Muramalla Ammannaraju Vs. Babba Seetaratnam and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- all india services act, 1951.sections 8 & 11 & a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control rules, 1961, rule 5: [v.v.s. rao, g. yethirajulu & g. bhavani prasad, jj] refusal by landlord to receive rent - deposit of rent in court - held, a tenant has the option to take recourse to section 8 in case of refusal or evasion by landlord to receive rent and if landlord were to not name a bank or refuse even the money order of rent, the tenant can deposit the rent in accordance with sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 5. the notice to person entitled to rent and proper maintenance of accounts of such deposits under sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 5 are solely dependent on compliance with sub-rule (3) by the tenant. the payment or deposit of rent under section 11 read with sub-rule (6) of rule 5 arises only in respect of a tenant who did not take recourse to section 8 or section 9 before an application for eviction has been made against him in respect of any rent in arrears by date of that application, whereas in respect of rent that becomes subsequently due since date of application for eviction, the tenant is bound to pay or deposit regularly until termination of proceedings in order to enable him to contest the application. any violation of section 11(1) to (3) and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 makes the tenant liable for the adverse consequences under sub-section (4) of section 11. thus, the provisions of section 11 and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 are intended only to ensure the payment and deposit of rent including arrears during pendency and till termination of proceedings for eviction. the forfeiture of right of tenant to contest in case of default is to protect the rights and interests of landlord pending such an application for eviction, but not to confer any right on tenant to plead that all defaults committed by him prior to application for eviction can never be considered wilful, if he were to deposit all arrears of rent due within fifteen days under rule 5(6) read with sub-section (1) of section 11. the object and effect of section 11 and sub-rules (1) to (5) to rule 5, the former being for protection of landlord during pendency of eviction proceedings and the later being for protection of tenant to avoid any liability for eviction on ground of wilful default. consequently, while taking recourse to section 8 by tenant is optional, once that option is exercised, compliance with sub-rules (1) to (5) of rule 5 becomes mandatory in the sense that any non-compliance with prescribed procedure will positively indicate the wilful nature of default committed in paying or tendering rent as prescribed. while deposit of rent in terms of provisions of act and the rules amounts to valid tender of rent to landlord, the failure to comply with rule 5 (3) requiring delivery of a copy of the challan for deposit of rent in office of controller or appellate authority, as the case may be, so as to enable controller or appellate authority to cause maintenance of proper accounts under sub-rule (5) and give notice of deposit to person amounts to wilful default in making valid payment or lawful tender of the rent by the tenant to the landlord. thus, where a tenant obtains an order to deposit rent, same shall be deposited at least by the last day of the month following that for which rent is payable and rent challan shall be delivered in the office of controller within a reasonable time so that rent controller can take necessary action for service of notice of deposit under sub-rule (4) of rule 5 of the rules within seven days of such delivery. in the absence of compliance in so depositing rent and delivering challan in the office of controller, tenant shall be deemed to have committed wilful default. - moreover, section 16 (2) clearly lays down that the order passed by the appellate authority in appeal shall become final. for this purpose, the revenue authorities were empowered to act as special officers to resolve the disputes, if any arise, between the landlord and the tenant, as they are well acquainted with the cultivation and other activities. so, the intention of the legislature in entrusting the powers to revenue personnel can be clearly inferred and a conclusion can safely be arrived at with regard to their status that the statute also regard the tahsildars as quasi-judicial authorities. so, the scheme and object of the act and the nature of the functions to be discharged by the tahsildar, clearly shows that the authorities are not civil courts but are only tribunals. it is further clear that like wise, in the absence of any specific notification empowering the district judge to act as vacation civil judge, he cannot act as appellate authority under the act.orderg. radhakrishna rao, j.1. this revision is directed against the judgment of the learned district judge, at rajahmundry in a.t.a. no. 15 of 1992 allowing the same and granting interim injunction against the revision petitioner in i.a.no. 365 of 1991 in a.t.c. no. 31/1991.2. the first respondent had taken a preliminary objection before the learned single judge of this court contending that since the proceedings arose out of andhra tenancy act, revision is not maintainable under section 115 c.p.c. the learned single judge n.d. patnaik, j., in his order dated 5-3-1993 observed as follows:-' since this question involves a matter of considerable importance under the andhra tenancy act, i feel that it is desirable that an authoritative pronouncement by a division bench on this aspect is required. i, therefore, refer the following questions for decision by a division bench:1. whether a revision lies to the high court tinder section 115 c.p.c. against an order passed by the district judge under section 16 (2) of a.p. (andhra area) tenancy act?2. if no revision lies under section 115 c.p.c what is the remedy of the aggrieved party - is it by way of filing a revision petition under article 227 of the constitution of india or a writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india? 'hence, the present revision has come up before us for adjudication.3. it is contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent sri m.v. durga prasad that the term 'district judge' is not synonymous to the term 'district court' and when appeal lies under the tenancy act to the district judge, he is only appointed as persona designata under the act as appellate authority under the act, but the appeal does not lie to the court of district judge, which is subordinate to the high court, and the revision, therefore, does not lie under section 115 c.p.c. to substantiate his contention, he referred to the various relevant provisions of the code of civil procedure, andhra pradesh (andhra area) tenancy act and andhra pradesh civil courts act, 1972, which will be dealt with at appropriate point of time. the learned counsel further contended that as per the scheme of the a.p. (andhra area) tenancy act, though judicial officers are appointed to adjudicate the disputes under the act, but they were appointed as persona designata and as such they are not vested with the jurisdiction that is conferred on a civil court. he drew our attention to section 16 (1) of the said a.p. (andhra area) tenancy act, which provides that -'any dispute arising under this act between a landlord and a cultivating tenant, including any question relating to the determination of fair rent or the eviction of a cultivating tenant shall, on application by the landlord or the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, be decided by the special officer after making an inquiry in the manner prescribed.'special officer is defined in section 2 (j) as any judicial officer not below the rank of a district munsif appointed by the government in consultation with the high court to perform the functions of a special officer under the act.4. as per section 16 (2) -'against any order passed by the special officer under sub-section (1), an appeal shall lie to the district judge,......and the decision of the district judge on such appeal shall be final. 'it is contended by sri m.v. durga prasad that even though a judicial officer of the rank of a district munsif is appointed to act as special officer under the provisions of the tenancy act to adjudicate the disputes under the act, he does not function as a civil court but functions only as a tribunal, as the provisions of c.p.c. & a.p. civil courts act make distinction between court & judge. he further contended that similarly, the appellate authority i.e., the district judge, who is appointed to act only as persona designata, does not function as a civil court but function only as a tribunal, and therefore, no revision lies under section 115 c.p.c. to this court from the order of such a tribunal.5. on the other hand, it is vehemently contended on behalf of the revision petitioner sri m.s.k. sastry, that since the provisions of the code of civil procedure are made applicable to the enquiries under the act, it is deemed to be a civil court and so a revision lies under section 115 c.p.c. for the purpose, he drew our attention to the provisions of rule 18 of a.p. (andhra area) tenancy rules, 1980, wherein it is provided that:'all proceedings before the special officer or the district judge under the act shall be summary and shall be governed, as far as may be, by the provisions of the code of civil procedure.'he further contended that the expression' judge' is synonymous with 'court' and so no distinction can be made between a 'district judge' and a 'district court'. he, therefore, contended that revision lies under section 115 of the c.p.c. he has further pointed out that under the a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act also a district munsif is appointed as the rent controller and appeal lies to the appellate authority who is the subordinate judge and they function as tribunal under the act, he similarly contended that there are some other enactments also under which the judicial officers are appointed to function as tribunals, but they are civil courts amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the high court under section 115 c.p.c.6. in the wake of the above rival contentions put forth before us, the point that is to be decided now is whether the district munsif and the district judge, appointed under the act, function as the presiding officers of a civil court or a tribunal. if it is held that they are tribunals and not civil courts, the provisions of section 115 c.p.c. cannot be invoked by the revision petitioner.7. the learned judge sri n.d. patnaik perused the judgement rendered by rama rao,j., as he then was, in c.r.p. no, 2740 of 1981 dated 9-7-1982, in which a similar question arose before the learned judge as to whether the authorities constituted under the tenancy act are civil courts or tribunals. in the said c.r.p., it was held by rama rao, j., as follows:-'the signs or scars of persona designata are not visible even to the microscopic vision. the indicia attributed to the constitution of persona designata namely the conferment of powers on a perticular and specific authority by name or to an individual without any reference to any statute are not present. on the other hand, the notification empowers all district munsif and it is abundantly clear that all district munsifs having teritorial jurisdiction under the civil courts act have been assigned the powers under this special enactment and exercise and modulation of functions are similar. the pattern in entrusting the original jurisdiction to district munsifs and the appellate jurisdiction to district judge has close affinity to civil procedure code. the judicial activism embracing all the requisite facets is injected into the act.'it is further held by rama rao, j., as follows:-'the district munsifs and the district judges courts have been entrusted with certain powers in addition to the powers that are exercised under c.p.c. and other enactment. in the course of exercise of such powers the courts are essentially civil courts exercising additional powers and they are not stripped of the characterists and incidents of civil courts.'however, the learned judge patnaik, j., differed with the view expressed by rama rao, j., in c.r.p.no. 2740 of 1981. it must be noted here itself that prior to the amendment to the a.p. (a.a) tenancy act, 1956 the tenancy courts presided over by the tahsildars and the revenue divisional officers were not considered as courts, but were considered only as tribunals. by virtue of the amendment to the above act, brought under act no. 39 of 1974, the expressions 'tahsildars' and 'revenue divisional officers' were substituted by the words 'special officers' and 'district judges', and the government, in exercise of the powers conferred under the act, by a notification, appoints the district munsif s as special officers under the act, and the district judges as the appellate authority. so except the change brought in by the legislature by replacing the judicial officers in the place of revenue personnel through the amendment act no. 39 of 1974, there is no other change in the act in regard to the applicability, scope or the nature of the act. so, the position as was prevailing prior to the amendment, that the tenancy courts presided over by the revenue personnel are not the civil courts still continues even after the amendment act came into force.8. it is not out of place to refer to the judgment of a division bench of this court, which dealt with the similar question. chandra reddy, c.j. delivering his judgment on behalf of the division bench to which srinivasachary, ]., was the other party, in jagannadha rao v. venkateswara rao, : air1960ap49 , which arose out of an order passed by the revenue divisional officer in an appeal against the order of the tahsildar under section 16 of the andhra tenancy act, held as follows:-'it is only courts that are subject to the authority of the high court that could answer the description of 'courts' indicated in section 115 c.p.c., and that section would not take in tribunals empowered to discharge quasi-judicial functions. the position of a tahsildaror a revenue divisional officer discharging functions under section 16 of the andhra tenancy act cannot be equated to that of a court, since they do not fall within the category of courts enumerated in the madras civil courts act. the tribunals in question are not civil courts subordinate to the high court for purposes of section 115 of the civil procedure code and as such their orders cannot be revised under that section.'9. in lakshmanan chettiar v. kannappar,air 1927 madras 93 (f.b.) it is made clear that -'under the municipal act and the rules framed under it, the chief judge of the small cause court for this purpose is persona designata and not merely a selected member of the court chosen to represent it and therefore the high court has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against his order.'10. the effect of the decisions rendered in jagannadha rao v. venkateswara rao, : air1960ap49 and lakshmanan chettiar v. kannappar, air 1927 madras 93 (f.b.) is that even if a district judge is appointed under this act, he functions under this act as persona designata and his order is, therefore, not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the high court. the criteria for judging whether the high court can exercise its jurisdiction over any other court is hinged on the determination of the aspect whether the tribunal is subordinate to the high court or not. for this purpose, the provisions of section 12 and section 10 of the andhra pradesh civil courts act, 1972 are to the gone into. section 12 reads as follows:-'12. establishment of courts of subordinate judges and district munsifs:-(1) the government may, after consultation with the high court, by notification, establish such number of courts of subordinate judges and district munsifs as they may deem necessary for each district in the state other than the district of hyderabad.(2) the government may, from time to time, likewise abolish any such court established under this section.'section 10 reads as follows:-'10. eastablishment of district courts:-(1) the government may, after consultation with the high court, by notification, establish such number of district courts as they may deem necessary and appoint a district judge for each district court.(2) the government may, from time to time, likewise abolish any district court established under this section.'as far as the district of hyderabad is concerned, section 3 of the a.p. civil courts act provides:' 3. establishment of a city civil court:-(1) the government may, after consultation with the high court by notification, establish a court to be called the city civil court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of subject to the provisions of this act, all suits and proceedings of a civil nature arising in the district of hyderabad.(2) the city civil court existing on the date of the commencement of this act shall be deemed to have been established under sub-section (1).'so, as per the provisions of the a.p. civil courts act, courts which will try and dispose of the suits and proceedings of a civil nature are termed as civil courts and such civil courts are subordinate to the high court, as per the provisions of section 3 of the civil procedure code.11. but there is no such provision in the a.p. (a.a) tenancy act to the effect that the special officers or the district judges, appointed under the said tenancy act, are subordinates to the high court. moreover, section 16 (2) clearly lays down that the order passed by the appellate authority in appeal shall become final. so, the intention of the statute is clear from the above provision that the dispute must come to an end in the appellate stage itself. a perusal of the provisions of the code of civil procedure shows that the provisions of c.p.c. will be applicable to all courts and tribunals in their entirety, but when there is specific provision in any act prescribing a certain procedure to be followed, the specific provision will prevail. a perusal of the provisions of the tenancy act makes it abundantly clear that the act is silent and does not confer any revisional jurisdiction to the high court over the orders passed by the special officers and the appellate authorities, functioning under the act. moreover, section 17 of the a.p. (a.a) tenancy act says that the provisions of this act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law, custom, usage, agreement, or decree or order of a court. it all goes to show that the act intends to give finality to the decisions passed by the appellate authority then and there itself and so, the invocation of the provisions of the code of civil procedure and filing of a revision under section 115 c.p.c. does not arise. our view is supported by the judgment, which was rendered way back in the year 1929 itself, in gaya prasad v. kalnp nath, air 1929 oudh 389 (f.b.) and in paidayyu v. murlidhar, : air1961ap498 . the full bench in gaya prasad v. kalap nath, air 1929 oudh 389 (f.b.) held that:-'the act does not provide for any third appeals or for revisions from the decisions of the district judges in such cases. the district judge exercises the function of a revenue court in hearing such appeals.'' the court of the district judge sitting as a court of revenue in deciding such rent appeals is not a court subordinate to the chief court unless there is any provision in the oudh rent act itself which makes it so subordinate. in section 119 oudh rent act the court of the district judge is given powers to hear appeals from decrees, orders of collectors or assistant collectors, 1st class in certain suits filed under section 108 oudh rent act and section 119-b oudh rent act lays down that from such judgments and decrees by a district judge, an appeal shall lie to the chief court of oudh in all cases in which a second appeal is allowed by the code of civil procedure and subject to the provisions of the indian limitation act of 1908.'12. sri rama rao, j., considered the decision in jagannada rao v. venkateswara rao (1 supra), and drew a distinction by holding that the said decision was concerned with the position anterior to the amendment of the act, mat subsequent to the amendment, the powers are conferred on the district munsif and district judge, and mat the tahsildars and revenue divisional officers before the amendment are essentially administrative tribunals and despite the quasi-judicial functions and trappings of the court they cannot be elevated to the status of civil courts.- however, he observed that, the district munsifs and the district judges courts have been entrusted with certain powers in addition to the powers that are exercised under cpc and other enactments, and therefore, the district munsifs and district courts are esentially civil courts for the purpose of this act. but, in view of our finding at page 8 of the judgment and in view of the settled principles of law laid down in jagannadha rao v. venknteswara rao (1 supra) and lakshmanan chettiar v. kannappar(2 supra), we are of the view that rama rao, j., went on a wrong aproach and the judgment rendered by him in crp no 2740 of 1981 has, in effect and in substance, run contrary to the dicisions rendered in the above two celebrated decisions. in view of the above discussion, we hold that a revision does not lie to the high court under section 115 of the code of civil procedure against the orders of the district munsifs and district judges passed under the a.p. (a. a) tenancy act.13. it is contended by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent sri m.v. durga prasad, that the district munsifs and the district judges are appointed only as persona designata and as such, they cannot be termed as civil courts and in which case the same are not subordinate to the high court, and therefore, the revision does not lie to the high court. he relied upon a dissenting judgment rendered by sri t.l.n. reddy, j., in crp no 3011 of 1980 and also the decision rendered in lakshmanan chettiar v. kannappar (2 supra).14. on the other hand, the learned counsel for tine revision petitioner sri m.s.k. sastry, contends that 'court' and the 'judge' are one and the same, that a judge named by his office or designation in the particular act is not persona designata but is only a court, and that if any perticular person by name is designated as an authority, then only he can be called as persona designata. for this purpose, he relied upon the dissenting judgment of sri p. a. choudary, j., rendered in crp no. 3011 of 1980; the judgment in new jaji labour society v. haji abdul raliaman saheb, : 1992(1)alt112 ; s. srinivasa rao v. high court of a.p.,1988 (2) alt 586; g. manikyamma v. t. seethramaiah, 1988 (2) alt 333 and c. ramachandra reddy v. s. aswathanarayana, : 1993(1)alt585 .15. kumarayya, j., in ramachandra rao v. state of madras, air 1962 a.p. 58 thoroughly dealt with the meaning of the expression persona designata, and held as follows:-'the expression persona designata connotes a person pointed out by name or other personal description in contradistinction to one whose identity is to be ascertained by the office which he holds. if a person be a judicial officer and is intended by the statute to act not otherwise than in a judicial capacity or court of civil jurisdiction, he cannot come within the expression 'persona designata' so that he may, irrespective of his continuance in office, perform the duty. the question whether such a person is a persona designata or not depends upon the intention to be gathered from the words used, nature of the functions to be performed and object and purpose of the statute.'in order to find out whether the authorities, appointed under the tenancy act, are persona designata or not, it is necessary to examine the scope and object of the tenancy act. on a plain reading of the provisions of the andhra pradesh (andhra area) tenancy act, it is clear that the act is made with a view to see that fair rent is fixed and paid by the cultivating tenants in our state. for this purpose, the revenue authorities were empowered to act as special officers to resolve the disputes, if any arise, between the landlord and the tenant, as they are well acquainted with the cultivation and other activities. so, the intention of the legislature in entrusting the powers to revenue personnel can be clearly inferred and a conclusion can safely be arrived at with regard to their status that the statute also regard the tahsildars as quasi-judicial authorities. it is also to be noted that the powers of the tahsildars are very limited under the act. their duty is to see that fair rent is fixed and paid to the landlords and nothing more or nothing else. they are not empowered to decide the aspect of title or some such thing, which involves adjudication of title, as the same is to be done by a civil court and not by a tribunal, which is established with limited powers. so, the scheme and object of the act and the nature of the functions to be discharged by the tahsildar, clearly shows that the authorities are not civil courts but are only tribunals. the same view was expressed as long back as in the year 1959 by this court and held that tahsildars are not civil courts but are only tribunals. the learned counsel sri m.s.k. sastry cannot take advantage of the situation, which arose after the amendment to the tenancy act, under which the judicial officers are entrusted to deal with the matters that arise under the tenancy act, replacing the revenue authorities. it is only done to implement the act in a more effective and impartial manner and so the revenue authorities are replaced by judicial officers. this view of ours finds support from the decision in jaganmdha rao v. venkateswara rao (1 supra). so, the argument of the learned counsel sri m.s.k. sastry that as a civil court is appointed to discharge the functions under the act, the authority holding the post of such civil court can be termed as civil court for all purposes and especially, for the purposes of the present tenancy act, is not correct. it must be pointed out here that except the entrustment of the powers to the judicial officers, there is no change in the nature, scope and the object of the statute. as already pointed out by us, the position which prevailed prior to the amendment with regard to the nature of the duties and the functions of the authority appointed under the act, is therefore prevailing as it is even after the amendment and as such, we hold that, the district munsif discharging the functions under the act is only a persona designata and he cannot be termed as civil court.16. sri m.v. durga prasad, contends that the vacation civil judge has no power to receive the appeal in the capacity of an appellate authority for the purpose of the tenancy act, as the vacation civil judge is not empowered under this act to receive the appeals that arise under the act. he, for this purpose, drew our attention to the provisions of section 32 of the andhra pradesh civil courts act.17. on the other hand, sri m.s.k. sastry contends that the vacation civil judge is having power to receive and entertain the appeals under the tenancy act, and for this purpose, he relied upon the judgment in v.k. viswanadam v. t.v. sarveswara rao, 1981 (2) aplj 362 and also the dissenting judgment of p. a. choudary, ]., rendered in crp no. 3011 of 1980, in which it was laid down as follows:-'it would serve the purpose of section 32 of the a.p. civil courts act 19 of 1972 and act 18 of 1956 if provisions of the two acts are reconciled holding a district munsif takes cognizance of the proceedings under act 18 of 1956. otherwise when a district munsif's court is closed for vacation, there will not be any forum available in law to a litigant for seeking remedy. therefore, the vacation civil judge had power to pass orders on the application filed under section 16 of the andhra tenancy act.'18. in this connection, the language that was adopted in section32 of the a.p. civil courts act has to be taken into consideration to find out the functions of a vacation civil judge. for this purpose, section 32 is extracted here below:-' 32. appointment of vacation civil judge.(1) notwithstanding anything in this act or in the code of civil procedure, 1908, the high court may for the duration of the adjournment of any district court in summer, appoint for such district court a vacation civil judge not below the rank of a district judge or the government may, after consultation with the high court so appoint a vacation civil judge not below the rank of a subordinate judge.(2) (a) the local limits of the jurisdiction of the vacation civil judge shallbe the same as those of the district court concerned, (b) the jurisdiction of the vacation civil judge shall extend to all suits, appeals and other proceeding pending in, or cognizable by, any court (whether a district court, a court of subordinate judge or a court of district munsif) in the disstrict concerned when such court is adjourned for summer vacation.(3) ............(4) ............(5) .............(6) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (5), any appeal from the judgment, decree or order of the court of the vacation civil judge shall, when such appeal is allowed by law, lie to the high court.'so, on a plain reading of section 32 of the said a.p. civil courts act, it is clear that a notification will be issued appointing vacation civil judges, and the officer appointed under the act as vacation civil judge will exercise the powers of a civil court and his jurisdiction is extended to all suits, appeals and other proceedings pending in, or cognizable by, any court whether it is a district court, or a subordinate judge's court or a district munsif's court in the district concerned when such court is adjourned for summer vacation. further, for the purpose of the tenancy act, the district munsifs were appointed as special officers and the district judges were appointed as appellate authority, in exercise of the powers conferred by the a.p. (a.a) tenancy act, by issuing a separate notification. but, no notification is forthcoming empowering the vacation civil judge to act as appellate authority under the tenancy act. unless and until specific notification is issued by a competent authority, the judicial officers cannot acquire any powers under the act to act as special officers or appellate authority and they cannot discharge the functions as such under the act. it is further clear that like wise, in the absence of any specific notification empowering the district judge to act as vacation civil judge, he cannot act as appellate authority under the act. for these reasons, we hold that the view taken by raghuvir j., in v.k. viswanadam vs . t.v. sarveswara rao (10 supra), that when a district munsif's court or subordinate judge's court is closed in vacation, the vacation civil judge has power to pass orders as appellate authority under the act, cannot be said to be made on sound lines. in such a case, there is no other alternative for the litigant to seek remedy and in such a case it is for the government to remove such difficulty by issuing a special notification empowering the vacation civil judges also to act as special officer and appellate authority under the act. in view of our discussion, we hold on this point also that the vacation civil judge, who received the appeal in this case, has no power to receive the same, in the absence of any notification under the act, to do so.18. in view of our foregoing discussion, we hold that the district munsifs or the district judges discharging functions under the andhra pradesh (andhra area) tenancy act are not civil courts but only tribunals, and as such, we hold that a revision does not lie to the high court under section 115 of the code of civil procedure against the orders passed by such tribunals, as the tribunals are not subordinates to the high court. we further hold that the remedy available to the litigant is only to file a revision petition under article 227 of the constitution or a writ petition under article 226. thus, the present revision is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.20. accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

G. Radhakrishna Rao, J.

1. This revision is directed against the Judgment of the learned District Judge, at Rajahmundry in A.T.A. No. 15 of 1992 allowing the same and granting interim injunction against the revision petitioner in I.A.No. 365 of 1991 in A.T.C. No. 31/1991.

2. The first respondent had taken a preliminary objection before the learned Single Judge of this Court contending that since the proceedings arose out of Andhra Tenancy Act, revision is not maintainable under Section 115 C.P.C. The learned Single Judge N.D. Patnaik, J., in his order dated 5-3-1993 observed as follows:-

' Since this question involves a matter of considerable importance under the Andhra Tenancy Act, I feel that it is desirable that an authoritative pronouncement by a Division Bench on this aspect is required. I, therefore, refer the following questions for decision by a Division Bench:

1. Whether a revision lies to the High Court tinder Section 115 C.P.C. against an order passed by the District Judge Under Section 16 (2) of A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act?

2. If no revision lies under Section 115 C.P.C what is the remedy of the aggrieved party - is it by way of filing a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? '

Hence, the present revision has come up before us for adjudication.

3. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the first respondent Sri M.V. Durga Prasad that the term 'District Judge' is not synonymous to the term 'District Court' and when appeal lies under the Tenancy Act to the District Judge, he is only appointed as persona designata under the Act as appellate authority under the Act, but the appeal does not lie to the Court of District Judge, which is subordinate to the High Court, and the revision, therefore, does not lie under Section 115 C.P.C. To substantiate his contention, he referred to the various relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act and Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, which will be dealt with at appropriate point of time. The learned Counsel further contended that as per the scheme of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, though judicial officers are appointed to adjudicate the disputes under the Act, but they were appointed as persona designata and as such they are not vested with the jurisdiction that is conferred on a Civil Court. He drew our attention to Section 16 (1) of the said A.P. (Andhra area) Tenancy Act, which provides that -

'Any dispute arising under this Act between a landlord and a cultivating tenant, including any question relating to the determination of fair rent or the eviction of a cultivating tenant shall, on application by the landlord or the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, be decided by the Special Officer after making an inquiry in the manner prescribed.'

Special Officer is defined in Section 2 (j) as any Judicial Officer not below the rank of a District Munsif appointed by the Government in consultation with the High Court to perform the functions of a Special Officer under the Act.

4. As per Section 16 (2) -

'Against any order passed by the Special Officer under Sub-section (1), an appeal shall lie to the District Judge,......and the decision of the District Judge on such appeal shall be final. '

It is contended by Sri M.V. Durga Prasad that even though a Judicial Officer of the rank of a District Munsif is appointed to act as Special Officer under the provisions of the Tenancy Act to adjudicate the disputes under the Act, he does not function as a Civil Court but functions only as a Tribunal, as the provisions of C.P.C. & A.P. Civil Courts Act make distinction between Court & Judge. He further contended that similarly, the appellate authority i.e., the District Judge, who is appointed to act only as persona designata, does not function as a Civil Court but function only as a Tribunal, and therefore, no revision lies under Section 115 C.P.C. to this court from the order of such a Tribunal.

5. On the other hand, it is vehemently contended on behalf of the revision petitioner Sri M.S.K. Sastry, That since the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the enquiries under the Act, it is deemed to be a civil court and so a revision lies under Section 115 C.P.C. For the purpose, he drew our attention to the provisions of Rule 18 of A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Rules, 1980, wherein it is provided that:

'All proceedings before the Special Officer or the District Judge under the Act shall be summary and shall be governed, as far as may be, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.'

He further contended that the expression' Judge' is synonymous with 'Court' and so no distinction can be made between a 'District Judge' and a 'District Court'. He, therefore, contended that revision lies under Section 115 of the C.P.C. He has further pointed out that under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act also a District Munsif is appointed as the Rent Controller and appeal lies to the appellate authority who is the Subordinate Judge and they function as Tribunal under the Act, He similarly contended that there are some other enactments also under which the judicial officers are appointed to function as Tribunals, but they are civil Courts amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C.

6. In the wake of the above rival contentions put forth before us, the point that is to be decided now is whether the District Munsif and the District Judge, appointed under the Act, function as the presiding officers of a civil Court or a tribunal. If it is held that they are Tribunals and not civil Courts, the provisions of Section 115 C.P.C. cannot be invoked by the revision petitioner.

7. The learned Judge Sri N.D. Patnaik perused the Judgement rendered by Rama Rao,J., as he then was, in C.R.P. No, 2740 of 1981 dated 9-7-1982, in which a similar question arose before the learned Judge as to whether the authorities constituted under the Tenancy Act are Civil Courts or Tribunals. In the said C.R.P., it was held by Rama Rao, J., as follows:-

'The signs or scars of persona designata are not visible even to the microscopic vision. The indicia attributed to the constitution of persona designata namely the conferment of powers on a perticular and specific authority by name or to an individual without any reference to any statute are not present. On the other hand, the notification empowers all District Munsif and it is abundantly clear that all District Munsifs having teritorial jurisdiction under the Civil Courts Act have been assigned the powers under this special enactment and exercise and modulation of functions are similar. The pattern in entrusting the original jurisdiction to District Munsifs and the appellate jurisdiction to District Judge has close affinity to Civil Procedure Code. The judicial activism embracing all the requisite facets is injected into the Act.'

It is further held by Rama Rao, J., as follows:-

'The District Munsifs and the District Judges Courts have been entrusted with certain powers in addition to the powers that are exercised under C.P.C. and other enactment. In the course of exercise of such powers the courts are essentially civil courts exercising additional powers and they are not stripped of the characterists and incidents of civil courts.'

However, the learned Judge Patnaik, J., differed with the view expressed by Rama Rao, J., in C.R.P.No. 2740 of 1981. It must be noted here itself that prior to the amendment to the A.P. (A.A) Tenancy Act, 1956 the tenancy Courts presided over by the Tahsildars and the Revenue Divisional Officers were not considered as Courts, but were considered only as Tribunals. By virtue of the amendment to the above Act, brought under Act No. 39 of 1974, the expressions 'Tahsildars' and 'Revenue Divisional Officers' were substituted by the words 'Special Officers' and 'District Judges', and the Government, in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act, by a notification, appoints the District Munsif s as Special Officers under the Act, and the District Judges as the appellate authority. So except the change brought in by the Legislature by replacing the Judicial Officers in the place of revenue personnel through the amendment Act No. 39 of 1974, there is no other change in the Act in regard to the applicability, scope or the nature of the Act. So, the position as was prevailing prior to the amendment, that the tenancy Courts presided over by the Revenue personnel are not the civil Courts still continues even after the amendment Act came into force.

8. It is not out of place to refer to the Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, which dealt with the similar question. Chandra Reddy, C.J. delivering his Judgment on behalf of the Division Bench to which Srinivasachary, ]., was the other party, in Jagannadha Rao v. Venkateswara Rao, : AIR1960AP49 , which arose out of an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in an appeal against the order of the Tahsildar under Section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy Act, held as follows:-

'It is only Courts that are subject to the authority of the High Court that could answer the description of 'Courts' indicated in Section 115 C.P.C., and that section would not take in Tribunals empowered to discharge quasi-judicial functions. The position of a Tahsildaror a Revenue Divisional Officer discharging functions under Section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy Act cannot be equated to that of a Court, since they do not fall within the category of Courts enumerated in the Madras Civil Courts Act. The tribunals in question are not Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court for purposes of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and as such their orders cannot be revised under that section.'

9. In Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Kannappar,AIR 1927 Madras 93 (F.B.) it is made clear that -

'Under the Municipal Act and the Rules framed under it, the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court for this purpose is persona designata and not merely a selected member of the Court chosen to represent it and therefore the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against his order.'

10. The effect of the decisions rendered in Jagannadha Rao v. Venkateswara Rao, : AIR1960AP49 and Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Kannappar, AIR 1927 Madras 93 (F.B.) is that even if a District Judge is appointed under this Act, he functions under this Act as persona designata and his order is, therefore, not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The criteria for judging whether the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction over any other Court is hinged on the determination of the aspect whether the Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court or not. For this purpose, the provisions of Section 12 and Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 are to the gone into. Section 12 reads as follows:-

'12. Establishment of Courts of Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs:-

(1) the Government may, after consultation with the High Court, by notification, establish such number of Courts of Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs as they may deem necessary for each district in the State other than the district of Hyderabad.

(2) The Government may, from time to time, likewise abolish any such court established under this section.'

Section 10 reads as follows:-

'10. Eastablishment of District Courts:-

(1) The Government may, after consultation with the High Court, by notification, establish such number of District Courts as they may deem necessary and appoint a District Judge for each District Court.

(2) The Government may, from time to time, likewise abolish any District Court established under this section.'

As far as the district of Hyderabad is concerned, Section 3 of the A.P. Civil Courts Act provides:

' 3. Establishment of a City Civil Court:-

(1) The Government may, after consultation with the High Court by notification, establish a Court to be called the City Civil Court with Jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of subject to the provisions of this Act, all suits and proceedings of a civil nature arising in the district of Hyderabad.

(2) The City Civil Court existing on the date of the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been established under Sub-section (1).'

So, as per the provisions of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, Courts which will try and dispose of the suits and proceedings of a civil nature are termed as civil Courts and such civil Courts are subordinate to the High Court, as per the provisions of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.

11. But there is no such provision in the A.P. (A.A) Tenancy Act to the effect that the Special Officers or the District Judges, appointed under the said Tenancy Act, are subordinates to the High Court. Moreover, Section 16 (2) clearly lays down that the order passed by the appellate authority in appeal shall become final. So, the intention of the Statute is clear from the above provision that the dispute must come to an end in the appellate stage itself. A perusal of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that the provisions of C.P.C. will be applicable to all Courts and Tribunals in their entirety, but when there is specific provision in any Act prescribing a certain procedure to be followed, the specific provision will prevail. A perusal of the provisions of the Tenancy Act makes it abundantly clear that the Act is silent and does not confer any revisional jurisdiction to the High Court over the orders passed by the Special Officers and the appellate authorities, functioning under the Act. Moreover, Section 17 of the A.P. (A.A) Tenancy Act says that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law, custom, usage, agreement, or decree or order of a Court. It all goes to show that the Act intends to give finality to the decisions passed by the appellate authority then and there itself and so, the invocation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and filing of a revision under Section 115 C.P.C. does not arise. Our view is supported by the Judgment, which was rendered way back in the year 1929 itself, in Gaya Prasad v. Kalnp Nath, AIR 1929 Oudh 389 (F.B.) and in Paidayyu v. Murlidhar, : AIR1961AP498 . The Full Bench in Gaya Prasad v. Kalap Nath, AIR 1929 Oudh 389 (F.B.) held that:-

'The Act does not provide for any third appeals or for revisions from the decisions of the District Judges in such cases. The District Judge exercises the function of a revenue Court in hearing such appeals.'

' The Court of the District Judge sitting as a Court of Revenue in deciding such rent appeals is not a Court subordinate to the Chief Court unless there is any provision in the Oudh Rent Act itself which makes it so subordinate. In Section 119 Oudh Rent Act the Court of the District Judge is given powers to hear appeals from decrees, orders of Collectors or Assistant Collectors, 1st Class in certain suits filed under Section 108 Oudh Rent Act and Section 119-B Oudh Rent Act lays down that from such judgments and decrees by a District Judge, an appeal shall lie to the Chief Court of Oudh in all cases in which a second appeal is allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure and subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908.'

12. Sri Rama Rao, J., considered the decision in Jagannada Rao v. Venkateswara Rao (1 supra), and drew a distinction by holding that the said decision was concerned with the position anterior to the amendment of the Act, mat subsequent to the amendment, the powers are conferred on the District Munsif and District Judge, and mat the Tahsildars and Revenue Divisional Officers before the amendment are essentially administrative tribunals and despite the quasi-judicial functions and trappings of the Court they cannot be elevated to the status of civil Courts.- However, he observed that, the District Munsifs and the District Judges Courts have been entrusted with certain powers in addition to the powers that are exercised under CPC and other enactments, and therefore, the District Munsifs and District Courts are esentially civil Courts for the purpose of this Act. But, in view of our finding at page 8 of the Judgment and in view of the settled principles of law laid down in Jagannadha Rao v. Venknteswara Rao (1 supra) and Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Kannappar(2 supra), we are of the view that Rama Rao, J., went on a wrong aproach and the Judgment rendered by him in CRP No 2740 of 1981 has, in effect and in substance, run contrary to the dicisions rendered in the above two celebrated decisions. In view of the above discussion, we hold that a revision does not lie to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the orders of the District Munsifs and District Judges passed under the A.P. (A. A) Tenancy Act.

13. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent Sri M.V. Durga Prasad, that the District Munsifs and the District Judges are appointed only as persona designata and as such, they cannot be termed as Civil Courts and in which case the same are not subordinate to the High Court, and therefore, the revision does not lie to the High Court. He relied upon a dissenting Judgment rendered by Sri T.L.N. Reddy, J., in CRP No 3011 of 1980 and also the decision rendered in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Kannappar (2 supra).

14. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for tine revision petitioner Sri M.S.K. Sastry, contends that 'Court' and the 'Judge' are one and the same, that a Judge named by his office or designation in the particular Act is not persona designata but is only a Court, and that if any perticular person by name is designated as an authority, then only he can be called as persona designata. For this purpose, he relied upon the dissenting Judgment of Sri P. A. Choudary, J., rendered in CRP No. 3011 of 1980; the Judgment in New Jaji Labour Society v. Haji Abdul Raliaman Saheb, : 1992(1)ALT112 ; S. Srinivasa Rao v. High Court of A.P.,1988 (2) ALT 586; G. Manikyamma v. T. Seethramaiah, 1988 (2) ALT 333 and C. Ramachandra Reddy v. S. Aswathanarayana, : 1993(1)ALT585 .

15. Kumarayya, J., in Ramachandra Rao v. State of Madras, AIR 1962 A.P. 58 thoroughly dealt with the meaning of the expression persona designata, and held as follows:-

'The expression persona designata connotes a person pointed out by name or other personal description in contradistinction to one whose identity is to be ascertained by the office which he holds. If a person be a judicial officer and is intended by the statute to act not otherwise than in a judicial capacity or Court of civil jurisdiction, he cannot come within the expression 'persona designata' so that he may, irrespective of his continuance in office, perform the duty. The question whether such a person is a persona designata or not depends upon the intention to be gathered from the words used, nature of the functions to be performed and object and purpose of the statute.'

In order to find out whether the authorities, appointed under the Tenancy Act, are persona designata or not, it is necessary to examine the scope and object of the Tenancy Act. On a plain reading of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, it is clear that the Act is made with a view to see that fair rent is fixed and paid by the cultivating tenants in our State. For this purpose, the Revenue authorities were empowered to act as Special Officers to resolve the disputes, if any arise, between the landlord and the tenant, as they are well acquainted with the cultivation and other activities. So, the intention of the Legislature in entrusting the powers to revenue personnel can be clearly inferred and a conclusion can safely be arrived at with regard to their status that the Statute also regard the Tahsildars as quasi-judicial authorities. It is also to be noted that the powers of the Tahsildars are very limited under the Act. Their duty is to see that fair rent is fixed and paid to the landlords and nothing more or nothing else. They are not empowered to decide the aspect of title or some such thing, which involves adjudication of title, as the same is to be done by a Civil Court and not by a Tribunal, which is established with limited powers. So, the scheme and object of the Act and the nature of the functions to be discharged by the Tahsildar, clearly shows that the authorities are not civil Courts but are only Tribunals. The same view was expressed as long back as in the year 1959 by this Court and held that Tahsildars are not civil Courts but are only Tribunals. The learned Counsel Sri M.S.K. Sastry cannot take advantage of the situation, which arose after the amendment to the Tenancy Act, under which the judicial officers are entrusted to deal with the matters that arise under the Tenancy Act, replacing the revenue authorities. It is only done to implement the Act in a more effective and impartial manner and so the revenue authorities are replaced by judicial officers. This view of ours finds support from the decision in Jaganmdha Rao v. Venkateswara Rao (1 supra). So, the argument of the learned Counsel Sri M.S.K. Sastry that as a civil Court is appointed to discharge the functions under the Act, the authority holding the post of such Civil Court can be termed as civil Court for all purposes and especially, for the purposes of the present Tenancy Act, is not correct. It must be pointed out here that except the entrustment of the powers to the judicial officers, there is no change in the nature, scope and the object of the Statute. As already pointed out by us, the position which prevailed prior to the amendment with regard to the nature of the duties and the functions of the authority appointed under the Act, is therefore prevailing as it is even after the amendment and as such, we hold that, the District Munsif discharging the functions under the Act is only a persona designata and he cannot be termed as civil Court.

16. Sri M.V. Durga Prasad, contends that the Vacation Civil Judge has no power to receive the appeal in the capacity of an appellate authority for the purpose of the Tenancy Act, as the Vacation Civil Judge is not empowered under this Act to receive the appeals that arise under the Act. He, for this purpose, drew our attention to the provisions of Section 32 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act.

17. On the other hand, Sri M.S.K. Sastry contends that the Vacation Civil Judge is having power to receive and entertain the appeals under the Tenancy Act, and for this purpose, he relied upon the Judgment in V.K. Viswanadam v. T.V. Sarveswara Rao, 1981 (2) APLJ 362 and also the dissenting Judgment of P. A. Choudary, ]., rendered in CRP No. 3011 of 1980, in which it was laid down as follows:-

'It would serve the purpose of Section 32 of the A.P. Civil Courts Act 19 of 1972 and Act 18 of 1956 if provisions of the two Acts are reconciled holding a District Munsif takes cognizance of the proceedings under Act 18 of 1956. Otherwise when a District Munsif's Court is closed for vacation, there will not be any forum available in law to a litigant for seeking remedy. Therefore, the Vacation Civil Judge had power to pass orders on the application filed under Section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy Act.'

18. In this connection, the language that was adopted in Section32 of the A.P. Civil Courts Act has to be taken into consideration to find out the functions of a Vacation Civil Judge. For this purpose, Section 32 is extracted here below:-

' 32. Appointment of Vacation Civil Judge.

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court may for the duration of the adjournment of any District Court in summer, appoint for such District Court a Vacation Civil Judge not below the rank of a District Judge or the Government may, after consultation with the High Court so appoint a Vacation Civil Judge not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge.

(2) (a) The Local limits of the Jurisdiction of the vacation civil judge shall

be the same as those of the District Court concerned, (b) The Jurisdiction of the Vacation Civil Judge shall extend to all suits, appeals and other proceeding pending in, or cognizable by, any Court (whether a District Court, a Court of Subordinate Judge or a Court of District Munsif) in the disstrict concerned when such Court is adjourned for summer vacation.

(3) ............

(4) ............

(5) .............

(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-section (5), any appeal from the judgment, decree or order of the Court of the Vacation Civil Judge shall, when such appeal is allowed by law, lie to the High Court.'

So, on a plain reading of Section 32 of the said A.P. Civil Courts Act, it is clear that a notification will be issued appointing Vacation Civil Judges, and the Officer appointed under the Act as Vacation Civil Judge will exercise the powers of a Civil Court and his jurisdiction is extended to all suits, appeals and other proceedings pending in, or cognizable by, any court whether it is a District Court, or a Subordinate Judge's Court or a District Munsif's Court in the District concerned when such Court is adjourned for summer vacation. Further, for the purpose of the Tenancy Act, the District Munsifs were appointed as Special Officers and the District Judges were appointed as appellate authority, in exercise of the powers conferred by the A.P. (A.A) Tenancy Act, by issuing a separate notification. But, no notification is forthcoming empowering the Vacation Civil Judge to act as appellate authority under the Tenancy Act. Unless and until specific notification is issued by a competent authority, the Judicial Officers cannot acquire any powers under the Act to act as Special Officers or appellate authority and they cannot discharge the functions as such under the Act. It is further clear that like wise, in the absence of any specific notification empowering the District Judge to act as Vacation Civil Judge, he cannot act as appellate authority under the Act. For these reasons, we hold that the view taken by Raghuvir J., in V.K. Viswanadam vs . T.V. Sarveswara Rao (10 supra), that when a District Munsif's Court or Subordinate Judge's Court is closed in vacation, the Vacation Civil Judge has power to pass orders as appellate authority under the Act, cannot be said to be made on sound lines. In such a case, there is no other alternative for the litigant to seek remedy and in such a case it is for the Government to remove such difficulty by issuing a special notification empowering the Vacation Civil Judges also to act as special Officer and appellate authority under the Act. In view of our discussion, we hold on this point also that the Vacation Civil Judge, who received the appeal in this case, has no power to receive the same, in the absence of any notification under the Act, to do so.

18. In view of our foregoing discussion, we hold that the District Munsifs or the District Judges discharging functions under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act are not civil Courts but only tribunals, and as such, we hold that a revision does not lie to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the orders passed by such tribunals, as the tribunals are not subordinates to the High Court. We further hold that the remedy available to the litigant is only to file a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or a writ petition under Article 226. Thus, the present revision is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.

20. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed.