleging that ananthayya, father of first plaintiff and satyanarayana, the defendant continued to live jointly till the death of the former and that they lived together enjoying joint family properties. ex.bl which is a registered deed disproved the case of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs failed to discharge initial burden by cogent, sufficient and satisfactory evidence that ex.bl in any way is invalid. therefore, the plaintiffs . are not entitled to reopen the partition. the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that partition of the property is inequitable has to be rejected having regard to the abundant documentary evidence, exs.b2, b3 and the admission made by pw1 that pullamma was living with the defendant show that the defendant was given more property to discharge the family debts as well as to maintain his mother. the partition cannot be branded as an inequitable, unjust and unfair partition. therefore, point nos.1 and 2 are answered accordingly.31. in the result, the appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs.