Paleru Venkateswarlu and ors. Vs. Pothina Chenchaiah, Chairman of the Trust Board of Pothinavari Tank and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- all india services act, 1951.sections 8 & 11 & a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control rules, 1961, rule 5: [v.v.s. rao, g. yethirajulu & g. bhavani prasad, jj] refusal by landlord to receive rent - deposit of rent in court - held, a tenant has the option to take recourse to section 8 in case of refusal or evasion by landlord to receive rent and if landlord were to not name a bank or refuse even the money order of rent, the tenant can deposit the rent in accordance with sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 5. the notice to person entitled to rent and proper maintenance of accounts of such deposits under sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 5 are solely dependent on compliance with sub-rule (3) by the tenant. the payment or deposit of rent under section 11 read with sub-rule (6) of rule 5 arises only in respect of a tenant who did not take recourse to section 8 or section 9 before an application for eviction has been made against him in respect of any rent in arrears by date of that application, whereas in respect of rent that becomes subsequently due since date of application for eviction, the tenant is bound to pay or deposit regularly until termination of proceedings in order to enable him to contest the application. any violation of section 11(1) to (3) and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 makes the tenant liable for the adverse consequences under sub-section (4) of section 11. thus, the provisions of section 11 and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 are intended only to ensure the payment and deposit of rent including arrears during pendency and till termination of proceedings for eviction. the forfeiture of right of tenant to contest in case of default is to protect the rights and interests of landlord pending such an application for eviction, but not to confer any right on tenant to plead that all defaults committed by him prior to application for eviction can never be considered wilful, if he were to deposit all arrears of rent due within fifteen days under rule 5(6) read with sub-section (1) of section 11. the object and effect of section 11 and sub-rules (1) to (5) to rule 5, the former being for protection of landlord during pendency of eviction proceedings and the later being for protection of tenant to avoid any liability for eviction on ground of wilful default. consequently, while taking recourse to section 8 by tenant is optional, once that option is exercised, compliance with sub-rules (1) to (5) of rule 5 becomes mandatory in the sense that any non-compliance with prescribed procedure will positively indicate the wilful nature of default committed in paying or tendering rent as prescribed. while deposit of rent in terms of provisions of act and the rules amounts to valid tender of rent to landlord, the failure to comply with rule 5 (3) requiring delivery of a copy of the challan for deposit of rent in office of controller or appellate authority, as the case may be, so as to enable controller or appellate authority to cause maintenance of proper accounts under sub-rule (5) and give notice of deposit to person amounts to wilful default in making valid payment or lawful tender of the rent by the tenant to the landlord. thus, where a tenant obtains an order to deposit rent, same shall be deposited at least by the last day of the month following that for which rent is payable and rent challan shall be delivered in the office of controller within a reasonable time so that rent controller can take necessary action for service of notice of deposit under sub-rule (4) of rule 5 of the rules within seven days of such delivery. in the absence of compliance in so depositing rent and delivering challan in the office of controller, tenant shall be deemed to have committed wilful default. - , on the ground of his authority as they are clearly without jurisdiction and are void ab initio and non-est under law.orderb. subhashan reddy, j.1. this writ petition is filed challenging the order of the 2nd respondent herein setting aside the order dated 2-4-1980 passed by the special deputy tahsildar (inams), ongole who is the 3rd respondent herein. the dispute revolves around the agricultural lands and the nature of the rights therein. while the petitioners claim that they were holding the lands in their personal capacity and that they were entitled to have ryotwari pattas, the contra claim was that the lands belonged to the institution and they are inam lands. the law which operates is andhra pradesh (andhra area) inams abolition and conversion act, 1956 (a.p. act no. 37/1956). section 3 confers power on the tahsildar, which according to the definition includes the deputy tahsildar also, to enquire into as to (1) whether a particular land in his jurisdiction is a inam land; (2) whether such land is in ryotwari, zamindari or inam village; and (3) whether such inam land is held by any institution. the enquiry initiated can be suo motu or on application. the 3rd respondent herein purporting to exercise his suo motu powers under the above provision, has initiated proceedings and rendered an order on 2-4-1980 holding that the lands in question are inam lands held by the petitioners and not by the institution. the said proceedings and the said order were on the premise that there were no earlier proceedings of that kind initiated. that is very clear from 3rd paragraph of the order 'in these cases, the old case records of the special deputy tahsildar, bapatla are not forthcoming. there is also no indication to show that the the decision under section 3(3) of the inams (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act, 1956 was issued previously and it was published in the district gazette. therefore, i am obliged to take up suo-motu enquiry in these cases under the inams abolition act, 1956.'2. admittedly, previously, there were proceedings initiated suo motu by the competent special deputy tahsildar in cases numbers 8598,8599,8600, 8601, 8602,8603,8604 and 8605 of 1959 and after due enquiry, the then special deputy tahsildar (inams), bapatla has rendered a decision on 10-3-1960 that the lands in question were inam lands belonging to the institution. in the records produced by the learned government pleader, the said order is found and mr. krishnamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioner also filed a photostat copy of the said order. thus, it is crystal clear that there were earlier proceedings concerning the same subject matter, same lands and same adjudication and it was held that the lands in question belonged to the institution and not to the petitioners and that the petitioners were not entitled for ryotwari pattas.3. i have scanned through the entire scheme of the act referred to above and i am at loss to find any provision enabling the special deputy tahsildar to reinitiate the proceedings even after the initiation of the proceedings suo motu earlier and the decision thereon. as such, the inescapable conclusion is that the entire proceedings initiated by the 3rd respondent culminating into his order dated 2-4-1980, were rightly set aside on valid grounds by the 2nd respondent, i.e., on the ground of his authority as they are clearly without jurisdiction and are void ab initio and non-est under law.4. mr. krishna murthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners, further contends that the earlier order passed on 10-3-1960 by the then inams deputy tahsildar, bapatla had not become final inasmuch as, an appeal was filed in i. a. no. 21/1960 before the appellate authority and that the said order dt. 10-3-1960 passed by the then inams deputy tahsildar, bapatla, cannot be construed as final and binding. i cannot countenance this argument for the simple reason that, admittedly, there is no stay or suspension of this order dated 10-3-1960 by any appellate or superior authority. it is also not shown to me that the appeal was prosecuted further or that it was allowed setting aside the order dated 10-3-1960. in the absence of the same, the irresistable conclusion is that order dated 10-3-1960 passed by the then special deputy tahsildar (inams), bapatla had become final. however, mr. krishnamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners disputes the correctness of the finding of the 2nd respondent in his proceedings that la. no. 21/1960 was returned and was not re-presented and that as such it can be taken that the order dated: 10-3-1960 passed by the deputy tahsildar (inams), bapatia, had become final. his contention is that la. no. 21 / /1960 is still pending. but, there is no trace of any paper so as to indicate the pendency of the said proceedings. however, i am not adjudicating on the fact as to whether the said appeal is pending or disposed of and that is entirely irrelevant so far as the adjudication of this writ petition is concerned and this writ petition is dismissed upholding the order of the 2nd respondent, thus annulling the order of the 3rd respondent only on the ground of jurisdiction and authority of the 3rd respondent to re-initiate the suo motu proceedings under section 3 of the act referred to above.5. the writ petition is dismissed. no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

B. Subhashan Reddy, J.

1. This writ petition is filed challenging the order of the 2nd respondent herein setting aside the order dated 2-4-1980 passed by the Special Deputy Tahsildar (Inams), Ongole who is the 3rd respondent herein. The dispute revolves around the agricultural lands and the nature of the rights therein. While the petitioners claim that they were holding the lands in their personal capacity and that they were entitled to have Ryotwari pattas, the contra claim was that the lands belonged to the institution and they are Inam lands. The law which operates is Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams Abolition and Conversion Act, 1956 (A.P. Act No. 37/1956). Section 3 confers power on the Tahsildar, which according to the definition includes the Deputy Tahsildar also, to enquire into as to (1) whether a particular land in his jurisdiction is a Inam land; (2) whether such land is in Ryotwari, Zamindari or Inam village; and (3) whether such Inam land is held by any institution. The enquiry initiated can be suo motu or on application. The 3rd respondent herein purporting to exercise his suo motu powers under the above provision, has initiated proceedings and rendered an order on 2-4-1980 holding that the lands in question are Inam lands held by the petitioners and not by the institution. The said proceedings and the said order were on the premise that there were no earlier proceedings of that kind initiated. That is very clear from 3rd paragraph of the order 'In these cases, the old case records of the Special Deputy Tahsildar, Bapatla are not forthcoming. There is also no indication to show that the the decision Under Section 3(3) of the Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 was issued previously and it was published in the District Gazette. Therefore, I am obliged to take up suo-motu enquiry in these cases under the Inams Abolition Act, 1956.'

2. Admittedly, previously, there were proceedings initiated suo motu by the competent Special Deputy Tahsildar in cases numbers 8598,8599,8600, 8601, 8602,8603,8604 and 8605 of 1959 and after due enquiry, the then Special Deputy Tahsildar (Inams), Bapatla has rendered a decision on 10-3-1960 that the lands in question were Inam lands belonging to the institution. In the records produced by the learned Government Pleader, the said order is found and Mr. Krishnamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioner also filed a photostat copy of the said order. Thus, it is crystal clear that there were earlier proceedings concerning the same subject matter, same lands and same adjudication and it was held that the lands in question belonged to the institution and not to the petitioners and that the petitioners were not entitled for ryotwari pattas.

3. I have scanned through the entire scheme of the Act referred to above and I am at loss to find any provision enabling the Special Deputy Tahsildar to reinitiate the proceedings even after the initiation of the proceedings suo motu earlier and the decision thereon. As such, the inescapable conclusion is that the entire proceedings initiated by the 3rd respondent culminating into his order dated 2-4-1980, were rightly set aside on valid grounds by the 2nd respondent, i.e., on the ground of his authority as they are clearly without jurisdiction and are void ab initio and non-est under law.

4. Mr. Krishna Murthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners, further contends that the earlier order passed on 10-3-1960 by the then Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Bapatla had not become final inasmuch as, an appeal was filed in I. A. No. 21/1960 before the appellate authority and that the said order dt. 10-3-1960 passed by the then Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Bapatla, cannot be construed as final and binding. I cannot countenance this argument for the simple reason that, admittedly, there is no stay or suspension of this order dated 10-3-1960 by any appellate or superior authority. It is also not shown to me that the appeal was prosecuted further or that it was allowed setting aside the order dated 10-3-1960. In the absence of the same, the irresistable conclusion is that order dated 10-3-1960 passed by the then Special Deputy Tahsildar (Inams), Bapatla had become final. However, Mr. Krishnamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners disputes the correctness of the finding of the 2nd respondent in his proceedings that LA. No. 21/1960 was returned and was not re-presented and that as such it can be taken that the order dated: 10-3-1960 passed by the Deputy Tahsildar (Inams), Bapatia, had become final. His contention is that LA. No. 21 / /1960 is still pending. But, there is no trace of any paper so as to indicate the pendency of the said proceedings. However, I am not adjudicating on the fact as to whether the said appeal is pending or disposed of and that is entirely irrelevant so far as the adjudication of this writ petition is concerned and this writ petition is dismissed upholding the order of the 2nd respondent, thus annulling the order of the 3rd respondent only on the ground of jurisdiction and authority of the 3rd respondent to re-initiate the suo motu proceedings under Section 3 of the Act referred to above.

5. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.