The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. Hyderbad Vs. Gadamsetty Vudayavarulu Setty - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- all india services act, 1951.sections 8 & 11 & a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control rules, 1961, rule 5: [v.v.s. rao, g. yethirajulu & g. bhavani prasad, jj] refusal by landlord to receive rent - deposit of rent in court - held, a tenant has the option to take recourse to section 8 in case of refusal or evasion by landlord to receive rent and if landlord were to not name a bank or refuse even the money order of rent, the tenant can deposit the rent in accordance with sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 5. the notice to person entitled to rent and proper maintenance of accounts of such deposits under sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 5 are solely dependent on compliance with sub-rule (3) by the tenant. the payment or deposit of rent under section 11 read with sub-rule (6) of rule 5 arises only in respect of a tenant who did not take recourse to section 8 or section 9 before an application for eviction has been made against him in respect of any rent in arrears by date of that application, whereas in respect of rent that becomes subsequently due since date of application for eviction, the tenant is bound to pay or deposit regularly until termination of proceedings in order to enable him to contest the application. any violation of section 11(1) to (3) and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 makes the tenant liable for the adverse consequences under sub-section (4) of section 11. thus, the provisions of section 11 and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 are intended only to ensure the payment and deposit of rent including arrears during pendency and till termination of proceedings for eviction. the forfeiture of right of tenant to contest in case of default is to protect the rights and interests of landlord pending such an application for eviction, but not to confer any right on tenant to plead that all defaults committed by him prior to application for eviction can never be considered wilful, if he were to deposit all arrears of rent due within fifteen days under rule 5(6) read with sub-section (1) of section 11. the object and effect of section 11 and sub-rules (1) to (5) to rule 5, the former being for protection of landlord during pendency of eviction proceedings and the later being for protection of tenant to avoid any liability for eviction on ground of wilful default. consequently, while taking recourse to section 8 by tenant is optional, once that option is exercised, compliance with sub-rules (1) to (5) of rule 5 becomes mandatory in the sense that any non-compliance with prescribed procedure will positively indicate the wilful nature of default committed in paying or tendering rent as prescribed. while deposit of rent in terms of provisions of act and the rules amounts to valid tender of rent to landlord, the failure to comply with rule 5 (3) requiring delivery of a copy of the challan for deposit of rent in office of controller or appellate authority, as the case may be, so as to enable controller or appellate authority to cause maintenance of proper accounts under sub-rule (5) and give notice of deposit to person amounts to wilful default in making valid payment or lawful tender of the rent by the tenant to the landlord. thus, where a tenant obtains an order to deposit rent, same shall be deposited at least by the last day of the month following that for which rent is payable and rent challan shall be delivered in the office of controller within a reasonable time so that rent controller can take necessary action for service of notice of deposit under sub-rule (4) of rule 5 of the rules within seven days of such delivery. in the absence of compliance in so depositing rent and delivering challan in the office of controller, tenant shall be deemed to have committed wilful default.muktadar, j.1. the state has preferred this appeal against the acquittal of the accused who was charged under the prevention of food adulteration act for having adulterated the chilly powder.2. it is not necessary to state the facts in this case. the trial court acquitted the accused on the ground that p.w. 1 who is stated to be the food inspector did not have the necessary qualifications as envisaged in rule 8 of the rules framed under the prevention of food adulteration act. the learned additional public prosecutor contends that the trial court fell into error in acquitting the accused simply because p.w. 1 did not have the necessary qualification to be a food inspector, because when once the court has taken cognizance of the offence under section 20 of the prevention of food adulteration act, the qualifications of the food inspector are not material because the prosecution was launched on the basis of the public analyst's report which states that the sample that was sent to him was adulterated, i regret, i cannot accede to this contention of the learned additional public prosecutor for the simple reason that section 20 of the prevention of food adulteration act postulates the filing of a complaint by a person who is duly authorised by the central government or state government or a local authority. simply because the court took cognizance of the case on the basis of the complaint filed by the person authorised under section 20 of the prevention of food adulteration act, it does not mean that the accused has to be convicted on the basis of the report of the public analyst, which would be an irregular one.the probative value that has to be given to the report of the public analyst under subsection (5) of section 18 of the said act, which provides that 'any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst unless it has been superseded under subsection (3) may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this act', will lose its force when that report is obtained on the basis of samples which were taken by a person not coming within the ambit of the expression 'food inspector'. in order that the probative value given to the report of the public analyst is to be maintained the food inspector should possess the necessary qualifications under the rules and the samples will have to be taken in conformity with the provisions of the act, and rules, and when the person taking the samples is not a food inspector, then the report given by the public analyst cannot have any evidentiary value. therefore, to my mind, the lower court was correct in acquitting the accused. hence there is no substance in this appeal it is therefore dismissed.