immadi Ramachandram Vs. the State of Andhra Pradesh - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. madhusudhan rao, j.1. the learned sessions judge allowed the petitioner's petition to the extent of recalling p.w. 1 and cross-examining him only on the question of supply of copy of the report of the public analyst before filing the complaint. he, directed the recalling of p.w. 1 in the light of this court's observation in public prosecutor v. sreeramulu 1975 (2) aplj (hc) 145. rule 9(j) of the prevention of food adulteration rules reads as follows:it shall be the duty of the food inspector... (j) to send by registered post, a copy of the report received in form iii from the public analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report. however, in case the sample conforms to the provisions of the act or rules made thereunder then the person may be informed of the same and report need not be sent.2. sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 13 of the prevention of food adulteration act read as follows:(2) after the institution of a prosecution under this act the accused vendor or the complainant may, on payment of the prescribed fee, make an application to the court for sending the part of the sample mentioned in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 11 to the director of the central food laboratory for a certificate; and on receipt of the application the court shall first ascertain that the mark and seal or fastening as provided in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 are intact and may then despatch the part of the sample under its own seal to the director of the central food laboratory who shall thereupon send a certificate to the court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of sample specifying the result of his analysis.(3) the certificate issued by the director of the central food laboratory under sub-section (2) shall supersede the report given by the public analyst under sub-section (1).3. in public prosecutor v. sreeramulu (1975) 2 aplj (hc) 145 the trial magistrate acquitted the accused on several grounds including the ground of the food inspector not having furnished the accused with a copy of the report of the public analyst. the accused in that case pleaded that he was prejudiced in his defence by the non-supply of a copy of the analyst's report to the effect that the sample of the food taken from him was adulterated. he asserted before the trial court that if a copy of the report of the public analyst was furnished to him by the food inspector as required under rule 9 (j) of the prevention of food adulteration. rules, he would have applied to the court under section 13(2) of the prevention of food adulteration act and got the sample analysed by the director of the central food laboratory in proof of his plea that the food in question was not adulterated. on appeal by the state against the order of acquittal, this court confirmed the order of acquittal observing that rule 9 (j) of the prevention of food adulteration rules is mandatory and that the accused therein was denied the salutary safeguard provided under the rules. in the absence of any proof of prejudice by the accused on account of the non-compliance of rule 9 (j) of the prevention of food adulteration rules, it could not be proper for the court to throw out the prosecution case only on account of the non-compliance. by itself the mere non-compliance with rule 9 (j) of the prevention of food adulteration rules does not enable the accused for a presumption that he has been prejudiced there by. in cases of non-compliance with rule 9. (j) the courts have to see whether the accused has been prejudiced in his defence by such non-compliance; it would be a question of fact in each case.4. sri k. pratap reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner urges that the two-documents sought to be filed by the petitioner are, a certified copy of a licence issued by the city municipality, warangal and an original receipt for the purchase of groundnut oil. as pointed out by the learned sessions judge, there is absolutely no valid explanation for the petitioner not having produced these two documents earlier during the trial. the licence is said to be dated 14-7-1974 while the receipt is said to be dated 14-8-1974. under the circumstances, the order of the learned sessions judge refusing to admit the two documents as additional evidence in the appeal is perfectly justified and does not call for any interference.5. this revision is, therefore, dismissed.