Karumanchi Veerangaiah Vs. Katta Mark and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds. ' in the context in which a-1 and a-2 abused the complainant and in the light of the words of abuse, there can be little doubt that these two accused intentionally insulted the complainant at a public place like a coffee hotel.madhusudan rao, j.1. the complainant in c. c. no. 7/75 on the file of the additional munsif-magistrate's court, bapatla is the appellant herein. the three accused who have been acquitted of a charge under section 504, i.p.c. are the respondents. there is a land dispute between the complainant and the accused. the complainant instituted a suit against the three accused and some others in regard to the land. pending disposal of the suit, he obtained an injunction restraining the accused and others from interfering with his possession of the land. he has also filed a complaint against the accused and others in the court of the judicial second class magistrate, bapatla alleging the commission of offences punishable under sections 143, 447, 427 and 149, i.p.c. he has further filed m. c. 7/74 under section 144, cr. p.c. in the court of the executive magistrate, bapatla against the accused and others. the said m. c. 7/74 stood posted for enquiry on 16-1-1975. on this day the complainant, the accused and others attended the court. the executive magistrate adjourned the case to 30-1-1975. according to the complainant, after the case was adjourned, he went to a nearby coffee hotel to take coffee. by the time the complainant finished his coffee and came to the counter to pay the bill, the three accused came there. pointing towards the complainant, a-2 said 'here is the fellow, who is bold enough to file cases against us.' the complainant pleaded, 'if it were a sin to file a case when he was robbed of his property'. gnawing his teeth a-1 thereupon said, 'you bastard, come out, i will kick you.' a-2 said 'who will come to your rescue if i kick you here.' he has further said 'who will come to your rescue even if we kick you in the village.' a-3 said, 'what more does he deserve than this'. on the intervention of the persons present in the coffee hotel, the three accused left the place.2. the plea of the accused was one of complete denial.3. in support of his case, the complainant examined himself as p.w. 1, the bench clerk of the magistrate's court as p.w. 2 and a student studying in the degree course in the college at bapatla as p.w. 3. the accused did not examine any witnesses on their behalf.4. the trial magistrate rightly believed the case of the complainant in the light of the corroboration of his evidence by the two disinterested witnesses p.ws. 2 and 3. he, however, acquitted all the three accused relying on pichai pillai v. ramaswamy lyyangar air 1940 mad 681 : 42 cri lj 48, and holding that none of the accused committed any offence punishable under section 504, i.p.c. by merely abusing the complainant in the manner proved by the complainant.5. the only question for decision in this appeal is whether the three accused or any one of them is liable to be punished under section 504, i.p.c. for having used such abusive language against the complainant as is mentioned supra.6. section 504, i p.c. reads as follows:whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, shall be punished.the section contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to break the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. but, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. if abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender, in judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by section 504, i.p.c. the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar diosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. it is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant, mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of section 504, i.p.c. if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under section 504, i.p.c. if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. in king emperor v. chunnibhai dayabhai (1902) 4 bom lr 78, a division bench of the bombay high court pointed out that:to constitute an offence under section 504, i.p.c. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.in guranditta v. emperor air 1930 lah 344 (2) : 32 cri lj 62, it was observed that in dealing with a case under section 504, i.p.c. the court should try to find out what in the ordinary circumstances would have been the effect of abusive language used, pichai pillai v. ramaswamy ayyangar (1941) 42 cri lj 48 (mad.) relied on by the learned magistrate is no authority for any proposition that no offence is committed under section 504. i.p.c. by the accused if he uses abusive language against the complainant. in that case there was a discussion between the accused bill collector and the complainant in regard to the amount due by the complainant towards tax collectable by the bill collector. in the course of that discussion, the bill collector shouted against the complainant saying 'shameless fellow, i will shoe you'. the details of the discussion and the exact circumstances leading to the shouting by the accused are not available from the brief judgment reported. it is also not known as to where exactly the occurrence took place in that case.7. the facts proved in the instant case are : the complainant and the accused are at loggerheads due to a land dispute, they went from their village to bapatla to attend the court of the executive magistrate in connection with a case filed by the complainant. after the case was adjourned, the complainant went to a nearby coffee hotel where there were other persons. when the complainant was at the cash counter to pay his bill. a-1 said, 'you, bastard, come out i will kick you'. a-2 said, 'who will come to your rescue, if i kick you in the village.' in the context in which a-1 and a-2 abused the complainant and in the light of the words of abuse, there can be little doubt that these two accused intentionally insulted the complainant at a public place like a coffee hotel. the complainant stated, as p.w. 1 that he felt very much insulted and became wild but controlled his passion forbearing himself from committing any breach of public peace or offence against the accused. even without reference to the evidence of the complainant in regard to his reaction, there can be little doubt that the abusive language used by a-1 and a-2 against the complainant, under the circumstances, is sufficient in the ordinary course to provoke the complainant to commit a breach of public peace or to commit an offence against the accused. the action of these two accused is squarely attracted by section 504, i.p.c. the words used by a-3 are merely 'what more does he deserve than this'. it is difficult to construe these words as constituting an intentional insult, punishable under section 504, i.p.c.8. for the reasons recorded, the order of the lower court acquitting the accused 1 and 2, is set aside. both these accused are convicted under section 504, i.p.c. and each is sentenced to pay a fine of rs. 50. in default of payment of the fine, the defaulting accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for four weeks. the order of the lower court acquitting a-3 is affirmed.9. in the result, the appeal is partly allowed.