Maddileti Alivelamma and Another Vs. Saraswathamma and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
civil - retrospective effect of amendment - andhra pradesh court-fees and suits valuation (amendment) act, 1997 - court possessing pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain suit on date of filing suit - jurisdiction taken away by subsequent amendment - law prevailing on date of filing of suit to continue to apply until final determination of suit - amendment act not to have retrospective effect. - maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. it would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the act used the plural products of livestock. the legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the act. thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in section 2(xv) of the act. whatever products are declared as such by the government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the act. consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under section 3(1) read with section 3(3) of the act on them it is competent for the government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [per p.s. narayana, j,(dissenting)]if livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. in view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] declaration of notified area held, it is only under section 3 that government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. it is very conspicuous that section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. thus, except ordaining government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under section 3(3) of the act nowhere much less under section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. when the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. in such a case, maxim, expressum facit cessare tacitum (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. section 7: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] levy of market fee element of quid pro quo - held, levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of sttaes taxing power. there is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. it is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. expressum facit cessare tacitum sections 4 & 3: [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] meaning when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. order1. this civil revision petition under article 227 of the constitution of india is directed against an order dated 16-4-1998 on the file of the learned district and sessions judge, chittoor with drawing os no. 151 of 1992 pending on the file of the learned senior civil judge's court, madanapalle and transferring the same to the file of the learned principal junior civil judge's court. it is a proceeding on the administrative side by the learned district judge.2. it appears from the record that the petitioners herein filed os no. 152 of 1992 on the file of the learned subordinate judge's court, madanapalle, chiltoor district for declaration of their exclusive right and title to the estate of one sreeramulu along with other reliefs. the suit was taken on file on 30-6-1992. the petitioners-plaintiffs have valued the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction at rs.78,750/- and a court fee of rs.3,026/- was paid on the aggregate of amount under section 6 of the a.p. court fees and suit valuation act. the learned senior civil judge after registering the suit directed summons to be issued to the respondents-defendants. the respondents-defendants having entered their appearance through an advocate filed their written statement opposing the suit filed by the petitioners-plaintiffs.3. there is no dispute that as on the date of filing of the suit, the learned senior civil judge, madanapalle had the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. in fact, the suit could have been filed only on the file of the learned senior civil judge's court. during the pendency of os no.151 of 1992 before the learned senior civil judge's court, madanapalle, the learned district judge through the impugned proceedings withdrawn the said suit and transferred the same to the principal junior civil judge's court, madanapalle on the purported ground that the learnedprincipal junior civil judge, madanapalle would have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. the learned district judge obviously appears to have passed such an order in view of the amendments to the a.p. civil courts act, 1972 (for short 'the act') as amended under act, 29 of 1997 which was published and came into force on 9-12-1997.4. learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the amendments to the provisions of the act as amended by act 29 of 1997 are prospective in nature and the amended provisions have no application to the suits already instituted and pending on the file of the competent courts of jurisdiction. the law as on the date of filing of the suit would govern until the disposal of the suit. learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance upon a division bench judgment of this court in k. ham gopal v. venkata ratna kumar, : 1993(1)alt482 . the principle laid down by the court in the said decision is that the amendments to the provisions of the act are not retrospective in their nature and equally be applicable to the amended act under which the pecuniary jurisdiction of the district munsif court is enhanced from that of rs.50,000/- to rs.1,00,000/-. as on the date of filing of the suit, the learned senior civil judge, madanapalle alone had the pecuniary jurisdiction to receive and try the suit. the learned senior civil judge alone can try the suit since as on the date of filing of the suit, the said court alone had the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. the provisions of the act as in force on the date of institution of the suit, shall continue to apply in respect of such suits instituted until their final determination. in the circumstances, the proceedings of the learned district judge withdrawing and transferring the suit to the court of the learned principal junior civil judge is set aside. the learned principal junior civil judge, madanapalle shall forthwith transmit the recordrelating to os no.413 of 1998 to the file of the learned senior civil judge, madanapalle for trial and disposal in accordance with law.5. having regard to the importance of question, i have requested sri c. v. nagarjuna reddy, learned standing counsel for the high court to assist the court in the matter. learned standing counsel also submitted that the decision of the division bench and the principles laid down therein would be applicable to the facts on hand. learned standing counsel also submitted that the amended provisions of the act as amended by act 29 of 1997 are not retrospective in nature but prospective.6. the civil revision petition is accordingly allowed. no costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. This civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order dated 16-4-1998 on the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor with drawing OS No. 151 of 1992 pending on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge's Court, Madanapalle and transferring the same to the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge's Court. It is a proceeding on the administrative side by the learned District Judge.

2. It appears from the record that the petitioners herein filed OS No. 152 of 1992 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge's Court, Madanapalle, Chiltoor District for declaration of their exclusive right and title to the estate of one Sreeramulu along with other reliefs. The suit was taken on file on 30-6-1992. The petitioners-plaintiffs have valued the suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction at Rs.78,750/- and a Court fee of Rs.3,026/- was paid on the aggregate of amount under Section 6 of the A.P. Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act. The learned Senior Civil Judge after registering the suit directed summons to be issued to the respondents-defendants. The respondents-defendants having entered their appearance through an advocate filed their written statement opposing the suit filed by the petitioners-plaintiffs.

3. There is no dispute that as on the date of filing of the suit, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Madanapalle had the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In fact, the suit could have been filed only on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge's Court. During the pendency of OS No.151 of 1992 before the learned Senior Civil Judge's Court, Madanapalle, the learned District Judge through the impugned proceedings withdrawn the said suit and transferred the same to the Principal Junior Civil Judge's Court, Madanapalle on the purported ground that the learnedPrincipal Junior Civil Judge, Madanapalle would have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned District Judge obviously appears to have passed such an order in view of the amendments to the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 (for short 'the Act') as amended under Act, 29 of 1997 which was published and came into force on 9-12-1997.

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the amendments to the provisions of the Act as amended by Act 29 of 1997 are prospective in nature and the amended provisions have no application to the suits already instituted and pending on the file of the competent Courts of jurisdiction. The law as on the date of filing of the suit would govern until the disposal of the suit. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would place reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in K. Ham Gopal v. Venkata Ratna Kumar, : 1993(1)ALT482 . The principle laid down by the Court in the said decision is that the amendments to the provisions of the Act are not retrospective in their nature and equally be applicable to the amended Act under which the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif Court is enhanced from that of Rs.50,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-. As on the date of filing of the suit, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Madanapalle alone had the pecuniary jurisdiction to receive and try the suit. The learned Senior Civil Judge alone can try the suit since as on the date of filing of the suit, the said Court alone had the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The provisions of the Act as in force on the date of institution of the suit, shall continue to apply in respect of such suits instituted until their final determination. In the circumstances, the proceedings of the learned District Judge withdrawing and transferring the suit to the Court of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge is set aside. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Madanapalle shall forthwith transmit the recordrelating to OS No.413 of 1998 to the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Madanapalle for trial and disposal in accordance with law.

5. Having regard to the importance of question, I have requested Sri C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court to assist the Court in the matter. Learned Standing Counsel also submitted that the decision of the Division Bench and the principles laid down therein would be applicable to the facts on hand. Learned Standing Counsel also submitted that the amended provisions of the Act as amended by Act 29 of 1997 are not retrospective in nature but prospective.

6. The civil revision petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.