Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. and ors. Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board Rep. by Its Secretary - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter......ordersardar ali khan, j.1. there are common questions of law and fact involved in this batch of writ petitions, which can be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. the salient facts in w.p. no. 14843/87 may be taken as the common set of facts for all the cases except for such deviation which may be necessary to be dealt with separately. 3. the petitioner in w.p. no. 14843/87 is ferro alloys corporation limited, shreeramnagar. the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the andhra pradesh state electricity board, hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent-board,' to treat the petitioner-industry as h.t. category-i and bill them accordingly. 4. the brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-industry has two connections (points). for the first connection (point) an.....

Judgment:
ORDER

Sardar Ali Khan, J.

1. There are common questions of law and fact involved in this batch of writ petitions, which can be disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The salient facts in W.P. No. 14843/87 may be taken as the common set of facts for all the cases except for such deviation which may be necessary to be dealt with separately.

3. The petitioner in W.P. No. 14843/87 is Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited, Shreeramnagar. The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent-Board,' to treat the petitioner-industry as H.T. Category-I and bill them accordingly.

4. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-industry has two connections (points). For the first connection (point) an agreement was entered into, which is being renewed from time to time, by virtue of which the Board has agreed to supply 46,105 KVA. The latest agreement in that regard is dated 13-1-1983. At the time of expansion, the petitioner-industry had entered into another agreement for supply of 17,000 KVA. The petitioner-industry comes within the category of H.T. Industries, which is further qualified by the term power intensive industry' having high load factor and power factor. It has a high load factor of 80% to 90% compared to L.T. Consumers who have a load fact(sic) of 30-50%. Since the industry is one which consumes large power as compared to the domestic consumers, it comes under the category of power intensive industry.

5. The respondent-Board was supplying power to bulk consumers at a less rate than it was done to other consumers. The supply to the bulk consumers is cheaper because the cost of such supply is considerably lower as compared to other consumers. The respondent-Board evolved certain guidelines in 1975 to classify certain industries as power intensive units for the purpose of charging lesser rates. Thereafter, B.P. Ms. No. 671 dt. 10-6-1987, and B.P.Ms. No. 736, dated 14-7-'87 revising the tariffs for various categories of consumers have been issued. The petitioner-industry satisfies the criterion stipulated for Category-I H.T Vide Part-A of Appendix-I--Terms and conditions of supply of electrical energy at H.T. notified in B.P.Ms. No. 272 dated 1-5-1974. The grievance of the petitioner-industry is that the Board does not seem to have any criteria for classification. For instance, it is submitted that V.B.C. Ferro Alloys, which is located at Medak, and manufactures Ferro Alloys, are bulk consumers of power but they are classified as H.T.I. Category whereas the petitioner-industry is classified as a power intensive industry, which entails payment of electricity charges at higher rates. Therefore, in sum and substance, what the petitioner-industry wants is that they should also be treated as H.T.I. Category and the consumption of energy by them should also be chargeable at the same rate. It seems, the petitioner-industry made a request to this effect to the respondent-Board, which has been rejected. The petitioner further denies that they have exercised any option in favour of being treated as power intensive industry thereby conferring the power on the Board to put the petitioner in the t category. The petitioner further stresses the, point that the creation of a separate category of consumers under the heading 'power intensive units' is unwarranted and not supported either under the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act or the Electricity Supply Act. The petitioner's further contention is that even if they are deemed to have opted for the category of power intensive industry, they should be allowed to come back to the category of H.T. Category-I as has been done in the case of certain industries like M/s. Chlorate India. The petitioner-industry, therefore. seeks to press home the charge that there is discrimination practised by the Board against it while favouring similar industries like V.B.C. Ferro Alloys and Chlorate India Limited by putting them in H.T. Category-I.

6. In the background of the above general run of facts, a detailed study will have to be made in this judgment about the categories and tariffs which are charged by the respondent-Board for the various consumers. For this purpose it would be necessary to examine certain basic facts which are directly linked to a proper solution of the case. The respondent-Board is a statutory Corporation constituted Under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to, for (sic) short, as the 'Act'. Its primary object is to generate, distribute and supply electricity to all its consumers in an efficient and economic manner. It qualifies as 'the State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Board, therefore, occupies an extremely important position in the hierarchy of industries engaged in the industrial development of the company, (sic country). Under Section 49 of the Act, the Board is empowered to fix terms and conditions of supply of electricity and to frame uniform tariffs having regard to nature of supply and the purpose for which it is required. The power conferred on the Board under Section 49 of the Act is, therefore, wide in nature and so the Board should exercise the same with great care and caution. In exercise of the power vested in the Board, it had initially classified its con-Sumers into two categories, viz., (1) Low Tension Consumers and (2) High Tension Consumers. There is a further sub-division of the Low Tension Consumers into several categories which may not be necessary for the purposes of the instant case. Nevertheless, the High Tension Consumers, with whom we are concerned in this batch of writ petitions, are divided into (1) H.T. Category-I for factory loads, (2) H.T. Category-II for other than H.T. Category-L (3) H.T. Power Intensive Industries (HT. III) and (4) H.T. Agricultural Consumers. The tariff rates fixed by the Board for the High Tension Consumers have been fluctuating from time to time keeping in tune with the conditions such as nature of supply, purpose for which it is required and other policy directions issued by the Government from time to time in exercise of the powers vested in Section 78A of the Act.

7. A general revision of tariffs was taken up for the first time in the year 1975 due to increase of cost of production and a notification was issued in B.P.Ms. No. 689, dated 17-9-1975 which was .given effect from 20-10-'75. Part 'A' of the said notification deals with the tariffs for H.T. Supply. The High Tension supply has been classified into three categories, viz., H.T. Category-I, H.T. Category-III and H.T. Category-Ill, and the demand charges for the said categories are given in the notification. However, on the heels of this notification another Gazette notification was issued in B.P.Ms. No. 778, dated 18th October, 1975 by virtue of which H.T. Category-II was deleted and H.T. Category- III is to be read as H.T. Category-II. The question of a separate tariff for highly power intensive consumer was considered by the Board and a separate tariff was provided vide Memo No. DF (COMML)1687-II/75/1, dated 18-11-1975. Under the said tariff, the following power intensive consumers were listed who will be eligible for the billing at the new rates, viz.,

(1) Caustic Soda Plant of M/s. Andhra Sugars, Kovvur;

(2) Ferro Silicon Plant of M/s. Nava Bharat Ferro Alloys Ltd., Paloncha ;

(3) Sodium Metal Piant of M/s. Alkali Metals, Hyderabad ; and

(4) Silicon Carbide Plant of M/s. Electro Thermics of Hyderabad.

The main feature of this new highly power intensive tariff is that it was an optional tariff which means that any industrial H.T. Consumer, who falls within H.T. Category- I, was given an option to be classified as a highly power intensive consumer if he proves to the satisfaction of the Board that the cost of power expressed as sale price of the product including statutory duties and taxes, if any was not less than 20%. The other features of this scheme of tariff for highly power intensive consumer units is that it was supposed to be a single part tariff based on energy cosumed and no rebate in this tariff is admissible as in the case of H.T. Category-I applicable to certain industries. The monthly minimum prescribed consumption is fixed at 403.325 Kwh per KVA of contracted demand or recorded minimum whichever is higher. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the highly power intensive tariff was created as a separate category as against H.T. Category-I, with a new tariff system.

A list of power intensive industries was added from time to time as new industries applied for the categorisation under the power intensive tariff. These industries are (1) M/s. Chlorate India Pvt. Ltd., Tirupathi, (2) M/s. Grindwell Norton Ltd., Karakambadi, Tirupathi and (3) M/s. A.P. Carbides Kurnool. The significant feature of the newly created intensive power tariff is that all industries whose cost of power is not less than 20% were not automatically categorised as intensive power industries even though they fall under H.T. Category-I. In fact, if the consumer opted to such a power intensive tariff, only then it could be billed accordingly. Moreover, if a consumer, who has opted for such a power tariff, later opted again for H.T. Category-I with effect from 20-10-1975 or from the date of release of supply to the consumer, whichever, is inter he was allowed to come under H.T. Category-I provided he pays the charges under H.T. Category-I from such date as if he remained in H.T. Category-I all the time. Taking advantage of this flexibility, some consumers, like M/s. V.B.C. Ferro Alloys, Medchal, opted back to H.T. Category-I from the date of release of supply or 20-10-1975, as the case may be.

8. Even though a separate category, known as 'highly power intensive category', was created, it was not notified in the Gazette. Several memoes were issued in the nature of administrative instructions from time to time fixing the tariff to this Category. The names of such of the consumers who came in this category, were added in the list of power intensive industries.

9. The highly power intensive category was notified for the first time in B.P. Ms. No. 671, dated 10-6-1987. H.T. Category- III was created for power intensive industries specifying the rate of 83 paise per unit at which they were to be billed. With the publication of B.P. Ms. No. 671, dated 10-6-1987 in the Gazette, as stated above, the entire complexion of the case has changed. It is to be noted that under B P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 no option is provided to the consumer to change from one category to another. Any consumer who comes under H.T. Category-Ill cannot be reclassified as H.T. Category-I or any other category. It must be remembered that M/s. Chlorate India Limited has opted to change its category as early as in 1982, i.e., much before the promulgation of Category-III in the Gazelle in B.P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987. Since the petitioner is now seeking to change the category after the issue of B.P. Ms. No. 671, dated 10-6-87, its request is not being acceded to by the respondent-Board.

10. The petitioner-industry belongs to power intensive industry and has been paying the bills at the rates applicable to such industries for more than 12 years. After the promulgation of B.P. Ms. No. 671 dt. 10-6-1987, the petitioner-industry clearly falls within H.T. Category-Ill created for the power intensive industies. in this connection it may be relevant to look into a comparative statement of percentage of concessions to power intensive tariff granted during the period from 1975 to 1989.

'Comparison of Percentage of Concessions

to power Intensive tariff over a period

of 1975--1989.

_______________________________________________________________________S. No. Details of period H.T. Tariff I Over Power Degree of RDemand Ene- all inten- Echarges, rgy. unit sive concession Mrate rate as percen- Ap/u p/u tage. RRs. S_______________________________________________________________________1. 20-10-75 to 21-8-77 21.19 21-15 23 11 52% I2. 1-9-77 to 28-2-78 -do- -do- 23 12.2 49%3. 1-3-78 to 31-8-79 -do- -do- 23 16.0 30%4. 1-9-79 to 31-10-79 -do- -do- 23 18.5 20%5. 1-11-79 to 31-10-80 -do- 30/24 32 21 34%6. 1-11-80 to 14-7-81 25 33/32 38 25 34% II7. 15-7-81 to 14-1-84 25 40 46 32 30% III8. 15-1-86 to 14-7-87 30 48 55 45 18% IV9. 15-7-87 to 5/89 36 67 76 83 -(9%) V10. 6/89 onwards 42 95 106 113 42 95 106 113 -(7%) VI_______________________________________________________________________

It may be seen that the degree of concession has been steadily decreasing from the year 1975 to 1989. So much so, from the year 1987-88 and 88-89 there is a minus degree of concession, viz., -9% and -7% granted to the power intensive tariff consumers. The question, therefore, is whether the petitioner-industry can be allowed to have the best of both worlds. The petitioner has opted for the intensive power industry category when the concessions were attractive and has enjoyed that rate for a period of about 12 years. Now that the rate of concession is decreasing, can the petitioner-industry be allowed to opt back to H.T. Category-I to avail advantage of the lesser rate which is applicable to that category Furthermore, indeed, the basic question is whether such an option is now available to him after the promulgation of B.P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 because now a specific H.T. category-III is created for the power intensive industries. Any consumer who comes within the purview of H.T. Category-III has no choice to be treated as H.T. Category-I and vice versa. The categories are fixed in terms of mathematical precision and it is a moot point in this case whether a consumer can back to Category. I when he actually falls under Category III. It would be pertinent to examine this proposition in the light of what is stated in paragraph 20 of the counter-affidavit, which, for the sake of clarity, may be re-produced hereunder as follows :

'20 It is true that VBC Ferro Alloys which is located at Medak manufacturing ferro alloys, have opted for H.T. Category-I under option available to him prior to 14-7-87. There is no discrimination involved. Like consumers are treated alike and if the petitioner desires to opt for H.T. Category-f, it can do so from 1-8-75 from which date the power intensive rate was made applicable to the consumer. Board has no objection to concede the consumer in that case he has to pay H.T. Category I rates from 1-8-75 onwards till 14-7-87. From 15-7-87 onwards he, however, comes under Category H.T. III only.'

Now, the position is clear that if the petitioner wants to opt back for H.T. Category-I, it can do so from 1-8-75 onwards, which is the material date, on which the power intensive rate is applicable to the petitioner, in accordance with the option exercised by him. But the snag is that this option can be available to him provided he pays H.T. Category-I rates from 1-8-1975 onwards till 14-7-1987. The question is, is it unreasonable to impose such a condition on the petitioner-industry which is now seeking to opt back to come under H.T. Category I. In my opinion, it is not at all unreasonable to do so. The petitioner has availed of the advantage of lesser rate during the period when it was billed at the power intensive rates which definitely worked out to be lower than H.T. Category-I in those days. Having taken the advantage of the lesser rates over a period of about 12 years, i.e., from 1-8-1975 to 14-7-87, the petitioner industry cannot now be allowed to go back to H.T. Category-I. Therefore, having taken the advantage of lesser rates, it is only fair and proper that he should be made to pay the rates applicable to Category-I during that period. In so far as the request of the petitioner to opt for Category-I from 15-7-87 is concerned, it is patently clear that this option is not available in view of B. Ps. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 which creates a specific category viz., H.T. Category-III for power intensive industries. In fact, neither the petitioner-industry nor any consumer who falls under H.T. Category-III, can now claim to be in H.T. Category-II or H.T. Category-I as the case may be. Therefore, the question of exercising of option after 14-7-1287 is merely an academic question which does not have any practical value in the context.of things as they exist to-day.

11. It is appropriate to reproduce Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, which is in the following terms :

'49. Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees:

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs.

(2) In fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shall have regard to all or any of the following factors, namely-

(a) the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required ;

(b) the co-ordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such- development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee;

(c) the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies ;

(d) the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas.

(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors.

(4) In fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person.'

12. A reading of this section makes it clear that the Board is empowered to supply electricity to any person, who is not a licensee, upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs. It would be axiomatic to state that the respondent-Board is given a free hand within the limitations prescribed Under Section 49 of the Act to frame uniform tariffs for the various consumers of electricity. Sub-section (2) of Section 49 provides that in fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shall have regard to all matters enumerated therein, for instance, the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required, the co-ordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity, the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies and the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to fast developed areas. In fact, the guidelines contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 49 will have to be observed by the Board while framing the uniform tariffs for the various categories of consumers. Sub-section (3) of Section 49 provides that nothing in the foregoing provisions of Section 49 shall derogate from the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient, to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors. Sub-section (4) of Section 49 imposes a limitation on the power of the Board in matters of fixation of tariffs by providing that in fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person. In my opinion, what is contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 49 is an equitable principle that the respondent-Board shall not favour any particular person as compared to any other person who may be similarly situated and, therefore, shall not give any undue preference to any one while fixing uniform tariffs, as the very term 'uniform tariff' suggests that the tariffs are to be fixed by the Board keeping in view the fact that the consumers who are similarly placed in identical circumstances, shall be subjected to a uniform tariff and not to any varied tariff whirh may result in discrimination against a particular consumer. The principal point emerging from a discussion of Section 49 of the Act, therefore, is that the Board has got the right to supply electricity to any person and to prescribe such terms and conditions as it thinks fit and for that purpose it is endowed with the authority to frame uniform tariffs. It is a matter of common knowledge that fixation of uniform tariffs in a matter of this nature can be a highly technical exercise which will have to be based on expert advice while taking into consideration the various exigencies that may be existing in a particular set of circumstances. It would, therefore, be only fair and proper to deduce the principle that unless there is something patently wrong in the fixation of the uniform tariff by the Board or there is something which shows that a clear error has been committed by the Board while exercising the powers of fixation of uniform tariff or any undue favour has been shown to one consumer which goes contrary to the grain of Sub-section (4) of Section 49, it would be difficult to interfere with the uniform tariffs fixed by the Electricity Board. The above circumstances are only by way of illustrations indicating the circumstances in which an interfernce can be made in the fixation of tariffs and are not supposed to be exhaustive of the conditions which may warrant any interference at the hands of the court.

13. The above reasonsing is fortified by a catena of cases which have been cited by Mr. V.R. Reddy, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board. In Nava Bharat ferro alloys Ltd. v. A.P.S.E. Board, Hyderabad, ( AIR 1985 A.P. 299), a Division Bench of this High Court had observed as follows:

'.... The Government, in our opinion, should be free to alter its industrial policies from time to time according to its own assessment based on socio-economic conditions of the society. If at one time such industrial policy was oriented in favour of encouraging the growth of heavy industries by offering concessional tariffs, if any, in their favour, it does not prevent the State Government from revising its policy and, instead encourage medium and small scale or light industries, which could be more evenly distributed with a view to remove regional imbalances, if any, in the matter of setting up of such industries and to promote employment potential in different areas of the State. If, in that process, the prexisting concessional tariffs applicable to H.T. Consumers are gradually withdrawn or even if such tariffs are fixed at a higher level than the rates at which power is made available for the more needy sections of consumers, no malice can be attributed either to the Government or to the Board. We accordingly reject this submission.

A similar view has been expressed in M.S.E. Board v. kalvan Municipality, : [1968]3SCR137 While dealing with the provisions of Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, Supreme Court has observed that Under Section 49, as it now stands,the Legislature has empowered the Board to frame uniform tariffs and it has also indicated the factors to be taken into account in fixing uniform tariffs. While fixing the tariffs two aspects will have to be kept in mind by the Board. These two aspects are contained in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49. The Legislature has made it clear in Sub-section (4) of Section 49 that the Board should not show undue preference to any person for fixing the tariffs and the terms and conditions for the supply of electricity should be fair for all the consumers. In yet another decision reported in Hyderabad Engg. Industries Ltd. v. A.P.S.E. Board, : [1988]3SCR159 it has been held that under Section 49 the Electricity Board has power unilaterally to alter the conditions of supply. The Supreme Court has further held that under subsection (1) of Section 49 the Board could lay down conditions of supply and for purposes of such supply it may also frame uniform tariffs. Sub-section (1) of Section 49, therefore, clearly authorises the Board to lay down the conditions of supply and to fix uniform tariffs as provided for in Sub-section (2). All these decisions clearly point to the fact that the power of the Board to frame uniform tariffs can be exercised only subject to the restrictions provided for in Sub-section (4) of Section 49 of the Act. So long as this power has been exercised in a fair and reasonable manner, it cannot be interfered with on the nebulous ground that the Board is favouring one consumer at the expense of another who is similarly placed in a particular situation. In K.S.E. Board v. S.N. Govinda Prabhu, : [1986]3SCR628 it has been held that under Section 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, (54 of 1948) the Board has got the power to revise tariffs and so long as this revision is neither arbitrary nor the result of application of wrong principle it cannot be interfered with by the courts. A significant observation has been made in this case by the Supreme Court in the following words :

'We are not delving into more details as we are satisfied that it is not within our province to examine the price structure in minute detail if we are satisfied that the revision of tariff is not arbitrary and is not the result of application of any wrong principle.'

14. In the light of the principles laid down by the decisions cited abcve, it is abundantly clear that the cases of the petitioners are based upon misconception of facts and law. The power to fix uniform tariffs has been exercised by the Board reasonably and diligently and is not hit by subsection (4) of Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act as no undue preference has been shown to any consumer.

15. Sri K. Srinivasa Murty, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. 14843/87 and W.P. 1854/88 and Sri M.R.K. Choudary learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. 11292/87, 13461/87 and 15424/87, have stressed the point that the Board is discriminating against the petitioners by not allowing them to revert back to H.T. Category-I. Both the learned counsel have cited examples of (sic)Chlorate India Pvt. Ltd., Tirupathi and VBC Ferro Alloys, Medchal,who have been allowed to continue in H.T. Category-I by revoking their options. This aspect of the matter has already been dealt with in this judgment earlier stating that in so far as Chlorate India Pvt. Ltd., is concerned, it has exercised its option as early as in 1982, i.e., much earlier than the H.T. Category-III being notified in the Gazette (i.e., before 10-6-1987) and therefore it cannot be said that there is any discrimination against the petitioner in not allowing them to do so. Same is the case in so far as VBC Ferro Alloys is concerned. They have also opted for H.T. Category-I under option available to them prior to 14-7-1987. The petitioner-industry can also be allowed to go back to H.T. Category-I from the period 1-8-1975 to 14-7-1987 provided they pay the rates applicable to H.T. Category-I from 1-8-1975 onwards till 14-7-1987. After 15-7-1987 there is no question of any of the petitioners continuing in H.T. Category-I as they all fall within H.T. Category-III under B.P.Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987. The learned counsel appearing for all the petitioners have placed reliance on the decision reported in Indian Alluminium Co. v. Kerala State Electricity Boards : [1976]1SCR70 wherein it is held that Sections 49, 59 and 60 of the Act do not confer any authority on the Board 10 override a contractual stipulation as to rates and unilaterally enhance in derogation of such contractual stipulation even if it finds that the rates stipulated in the contract are not sufficient to meet the cost of production and supply of electricity and it is incurring operational loss. I am afraid I do not see how the above said judgment can be relied upon to substantiate the case of the petitioners. The observation of the Supreme Court in the above case is with reference to contractual obligations assumed by the parties for the supply of electricity. It provides the overriding influence of contractual stipulation over the power of the Board under Sections 49 and 59 of the Act to prescribe uniform tariffs for the supply of electricity. Such a situation does not exist in the instant cases and therefore it cannot be relied upon for the purpose of a decision in these cases.

16. Sri M.R.K. Choudary, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 11292/87, 13461/87 and 15424/87, has also raised the question of the Board issuing demand notices to the petitioners who have not been allowed to convert themselves from power intensive category to that of H.T. Category-l. He has also submitted that the objections raised by the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 11292/87, 13461/87 and 15424/87, have not been considered by the Board before issuing the revised bills, imposing penalties in respect of the power consumed by such petitioners. It must be stated that though these questions have been raised in an ancillary manner in the writ petitions, they have not been pressed further during the course of arguments. The main contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners have been with regard to the fixation of uniform tariff by the Board, Under Section 49 of the Act. Therefore, the ancillary questions with regard to the demand notices issued by the respondent-Board and the fixation of charges consequent upon the refusal to convert the petitioners into H.T. Category-I are liable to be rejected as matters which cannot be gone into in these writ petitions.

17. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, as indicated above, the writ petitions are dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.